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Abstract
In the broadest sense this  work is  concerned with processes of cultural construction in the 
contemporary city, and their connections to the framing, recording and concrete 
manifestation of society and its  ills. Acknowledging the academy to be a productive site in 
this  regard this  thesis  takes  a somewhat meta-theoretical approach, engaging with 
dominant analyses  of urban problems and the methodological approaches they entail. My 
specific focus  is  on understandings of time and modes  of temporality – crucial factors  in 
the organisation of urban society but which appear largely naturalised in both everyday life 
and the academy. Attempting to uncover some of the ways in which the socially 
constructed nature of time has become invisible in these contexts, my aim in this work is to 
recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of urban culture and the 
organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed future study. Beyond that, this  work 
seeks to establish this  case as  an impetus for the examination of other absences in urban 
knowledge production, and a renewed urban imagination. To this  end I have designed a 
methodological approach of autoethnographic rhizoanalysis. I have rhizomatically 
analysed the urban studies canon for the (non)presence of time and temporality within its 
dominant texts, practices, performances  and methods; and I have performed everyday and 
experimental autoethnography, as  I have continued to make sense of time and temporality 
as  a member of both the contemporary culture that experiences time as  naturalised, and 
the academic culture which seeks  to construct knowledge of the city. Along the way this 
work has also engaged with the craft of academic work, as I have worked to uncover some 
of the everyday assumptions and practices which may serve to maintain and strengthen 
hegemonic ideas of the nature of time, temporality and truth. As a counter to the ways in 
which existing approaches may limit rather than expand urban imaginations  I have made a 
hand-embroidered, patchwork quilt to accompany this  written thesis. This object allows for 
an alternative way of experiencing and performing this work as it  relates to processes of 
knowledge production and cultural construction, of  and in the contemporary city.
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Preface
IN AND OF TIME
It is  Friday the 1st of March, 2013. Today, as  I leave my flat and walk to the train station on 
Albert Drive to get the 10:24AM to Glasgow Central, popping into my local shop to make 
change on the way, I am suddenly aware of two things. First, the sobering knowledge that 
I’ve only seven months of funding remaining is  strongly countered by a giddy bemusement 
that I have not felt for a while: I am getting there. From this  present moment I can almost 
touch the future and the prospect of life beyond a PhD. Second, much has  changed since I 
first returned to the University of  Glasgow as a postgraduate student in September, 2008. 
Darnley Road, my regular thoroughfare for the past two and half years, is both indicative 
and illustrative of such shifts. To my right I see the now almost completed Sing Sabha 
Glasgow Central Gurdwara. This  time last year I’d listen to the rhythmic pounding of 
construction machines  preparing the ground, marking time as I sat at my desk. Back then 
there was no gold dome to reveal the intended evolution of the site, only a Glasgow City 
Council issued planning permit, fixed to a lamppost between the train station and the 
Tramway Theatre. A single sheet of A4 paper that spoke more of a need to materialise 
bureaucratic process in the concrete form of the city than the fact that this was to be the 
first purpose built Sikh temple in Scotland, some twenty-odd years in the planning. In 
contrast, Darnley Road as it appears  on my left hasn’t changed that much at all. The bus 
stop at the top of the street remains not in use and an unknown white powder continues  to 
coat the pavement outside the electrical supplier, tracing the movements  of visitors  to and 
from its  premises, and up the street. But whilst visually this  side has remained stagnant I am 
reminded of other changes  when I leave the shop, water in hand, change in purse, and 
approach the Italian restaurant at the corner of Melville Street. Two years ago Roma Mia 
was  just somewhere I kept meaning to try. Now, it’s a place where I’ve exchanged stories with 
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friends  over meals, celebrated special occasions with family and learned that I share my 
surname with the owner’s  wife – connections which elicit a courteous nod between myself 
and the owner today, as is often the case. But my overriding sense of where Darnley Road 
and Melville Street meet returns me to last January, when police lined the surrounding 
streets  throughout that month and national newspaper headlines shared and rotated the 
terms: racial, attack, alleged, youths, white, Asian, Muslim and Irish. It is  these words and 
their connotations that remain etched in my mind, hinting, just as they did in print, at the 
politicking involved in telling the story of  a man’s murder, and telling it right. 
As I turn right onto Albert Drive, nearing the station, my thoughts turn to changes to my 
inner realm, specifically as they relate to the trajectory of my research problem. I 
commenced this  PhD already concerned with how processes of cultural construction in the 
contemporary city connected to the ordering of society and its ills, already armed with the 
foresight that space was the prevalent lens for engaging such concerns in the disciplinary 
traditions  of urban studies. Gradually a more distinct focus developed: time was initially 
elevated as a culturally contingent feature worthy of attention; the extent to which time 
appeared as  a largely naturalised thing in the contemporary city was subsequently revealed. 
But as  I embarked to feel out the parameters for my positive engagement in such issues  I 
instead found a cornucopia of gaps, cracks, aporias  and Others, leaving in their eventual 
wake a three-tiered research problem that today I state as follows:
1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
Just as on Darnley Road, the expansion of an initial focus on the city and difference to the 
development of the multifaceted problem above includes points that are marked on my 
material and mental landscape. On Tuesday the 12th of October, 2010, nine days  prior to 
my first ever meeting with my PhD supervisors, the question what about time? became etched 
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in my thoughts as  vivid as it was scrolled over and over again in my notebook entries that 
day. Just as memorable is  the knot in my stomach as I nervously typed, deleted and typed 
again point three of the research problem above onto my powerpoint slides the night 
before my First Year Review presentation, simultaneously admitting for the first time the 
disciplinary and institutional dimensions  of my problem, and my fear of speaking them 
aloud to my peers and betters. But while I remain cognisant of these moments the majority 
of shifts are more subtle, and I find it impossible to untangle the ways  in which the ideas 
above have entered dialogue with each other, and the city underfoot, weaving together 
across  the days, months and years to produce the research problem above. Nor can I 
expound in full the ways in which my research problem came to include as  its  concerns 
institutional and non-institutional dimensions  of ethics; the promise of rhizomatic thinking 
for critical thought; and the craft of academic work. Or how it led me to explore non-
standard methods and alternative mediums to convey this work, resulting in my making of 
a hand-embroidered, patchwork quilt as  companion to this text. In many ways I am no 
more privy to the origin and order of these things than the passerby who perhaps  sees and 
wonders why I nod to the Italian restauranteur. 
As I reach Pollokshields East Train Station I am confronted by my journeys up and down the 
steps to the platform. Just like the development of my research problem some are clear or 
at least seem clear. Nonetheless, such clarities  are forcibly overridden by my sense that any 
attempt at order would be both artificial and detract from their cumulative, non-linear 
nature. The city and my relations to it are remade anew with each encounter. And 
suddenly, keenly, I am aware of the extent to which time – a principal subject of my work 
and the necessary condition through which I experience and write my thesis  – flanks  me on 
all sides. The question of how to represent the development of difference, the city and time 
as  a research focus through time has sat with me for a while now. No easy solution avails. To 
frame the work solely in the terms in which it was first conceived would be unable to 
capture the iterative driving force which revealed its  multifaceted form above. Reporting on 
it as  an end-point would be similarly ineffective, missing the nuanced ways  in which my 
understanding of time has been inextricably bound with my experience of time across  this 
project, and vice versa. Each and every has changed.
Departing the train at Glasgow Central – checking the time, checking myself for checking the 
time – I think back to my most recent supervision meeting only two days ago, where the 
PREFACE
3
substantive item of discussion was  my latest findings chapter. The meeting went well and 
my supervisors agreed that now was  a good point to draw a line under work completed; to 
go back to the start and bring it all together. I’ve little doubt that it was  this which 
precipitated the giddy bemusement I noted at the start of this  Preface, if only then to 
channel such carefree thoughts  of the future towards concern over how I reach it. As I 
mentally run through my monthly submissions I reflect again on all that has  changed in the 
past four years  to shape my understanding, my approach, my productions. But going back to 
the start I realise that I am no longer witness to the development of a problem but to the 
development of my imagination in relation to it. I remember that this  is  a thesis about time, 
the city and the people who live there; that my central concern was and remains  the 
cultural norms  which exclude and Other those whose use and experience of time fall out 
with normative city logics. I remember that my desire to capture the ways in which 
processes of urban cultural construction leant to the development of material and mental 
biases against those who don’t fit with dominant modes, motivated an opening of my mind 
and a questioning of what those processes were. It was  here that my immersion in such 
concerns revealed culture in a multitude of processes that weren’t countable or knowable all 
at once, nor at all. As I delved deeper, leaving behind the certainty of what was known, I all 
too clearly saw myself, my colleagues  and the work of urban studies  as we researched, 
wrote and constructed the city through our work. I recognised the productive capacity of 
ideas to shape the reality of what is, and the potential role for imagination either to 
legitimate existing understandings  or to expand horizons  towards that which could not be 
thought. And it was this  that precipitated a final shift to consider that time is  not the only 
conceptual victim but that the ways in which knowledge is  constructed within the academy 
can lead to a narrowing of imagination and of ideas. No longer could I be satisfied that the 
naturalisation of time in the city could be separated from the temporal modes of the 
academy, nor could I be assured that the tools  on offer were suitably orientated to my 
concerns. I’d glimpsed the (im)possible, and those things seen, that which was  imagined, 
could not be undone.
As I move beyond the limits of Glasgow Central I realise that it is not changes to the city nor 
the research problem which drove this thesis  onwards, but changes that have occurred 
within my imagination. It is  my imagination which has helped me make sense of the 
uncertain and unknown aspects of this  work. It is  my imagination that has positioned them 
not as  gaps  to be filled but omissions  to be questioned. It is  my imagination that now 
IN AND OF TIME
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recognises  these as central and necessary to the progressing endeavour. My journey towards 
and across  these shifts has  not been linear nor fully knowable by any means. Every change 
is bound up with others; each is part of both larger and smaller transformations. But these 
are transformations  which nonetheless provide partial coordinates from which to orientate 
myself, and which therefore hold a similar promise for the production of my work within 
this thesis.
* * *
Difference, the city and time have long served together as the primary connections, the 
anchors  I’ve used to delve deeper and collect the other threads in this  thesis. As I’ve delved, 
the certainty of even these primary connections have themselves been drawn in from the 
periphery. This has  forced me to face tensions, exclusions  and processes  of Othering where 
it was difficult and uncomfortable to do so. But in the aftermath, I have been freed to 
imagine alternatives. I have written this thesis so as to reflect these processes and their 
productions, and the document you hold is accordingly structured to capture the 
development and transformation of my imagination in relation to three intersecting tiers: 
my research problem, my research approach, and my understanding of difference, the city 
and time. To give a brief  overview of  how this unfolds:
‣ Chapters One, Two and Three move between various bodies of literature on the 
city and time as  I encountered them, presenting them not as  reviews  of existing 
knowledge but as  constitutive elements  of the journey through which my 
imagination of  the problem developed. 
‣ In Chapters Four, Five and Six, I discuss matters of a methodological nature. 
The narrative once again tracks  alongside my imagination as  I discuss  the 
methodological concerns  which have arisen as  I’ve continually questioned the 
dimensions  of my research problem. I detail here my methodological approaches  of 
autoethnography and rhizoanalysis, and embed these within discussions  of social 
justice, ontological politics and performance. 
‣ Having reported on the productions of my method in Chapters Seven, Eight 
and Nine, Chapter Ten discusses  the potential returns of that insight for this 
project. Chapter Eleven then draws  conclusion to the concretisation of my 
journey in this thesis.
In addition, there are two points which pertain to the content and orientation of those 
discussions described above which are helpful to be aware of  in advance of  their reading:
PREFACE
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‣ Chapters Two and Three look upon literature on time not for review but as  a 
research resource in its  own right. That is, they seek the literature not as  support for 
but to do the work of the PhD. In addition to the extensive research activities  of 
reading, synthesising and analysing this  literature, these chapters  draw on primary 
research generated through autoethnography, a method I’ve pursued since the first 
year of this  work. There is  a dedicated discussion of autoethnography in Chapter 
Five.
‣ The quilt mentioned is  a separate but very much connected feature of this  thesis. 
It is  constructed from thirty-six squares  of fabric, each one hand embroidered with 
a text excerpt from a non-academic source. Each is  unique but all are linked across 
a myriad of registers. Both outputs – the thesis  document and this  alternative form 
– combine to reveal the incompleteness  of the other and in doing so argue for the 
need to make visible that which cannot be said within existing parameters. There is 
a more detailed discussion of  this in Chapter Six.
Across three tiers and in this  way, that is  how I’ve chosen to write of time in time. On the 
face of it, these particular transformations might simply appear as the conventional 
moments of narrative that guide the reader of any thesis, journeying from literature to 
method, and onto a discussion of findings original. However, within this thesis, within each 
of these transformations, there are many more shifts  and their combined effect is one 
which serves to disrupt that presumed linearity of thesis-making. My hope, therefore, is that 
this presentation in this thesis enables  me to capture difference, the city and time in ways 
that support the need to imagine the temporal possibilities  of the city anew. Thus to speak 
of  these connections, and in doing so establish many more, is all that remains.
IN AND OF TIME
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I
LOOKING TO THE LITERATURE 
(LOOKING TO THE SELF)
Chapter One
DIFFERENCE, THE CITY AND TIME
What About Time?
It is  a simple question that sits at the heart of this  work: what about time? In this  thesis  it is 
aimed at the literature of urban studies, the inner workings  of the contemporary academy, 
and directed towards everyday life in general. But as  it first came to my mind in the 
Autumn of 2008, it was a more inward retort, prompted by an experience that was  not 
directly mine. At that time I was a student, studying for a Masters in Public Policy, 
observing at home from the comfort of my sofa. It was Toby Ziegler who had a place at the 
table. Toby was  the White House Communications  Director and special advisor to the 
President of the United States of America – a fictional character in a television show about 
the daily grind of modern policy making and politics at America’s highest office, The West 
Wing. In the episode Toby and his White House colleagues were hosting a summit to 
investigate the cost and availability of AIDS medication to African nations beset by the 
epidemic1. 
Via my television screen I’d been privy to many such occasions, with most following a 
similar trajectory. Proponents would outline a problem, make a case for action, perhaps 
offer a possible solution. Their respondents  would then query such premises, or at very 
least temper their case and make a counter offer of realistic action. A tussle of words would 
ensue, playing out over one, two, maybe three scenes. Until eventually, hesitant nods would 
be issued from relevant authorities, each side marking their respective concessions; 
recording their partial wins  nonetheless. Only that was rarely the end of it. As Toby Ziegler 
– more incisive and critical, more jaded and stubborn than the others – would invariably 
point to the flawed logic: why things  wouldn’t work, why deals  couldn’t be done. Hard 
silences would follow, along with the scratching of heads, the rubbing of temples, the 
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stretching of arms, and so on. Scenes would fade to black and other stories told. And while 
battles  were at times revisited in later acts, equally often they were unconcluded, the spoils 
and scars unbeknownst to both characters and viewers alike. 
I’d found that my nightly viewing of The West Wing provided an unexpected antidote to the 
abstractions of policy I was  studying by day. In lectures I learned of a policy process that 
cycled from the definition of problems, to the setting of agendas, and onwards  to the 
development, implementation and evaluation of policies. In class we discussed that any 
such cycle was linked to another, that of politics. We considered the challenges that may be 
encountered where a policy was  actualised in the real world; heard testimonies from 
insiders to various policy fields who recounted their experiences, at times  to very personal 
affect. But rehearsed dry in lecture theatres and tutorial rooms, it never came close to 
capturing the ever ongoing, playing-out of policy making in every direction and all at once. 
The West Wing was of course a fictional account, developed from a fixed geographical and 
historical context, and specifically tuned to the sensibilities of its prime-time American 
audience. Nonetheless, it pointed to things uncollected in abstract models, unsaid by those 
who had experienced life on both sides of the polity. The intractability of problems faced; 
the directing of evidence towards  pre-conceived ends; abuses of power at every level; 
incalculable dimensions of bureaucracy. Each of these less  than palatable aspects of policy 
making which often sat just out of sight were front and centre in The West Wing. It was, 
however, the more personal presentations which for me revealed something previously 
unseen and unimagined. Apathy, indifference and fatigue which followed optimistic and 
pessimistic characters  alike; self-imposed gags  and inter-personal policing methods which 
accompanied even the most moral of pretenders; self-destructive behaviours  adopted to 
make bearable a life full of concessions. In these traits, and for the first time, I recognised 
policy making not just as  an external struggle for resources, leverage and the privilege of a 
speaking position, but as  an internal battle that established itself firmly in the everyday and 
in the individual.
Twenty-six episodes in to the seven-season series, and I was  witnessing these personal 
presentations not just on screen but within my own mind. As I sat and watched, a growing 
orchestration of mitigations and excuses filled my head: at least they tried, that could have been 
much worse, given the circumstances, their hands were tied, etc. Yet in this  episode, the one in which 
they turned to address the AIDS crisis  in Africa, there was  a more buoyant air of potential 
DIFFERENCE, THE CITY AND TIME
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to the proceedings. It was  the third act of the episode, the fourth day of the summit, and 
they were still talking. Toby sat at the table alongside Josh Lyman, the White House Deputy 
Chief of Staff. President Nimbala of the fictional sub-saharan nation of Equatorial 
Kundu, the proponent, was present with only a translator by his  side. Directly across  sat 
Alan Damson, CEO of a pharmaceutical giant, and his entourage of aides and 
spokespeople. They, and representatives from a number of other drug companies, 
responded collectively to the gentleman from Africa. 
Many issues surrounding the supply of AIDS medication to Nimbala’s country had been 
brought into focus earlier in the episode. For example, Nimbala raised concern that it was 
far cheaper for Norway to purchase the drugs  than African countries. Damson lamented 
that black market trade to Africa was  in violation of patents held by the pharmaceutical 
companies. Toby pointed to the disincentives of action, forcing others  to grudgingly 
concede that it was more profitable to treat a white man’s  erectile disfunction than it was to 
cure a black person of AIDS. And Josh, away from the activity of the meeting room, 
quietly cautioned the already self-righteous Toby to get “out of their face” given that “the 
pharmaceutical companies  got half the House of Representatives  elected”. The breadth of 
issues  was  as vast as it was complex, but as each was heard and debated over the course of 
the episode the impression was that though they were compounded, they were not 
insurmountable. This sense that something might for once be achieved continued to build, 
right up until the following dialogue ensued:
ALAN DAMSON: I think there’s a more fundamental problem than marginal costs. We’ve 
been at this  for four days  and I still think we haven’t talked about the fundamental 
misunderstanding in Africa over the basic facts of  AIDS.
TRANSLATOR [NIMBALA]: I don’t think there’s a misunderstanding.
ALAN DAMSON: A week ago you people stood up and said that AIDS has  only a casual 
relationship to HIV.
TRANSLATOR [NIMBALA]: I’m not sure to whom you are referring when you say, ‘you 
people’, but it was  President Mbeki of South Africa who said that, and not anyone in 
this room.
SPOKESMAN 2: I think Mr. Damson has brought up a hard truth that should faced.
JOSH: What’s that?
ALAN DAMSON: If tomorrow we made AIDS medication free to every patient in your 
country, as much as  they needed for as long as  they needed it, it would likely make very 
little difference in the spread of  the epidemic.
CHAPTER ONE
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JOSH: Why?
SPOKESMAN 2: Anti-HIV drugs  are a triple cocktail. It’s  a complicated regimen that 
requires  ten pills  to be taken every day at precise times. Two protease inhibitors  every 
eight hours, two combination RTI pills every twelve hours.
JOSH: What’s the problem?
There is a silence. Toby sighs.
TOBY: They don’t own wristwatches. They can’t tell time.
Josh rubs his temples, looking tired. There is another silence.
For the rest of the episode I remained with the silence in that room – held back, shocked, 
dumbfounded. I’d grown to recognise, even expect the so-called barriers  to policy: money, 
political will, (dis)incentives, existing legislation, discrimination, relationships, to name a 
few. Such things were tangible, contested and constructed, and were very much active and 
changeable sites of interpretation in that regard. But time – the self-evident backdrop of 
existence, the fundamental nature through which life is  lived – how could this  be blamed 
for the inability to act? How could this be named as the excuse to deny longevity to those with no other 
recourse? 
I made half grasps  to process both the sensibility of what I’d witnessed and my reactions to 
it but was only after the credits rolled and I moved from the relative comfort of my viewer’s 
position, that Toby’s  comment returned to strike a blow of a more personal and telling 
nature: how could I not have anticipated this would be an issue? How could I have assumed 
a self-evident nature of time? I suddenly remembered the internal sites  at which policy 
making took place and my initial reactions were now closely accompanied with alarm and 
ire towards my own complacency; concern over what it suggested of my potential 
complicity. Such thoughts  lingered for some time, appending themselves  to my questions, 
undermining that which I thought I knew, and all the while I thought to myself what about 
time? Until eventually, perhaps  not knowing what to do with it, I must have put it away 
again.
* * *
Almost two years on and my one year of postgraduate study had turned to a prospective 
five. I’d completed my first Masters and was  now nearing the end of a second, this time an 
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MRes  in Public Policy, purposefully leading to a PhD in Urban Studies. From policy to the 
urban, my academic interests had undergone a similar shift. My attention was now focused 
on the ways in which cultural norms  were produced in and through the very fabric of the 
city, and the means by which such norms could order difference and exclude those whose 
ways of life fell out with dominant urban logics. Policy remained a part of this, but its 
relevance was not contained in its  reactive, problem-solving dimensions. Rather, it was  its 
productive capacity for shaping the urban form and population to specific cultural ends 
through the naming of problems  and the framing of viable solutions, that garnered my 
attention. There of course remained very real ills  to be counted in the modern city. But I 
recognised these as no longer confined to the epidemic, catastrophic and apocalyptic 
scenarios  which legitimated policy intervention. Instead, I was  drawn to issues  anchored in 
the everyday experiences  of ordinary people as  they made their ways  and lived their lives  in 
urban quarters. It was here that encounters between the city and difference were 
happening all the time, and where I found it most prudent to ask who the city worked for 
and who it worked against.
My finding of this  focus  was in no way immediate but emerged slowly as I grew more and 
more familiar with the field of urban studies. Via the fictional worlds  of literature and film, 
my mind had been previously exposed to the dark and desperate faces of city living. From 
Victorian-era depictions of overcrowding, abject poverty, dispossession, and squalor found 
coursing through the works of Charles Dickens and Victor Hugo. To the terror of 
dystopian futures plagued by bureaucracy, class  division, totalitarianism, censorship and 
genetic engineering – imagined in the novels of Yevgeny Zamyatin and Ray Bradbury; 
made manifest in the films  of Fritz Lang and Terry Gilliam2. Questions regarding the 
forms  and natures of urban ills  were long etched in to my curiosity. As I embarked to 
engage with academic discussions I found the non-fictional accounts of urban studies to be 
borne of similar concerns. They included, but were in no way limited to, “catastrophic 
proportions” of inner-city poverty, welfare dependancy, teenage pregnancy and serious 
crimes in William Julius Wilson (1987: 3). The devolution of public life, repression of 
feelings  and “resigned acquiescence” in Richard Sennett (1974: 3). The maintenance of 
injustice through “elitism, exclusion, prejudice, greed and despair” in Danny Dorling 
(2010). The displacement of “minorities, working people, the poor and homeless” in Neil 
Smith (1996: ii). And even those darkest faces of urban living which were perhaps  more 
comfortably held in fiction, or at very least consigned to an earlier, less advanced stage of 
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city dwelling, were revealed a contemporary and growing concern in Mike Davis’ text with 
the all revealing title: Planet of  Slums (2006).
It was beyond its depiction of urban ills, however, that the academic literature had its  most 
salient role to play. No doubt buoyed by the same sense which led the World Health 
Organisation to project seventy per cent of the world’s  population as  city dwellers by the 
year 2050 (WHO, 2010), its  description extended to explanation, its critique to 
prescription. This  seeming inevitability of urban futures  also secured a place for more 
positive associations to be found. Post-industrial shifts towards a knowledge-based 
economic order, the benefits of regeneration, the rise of the creative class  and the creative 
city, and the value of urban clustering, for example, each drew a vast commentary across 
journal articles, dedicated monographs, conference streams and edited collections. But still, 
it was  engagement with the urban problem that for me emerged as  the most compelling 
avenue, and I found much to reflect on in the connections David Harvey drew between 
social justice and the geography of the city (1973); the correlation Georg Simmel imagined 
between city living and poor mental wellbeing (1903/1995); and the explanations Sharon 
Zukin gave as to how the post-industrial city, and its people, had been aggressively reshaped 
through processes of  deindustrialisation, gentrification and immigration (1995).
With my familiarity of the urban literature growing I was starting to see my own city, 
Glasgow, in very different ways. I found myself with a new language to describe my 
experiences, different models  to weight my observations against. Progressively, the city 
became not just somewhere I lived in or moved through, but a conceptual puzzle with 
boundless pieces and orientations. As I mulled these over in my mind, in person I was 
motivated to visit areas un-trapped in the webs of my daily, weekly and monthly routines. I 
drove by different streets, walked by different routes, and did so even when there was no 
ordained destination. As I slowly filled in the fragments of my urban reality with those that 
had previously been hidden to me I again found the urban literature crucial in helping me 
make sense and extend the meaning of what I’d witnessed. This  experience of seeing 
different parts  of the city whilst seeing the city differently, shaped my urban imagination in 
a couple of  defining ways.
First, as I started to move more purposefully around the city I began to better appreciate 
the ways  in which inequality was  constituted. Previously I’d informed myself with headline 
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grabbing statistics designed to illustrate the Glasgow effect 3: premature deaths were more than 
30% higher in Glasgow than in the comparable cities  of Liverpool and Manchester (Walsh, 
et al., 2010: 8); life expectancy was almost eleven years shorter for men living in the most 
deprived areas of the city compared to their less  deprived counterparts (Audit Scotland, 
2012: 2); 57% of children were living in poverty in the most deprived deciles compared to 
6% in the least deprived (SIMD, 2009). It was, however, only when I left behind my city and 
ventured to encounter the Glasgow of Other realities, that I came to recognise the 
actualities  of such polarised fates. A familiar walk from the leafy serenity of Pollokshields 
West into the hustle and bustle of Govanhill, for example, revealed difference across  many 
registers. Between both points I found a sensory mix of sights, smells and sounds that did 
not so much confirm the truth of the quantitative descriptors, but rather reveal them a 
sanitised record of the stark inequalities  faced by those living only two miles from 
Glasgow’s much celebrated Garden Suburb (Pollokshields Heritage, 2012). However, this 
walk, and others like it, also revealed a quality of difference that couldn’t rightly be 
categorised as  negative: it was  not simply deprivation that was brought to the fore, but ways 
of life and ways of being with Others that were quite unlike the urban logics which 
dominated.
Second, as my journeys through both the literature and the city intensified, so too did my 
appreciation of the nature of urban ills. The academic literature told at great lengths of 
the multi-faceted (Paddison, 2001), complicated (Harvey, 1973), complex (Healey, 2007), 
even wicked nature (Rittel and Webber, 1973) of the urban site and its  problems. It was only 
as  I read more and seen more, however, that I truly recognised the substance of such 
descriptions. I became increasingly aware of a profound intermingling between the likes of 
poverty, unemployment and depression; apathy, drug misuse and anxiety. In any given 
scenario, at any given time, any problem could be cast as antecedent to another. Job loss 
might engender poverty, but impoverished living could lead to insufficient employability 
skills. Alcohol dependancy might prompt a turn towards  criminal methods  of money 
making, whilst immersion in a life of crime might lead one to congregate in circles of drug 
misuse. No one thing would necessarily serve to disentangle a primary cause of the troubles 
nor a true concern from that which was effected by it. No problem was  discrete. This 
intractability not only brought to life the complexity and fluidity of the urban sphere, but 
even more significantly, it hinted that the problems of the city and the ills of urban living 
were manifestations of  much deeper things at play. 
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With my experience of the city continuing to build alongside my reading of the literature, 
the constitution of difference and the sense that there was something deeper at play where 
urban problems presented remained equally prominent to my concerns. Together, they 
drew my attention to sites at which difference was  visible in everyday urban life and 
processes whereby it was mediated and ordered through it. Here I felt it might be possible 
to discern not simply the ills  of city living, but places where norms of culture came face to 
face with alternative expressions, and where power, order and exclusion sat side by side. I 
had many questions  to pose at such sites: how does difference play out?, I wondered. How does it 
hold steady? Who benefits from the ordering of difference and who struggles? As I worked to hone 
these questions  and locate their possible targets  I found precedent for such inquires within 
urban traditions, with culture marked a privileged concern in some of discipline’s  most 
foundational texts  (Simmel, 1903/1995; Mumford, 1938; Wirth, 1938; and Benjamin, 
1999). Quite in-keeping with the cultural turn which took the social sciences  more generally 
from the 1950s onwards, the promise of culture as a means to understand the social was 
immediately discernible from the array of lenses  urban studies  made available to itself – 
whereby it could hold difference still for just long enough to see its  effects. Social class 
remained a key dimension here, but the likes  of race, gender, and sexuality were also 
cemented as important and legitimate registers in the seminal texts  of Wilson (1978), 
Gillian Rose (1993) and David Bell and Gill Valentine (1995), amongst others. The notion 
of a culturally heterogenous urban sphere in which people benefited or suffered as a result 
of how their ways of life sat with the city’s prevailing norms quite simply appeared to go 
without saying in urban studies. 
It was, however, as I considered how to ask questions of difference more generally – 
questions  which were not tied a single lens but which spoke across  the already legitimate 
and those yet unspoken dimensions of difference – that I began to appreciate something 
even more relevant to my concerns; something even more telling of the character of urban 
scholarship. While the cultural turn might have fixed difference within the urban studies’ 
epistemology it was the spatial turn which called to prominence the site via which difference 
was  ordered and contained. Its catalyst placed by many in the work of French philosopher, 
Henri Lefebvre (Massey, 1992), the spatial turn of the 1990s saw both a reconceptualisation 
of space, and a reconceptualisation of urban questions. Objecting to its previously reified 
nature in urban theory, Lefebvre insisted that space was  a product that was  materially 
produced whilst simultaneously operating “on processes from which it cannot separate itself 
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because it is a product of them” (1991: 66). No longer was  space presented as  a vacant 
stage on which social life played out, it was active – constitutive of and constituted by the 
activity. Furthermore, noting that the processes of spatial production were based upon 
values which led to the social production of meaning, Lefebvre argued, in line with 
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony, that the production and codification of 
space was commanded by the dominant class as a tool to reproduce its dominance.
The spatial turn ensured that its  disarmingly simple thesis – that urban space involved the 
production and reproduction of all aspects of urban life – would transform the way in 
which urban studies dealt with culture and society. It became theoretically commonplace to 
acknowledge that conceptualisations  of space were not power-neutral, but generative of 
effects  and inequities (Harvey, 1973, 1992; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996, 2010). And in terms 
of its  empirical development, the discipline witnessed the further evolution of geographical 
frameworks  for analysing trajectories, thresholds, spatial nodes, and other elements  of 
space, both real and imagined (Vuolteenaho, et al., 2012). But by the time I’d encountered 
the urban studies literature, so seemingly complete was the turn that I admittedly failed to 
discern its  spatialising tendencies  in my earliest readings. Quickly, however, I came to 
appreciate both its  reach and potential, and I found its  effect on my own work to be 
similarly pronounced. 
Continuing my journeys  with a spatial gaze, I increasingly recognised the city not as 
planned but as  produced and productive. The concrete forms of car parks and office 
blocks, wooden fences and video entry systems, merged with their users  and non-users 
alike, marking out the sensibility of urban life. The public nature of Queen’s Park lent itself 
to the mingling of difference and increased the probability of chance encounters. The tee-
off times at Cawder Golf Course guaranteed its  private members  adequate distance from one 
another, whilst its  dress rules ensured their visual homogeneity. The M8 motorway cut its 
path through Glasgow’s city centre, elevating car users’ easy access from the north to the 
south, downgrading pedestrians to alternative routes. And the shop lined, pedestrianised 
zones  of Sauchiehall, Buchanan and Argyle Street turned shoppers’ eyes  away from the 
River Clyde and Glasgow’s  maritime history, towards a new economy of consumption. 
Density and distance, proximity and barriers, the fabric of the city enabled certain 
groupings to come together with ease whilst preventing other connections from forming. It 
allowed some behaviours  to be praised, others  to be sanctioned, a few to pass  unseen, the 
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rest deemed problematic. Variable categories and degrees  of difference were permitted at 
various  sites, but always  dealt with and always ordered. And across all of these facets  the 
dominant productions  of space embedded themselves  in everyday life, reinforcing the 
norms to which their users were tested. 
Within this hegemony I came to recognise Lefebvre’s  stance that urban space wasn’t just 
the place where political struggles  happened, rather, it was the seat of those struggles. 
Arguments over the location of airport runways, golf courses  or off-shore wind farms, for 
example, were not simply turf wars. But with space the vehicle through which a culture 
developed, built and sustained itself, each was a “trial by space” (1991: 416); an attempt to 
promote certain usages into wider consciousness, and with them, the ways of life from which 
they were imagined. These turf wars were ontological battles over that which got counted as 
real and that which was to be dismissed as fanciful or illegitimate. As Lefebvre had it, “the 
production of space – has nothing incidental about it: it is  a matter of life and death” (417). 
And for my own interests, I realised that no longer could I hold the ordering of difference 
and the ills of modern urban living “on the head of a pin, in a spaceless, geographically 
undifferentiated world” (Massey, 1984: 4). I had to pose them of the production of space 
itself.
* * *
In the earliest days  of my PhD there was  a point at which I thought back to my watching of 
episode twenty-six of The West Wing, and where the experience became caught-up with a 
meaning that had previously escaped me. I couldn’t say with certainty the exact 
circumstances of clarification but I remember working from home, from a makeshift desk 
in my living room. I was making preparations for my first supervision meeting. It happened 
also to be the day that thirty-three Chilean miners  were rescued from seven hundred 
meters below ground, following a mining accident that had left them trapped for sixty-nine 
days. I’d tuned into BBC News with breakfast that morning just as  the eighth of Los 33 was 
brought to the surface, and hadn’t yet the will to turn it off again. So as  I outlined a brief 
of how I planned to take my interests  forward into a three year research project the 
conclusion to the miners’ rescue played on in the background. My attention flitted between 
the two but that wasn’t a problem – it was one of those days where the writing seemed to 
take care of  itself. 
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Over my two years of studying the city I’d grown increasingly confident with how to pose 
questions  of difference and order within the urban context. And with the theoretical 
precedents  of urban studies  very much in mind I proposed, in my first-ever paper for my 
supervisors, that to examine who the city works for and who it works  against, I’d identify 
spaces of conflict and spaces  of agreement. I’d observe how they were used and by whom, 
and study behaviours that were celebrated and those which appeared challenging. I would 
talk to people and with them design ways to track their movements. Then I’d make 
comparative maps  of individual users  across spaces in the city, and maps  which compared 
multiple users  in a single space. Taken together the findings  would let me say something 
meaningful about the ways in which difference was  ordered in and through the city, and 
maybe, just maybe, I’d be able to report on the connections between such processes  and the 
ills of  everyday city life. It was obvious and I was done. 
Satisfied with my progress so far that morning I turned my attention to a pile of 
undergraduate policy essays  sat patiently awaiting their grades, whilst news of the miners’ 
rescue played on in the background. Thirteen men had now made it safely to the surface 
and the rescue capsule was  descending to collect the next in line. The broadcaster rarely 
moved to tell of other news. Instead, pre-recorded segments  connected to the headline 
story were rotated: vigils kept by family members, interviews with technical experts, 
overviews of Chile’s mining industry, and so on. Most frequent of these, however, was a 
segment telling that it was against all odds that these thirty-three men were on the brink of 
their freedoms. It explained how The San José Mine’s notoriously poor safety record and 
limited rescue resources both pointed to a single, inevitable truth: none were likely to have 
survived the initial collapse but if by any slim chance someone had, they would likely starve 
to death before they were ever located. And so, that seventeen days into the crisis  the tip of 
a drill which had made one of just eight intended exploratory boreholes  should carry a 
message from the miners back to the surface was, given the circumstances, nothing short of 
a miracle. An image of the miners’ hand written note was  shown at the climax of the 
segment, it read simply: Estamos bien en el refugio, los 33 / We are well in the shelter, the 33.
It was at some point around the rescue of the fifteenth miner that I turned off the 
television to attend fully to the essays. Despite the quiet I now found myself distracted. I 
moved my workspace to the kitchen table, made a cup of tea, but couldn’t find focus. I 
stopped for lunch, then afterwards  sat on the sofa with the essays  on my lap, but my 
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attention seemed elsewhere. Looking to satisfy myself that I’d achieved something that day 
I turned to proof the research brief I’d written just a few hours prior. It was then I found 
cause for my distraction. The text was  exactly as I’d recalled but no longer did I feel 
satisfaction, I felt unease. I felt concern that it should have been so easy; alarm that it 
should have appeared so obvious  that difference, order and everyday life were tightly tuned 
to the spatial production of the city. And suddenly, there in my mind was Toby Ziegler and 
I recalled my dizzying frustrations from another time. I remembered the ways in which the 
obvious concealed much from sight and where the ascendancy of the self-evident had very 
real consequences  for those who’d experienced it otherwise. Perhaps it would be the deaths 
of those whose suffering from AIDS was deemed inevitable due to the cultural assumptions 
and workings of Western medicine. Maybe it would have been the ultimate perishing of 
thirty-three Chilean miners if economic sense had prevailed and only two exploratory 
boreholes were drilled instead of eight. I moved from the sofa back to my makeshift desk, 
opened my notebook and started to write. And this time the question was entirely mine to 
pose: to urban studies, what about time?
Dimensions of a Research Problem
As I’ve presented it thus far, the question what about time? has  had its  significance in 
recording my alarm at the fixity of time within my own mind, and in my reaction to the 
ubiquity of the spatial turn in urban studies. Those early moments  I’ve recounted, and 
many others like them, while largely rhetorical, have nonetheless had a formative effect on 
this  work. It was these which first led me to pose some precursory questions of a time 
whose nature was  not like the naturalised one I’d supposed. They encouraged me to turn to 
anthropological studies  of the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard, 1940), the Hopi (Whorf, 1956) and 
the Amondawa (Sinha et al., 2011), and through these I began to appreciate times of other 
cultures  which manifested beyond confines of the clock. Furthermore, I began to imagine 
temporal differences  within cultures  that were quite incongruous  with the linear and 
rational norms of time which seemed to dominate the contemporary urban experience. 
Single parents, religious minorities, the terminally ill, the unemployed, children, the 
working poor, those suffering with drug and alcohol addictions, rural and ethnic migrants – 
the list of those who might have known other temporalities was  endless. My early 
experiences  also led me to look more closely to the composition of the urban field. I noted 
in the previous section a sense that difference went without saying in urban studies. Indeed, it 
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was through this condition that issues of justice, power, rights, exclusion, and so on, seemed 
most articulate and meaningful. On closer inspection, however, this  did not stand true for 
time. As  a category of analysis, or a lens  through which to view difference in the city, time 
appeared largely absent4. Its  presence, instead, was  constituted by a form that was 
naturalised, homogenous, fixed and, crucially, unproblematic. That difference should have 
appeared so prevalent pointed not only to the extent to which the field was conceived 
spatially, but suggested also that this proliferation of space was keenly joined by silence as 
far as  time’s heterogeneity was concerned. Finally, these early returns together served to 
reinforce the importance of paying attention to niggles and things  which didn’t sit quite right. 
I’ve continued to do this  ever since, and have grown ever more mindful of where such 
things manifest, mentally and physically. This experience of seeing, being, and feeling my 
way within and beyond an academic field has had a very significant effect on my work, 
shaping not simply the methodological direction of this project, as I will show in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six, but my research practice more broadly. 
It is  beyond these more reflective gains, however, that the question what about time? has come 
to generate a more productive and substantive course for this work. Posed directly to the 
urban field it has served to unearth moments  of time’s naturalisation and absence, and has 
subsequently revealed the potential consequences  wrought through such presentations. 
Sitting across  many layers  but with three interactive dimensions keenly discernible, those 
returns can be summarised as follows:
When the question what about time? is posed to the urban field:
ONE: The inability of urban studies to account for a multiple and complex range of 
realities which shape urban life is revealed;
TWO: the capacity for urban studies  to Other and marginalise those whose differences 
from the norm extend to a temporal register is highlighted; and
THREE: the ability for urban studies  to further engender a naturalised view of time 
within its  academic practice, and extend this  outward to everyday life, is  brought into 
focus. 
Together, these potential consequences  have helped explicate the research problems  with 
which this  work has ultimately found itself involved. Looking to each of these in turn the 
remainder of this section moves to provide a more explicit defence of why the 
naturalisation of time within the urban field is  of consequence, and moreover, why it marks 
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a significant concern where matters of difference, order and everyday urban life are 
concerned. This chapter concludes with an overview of how these consequences, together 
with my ongoing reflections on such matters, have served to develop a research agenda 
capable of  engaging with such concerns.
With regards the sensibility of those consequences summarised above, it is  vital to first 
recognise that when questions regarding the interactions  of difference and the city are 
posed in a temporal way, the urban field itself starts to change. Surprisingly, returning to 
the foundational ideas  which gave rise to urban studies’ spatial development offers  one way 
to appreciate the significance of this change. As outlined in the previous section the move 
to conceive of space not simply in terms of its geometry but in the practices and associated 
meanings which it contains is  placed by many in the work of Henri Lefebvre. In The 
Production of Space (1991) – Lefebvre’s  most frequently cited text by far – he demonstrates 
and supports his  claim by conceptualising space across three layers: representations of space, 
spaces of representation and spatial practices. It is  through this  triad that Lefebvre renders 
intelligible qualities of space that are both perceptible and imperceptible to the senses, and 
rescues it from its status as something absolute and beyond human experience. This space 
that Lefebvre frees from metaphysical absolutism bears  a striking parallel to the qualities, or 
indeed absence of quality, the urban field currently bestows  upon time. With his  spatial 
apparatus also offering a means  to problematise the seemingly unproblematic, I’d argue 
that Lefebvre’s work has the conceptual faculty to similarly bring to the fore the temporal 
dimensions of  difference, order and urban problems pertinent to urban inquiry5. 
To first look more closely, then, to the detail of Lefebvre’s spatial triad. Representations of 
space are those spaces  found in the professional practices  of planners, architects, bureaucrats 
and technocrats. They are the blueprints, models, plans  and designs that are conceived by 
those with the means to actualise them. With their reach and qualities far removed from 
the everyday routines  of their users, these spaces  are instinctively regarded as abstract. 
However, as they find manifest expression in the concrete forms they expound – be it 
“buildings, monuments, works of art” (1991: 33) – these representations of space are objectified 
in and through professional practice, along with the ideologies, power relations and 
knowledge schemes  embedded in their representational form. These spaces, writes 
Lefebvre, “are tied to relations  of production and to the ‘order’ those relations  impose, and 
hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, to ‘frontal’ relations” (33). In contrast, spaces of 
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representation are those spaces directly lived in and which comprise everyday experience. Users 
know these spaces through their idiosyncratic descriptors – from the widely recognised Big 
Ben, to the hyper-contextualised wee red brick house next to Mary’s. Unlike representations of space, 
these spaces are more of feeling than thinking. They are elusive, changeable and as alive as 
those who give meaning to them. As  Lefebvre explains, they “may be qualified in various 
ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, 
fluid and dynamic” (42). Finally, spatial practices give structure to both spaces of representation 
and representations of space, via the routes, networks, patterns  and interactions  that connect 
people to place, and reality with images. With the ordering of difference through everyday 
life at the fore his concerns, Lefebvre notes that such practices link strongly to how 
individuals perceive their world, and in particular its  ordinariness. Arguing that they 
“propound and propose” (38) society’s  space, shaping each other whilst themselves being 
shaped by the process, he reveals their dialectical interaction with space as  it is conceived 
and space as  it is  lived, pointing also to their mediative function in this regard. This  is  not 
to say that this mediation between representations of space and spaces of representation is 
fashioned in an equally unfolding manner. Indeed, Lefebvre stressed a universal 
capitulation to conceived space from that which is  lived, enabling representations of space to 
impregnate and socialise individuals to such an extent that users willingly forego truths 
grounded in their spaces of representation. And where abstract space ultimately denies 
concrete qualitative space – where a consensus  forms  as to what space is – difference is also 
denied, lending itself to those for whom abstract space accords, causing great mental and 
material hardship for those it does not.
Looking again to Lefebvre’s  triad but this time replacing his  spatial layers  with temporal 
designations, helps build a picture of what a temporally aware urban field might look like. 
Representations of time would likely have in its domain clocks, calendars and diaries, those 
things which are not time but which nonetheless  impress  themselves to such an extent 
where they emerge synonymous with it. Times of representation, on the other hand, would be 
time as  it is experienced internally and with Others who share similar modes. It might be 
watched pots  that never boil, ‘Friday feelings’ or lives flashing instantaneously upon the 
news  of incurable disease, but time would be infinitely changeable beyond these 
expressions, as fluid and dynamic as  its users’ experiences. Temporal practices would then refer 
to the everyday use of time through time as it is  objectively represented. Examples might 
include public holidays and religious  events; the practice of working five days  followed by 
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two days  of rest; the celebration of a new year on the first day of January. As with its 
spatial counterpart temporal practices would enact a mediative role here, perhaps  in helping 
the seventh day of the week feel different from the fifth or in garnering a sense of guilt 
where a full-time employee embarks on leisure time at 2:30PM on a work day. And just as 
abstract space denied the existence of qualitative space, abstract time would similarly deny 
qualitative time, and with it the experiences and needs of those who knew and lived by 
different temporalities.
One only has to look at the work of Lefebvre and its paradigmatic march across the urban 
studies’ landscape to glimpse the potential impact of its temporal analogue: theoretically, 
ontologically, empirically, epistemologically – no aspect of the existing field would be 
safeguarded from revision. Just as the spatial turn facilitated an ongoing investigation into the 
effects  and inequities  generated in and through spatial production, so might a temporal 
shift. Just as it saw to the development of new tools and technologies  of research to help it 
see its subject better, inquiries  into a contingent but dominant and power-imbued 
temporality might lead to new methods which isolate the temporal facets of urban living. It 
is  not, however, changes to the urban field that are of greatest consequence here. Rather, it 
is  the potential for different perspectives on urban life to emerge where such a change takes 
place that is most crucial to appreciate. Even from the rudimentary framework I’ve mapped 
onto Lefebvre’s  triad, temporal facets  pertinent to urban living are discernible. Extending 
across  the objects, experiences  and practices of time that comprise everyday urban life, 
questions  might consider how the objects  of time shape the everyday experience of it. They 
might ask after those practices of urban life which seem untenable in the face of time’s 
objective reality. And it is  the potential returns from these inquiries  which start to reveal the 
gravity of posing the question what about time? to the urban field, highlighting more fully the 
potential consequences wrought through time’s silence: 
ONE: Where time is  asked after, a much fuller range of difference is  brought into 
focus. Where it lies  silent and inquiries  follow existing means, the temporal aspects  of 
difference which aren’t visible in space are missed. When this  occurs, an entire realm 
of urban life is  excluded from view, arguably leading to the production of knowledge 
and explanations  of the city which fail to account for the multiple and complex range 
of  realities which comprise contemporary urban existence. 
Immediately the query comes: what can be done about this? How can it be ensured that 
knowledge of the city isn’t as partial in its reach? These are necessary questions. But equally 
DIFFERENCE, THE CITY AND TIME
23
important to note is that the consequences do not end with this  first point. As outlined early 
in this chapter, the activities of urban studies  don’t rest with description and critical 
explanation, but extend to prescription and the imagining of routes  beyond urban 
problems. That the theoretical substance of urban studies  is  not only produced by but is 
itself productive of the realities  it describes, means that attention must extend far beyond 
its explanatory shortcomings to relate to the productions of its  work beyond the academy. 
This fact brings into sharper focus the second consequence of  time’s naturalisation:
TWO: Not only does  a temporal mode of inquiry see different problems, it yields 
different solutions. Where temporal questions  are not posed, answers  are unlikely to 
return temporal findings. And where the utility of the predominantly spatial work of 
urban studies is  examined in regard to the development of the contemporary urban 
environment – when it is  used by policy makers, architects, academics, government 
ministers, planners, etc., to support and/or effect change in the city – only spatial 
problems  are dealt with, and difference and order are met only in a spatial register. Not 
only does  this  do little to help surface the temporal heterogeneity of the city, the 
authority with which academic theory speaks means  that in failing to do so, it in effect 
denies  it. Therefore, by failing to direct the attention of urban actors  to temporal 
heterogeneity and by implicitly obscuring such needs  from view, the discipline itself 
has  a role to play in marginalising and Othering those whose difference to the norm is 
expressed not just spatially but temporally. 
To the most immediate inquiries outlined after point one, comes the even graver concern of 
point two: how can urban inquiry avoid further marginalising and Othering those whose differences to the 
norm manifest not just spatially but temporally? Where the productive capacity of the field as a 
whole is considered, however, I find that another line of inquiry emerges  as much more 
pressing and requisite, namely: what are the conditions and motivations by which the field has emerged 
so partial in the first place? To elaborate further: why is  it that questions of spatial justice are so 
readily posed, but not temporal justice? If space has been thoroughly deconstructed, why 
hasn’t time? Is  there something that secures the prominence of space and prevents the 
inclusion of temporal concerns? What factors might support the dominance of space’s 
contingency alongside time’s naturalisation? Such questions  look not simply to the 
productions of  urban studies beyond the field, but within the field itself.
To reflect briefly on such matters, I find these words of the geographer Doreen Massey 
provide a particularly relevant entry point. Discussing the work of Lefebvre, amongst 
others, she asserts  that “‘[s]pace’ is very much on the agenda these days” (1992: 65)”. This 
simple observation cracks open the possibility that it is something other than the absolute 
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primacy of space which underpins  its  dominance, and perhaps, also, that this something 
might answer for the silencing of temporal concerns. There is  indeed an interesting politics 
surrounding the dominance of space within urban studies, perhaps none more so than the 
manner in which Lefebvre’s  ideas have come to occupy prime position within the field. The 
ascendancy of space as the framework in which to conceive of life in the city does not 
accord with Lefebvre’s initial writings  on the subject but in their later rediscovery. Published 
in French in the 1970s, Lefebvre’s theories of space were not immediately resonant 
(Schmid, 2008: 27). Rather, it was David Harvey in Social Justice in the City (1973) who first 
brought to the fore the centrality of geography for understanding experience in the 
modern city (Butcher, 2011). Moreover, it was  Harvey’s  subsequent reading of Lefebvre’s 
The Production of Space (1991) and, along with likes  of Fredric Jameson (1991), Mark 
Gottdiener (1993) and Edward Soja (1996), his crediting of him for having reinvented 
urbanism, which secured the eventual, albeit unsolicited appointment of Lefebvre to the 
field (Merrifield, 2006: xxxii; Aronowitz, 2007; Butcher, 2011). It should also be noted that 
time was  far from homogenous in Lefebvre’s wider body of work, a point perhaps most 
appreciable in his work Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life (2004). Indeed, 
Lefebvre’s  temporal interests preceded his  spatial analyses of the city, featuring prominently 
in his  writing as early as  the 1920s, and as Stuart Elden reveals in the introduction to his 
2004 translation of  Rhythmanalysis, a focus on time was central to Lefebvre’s work:
the writings on rhythmanalysis  are [...] the attempt to get us 
both to think space and time differently. [...] [In The Production 
of Space] Lefebvre’s  analysis  is  both conceptual [...] and 
historical. The historical dimension is  often neglected in 
contemporary appropriations of Lefebvre’s  work, which is 
seriously to misread him. [...] he was  also involved in a 
lifelong struggle both within and without orthodox Marxism 
to pluralise its understanding of  time and history
Elden, 2004: ix
Nonetheless, when The Production of Space was finally delivered to the anglophone world in 
1991 it cemented the conceptual and spatial tradition of Lefebvre’s  work for urban studies. 
And as Stefan Kipfer, et al. argue, along with the spatial arguments excavated by urban 
scholars in the texts  of Michel Foucault (1967) and Walter Benjamin (2002), Lefebvre’s 
work lent its  considerable weight in securing a privileged slot for space in the analytical 
agendas of  the day (2008).
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It is within this same field that: 
	 	 	 	
	 time 
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 falls 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 silent.
CHAPTER ONE
26
This  emphasis I make is  not to suggest that the dominance of space secures  the absence of 
time de re, nor am I arguing that space and time relate to each other in any straightforward 
or guaranteed causal way. Rather, it  is  to highlight that both are features of the same field, 
each shaped by the field’s activity. And where the productions  of spatial and temporal 
analyses also shape the field – along with the absence of such productions – through it they 
shape each other. Such considerations place attention on the inward productions  of the 
field itself, and it is  indeed within the field that the third and final consequence of the 
absence of  a temporal problematic in urban studies can be most fully appreciated:
THREE: In their ability to capture temporal aspects  of urban difference, temporal 
analyses simultaneously reveal their existence and subsequently bring to the fore time’s 
heterogeneity. Where spatial findings  are overwhelmingly delivered, space extends its 
legitimacy. Where space extends  its  legitimacy and questions of time go increasingly 
unposed and unanswered, time is  further naturalised within the urban literature and 
practices of  urban research. 
Focusing on the ability of an academic field to reproduce itself through its  productions, the 
concern here isn’t simply that the dominance of space is reified, but that with it, so too is 
the naturalisation of time. This  shows  that it is not simply the partiality of the field, 
revealed in the first point, nor its  outward productions, highlighted in point two, that are 
marked issues as far as  time’s  absence is concerned. Indeed, this final point reveals that any 
desire to attend to the shortcomings of urban studies’ explanatory reach, and with it, the 
ill-effects of its productions, are potentially premature where the field itself is  non-
conducive to temporal accounts. As such, the question that emerges most urgently after this 
final point is  what can be done to introduce, secure and elevate the status of temporal accounts within a 
spatially dominated urban field?
The concerns  revealed throughout this  section have each emerged more pressing than the 
last, but all are of necessary importance and no easy indication is  offered as  how best to 
proceed. It is at this  point that it bears  repeating that the potential consequences  unearthed 
by posing the question what about time? to the urban field do not sit apart, nor do their 
productions. Where they interact, each upholds and strengthens another:
Where time is  naturalised in the academic literature, through the same mechanisms  by 
which the work of urban studies  is  made concrete in the city time is  further naturalised 
within everyday life. Where time is  naturalised in everyday life it appears  inevitable 
and unproblematic, and can become easily overlooked as a salient category in 
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academic debates. Where it is  repeatedly overlooked in urban studies  accounts of 
contemporary urban issues  are unable to capture the true complexity of urban life. 
Where accounts  of urban life are partial and unable to capture the heterogeneity of 
time, the naturalisation of time becomes  normative in the academic literature. And 
through this  very same cycle, the naturalisation of time extends  itself outward again, 
casting its logic upon everyday life. 
The interactions supposed above do not elevate the individual urgency of any one 
consequence over another. Rather, they suggest that simultaneously and silently, a place has 
been secured for a normative and naturalised understanding of time both external to and 
within the urban field. And it is with regards  the hegemony of time’s naturalisation which 
sits  across  both these dimensions  that I believe the question what about time? finds its  most 
pregnant expression and important trajectory. It reveals  that for any inquiry to effectively 
engage with the interplay of difference, the city and time, questions must be posed both 
external to and within the urban field, in conjunction. 
Towards a Research Agenda
In a global age where difference has the potential to manifest more variously than ever 
before in urban settings, the processes through which difference is ordered are of great 
concern. In particular, questions looking to who participates  in creating the conditions 
which come to govern the ways of life deemed proper in the city must be addressed, as  must 
the mental and material impacts such standards have on those whose ways differ from the 
norm. Queries of this  type are readily posed within the discipline of urban studies. 
Premised largely on a spatial understanding of the city, however, the theories and solutions 
attached to such inquiries  have a similarly spatial yield and arguably obscure the extent to 
which time and temporality are significant elements in the formation, form and effects  of 
culture. With traditional urban analyses  thus  unable to capture these temporal facets of 
urban life, it bears consideration that work which emerges  from such accounts is partial in 
its reach. A pressing need therefore exists  within the field of urban studies, and arguably in 
the broader academy, to move beyond an overwhelmingly spatial understanding of urban 
issues  and to explore the processes of social and cultural construction via a temporal lens. 
Just as urgent is the need to demonstrate to those who seek utility from urban theory the 
importance of conceptualising urban issues from a temporal perspective. Therefore, the 
first problem with which this work seeks to engage is stated as follows:
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1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
The overwhelmingly spatial conditions of the urban field reveal many areas that would 
mark a significant contribution to knowledge in this  regard. Beyond the explanatory 
shortcomings thus  far described, pertinent areas might extend to and include, for example, 
the phenomenological experience of urban time; the impacts  of temporal technology; the 
routes through which urban time is  constructed; or the social consequences  of particular 
temporalities6. However, as evidenced by the concerns raised in the previous section, the 
explanatory shortcomings of urban studies  don’t arise simply as gaps to filled. That 
temporal concerns have fallen from the agendas of urban inquiry is  not solely an 
intellectual avenue marked as  opportunity in the urban field. Indeed, given urban studies’ 
well developed appreciation of diversity within the urban population, the conditions which 
have allowed such omissions to form in the first place are themselves questionable. 
Recognising this  reveals that it is  not enough to merely highlight the sites  of time’s 
construction, pressing though this  certainly is, but that it is  necessary to look to why such 
concerns have fallen from the urban agenda. Accordingly, the second problem with which 
this work engages is as follows:
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
As suggested by my light engagement with this problem in the previous section, the political 
nature of academic knowledge production is  potentially consequential in such a case. This 
brief look also suggested that the temporal understandings of urban studies were as 
normative and naturalised as their prospective targets. As  such, the third and final problem 
with which this work engages is as follows:
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
This  third and final problem reveals  that in addition to highlighting the temporal 
dimensions of urban problems  and looking to why such concerns  have fallen from the 
urban agenda, it is necessary to consider the ways  in which time can be introduced as a 
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research topic in a field that is dominated by spatial research. As stressed at the end of the 
previous section, where matters of time sit at the intersection of everyday life and urban 
studies attention must be paid across both sites in conjunction.
Taking direction from the research problems described, the main contribution this  work 
seeks to make is  to help imagine a research environment in which questions of difference, 
the city and time can be suitably posed and engaged with. To that effect, the purpose of 
this research is:
‣ To expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and 
temporality as  critical factors  in the formation of urban culture and the 
organisation of  urban society, which warrant detailed future study.
More specifically, this work aims to:
‣ bring to life time’s  social construction, and with it, to highlight sites of its  normative 
function in the contemporary city; 
‣ open up dialogue on the meaning of  time and temporality in the city; 
‣ consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions  which have 
contributed to time’s naturalisation;
‣ help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; and
‣ stress  the need to consider contemporary urban problems  from a temporal 
perspective.
Beyond the scope of this study, and in the longer term, this work aims  to contribute to a 
temporal urban agenda that is  as effective as  it is buoyant. Perhaps the ultimate test of this 
will once again come back to the question with which this chapter opened. Only, rather 
than return a list of sites where time is absent and naturalised, when what about time? is 
posed to the urban field it shall overwhelmingly yield an emphatic content which attests to 
the significance of  time for urban inquiry and its concerns. 
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1 The episode, entitled In this White House, is the fourth episode of  the show’s second season, originally airing 
in 2000.
2 See Dickens (1859/1999); Hugo (1862/1982); Zamyatin (1924/2007); Bradbury (1953/2008); Metropolis 
(1927); Brazil (1985).
3 The Glasgow effect is a widely used term, referring to unexplained poor health and low life expectancy of  
Glaswegians when compared to the rest of  the UK and Europe (see Walsh, et al., 2010).
4 To be very clear, I’m not arguing that time is altogether absent in urban studies. It has a central presence in 
a number of  texts, including Kenneth Lynch’s What Time is this Place (1972) and, crucially, in Lefebvre’s 
Rhythmanalysis (2004); not to mention its constitutive presence in the hybrid terms of  space/time (Harvey, 1989),  
time-geography (Hägerstrand, 1970) and timespace (May and Thrift, 2001). What I am arguing, however, is that 
there is a naturalness presumed of  time, in comparison to space which, after the spatial turn, is more readily 
recognised as produced and productive of  social realities, and, therefore, an important means by which to 
conceptualise difference, social justice, culture, the Other, and so on.
5 This is not to suggest that Lefebvre’s work is the best or only way to examine the city temporally, only that it 
can be used to show what a temporally aware urban field might look for.
6 See Appendix One for the results of  the research mapping exercise which led to the identification of  these 
areas.
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME
Introduction 
A BRIEF NOTE ON METHOD
It might seem a bit strange that I should preempt the literature chapters of this work with a 
discussion of research methods. It would perhaps  be more expected that having outlined 
the problems  with which the work is engaged in Chapter One, I would now proceed with a 
review that embeds  them within the wider disciplinary literature; allowing me to 
unequivocally identify and name the gap this  work intends to fill. Only then would my 
attention turn to my research, actioned largely through the presentation and defence of my 
chosen methodological approach. While this pattern of thesis writing in many ways 
epitomises both the conventional social science thesis and the pursuit of academic 
knowledge as  it  is  classically imagined, my own PhD journey has  revealed such notions at 
odds  with the progression of this  work. I have broader concerns which relate to this  and 
which I will attend to in later chapters, but for now, there are two aspects of this tension 
which emerge most prominently at this point. 
First, I am unable to embed this work into the urban studies’ literature on time given that 
this  thesis has  as  a primary concern the very absence of such work. Second, the absence of 
this  literature does  not simply represent a gap in existing knowledge that requires  to be 
filled but just as  pressing are those questions  which consider why such a gap has emerged in 
the first place. As such, these next two chapters look upon the literature on time not for 
review but as a research resource in its own right, that is they seek the literature not as 
support for but to do the work of the PhD. In addition to the extensive research activities  of 
reading, synthesis  and analysis which make possible yet often go unmentioned in literature 
chapters, these next two chapters also draw on primary research generated through 
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autoethnography, a method which I’ve been pursuing since the first year of this work and 
which has been very much reflected in my writing style thus far. I therefore want to take a 
moment to remark briefly on this method.
The practice and potential of autoethnography is in no way commonly agreed upon by the 
academic community. It has been diversely defined, ranging from a cultural study of one’s 
own people (Hayano, 1979; Anderson, 2006), to a method which allows  researchers to 
understand themselves in deeper ways, in turn enhancing their understanding of other 
issues  (Hemmingson, 2008). Sitting somewhere between these descriptions, my initial turn 
to autoethnography was  prompted by my desire to get behind the dominant experiences 
and representations of time in everyday urban life. Having designed and conducted a three 
week experiment during which I aimed to eliminate my access to clocks  in order to reflect 
on my experience of time without these conventional tools of time-keeping7, I also began 
to realise the broader potential of this  method more generally. My eventual practice of 
autoethnography in this work has allowed me not simply to isolate and examine those 
aspects  of my own culture which I take for granted, but furthermore, in helping make them 
strange and unnatural, it has yielded a very powerful, transformative effect on both my 
perception of time and the city, and also on my position as an academic researcher more 
generally. As such, it has  formed an ongoing method in both this work and my broader 
practice, unbounded by notions of research start and end dates or ideas of what might 
constitute the research field. Moreover, in addition to its  ongoing practice I have also 
conducted two other stand-alone autoethnography experiments. I draw on all three of these 
experiments, described briefly below, in these next two chapters, and throughout the thesis.
EXPERIMENT ONE
EVERYDAY LIFE WITHOUT CLOCKS
This experiment explored the experience of everyday life without the use of 
conventional methods  of time-reckoning. The aim was  to examine how and to 
what extent the subjective and intersubjective experience of time remains 
sensible without access  to clocks, and to consider what this in turn reveals  about 
the materiality of  time in the contemporary city. 
EXPERIMENT TWO
SAME SPACE, DIFFERENT TIME
This experiment tried to capture some of the space/time connections  of daily 
urban life over five weeks  by staggering (by 90 minutes) a walk taken every 
Tuesday by the same route through the city, culminating with a stop in the 
Tramway café.
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EXPERIMENT THREE
EXPERIENCES OF HOLIDAY TIME 
This experiment tried to capture and compare some of the different sensibilities 
experienced while on holiday and while at work. It looked to how the perception 
of time differed, and how this  in turn shapes perception of time in the moment 
and going forward.
There is a much more in depth discussion of the method of autoethnography in Chapter 
Five of this  work. For now, however, it should hopefully suffice to say that it, along with the 
non-urban literature on time, has held a generative function in the content produced across 
these next two chapters.
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS TWO AND THREE
Time strikes  a natural, almost inevitable figure in the contemporary city. It is carried with 
us daily: on our watches, diaries and mobile phones; within in our minds as we calculate, 
sort and organise our tasks  for the day, weeks and months ahead. Rarely do we question its 
nature but instead work within a reality which assumes it as  fact. Despite such appearances, 
time is not natural nor factual but has form in a rich tapestry of representations, feelings, 
experiences, conceptualisations and behaviours. That a sense of its  naturalness  should 
pervade the modern urban experience must therefore be recognised as a partial, 
exclusionary and normative view of time, as outlined by the first point of my research 
problem: 
1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
That such a problem seems largely absented from the urban literature makes  this concern 
all the more urgent and pronounced. As such, the aim of the next two chapters is to 
develop this argument further. To achieve this, Chapter Two looks to the social 
construction of time, whilst Chapter Three looks  to time’s construction of the social. Taken 
together, they aim to show that time is  socially constructed, and that such constructions  are 
political in form, function and effect.
Given the relative absence of such concerns in the urban literature direction is instead 
taken from other fields, including sociology, philosophy and anthropology. It is, however, 
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worth pointing out two things. First, the absence of temporal concerns  within urban studies 
is  not unique to the discipline. And second, those temporal inquiries  found within sociology, 
philosophy and anthropology do not exist fully ideal for this  task. Indeed, even in those 
disciplines where time is appreciated as, or at very least recognised in some quarters  as 
constructed, there remains  long standing barriers  to recognising the full extent to which it is 
culturally and socially variable, and hence politically significant. In sociology, such analyses 
have only emerged in the last thirty or so years, and reflecting on this  Barbara Adam 
considers that time has been a long standing “missing problem” in all social disciplines:
Much like people in their everyday lives, social scientists  take 
time largely for granted. Time is  such an obvious  factor in 
social science that it is  almost invisible. To ‘see’ it and to 
recognise it in not just its dominant but also its  less  visible 
forms has proved to be hard work.
1990: 3 
Certainly, Adam’s writing on the subject (1988; 1989; 1990; 1995), and her work to bring it 
more to the fore by establishing the journal Time and Society in 1992, have gone some way to 
making recognisable the considerable absence of social time studies prior. However she, 
and others (Bastian, 2014), continue to stress that considerable work remains in this area 
(2006). In philosophy too, despite time being a long standing topic of metaphysical debate 
those accounts  on offer certainly have their shortcomings. While the discipline hosts  a long 
and varied engagement with time’s  different natures and experiences, there are those who 
contend that its most pregnant expressions remain with Newtonian physics  and Cartesian 
dualisms  of thought (Bernet, 1982; Ingold, 1986; Adam, 1988; Macnaughten and Urry, 
1998; Urry, 2000). Nonetheless, philosophy, and specifically metaphysics, has  proved itself a 
key domain for those starting to inquire after time, even in those studies of a non-
philosophical bent. Finally, while anthropology has  in many ways been at the forefront of 
exposing different systems of time and temporality, its earlier writings are today criticised 
for masking an elevation of our time as Time, in and through the ways  it has traditionally 
attended to the time of Others. Nonetheless, even taking into account these disciplinary 
limits, anthropology, along with sociology and philosophy, offers  an emergent body of 
literature on time. And taken together, these literatures provide sufficient theoretical and 
empirical insight to begin engagement with a problem that in urban inquiry is notable only 
for its absence.
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Having got such caveats  out of the way I’ll now describe the structure of these next two 
chapters, which together seek to delve more deeply into the significance and consequence 
of the first research problem of this  work. Each chapter takes  as  its cue and target, parts  (a) 
and (b) of research problem one respectively. This chapter begins its task by looking to the 
diversity and plurality of Other times in order to consider how our  time might have been 
different. Arguing that this reflexivity allows us to recognise time as  constructed, I mark out 
some of the early politics  that link parts  (a) and (b) of the research problem. Having 
exploded the view of a naturalised and factual time in principle, Chapter Two then looks  to 
the dominant form of Western urban time, and concludes  by looking in greater detail to 
the various sites of  its construction. 
Having thoroughly engaged with part (a) of the research problem in this chapter, the aim of 
Chapter Three thereafter is  to consider part (b), and to examine time’s  construction of the 
social. I begin by looking toward the material consequences of time as  they emerge in and 
through the Western urban context. From such concerns  I then look to identify and 
describe in more specific detail time’s functions which give rise to those areas of political 
concern outlined in Chapter Two, and to consider those groups and individuals who are 
most negatively affected by such mechanisms. The final part of Chapter Three looks to the 
challenge of posing such questions  within urban studies  – a site, I argue, that time is 
naturalised in and through – and I end with an overview of how this  thesis proceeds in 
light of the insight generated through my engagement with point one of my research 
problem.
Towards an Intimate Politics of Time
PLACING OUR TIME WITHIN THE OTHER
The idea that time is  a relevant dimension for urban inquiry marks a cornerstone of this 
thesis, nestled within which is  another, more foundational belief: time is not homogenous nor 
natural, but is itself constructed in and through social interaction. When faced with the overriding 
sensibility of representations of time, to re-use the Lefebvreian terminology from Chapter One, 
such a position can be difficult to maintain. Indeed, at the start of this  PhD, even though I 
was  increasingly questioning the modes  of time which I took for granted and challenging 
them with my own times of representation, I nonetheless found myself caught within the 
familiarity of what I knew. At moments such as these I found Henry Rutz’s  opening remarks 
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to The Politics of Time to be incredibly supportive. Writing that “[t]he key to a politics of 
time is the theorem that time is  a social and cultural construct” (1992: 2), Rutz’s  claim not 
only allowed me to state that time was constructed with some confidence, but helped me 
believe it so. I found the same true of Emile Durkheim’s turn from the absolute time of 
metaphysics towards  time’s cultural diversity in The Elementary forms of Religious Life (1912); 
Carol Greenhouse’s appropriately central premise that “time is cultural” (1996: 1); and 
Barbara Adam’s insistence “that a multitude of times  coexist” (1995: 42). Their combined 
protest that time was  many things beyond its  seemingly natural appearance allowed me to 
position time as an object of urban power and to connect it, in principle, to the ills  of 
inequality, deprivation and poverty, unevenly pervasive in the landscape of the 
contemporary city. And here, it was  possible to arrive at a most general understanding of 
the political nature of  time’s construction, representation and use.
It was  not, however, the theory contained in these sociological accounts, but my exposure to 
Other times within them, and within other texts, which I believe set in motion the more 
intimate trajectory of this work outlined at the end of Chapter One. Piece by piece, stitch 
by stitch, as I’ve read, reflected and wrote about time the resounding result has  not been to 
my better understanding but rather time’s  continued diversification within my own mind. 
At points this has  been overwhelmingly the case, and to this  day I keenly share the sense of 
anthropologist Nancy D. Munn who likens the experience of reading about time to the 
reading of Jorge Luis Borge’s  Book of Sand in Borge’s short story of the same name. “As one 
opens this book, pages keep growing from it – it has no beginning or end”, writes Munn in 
her seminal essay, The Cultural Anthropology of Time (1992: 93). I’ve come to recognise, 
however, that Munn’s choice of analogy captures  much more than the overwhelming 
experience of time’s infinite diversity, it reveals  the continuously transformative effect of 
looking. And I have found this to be an all together more powerful effect than theory alone, 
no more so than in relation to those times  of practice and of experience with which we are 
most connected in our daily lives. It has enabled me to shift from a position where I believed 
that time was constructed to one where I perceive it as  such. This  is  a position I now consider 
necessary to this work given that my aim is not simply to look towards  an idea that time is 
constructed, but rather, is to cast the time of urban life, the time that I experience, within 
this  assessment. There are, of course, no easy shortcuts  to this effect. Nonetheless, an 
appreciation can at least be drawn by presenting just some of the diversity which has 
coloured my journey thus far:
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ONE: There are no units  of time between the month and day and 
night. People indicate the occurrence of an event more than a day 
or two ago by reference to some other event which took place at the 
same time or by counting the number of intervening ‘sleeps’ or, less 
commonly, ‘suns’. There are terms  for to-day, to-morrow, yesterday, 
etc., but there is no precision about them. 
TWO: Gets up late, hits  the street in the late morning 
or early afternoon, and works  his  way to the set. This 
is  a place for relaxed social activity. Hanging on the set 
with the boys  is  the major way of passing time and 
waiting until some necessary or desirable action 
occurs. [...] On the set yesterday merges into today, 
and tomorrow is  an an emptiness  to be filled in and 
through the pursuit of  bread and excitement.
THREE: The constantly diminishing future creates  a 
new emphasis  on the here, the present, the now, 
and while the threat of no future hovers  overhead 
like a storm cloud, the urgency of being also 
expands the potential of  the moment.
FOUR: Time has  stopped; there is  no time. 
[...] The past and future have collapsed into 
the present and I can’t tell them apart.
FIVE:  Now again we wait, facing each other silently [...] We 
sit, the way Zen masters sit. There’s  no awkwardness  in it, no 
frantic noddings of  the head or reassuring smiles.
SIX: And eat and drink until the white 
thread becomes  distinct to you from 
the black thread of the dawn. Then 
strictly observe the fast until nightfall.
SEVEN: I do not know the date of my brother’s  fall but I 
remember that it was  autumn and the beginning of 
his first and my final year in primary school.
EIGHT: The meetings  took hours. 
But they were supposed to go on 
forever. They created a different 
structure of relevance, a different 
universe, one in which time was  set 
out of  order.
NINE: My alarm goes  off. I glance at my phone but its  not 
time to get up. I’ve fifteen minutes  yet. I may not sleep, but 
I’m winning all the same with the time I’ve made for myself.
TEN:  Time is  divided not into years, but into two 
seasons: the dry season Kuaripe (‘in the sun’) and the 
rainy season Amana (‘rain’). [...] The passage of the 
seasons  is  marked by changes in the weather, and 
consequent changes in the landscape, and also by 
the rhythm of  agricultural activities.
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ELEVEN: As  for time, female subjectivity seems to offer it a specific concept of 
measurement that essentially retains  repetition and eternity out of the many 
modalities that appear throughout the history of civilisation. On the one hand, 
this  measure preserves  cycles, gestation, and the eternal return of biological 
rhythm which is  similar to the rhythm of nature [...] On the other hand, it 
preserves  a solid temporality that is  faultless  and impenetrable, one that has  so 
little to do with linear time that the very term ‘temporality’ seems inappropriate.
TWELVE: a cacophony of feelings  and 
sensations, a bit like being tossed 
inside a washing machine. [...] a sense 
that time is  standing still, or that your 
world is  spiralling out of control.  [...] 
in a dream, where nothing feels  real 
[...] thoughts are fragmented.
THIRTEEN: I know without looking that the room where the candles  would be 
burning is  having its  last golden moment of the day, the sun having sunk low 
enough to gild the walls. The sun sets  shortly thereafter and plunges the 
world inside my time zone into [...] a temporal no-man’s-land. It’s  neither the 
end of  the sixth day nor the beginning of  the seventh.
FOURTEEN: A taytu (a species  of yam) contains a 
certain degree of ripeness, bigness, roundedness, 
etc.; without one of these defining ingredients, it is 
something else, perhaps  a bwanawa or a yowana. [...] 
Events  and objects  are self-contained in another 
respect; there is  a series  of beings, but no 
becoming. There is  no temporal connection 
between objects. The taytu always  remains itself; it 
does  not become over ripe; over-ripeness  is  an 
ingredient of  another, a different being.
FIFTEEN: [They] always  carry the past with them 
[...] time is a tapestry incorporating the past, 
present and future. The past is ever present.
SIXTEEN: It seemed to me, first, like a kind of solvent which 
dissolved the future, our future, a little at a time. It was  like a 
dark stain, a floating, inky transparency hovering over 
Wally’s body, and its  intention was  to erase the time ahead of 
us, to make that time, each day, a little smaller.
SEVENTEEN: For her, time stands  still, moments  flow together, 
the past and future do not lie still behind and before her. In 
place of sequence, and linear relation, there is  an 
overwhelming richness  of sensation, which pulls  her 
attention from the outer world. She is  immersed in the 
immediacy of experience. Her body is  no longer a neutral 
background for her consciousness.
EIGHTEEN: Time changes  and it changes  reality. The 
role of time in my life relates  to my consciousness 
and emotional relationship to time as well as  my 
concern about what I do with it, how I use it. [...] 
Today I live more in the present than ten years ago.
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NINETEEN: There’s  also a kinetic and haptic difference here. No longer checking 
in with the clock, I no longer reach for my phone. But it’s  more than that. My 
shoulders  no longer meet my ears. My brow is  no longer creased. I finish 
breakfast and I look outside the window. Materially, this feels different.
TWENTY: Sunday mornings  are the lowest 
part of the week, because with no 
demands  on attention, they are unable to 
decide what to do. The rest of the week 
psychic energy is  directed by external 
routines: work, shopping, favorite TV 
shows, and so on. But what is  one to do 
Sunday morning after breakfast, after 
having browsed through the papers?
TWENTY-ONE: When the stop arrests  the 
intellectualising tendencies  of the mind, the 
concept of time is  also affected [...] When time 
comes  to a stop, one experiences  not timelessness, 
but time unqualified by intellect. [...] A reversal of 
ordinary assumptions  takes  place. Events  are linked 
by nonlinear relations  rather than by succession. 
Time ceases to be past, present and future, and 
instead either moves  or is  frozen. Time becomes 
ample enough to allow an event to occur without 
crimping it. Time ceases  to exist apart from what 
takes  place; instead it becomes  a quality specific to 
the event.
These twenty-one excerpts cast time in a myriad of guises, together revealing the 
heterogeneity of Others’ times. But their commentary also extends far beyond the diversity 
of those times  told to reach and include our own, regardless of the form the our may take. 
Some may resonate or pass  as  unremarkable, others might jar or baffle. Their effect will be 
entirely dependant on the reader. But that they should impress  themselves  at all, or indeed 
fail to impress, tells  of an implicit statement of (y)our time contained within each8. When 
viewed collectively, the effect intensifies: each builds upon the others, marking out a 
diversity of time across  both history and space, including (y)our time in the gaps between. 
The eventual result is  a collage which speaks not only to time’s  diversity, but to everything 
(y)our time is, everything that it is  not, and everything that it might have been. And here, 
where our own personal time is contained within the collage – as just another piece which 
speaks  to time’s  diversity, contingency and construction – the idea that time is not 
homogenous  nor natural is not only believed of Other time, it may begin to be perceived of 
our own practices and experiences. 
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In recognising that time, our  time that we take for granted, really could have been other 
than it is, it becomes possible to imagine a politics concealed within dominant 
representations which colour not only Others’ time but also our own. Indeed, it is this 
placing of our time within the Other which allows for a much more intimate and relevant 
politics  of time to emerge. At this stage it is  only the most basic of discussions that is 
possible. Nonetheless, it is  one that can reveal the powerful and divisive politics  that time 
enacts  across three key dimensions: practices of time; the relationship between time and 
culture; and the production of temporal norms. I’d argue that these three areas  alone 
reveal the significance of time for urban studies  and establish the need for a purposeful 
temporal consciousness within urban theory and research. To look to the first of these 
dimensions. A number of those examples given – excerpts  ONE, FOUR, SIX, SEVEN, NINE, 
TEN, THIRTEEN and SEVENTEEN – relate to or speak of one such practice of time, the act of 
telling it. Even as  presented, these acts  relate not to time’s natural measure, but to the values 
which underpin it. Compare, for example, excerpts  SIX and NINE. Excerpt SIX is  quoted 
from the Quran and describes the comparative use of different coloured threads  to meet 
the daily fasting conditions of Ramadan9. Excerpt NINE comes from one of my own 
autoethnographic writings, recorded in response to my usual practice of waking-up in the 
morning. In each excerpt the person doing the reckoning gauges, measures, or counts not 
simply what time it is, but in doing so enacts that which is of value to them. In excerpt SIX, 
it is not a mechanical time piece set to an abstract measure but a thread clock dependent on 
conditions  of light and darkness which ensures that fasting satisfactorily meets a literal 
interpretation of the Quran. As far as  my own activities go, an alarm clock set not to the 
hour I wish to rise but instead to the time I wish to first gain awareness of the time ensures 
that getting out of bed feels more of my own making. In bringing these more subjective 
moments of time reckoning to the fore the notion that there exists a solely natural measure 
which sits beneath our temporal practice is quickly dispelled, helping reveal that even the 
practice of  telling time enacts and engages a politics of  time in and of  itself.
Time’s  politics, however, are not contained in practices of time alone. The second 
dimension is  revealed when the values with which time is  measured, gauged and counted 
are contextualised in relation to a wider conception of priority and worldview. Look to 
excerpt THIRTEEN, for example. It is  not simply the practice of the Sabbath but the 
corresponding rabbinical view that it is necessary to attend temple in both space and time 
(Schulevitz, 2011: 3) that structures  this “temporal no-mans land” as  a definitive feature of 
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Jewish culture. Similarly, the event orientated times of excerpts ONE and TEN make clear 
the connections  between time, nature and the land for the Nuer and the Amondawa, 
respectively. In the broader literature, the strength of these connections between a culture 
and its time are well documented. Indeed, Robert Levine advocates that much can be told 
of what matters  to a culture by looking to their systems of time (2006). While in The Silent 
Language, Edward T. Hall, someone from whom Levine takes great inspiration, reveals the 
power with which time speaks when he writes: “time talks. It speaks  more plainly than 
words. The message it conveys comes  through loud and clear. [...] It can shout the truth 
where words lie” (Hall, 1973: 1). This  strong connection between a culture and its  systems 
of time suggests that time’s  politics are not distinct nor immune from the ideological 
movements  which come to shape a culture’s broader form, and that time is  a key object of 
power in this regard. But perhaps  most significantly, it reveals that the politics of time 
extend far beyond the construction of time as an isolated thing, towards  the construction of 
a way of  life.
Finally, the third, and most pertinent dimension comes to the fore where there is potential 
for those excerpts  presented to occur simultaneous within a context in which one time is 
dominant: the modern city. In a global age where the mixing of culture and identity in and 
through urban environs  is prolifically documented (see, for example, Sassen, 1991; 
Featherstone, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Castells, 1997; Brenner, 1999; Low, 2000; Back, 
2007), time’s diversity translates  into a plurality of time. Each individual comes to face not 
only their subjective experiences of time which differ from dominant modes, but the 
temporal systems  of Others. As Lewis Mumford’s  description of “the Englishman in 
France who thought that bread was the right name for le pain” makes clear, however, “each 
culture believes that every other kind of space and time is an approximation to or a 
perversion of the real space and time in which it lives” (1946: 18). In the modern city, such 
judgements are of course uneven in their reach. Just like the argument Lefebvre puts forth 
of a cultural hegemony that is  enacted via space, the processes of time’s production are 
based upon values which lead to the social production of meaning, the production and 
codification of which is commanded by dominant groups  as  a tool to reproduce their 
dominance. Therefore, recognising this  plurality of time within a setting in which one time 
is dominant reveals that those who conform to the dominant time have the more 
prominent platform from to name Others’ time as a “perversion”. This necessitates  that 
those first two political dimensions already considered – the everyday practices  of time and 
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their connections  to a way of life – must here contend with an extended politics. Where time 
is not merely lived in but is  constructed in the living, time’s value accords not simply with 
time itself, or the broader ideological context in which it operates. It has the capacity to 
extend outwards beyond its own from to order difference, and hence to affect time’s users 
in exclusionary ways in much the same fashion as Rosalyn Diprose describes:
Truth may be arbitrary, but it endures  through the work of 
fabricating social life and preserving the individual within the 
cultural group that that individual inhabits. To say one sees 
otherwise than the majority is  to disqualify oneself, or be 
excluded, from that way of  life.
2002: 150
Such functions  point to time’s ability to exclude those ways of life which fall out with 
dominant urban logics. Perhaps more crucially, however, it reveals  that it is not simply the 
construction of time in general terms, but the construction of a dominant and normative 
time that is  of immediate consequence to the visibility of time’s diversity and plurality, and 
the wellbeing of  time’s users in the contemporary city. 
In order to develop this discussion further, and into more specific areas  of concern, it is 
now necessary to have in mind the form of those representations dominant to the 
contemporary urban context, and the sites of their construction. This  more intimate 
understanding will help make real the ways in which norms of time come face to face with 
alternative expressions, revealing the likely sites  at which power, order and exclusion sit side 
by side. As such, this  chapter will next look to those representations of time found in modern and 
Western modes. Widely discussed as  reciprocally connected to the Western history of urban 
economic life, and the rise in urbanisation across its  various stages  (see Marx, 1857/1973 
and 1867/1976; Simmel, 1903/1995; Mumford, 1934 and 1946; Thomson, 1967; 
Giddens, 1981; Thrift, 1981; and Glennie and Thrift, 2005), I consider that such broad 
categorisations  of time remain consonant with the continual evolution of the modes 
dominant to the contemporary urban context. This  chapter will then conclude by 
examining the construction, maintenance and reification of these dominant modes across a 
handful of different sites. The task of Chapter Three thereafter will be to consider the 
political and uneven exercise of such constructions, and to examine their reign over 
individuals and groups disadvantaged by dominant modes of  urban time. 
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FINDING OUR TIME WITHIN THE OTHER
Catching a glimpse of that which is so embedded, natural and taken for granted is  not an 
easy task. The tenor of the previous  section – the idea that our time is contained within our 
descriptions of Other time – does, however, offer a possible way into such matters. Such is 
a notion that in many ways  extends  itself from the idea that learning of the Other brings 
with it a learning of the self. In making his dedication of The Silent Language “to my friends 
and colleagues in foreign cultures  who taught me so much about my own culture” (1973: 
iv), the value of reflexivity was  something clearly at the forefront of Hall’s thoughts  as he 
wrote of time and space. And within the more recent time studies  of anthropology and 
sociology, a similarly reflexive position is increasingly attributable to the work of Johannes 
Fabian (1983) and Barbara Adam (1989; 1990; and 1995), amongst others  (Ingold, 1986; 
and Greenhouse, 1996). For Fabian, such an approach is a necessary one. Arguing against 
uncritical constructions of the West as  progressive and of Others as dwelling in earlier, less 
advanced times, he seeks to unravel anthropology’s  hidden agenda – what he recognises to 
be a politics of time aimed at creating a discourse of Otherness which justified colonial rule 
and the “domination and exploitation of one part of mankind by another” (1983: xi). 
Adam’s motivation similarly stems  from the seemingly unproblematic presentations of us 
and them in traditional ethnographies. She insists that an “explicitly reflexive approach to 
time is imperative” (1995: 31) in order that time studies might move beyond dichotic 
explanations which serve only to conceal the plurality of times which coexist in 
contemporary life. 
While disciplinary critiques such as  these are a common driver, the potential for reflexive 
practice to unpack those representations of time which quietly dominate the Western 
experience is also recognised. Asserting that “the backcloth upon which our descriptions 
are drawn remains unattended”, Adam insists that “any analysis of ‘other time’ is a 
simultaneous  commentary on ‘our time’” (1995: 31). With reference to those studies  which 
epitomise the traditional work of anthropology, she continues to set forth the logic of her 
position, arguing:
The studies  of Evans-Pritchard (1940/1969) Whorf (1956) 
and the conceptual models of Lévi-Strauss  (1963/1972) 
provide excellent exemplars  of classical analyses  of ‘other 
time’. It is, however, neither their respective analyses  of the 
difference between ‘our’ and ‘other time’ nor, as  I have 
already mentioned, the many critiques  offered in response to 
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these studies  which are of interest here. Rather, it is  the 
stereotypical backdrop of unquestioned ‘Western time’ 
against which the respective time perception of the 
‘traditional’ cultures are delineated which needs  to become 
the centre of  our attention
1995: 32
In addition to Adam’s  focus on the “stereotypical backdrop” implicit in traditional 
constructions  of Other time, I’d argue that this  reflexive potential further extends beyond 
the accounts of appointed experts, to moments  where we describe our own practices  and 
experiences  of time as being or feeling different from the norm; where we witness our times of 
representation in contrast, contradiction or even conflict with the seeming objectivity of 
representations of time. Both types of reflections share in common an implicit ordinariness  and 
everydayness of time which is  used to cast a strangeness  on that which time is  not. Both, 
therefore, offer a valuable insight into that which time is. This  section takes  its  cue from 
such effects. Combining reflexive readings  of those excepts already presented10, along with 
sociological literature on time and my own autoethnographic findings, the aim is to bring 
to the fore some of those constructions characteristic of the dominant and normative times 
of  urban life.
To begin this  task, I want to first return to the excerpt from The West Wing discussed in 
Chapter One, and specifically to Toby’s description of the problem. In exclaiming: “[t]hey 
don’t own wristwatches. They can’t tell time”, Toby reveals little about time in Equatorial 
Kundu, but a great deal about his  own conception. His articulation thrusts forth an 
assumption that the telling of time is inextricability tied to a time-piece: an abstract, 
objective marker severed from its  user’s subjective experience. While this  analysis  stems 
from a fictional account it nonetheless resonates  with the non-fictional context of its origin. 
Looking again to those excerpts presented at the end of the previous  section, similar 
evidence can be drawn from Evans-Pritchard’s  depiction of Nuer time as  “oecological 
[ecological]” in excerpt ONE, and Sinha, et al.’s  description of the Amondawa’s reliance on 
agricultural and meteorological markers in excerpt TEN. Both tell of a different time. Their 
success  in making sensible the difference of these times, however, relies on an ability to 
contrast them with something already understood. As  such, “no units of time between the 
month and day and night” and “no precision” in excerpt ONE; and time that is “divided not 
into years” and governed instead by the natural “rhythm of agricultural activities” in 
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excerpt TEN, can be read, in contrast, as time that is  measurable and precise, divisible and 
countable in single objective units, and above all else, abstracted from nature. In addition, 
that time which deviates  from such measures should appear so dramatically altered – as 
suggested by the depiction of protest time in excerpt EIGHT which saw a “different structure 
of relevance, a different universe, one in which time was set out of order” – the extent to 
which time’s more natural partner is the clock in this context is strongly indicated. 
In the broader literature too, the use of an abstract and objective measurement through 
which time is correctly reckoned is  found not only to be a definitive hallmark of Western 
time, but is  further extended. Taking the short step from time that is  associated with the 
clock to time that is  synonymous  with it, clock time emerges  as  all pervasive. While Adam 
sees  it an important point to reiterate the plurality of times  which exist beyond clock time, 
she nonetheless  recognises  a urgent need to impress “the central importance and hegemony 
of the abstract, decontextualised, neutral medium of clock time” (1995, 156). Eviatar 
Zerubavel agrees on its prominence, writing:
It is  thus  the clock, whose introduction to the West cannot be 
separated from the evolution of the schedule there, that 
allows the particular notion of temporality which has 
becomes so characteristic of Western civilisation. It is clock 
time that is  at the basis  of the modern Western notion of 
duration and that allows  the durational rigidity that is  so 
typical of  modern life.
1981: 61 
Many who write on this  subject similarly afford clock time a definitive rank (Nowotny, 1994; 
Greenhouse, 1996; Landes, 2000; Levin, 2006; and Birth, 2012), and reflecting on its 
prominence Young and Schuller muse “[w]e have become like Alice’s  White Rabbit, always 
aware not of what time is but of what time it is” (1988: 2). Such is a notion that Adam 
shares  and extends even further, commenting that it is not simply the creation and use of 
clock time that marks  a definitive aspect of Western society but that we “relate to that 
creation as being time and organise [our] social life around it” (1990: 120). Her emphasis 
suggests that clock time not only dominates  the contemporary Western experience of time, 
but that it dominates the contemporary Western experience absolutely. 
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Within this context many of those features  of the clock can accordingly be extended to the 
experience of clock time in and across  daily life. Going so far as  to describe the clock as a 
necromantic device – a tool in which “the dead thinks for the living” (2012: 35) – Kevin 
Birth provides a possible foundation for this. His  description reveals the behavioural 
trajectory of clock time’s invention and further echoes Young and Schuller’s  description of 
our passive engagement with time. Birth himself writes: “[c]locks are tools  which tell us 
time, but that obscure the answer to the question of what time is” (2012: 37). Indeed, such 
acquiescence manifests in practices that themselves  are comparable to the clock, whereby 
the referencing of an objective, quantitative and rational source makes  clock time something 
that is  practiced by measuring, checking, counting and dividing. For Zerubavel, the extent 
of this is underlined by the all encompassing need for temporal regularity, where it not only 
expected that time-pieces  should keep precise and regular time, but that the same is  desired 
of our activities  which fill it (1981). I’ve reflected on many such moments myself 
throughout this PhD: of the need to schedule meetings in one or two hour slots; to meet on 
or at half past the hour; to maintain week days for work and weekends for rest; and to 
subtract from time available in order to work out how long something will take – practices 
very much indicative of  a life that is supposed to run like clockwork.
Beyond these everyday practices, there are certain characteristics of the clock that take on a 
markedly different shape. While the objects  which maintain clock time are represented in 
more cyclical terms – hands which continuously rotate from twelve to twelve; diaries which 
start in January only to return to it again in twelve months  – it is  a decisively more linear 
structure that characterises the modern Western notion (Zerubavel, 1981; Adam, 1990 and 
1995; Nowotny, 1994; and Greenhouse, 1996). Helpful counterpoints to this can be seen in 
Ziauddin Sardar’s  description of Wahhabism in excerpt FIFTEEN and Dorothy D. Lee’s 
description of the Trobriand Islanders  in excerpt FOURTEEN. In contrast, the linearity 
dominant to Western time becomes all too obvious: the past is never present, nor does the 
past, present and future combine – each is  contained and maintained in neat progression. 
Moreover, the temporal direction which runs from the past to the present, and onwards to 
the future, is  inescapable, and to Adam’s  mind it is  this  linearity which further secures 
time’s irreversibility and elevates the importance of history and succession (1995). And 
where this  linearity is considered alongside those abstract, objective and quantitative 
aspects, a further dimension is revealed: the measuring of time by distance and its  resulting 
spatialisation. As Roger Jones explains:
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When we speak, for example, of time intervals  and durations 
or of time order and sequence, we have in mind an 
imaginary long straight axis of time with points  on it locating 
events and distances  along it measuring the elapsed time 
between events. The very words  interval, duration, sequence 
evoke spatial images  that help us  to think about time and its 
measurement.
1983: 79, original emphasis
These presentations of clock time as fixed, measurable, linear and spatial combine to help 
render it as something that is  finite and can be used up, as “something that passes  or can be 
saved, sold or wasted” (Adam, 1995: 33). This  has  a considerable two-fold effect on those 
temporal modes which accompany clock time’s dominance in Western life. First, and most 
notably, is time’s  commodification – something stressed most famously by Karl Marx in 
both Grundrisse (1857/1973) and Capital (1867/1976). Connecting this  back to the 
dominance of clock time, Levine writes  that “[w]hen the clock predominates, time becomes a 
valuable commodity. Clock time cultures take for granted the reality of time as fixed, linear, 
and measurable” (2006: 90). Indeed, for Marx it was  precisely the decontextualised, 
abstract nature of time that facilitated its commodification, allowing the conversion of a 
variable quality into an invariable and abstract exchange value (1857/1973). Second, the 
foremost economic value that is constructed, maintained and reified within and through 
clock time is  widely linked to an increasingly hurried pace of modern life (Adam, 1995; 
Levine, 2006; Burnett et al., 2007; and Birth, 2012). Considering this to be decisively urban 
phenomenon, Irving Hoch writes:
As a city grows  larger, the value of its  inhabitants’ time 
increases  with the city’s  increasing wage rate and cost of 
living, so that economizing on time becomes  more urgent, 
and life becomes more hurried and harried.
1976: 857
It is  at this juncture where clock time is  most readily recognised not simply of the clock but of 
the daily practices  which accompany its  use, that the first and second dimensions of time’s 
politics  considered in the previous section (pages  41–42) are most articulate and interrelated: 
our practices of clock time connect to and maintain the ways of life associated with them. 
Further, it is additionally possible to recognise the third dimension here. While I’ve retained 
the descriptor of clock time throughout this section it must be stated that clock time is  known 
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here simply as  time, and more significant than those individual hallmarks – be it time’s 
fixity, objectiveness, abstract form, quantitative nature, measurability, divisibility, linearity, 
spatiality, economically assumed value, or, indeed, its  hurried pace – is that each is 
considered natural in this context. This  reinforces  not only the dominance of these 
hallmarks  but, viewed in relation to the first and second political dimensions  noted above 
and in the previous section, begins to hint at their hegemony and normativity. In bringing 
such things to light there are a number of questions which now follow in terms of the 
relationship between these constructions and their politics, namely: 
‣ What leads to and maintains the formation of  this time?
‣ How does  the time that dominates  modern, Western life function to order, Other 
and exclude? 
‣ What are the connections  between processes  of temporal ordering and the ills  of 
everyday city life?
The second and third of these questions  form the work of Chapter Three. The remainder 
of this chapter will now cast its  attention upon question one, and those sites  at which 
dominant modes of  urban time are constructed, maintained and reified as natural.
Sites of Time’s Construction
Having outlined the dominant features of Western time prevalent to the contemporary 
urban context, it is now possible to imagine and look to the sites of their construction. By 
this  I refer both to those areas  of social interaction that are shaped by time, and those areas 
which are themselves  a constitutive force in time’s  resulting form. As will be seen 
throughout this section, and in Chapter Three, these two aspects are far from separate. To 
achieve this, I again take my cue from both the literature and my own autoethnographic 
findings, and look first across the broad categories  of history, politics, and everyday life – 
sites  that in many ways run parallel with Durkheim’s  description of time as  a social 
institution with traditions, rules and practices which surround our use of it (1912). Working 
to find time in the name of diversity, Durkheim turned against classical discourses of 
metaphysical abstraction found in the works of Isaac Newton, Immanuel Kant, Henri 
Bergson and Francis Herbert Bradley (Sorokin and Merton, 1937). And while his analysis 
was  limited to differences  between cultures, Durkheim’s writings  nonetheless paved the way 
for sociology to cast its eye on temporal difference as it is more socially constituted 
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(Zerubavel, 1981; Adam, 1990; Nowotny, 1994; and Greenhouse, 1996). Though I take 
direction from Durkheim in this instance, however, I will end my discussions in this section 
by looking to those systems of thought which Durkheim positioned himself against: the 
construction of  time in and through philosophy. 
Unfortunately, there is  not the scope in this  work to be comprehensive about any one of 
these sites in great detail. Indeed, such a task would be futile even if one dimension had 
been identified as  the sole focus  of this thesis. Nonetheless, while my consideration of time’s 
construction through history, politics, everyday life and philosophy is  both necessarily brief 
and partial, this  discussion remains highly beneficial to this work insofar as  it manages to 
make manifest just some of the complex, intermingled and intimate ways in which time 
becomes the time which dominates the contemporary urban experience.
HISTORY
The time that so typifies the modern Western temporal experience is in fact not particularly 
Western at all but is  derived from a great deal of other cultural and social influences that 
have combined over time. The literature tells  of many origin points through which time’s 
regulation by clocks, calendars  and schedules  has  evolved, and through which ideas of time 
as  fixed, objective, countable, and linear have become dominant and naturalised. 
Remarking on some of its  more multi-cultural influences in Objects of Time: How Things 
Shape Temporality, Kevin Birth reveals  that it was the Ancient Egyptians  who first divided day 
and night into twelve hours  each, resulting in the daily allocation of twenty-four hours with 
which we are accustomed; while it was the Babylonians whose notions of sixty minutes  and 
sixty seconds have extended to shape our own systems of counting (2012). In both 
examples, Birth appears keen to draw attention not simply to the non-Western cultural 
influences  on modern time, but to emphasise that there is  nothing inherently rational or 
scientific, i.e. Western about Western time. For example, while many perhaps hold a loose 
idea that twenty-four units of sixty-minute hours  accurately tracks the movement of the 
earth around the sun, Birth informs that these accord only with an average day, and that 
the earth’s axis and rotation around the sun ensures that some days are longer than others. 
Not only, then, are those hallmarks derived of the collective effort of many cultures  over a 
long period of time, but any notion that time is solely of Western invention or a product of 
the scientific revolution is quashed.
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Further demonstrating that our rational, objective time is in fact borne of much wider 
motives  is the decisive influence that Benedictine monasticism has had on temporal 
regularity, order and punctuality. This is  marked as a highly important origin point 
throughout much of the literature, discussed at length in a great many sources from 
Mumford (1967) and Foucault (1977), to Zerubavel (1981) and Adam (1995). Of its 
influence, Zerubavel writes:
It is  in the medieval Benedictine monasteries  that we find 
what most probably constituted the original model for all 
modern Western schedules. [...] Therefore, it is  in the 
medieval Benedictine monasteries  that we ought to look for 
the genesis  and source of diffusion of the particular type of 
temporal regularity that is  so characteristic of modern life, as 
well as  of one of the most fundamental sociocultural 
institutions in the modern West.
32
The model to which Zerubavel refers  is a strict and precise timetable of daily life used by 
Benedictine Monks, contained in The Rule of Saint Benedict, The Horarium. Translated as The 
Hours, this  schedule governed the set times for annual, weekly and daily routines, including 
prayer, work, sleep and bathing. To this  day it remains a key aspect of Monastic life in 
Western Christianity, however, today its more considerable influence is  arguably beyond the 
church (Moore, 1963; Zerubavel, 1981). In line with this  proposition Michael Young 
considers  that the first metronomic social system of Europe is indebted to the Benedictine’s 
schedule, resulting in a “concatenation of informal and formal agreements, founded on the 
increasing sophistication of measurements  and securing, above all, the greater willingness 
of people to undergo entrainment of their time habits than entrainment of any 
others” (1988: 78). Nonetheless, just like the cultural influences which shaped the Egyptian 
and Babylonian models of time to which we now ascribe, there is nothing particularly 
objective about The Horarium. According to Adam the motivation for this model was  to 
avoid “idleness”, a desire made clear in Rule XLVIII which states that “[i]dleness  is the 
enemy of  every soul” (1995: 64).
These examples reveal just some of the influences  and interests which have come to bear 
upon the form of modern Western time, and help show the ways  in which time is made 
through time. The power of history to construct time, however, is  not conveyed through 
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individual examples alone. Rather, it is  the way in which modes become traditional that to 
my mind reveals the true power of this  site. This  is  quite difficult to appreciate from the 
examples  discussed alone. Though they speak of different cultures and movements, the 
systems they describe retain a familiarity. The power of history to shape time is, therefore, 
perhaps better demonstrated by something unfamiliar. One such example is  the French 
Revolutionary Calendar, discussed by Zerubavel (1981). Created and implemented during 
the French Revolution, the French Revolutionary Calendar was  used by the French 
government from late 1793 to 1805, and for 18 days by the Paris  Commune in 1871. 
Though it retained adherence to a twelve month year, each month was instead divided into 
three ten-day weeks  called décades; and each day into ten hours  of 100 decimal minutes, 
which were themselves divided into 100 decimal seconds. At the heart of the design was an 
attempt to eradicate the religious and royalist overtones of the existing Gregorian calendar, 
and to continue France’s march towards decimalisation. As Zerubavel comments:
The French Republican calendrical reform is  undoubtedly 
the most radial attempt in modern history to have challenged 
the calendrical system that prevails  in the world today. It is 
hard to over emphasize the extent to which the reformers 
obliterated the existing units  of time as  well as  the existing 
time-reckoning and dating frameworks, since almost none of 
the constituent of those was spared. The scope of the 
Republican calendrical reform was almost total, since its 
architects  strived to bring about a total symbolic 
transformation of  the existing calendrical system.
1981: 83
That it is  not used, and that many will not even recognise the historical existence of the 
French Revolutionary Calendar, reveals  much about the historical construction of time. 
This  example illustrates  that time is not just made through time, but that it is also unmade 
through it. In ways more apparent than those familiar examples  previously offered, the 
French Revolutionary Calendar reminds that history sorts  and orders both the objects  of 
time’s constructions and our constructions of time into those which are legitimate and 
illegitimate. Furthermore, given that the symbolism of the French Revolutionary calendar 
arguably accords  much more strongly to the secular, rationalist and enlightened tendencies 
of the modern West, tells of history’s significant power to act upon itself: at the point at 
which those legitimate modes become traditional it has  the ability to erase from view their 
diverse histories which attest to more cultural influences, and to reinforce them as  simply 
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natural. And ultimately, then, it seems that time is  made through time only so far as  it is  re-
made and stabilised through it.
POLITICS
To now turn to politics, and its roles  in influencing the shape of time. A number of political 
theorists have gone so far as  to afford governance a very direct function in this  regard, 
suggesting that the rise of the modern state rests in part upon its  ability to provide not just 
standardised systems of laws and rights, but also a standardised system of time (Gross, 
1985). Indeed, in very explicit ways, states around the world have governed to construct 
time through politics and legislation, and interventions in Western countries  can be 
recognised as analogous to the uniform shape of modern time. In the United Kingdom, 
the Interpretation Act of 1978 ensured the proliferation of Greenwich mean time (GMT) as 
the proper measure in both practice and law, stating that “whenever an expression of time 
occurs in an Act, the time referred to shall (unless otherwise specifically stated) be held to 
be Greenwich mean time” (Section 9). Similar measures were introduced in Belgium (1946, 
1947); the republic of Ireland (1971; 2005); and in Canada (1985) (Landes, 2000), to ensure 
that local time in these countries was defined with reference to GMT. In the United States, 
the Standard Time Act of 1918 was the first standardisation of nation-wide time. Prior to this 
time had been a matter reserved for local level, with not just states but cities  and towns 
often having different measures that were maintained only by reference to a central clock 
(Prerau, 2005). The Uniform Time Act of 1966 then continued these efforts, promoting “the 
adoption and observance of uniform time within the standard time zones” (Sections 2 and 
4), and sought to simplify the methods by which Daylight Savings  Time (DST) should be 
measured. Such strides towards standardisation are reflected across  much of the Western 
world today. Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) was formally adopted as the legal basis 
for the way in which the world regulates both clocks and time in 1963, and while the 
United Kingdom notably maintains its  legal reference to GMT, both UTC and GMT are 
recognised as largely synonymous (Langley, 1999).
There are a great many more interventions through which states  have acted to fix time for 
their citizens. But what is  of significance is not simply their power to explicitly construct 
time in certain ways, but rather, their capacity to maintain and extend existing modes. To 
look to those examples already discussed, it was the United Kingdom’s growth as a 
maritime nation that prompted a better coordination of time-keeping, and arguably its 
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eventual development of and adherence to GMT (Nelson, 2001). While in the United 
States, it is  argued that the practical needs of communication and travel led to the first 
legislation of DST practices (Prerau, 2005). In analogous ways, the move to adopt as  far as 
possible a world-wide standardised measure in UTC similarly has  the modern drivers of 
global trade and markets as its motivation. As Helga Nowotny remarks:
Today, the systems of time are chiefly fixed by the market 
and the state. The market fixes  time via the work to be done 
and the exchange relations  between time and money. The 
state imposes its  system of time via the legal system and thus 
structures the lives of  its citizens.
2005: 105
In this sense, then, GMT, DST, UTC, and many other systems not discussed, don’t simply 
construct time as a primary step. Rather, they react to time as it is already conceived in 
order to refine its practice. And then in making it ubiquitous they further reinforce its 
dominance. 
There are also many legislative acts  and policy measures  which though they don’t seek to 
establish a state sanctioned practice of time, at their core lies  normative temporal ideals 
nonetheless. As Munn notes:
The importance of calendric and related time shifts 
connected with sociopolitical changes  is more than political 
in the narrow pragmatic sense. It has to do with the 
construction of cultural governance through reaching into 
the body time of persons and coordinating it with values 
embedded in the “worldtime” of a wider constructed 
universe of  power.
1992: 109
Some obvious examples  of Munn’s “cultural governance” in a UK context include the 
setting of an age of consent at sixteen; establishing the right to vote at eighteen; and, by 
2020, working towards the same State Pension age for men and women. These measures, 
and many others, fix in the mind a factual and linear progression of time across  life. Less 
explicit examples  can also be found. The policy of minimum wage, for example, 
introduced by Tony Blair’s  New Labour government in 1999 to protect low paid workers, 
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simultaneously maintains  the idea that labour’s  value is  correctly measured by the hour. 
While the UK area based initiative Sure Start announced in 1998 to give all children “the 
best possible start in life” manages  to uphold the right to an equal and fair childhood, and 
with it, the notion that the past, present and future are causally connected in a linear 
direction. 
Beyond these direct efforts  and active strategies, time is also shaped through the very 
practice of politics. Barack Obama’s  2008 election campaign for the United States’ 
presidency, for example, was fought and won on the platform of Hope – an instruction to 
look not to the past but towards the future. The campaign’s success in this  regard was not 
only in obtaining the presidency but in obtaining buy-in to a particular way of seeing, 
making prolific a particular way of orientating oneself in time. A second example, and one 
that is  much more local and familiar to me, is the 2006 cultural strategy of Glasgow City 
Council. Common to many of the UK’s large postindustrial cities, urban cultural policies 
such as  this look not only towards  potential gains for a city’s economic and tourist 
industries but take a largely nostalgic view of urban heritage to engender an urgent sense 
for reclaiming the past. In doing this, they work to construct an archive of official memories 
that, in similar ways to Obama’s notion of hope, attempts to achieve buy-in from citizens at 
the level of perception. Neither of these examples explicitly remark on a use of time or the 
meaning of time itself. But relying strongly on a linear conception of time which can be 
reconstructed through rhetoric and a captive audience, both work to establish proper ways 
for citizens to experience it. As  such, in these examples, and those others  considered, the 
site of politics  works  both explicitly and implicitly to construct, maintain and reify time, 
and it does so in ways amenable to time’s already dominant constructions.
EVERYDAY LIFE
Everyday life is  by far the most subtle, diverse and expansive point at which time could be 
said to be constitutive and constructed. It not only encompasses those traditions and rules, 
of history and politics  already discussed, but includes  many other dimensions which are 
indicative of time’s  dominant form and of considerable influence to its  formation. In many 
ways, then, everyday life is  not a single site but a connection point at which rules  and 
traditions  meet with cultural practice, language, means  of communication, tools, aesthetic 
sensibilities, technology, institutions, artistic modes of expression, naming but a few, to 
colour the experience of daily life. There is not scope here to consider in any detailed way 
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such a broad cross section of areas. Nonetheless, it  remains important to recognise the 
diversity of those everyday dimensions through which time is constructed. As such, this 
section looks  to three areas of everyday routine and experience at which time’s  ordinariness is 
often assumed: tools and technologies; language; and institutional structures and ideals.
– Tools and technologies of  time
It is  somewhat suggested by the close affiliation of the clock to clock time that modes of 
everyday life are intimately connected to the tools and technologies which are used to 
maintain it. As already considered, clocks, calendars  and schedules form the backbone of 
clock time’s practice in the modern city to such an extent that Mumford concludes it to be 
“the clock, not the steam engine [that] is the key-machine of the modern industrial 
age” (1934: 14). Indeed, it is the exacting nature of these tools  which allows  for the 
measurement and allocation of minutes, hours and days, throughout the week, month and 
year. And for Zerubavel, it  is this ability which maintains temporal regularity, and with it 
the four “fundamental” parameters of time’s order: sequential structure (the order in which 
events  take place); duration (how long events last); temporal location (where, with reference 
to the clock, they take place); and rate of recurrence (how often events occur) (1981: 1). 
The time produced, however, does not remain with the tools  themselves, but extends to 
structure the way time is  felt  and conceptualised in the mind (Adam, 1995; Birth, 2012). As 
I’ve conducted autoethnography throughout this PhD, I have at various points considered 
what my own conception of clock time looks  like. More often than not, when someone speaks 
the time aloud I see in my mind’s-eye the simplified clock-face on which I learned to tell 
time: a red bezel with a white face and different coloured numerals, which are met by two 
black hands, each with an arrow pointed end. Similarly, my visualisation of the week 
retains its  image in the standard issue homework diary of my secondary school. Each 
double page contained a week to a view. Monday through Wednesday split the left-hand 
page in three; and on the facing page, Thursday and Friday took the top two slots, with 
Saturday and Sunday made to share the bottom. To this day, both of these images retain 
their strong connection to what the time, and the time available, look like to me.
In today’s  city Zerubavel’s  hallmarks of temporal regularity are not maintained by clocks, 
calendars  and schedules alone but are also embedded within more modern technologies, a 
good example of which is  the smart phone. There are two things of particular resonance 
here. First, the smart phone has the unrivalled ability to combine in one object dimensions 
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of time keeping that were previously disparate. This is not only more convenient, but the 
added benefit of multi-channel communication is also appreciable. By text message, email, 
voice call, and even synced applications, schedules can be compared, and time can 
allocated evermore efficiently – quite in keeping with the dominant ideal of the fast-paced 
lifestyle. The second crucial aspect of the smart phone is the vast range of additional tools 
available within it. Apps range from diaries and to-do lists, to alarm clocks  and shared 
scheduling systems, each with the capacity to further extend the dominant hallmarks of 
Western time. One such example is the McTime app (Brown, 2013). Created for 
McDonald’s workers  to allow them to check their own and their co-workers schedules 
direct from their iPhones, scheduling becomes  an outsourced and unpaid aspect of already 
low paid work, in many ways epitomising the time is money mantra of large corporations. 
Moreover, it enables work-time to extend beyond the place of work with ease, allowing it 
also to structure an individual’s  experience of non-work time. What this  maintains  from the 
long established tools of clocks, calendars  and schedules  is the idea of time budgeting. It’s 
high level precision, however, manages to extend this notion even further. In this  app, and 
many others  I’ve came across, time works  only as a process of subtraction – something that 
is  worked back from and divided up, rather than being allocated and built from the basis  of 
need. This  further refinement to the ideals of clock time strongly suggests that technology 
does  not simply cater to time’s demands, but that technological advancements  strongly 
shape the form of  time available.
Beyond the smart phone and its  vast range of apps, similar refinements can also be seen 
within the ongoing development of the alarm clock. A number of recent models go beyond 
the traditional notion of an alarm that sounds at a user-determined time, to include 
functions which require active engagement from the user in order to silence the device. 
Clocky, for example, is designed for the “40% of people” who “abuse the snooze” – it “runs 
away and hides if you don’t get out of bed” (Nanda Home, 2011). While the Puzzle Alarm 
Clock (also available in app form) forces a level of cognitive engagement in order to rouse 
the user out of bed. It can only be silenced after a puzzle is solved (Ranjan, 2012). Finally, 
the Money Shredding Alarm Clock, while still in prototype stage, is  designed to literally shred 
paper currency after a period of time if the user has  not woken-up sufficiently to silence it 
(Olson, 2013). Such machines  might be readily dismissed as novelty items, and yet the 
message of the time carried forth through these mediums is  clear: time is  finite, and is first 
and foremost of economic value. Such is a sentiment that would no doubt ring true for 
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author Jonathan Crary, who in 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep concludes 
capitalism’s all encompassing colonisation of  the day (2013).
Finally, it is  important to reiterate that the messages  of these tools and technologies  remain 
in no way tied to the objects which articulate them, but through our use of such objects, 
these messages becomes further embedded into everyday life. Just as the structure of my 
homework diary continues to prefigure the look of available time in my mind, Kevin Birth 
impresses  that in modern life clock time is  largely experienced without reference to any actual 
clocks  (2012). As I’ve continued to examine my own temporality throughout this PhD this 
has certainly been true of my experience also. In my first autoethnography experiment, 
Everyday Life Without Clocks, I found that even when I removed all clocks from view clock time 
remained present to such an extent that I could continue to locate myself within the day11. 
This  was delivered in two particular ways. First, I found that tools  and technologies  that 
weren’t designed to tell time directly nonetheless  remained governed by clock time, and as 
such communicated it through their order and structure. The programming of television 
broadcasts, for example, maintained both a daily and weekly temporal regularity. Morning 
television was of notably different content from post-watershed viewing, as  was  weekend 
scheduling to programming during the week. The timing and frequency with which emails 
were delivered to my personal and work inboxes were another powerful indicator. My work 
alerts  largely sounded only between the hours  of 9:00AM to 5:00PM, while my personal 
account received a large volume of promotional content before 10:00AM and again after 
5:00PM. Second, during the experiment I came to recognise that my unconscious  familiarity 
with the ways  in my routine overlapped with Others’ was another strong indicator of clock 
time. Though I was not consulting a clock directly, both memory and the use of clocks  by 
Others that were proximate helped me keep time with the conventions  to which I was 
practiced. The findings of this experiment not only helped reinforce Birth’s  claims, but they 
strongly suggested that the construction of clock time comes  not only via its  technologies, but 
that it is stabilised in many more subtle, embedded and pervasive ways. 
– The language of  time’s articulation
One such subtle way through which clock time proliferates, and the second aspect of 
everyday life I want to consider, is the language common to its description and practice. 
Like the brief discussion of tools  and technology above, I found the relevance of this aspect 
to be revealed not only through academic writing on the subject, but supported further 
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through my autoethnography findings. Indeed, it wasn’t until I forced my perception 
towards  a setting that wasn’t completely dominated by the clock that I grew significantly 
aware of the extent to which the language of clock time was dominant in everyday life. Again 
in my first experiment, this  manifested through the ways  in which those around me reacted 
to time’s  quantitative indicators. Numbers on clocks  were frequently bestowed a qualitative 
value depending on how much time was left in the day. Only a hour left might be good should 
one be looking forward to home time, bad if there was a deadline to meet. These qualitative 
assessments  of quantitative time served not only to uphold the idea that time’s reckoning 
was  correctly conducted through a process of subtraction, but in doing so it reinforced the 
sense was time was finite. 
This  finiteness was  also a feature of experiment two, Same Space, Different Time. Each of my 
walks culminated in a forty-five minute tea break at the café in the Tramway Theatre. The 
first Tuesday of my walk I arrived 9:25AM, five minutes before opening time. I was not the 
only one waiting. There were two individuals, wearing business dress, each there to meet 
the other. Inside, and in the short queue, the two talked about how it was good they had 
found a time to fit-in the morning’s meeting, and as they discussed the tightness of the 
programme each cautioned the other over the non-flexibility of their interdependent deadlines. 
In contrast, during walks two, three and four, my arrival at the café coincided not with 
morning business dealings but with organised and informal meetings of mothers, fathers 
and their young children. Perhaps  these might have been imagined to be less tied to such 
rationalised measures. From snippets  overheard, however, two concerns were mentioned 
often: that their children were growing up too fast; and that there weren’t enough hours in 
the day. 
Each case briefly described is very much indicative of Adam’s assessment of clock time as  “a 
time that is running on and out” (1995: 56), a time that is fixed, finite, factual and linear. 
The extent to which this notion is  embedded, however, is  not only indicated by the 
conversational tone of the exchanges I’ve recounted, but it grows  even more apparent 
where the temporal lexis dominant to the practice of time is  considered. Time is enjoyed, 
made, found, sold, wasted, saved, allocated and budgeted. Many of these activities  are 
contextualised by the ways in which time is not only divided, but further by the way it has 
its compartmentalisation maintained via the suffixes of home, work, holiday, leisure, free, 
public and private. Moreover, good and bad uses of time are further supplemented with the 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME
59
additional descriptors  of economy and efficiency, and are often assessed with reference to 
deadlines, endpoints and delivery dates, in the longer term, and in the shorter term, by 
appointment start and end times, work time and non-work time, and weeks and week-ends. 
The use of this language of time in everyday practice serves  not only to reveal the fixed, 
measurable, linear and finite sense of time that dominates, but its profusion begins to reveal 
the way in which the commodification of time is deeply embedded within everyday life 
itself. And our almost complete turn to this language can perhaps be best appreciated when 
we recognise its place within protest also. Remarking upon conflicts between factory 
workers and their fight to reduce the twelve-hour day to an eventual eight-hour day, E. P. 
Thomson notes  that workers still “accepted the categories of their employers and [fought] 
back with them” (1967: 86).
That this  language of clock time is not only descriptive of time’s  form but extends  its 
descriptive reach to shape our understanding, practice and also our critique of time, gives a 
sense that this  language is not only indicative of time, but is constitutive of it. The 
consequence of this is  not only the construction and maintenance of clock time through the 
profusion of clock time’s language, however, but arguably more concerning it is  the 
maintained absence in language of that which clock time is  not. Indicating one such absence, 
and its  connection with practice, Rebecca Solnit looks  to slowness as  a counterpoint to the 
hurried pace that is a feature of  the modern context. Of  clock time’s language she writes:
Lost in the list is  the language to argue that we are not 
machines  and our lives  include all sorts  of subtleties  – 
epiphanies, alliances, associations, meanings, purposes, 
pleasures – that engineers  cannot design, factories  cannot 
build, computers  cannot measure, and marketers  will not 
sell. [...] Ultimately, I believe that slowness  is  an act of 
resistance, not because slowness  is  a good in itself but 
because of all that it makes  room for, the things  that don’t 
get measured and can’t be bought.
2007
Even for Solnit, the significance of this extends  far beyond a comparison between a fast-
paced lifestyle and slow one. Revealing the consequence clock time’s language has upon the 
construction and practice of time more generally she urges  that “[w]hat we cannot 
describe vanishes into the ether, and so what begins as a problem of language ends  as  one 
of the broadest tragedies of our lives” (2007). And in this sense, the very absence of an 
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alternative temporal language must itself be recognised as serving to reify the dominance of 
clock time and those ways of  life with which it is associated.
– Institutions of  practice and institutionalised ideals: education and family life
Finally, I want to end this  section on everyday life by turning to the institutional structures 
and ideals  which are not only driven by notions of clock time but which strengthen it further. 
The diverse institutions  which surround the work and labour of modern life are perhaps 
most easily connected here, linking quite obviously to time’s commodification in labour that 
is  paid hourly, and surplus profits that can only be understood in terms  of temporal units 
(Harvey, 1989). Indeed, Adam notes such a focus to be the most prolific of all scholarly 
contributions  to the study of social time (1995). However, given the relative presence of 
such accounts  within the wider literature, I instead want to look at two things which are not 
as  widely connected to the dominant time of modern life, but which nonetheless  can be 
seen to reinforce the ideals  of clock time as well as  reconstructing them further. The first of 
these is  education, a key site at which clock time is  learnt and at which its use is made 
normative. Second, I’ll look towards the family and how the institutional norms which 
surround family life afford clock time a proper use not only in the short term but in a much 
longer sense also.
To attend first to education. For Adam, a key aim of Western education is the socialisation 
of children, and time has a fundamental role in this  regard. Education, Adam argues, 
constitutes  a “hidden curriculum” in which the “dominant temporal structures  and norms 
of society are absorbed, maintained, re-created and changed in daily educational 
practice” (1995: 59). Perhaps the most telling example of this process is  the way in which 
time is commonly taught. Reflecting on his first experience of time as it was joined to the 
life world of  education, Levine writes:
Like most young Americans, I was initially taught that time is 
simply measured by a clock—in seconds  and minutes, hours 
and days, months and years.
2006: xi
Such experiences  are common throughout much of the literature (Nowotny, 1994; Adam, 
1995; Birth, 2012) and reveal two things. First, that a key role of temporal education is  to 
teach children how to tell clock time. The manner in which this  is achieved reaches  far 
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beyond the classroom, towards play at home. Throughout this  PhD I’ve made note of 
numerous  items  which at first glance pass as completely benign. Play things  such as a foam 
clock face with moveable hands, designed to suction onto the side of a bath; a “first 
learning” soft toy clock, again with moveable hands; and a wooden play puzzle with 
swappable numbers; not to mention countless  children’s books on the subject of time, from 
Eric Carle’s Tell Time with the Very Busy Spider (2006) to The Clock Struck One: A Time-Telling Tale 
by Trudy Harris (2009). 
On closer inspection, however, such objects are far from benign, and fall fatefully in line 
with Roland Barthes’ analysis of  French toys in Mythologies. He writes:
French toys  always mean something, and this something is 
always  entirely socialized, constituted by the myths or the 
techniques of modern adult life [...] The fact that French 
toys  literally prefigure the world of adult functions obviously 
cannot but prepare the child to accept them all, by 
constituting for him, even before he can think about it, the 
alibi of a Nature which has at all times created soldiers, 
postmen and Vespas. Toys here reveal the list of all the 
things the adult does not find unusual.
1993: 57, original emphasis
By the same reckoning those clock-based toys and books  described above – and indeed, 
playground games such as What’s the Time Mr Wolf and children’s television shows such as 
Tickety Toc (2012) – seek to socialise the child to a key idea dominant to modern life: how to 
tell the time. Moreover, working to fix this as “Nature” for the child, such artefacts don’t 
simply get the child to accept clock time, but leads them from asking more exploratory 
questions over what else time might be, either in their’s or in Others’ experiences.
This  “hidden curriculum”, as Adam describes it, extends beyond the silencing of questions 
over time’s  heterogenous nature to impart many other dominant notions. A great deal of 
these take place within the institutional setting of the school itself. Of this environment 
Adam writes: 
Even the most cursory examination of the way education is 
organized in Western-style societies  show that everything is 
timed. The activities  and interactions of all its participants 
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are orchestrated to a symphony of buzzers, bells, timetables, 
schedules  and deadlines. These time markers  bind pupils  and 
staff into a common schedule within which their respective 
activities  are structured, paced, timed, sequenced and 
prioritized. They separate and section one activity from 
another and secure conformity to a regular collective beat.
1995: 59
Thus it is  in the experience of the school day itself that dominant notions  of time, such as 
its measurability, divisibility and homogenous nature, are firmly established. Arguably 
much more influential than the content of their lessons, it is  this  embodied practice of 
moving through school which prepares  pupils for life beyond childhood and their entry into 
work. 
This  has  a further two-fold effect: the imparting of time’s  proper use and of proper order. 
The first of these is  embedded in two ways, through the child’s use of time and in their 
experience of reward or punishment aligned with either their good or bad use. To elaborate, 
where a child displays  the proper use of time – i.e. in accordance with the “bells, buzzers, 
bells, timetable, schedules and deadlines” – there are often rewards that confirm its  good-
ness. The giving of more time to the pupil via additional free-time, play-time or reading-
time, for example, or the cumulative rewards of a good report card and end of year 
certificate. In contrast, incorrect uses of time – late to class or repeated absence, missed 
deadlines, talking during lessons, fighting during play-time – are met with punishments 
which corroborate the bad use. Even more obviously temporally aligned than the rewards, 
such measures include the taking away of a pupil’s  previously spare time through detention 
and extra homework. Measures such as these further embed the rules  of clock time within 
the pupil’s  mind as  ideals likely to carried into adulthood. Secondly, as Adam points  out, it 
is  not just the correct use of time that is  taught in schools, but the correct order of it. The 
maths that a child learns in primary seven is different from that learnt in primary three; just 
as  different texts will feature in early school English, to those that will appear in a higher 
level (1995). Of  these “learning assumptions” Adam writes:
They encompass implicit assumptions about a ‘right age’, a 
pre-existing ‘appropriate base’ upon which to build, and 
about ‘proper sequencing’. They are premised on the 
supposition that that a child who has  not learnt to add up 
cannot be expected to grasp multiplication, that there has  to 
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be a progression from the simple to the complex and from 
the concrete to the abstract.
1995: 68
Finally, it  is important to note that the institutionalisation of time in and through education 
does  not simply configure time in this environment alone but extends  far beyond it to 
structure time as it is  experienced in other aspects of everyday life. As  mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the effects of the school experience accompany most into adulthood, 
and no doubt focus the temporal experience of the other institutions of work and life. But 
it is not just through memory and socialisation that school education holds sway over 
dominant experiences of time, education also enacts a more active and present role. Of 
particular note in this regard is  holiday-time. The duration of school holidays  strongly 
enters  the adult experience of scheduling, forcing parents  to work around a school’s  stipulated 
holidays. Even for those without children, the time of school holidays  might be a more 
expensive time to travel, or indeed a busier time, and this may lead them to alter their 
holiday schedule accordingly. Furthermore, while in one sense the vast proportion of 
school holidays  align with preconfigured times  – Christmas  and Easter, for example – the 
number of days allocated to these by the school calendar has a strong bearing on what is 
possible for these holidays, and therefore strongly shape the experience of those holidays 
elsewhere deemed important. As such, time is  constructed through the institutions  of 
education not just in socialising children to the fixed notion of time and the proper ways  of 
its use, but also by reaching beyond the institution to shape time as it is more broadly 
experienced in the present setting of  everyday life.
To turn now to the second topic, the family. As thus far shown, the dominance of clock time, 
and its  firmly associated features, find a particular manifestation in terms of what it is to 
have a good use of time in the short term, and can be understood as  normative in this 
sense. The normativity of clock time does not remain confined to the daily practices of 
schedules, timetables  and diaries, however, but extends much further to strongly influence 
and be influenced by the shape of successful life patterns in the longer term. Writing about 
the use of time across life, Judith Jack Halberstam considers its  dominant cultural form to be 
one that has  longevity “as  the most desirable future” (2005: 4). For Halberstam, the 
Western propensity towards  long life at any cost very much finds  its most natural expression 
in the times which characterise family life:
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Obviously, not all people who have children keep or even are 
able to keep reproductive time, but many and possibly most 
people believe that the scheduling of repro-time is natural 
and desirable. Family time refers  to the normative scheduling 
of daily life (early to bed, early to rise) that accompanies the 
practice of child rearing. This  timetable is  governed by an 
imagined set of children’s  needs, and it relates to beliefs 
about children’s  health and healthful environments for child 
rearing.
2005: 5
Within Halberstam’s description there are a number of ideas  which are critical to note. 
Deserving particular attention is the notion that longevity is  best maintained through order, 
proper scheduling and, perhaps most importantly, through stability and reproduction. It is 
through the idea of stability in particular that clock time can begin to be connected to 
behaviours and modes that at first glance may have nothing to do with time at all.
Marriage, for example, might on the one hand be seen as a life choice, or elsewhere, as  a 
culturally requisite expression of love. But where it is positioned linearly, at the start of 
family life, it enacts  a temporal gesture which is  about commitment, leading to stability, and 
onwards  to longevity. What it is even more interesting here is that that longevity is not 
simply contained within the individual’s  life, but extends  across generations. And here the 
importance of reproduction can be appreciated. One might live to be one hundred years, 
but that achievement would, under Halberstam’s reading, be lessened should it not also 
secure that individual’s onward presence in family memory, and perhaps more importantly, 
the attribution of “values, wealth, goods  and morals  [...] passed through family ties  from 
one generation to the next” (2005: 5). In many ways, then, family life is the institutionalised 
practice of clock time in both the short and long term. The short term extends the education 
of clock time from the school to the home through the maintenance of proper routine. And 
in the longer term, the clock time notion of linearity guides its users toward the pursuit of 
longevity which is  secured not just for the individual, but across generations who similarly 
adhere to the “values” and “morals” of  clock time’s proper usage.
There is  thus much at play in the ideal of the family which is  highly pertinent to the 
experience, representations  and conceptions of time that dominate daily life, and extend 
across  longer periods also. It is when this  notion of family time is  connected back up to the 
broader demands of the state, however, that its full institutional reach can be best 
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appreciated. Writing on the significance of reproduction in this  regard, Sarah Franklin and 
Helena Ragoné consider it a “potent symbol of the future, as well as  of tradition and 
continuity with the past [...] increasingly visible as  one of the most contested sites of 
contemporary cultural change” (1998: 11). When recognised as a site of cultural 
construction it is  revealed that it is not simply familial stability that connects  to longevity 
and the family, but that national stability is  of similar consequence. This  is  something 
clearly to the fore of Lauren Berlant’s  thoughts  when she considers  the maintenance of the 
“national future”:
Because the only thing the nation form is  able to assure for 
itself is  its  past, its  archive of official memory, it must develop 
in the present ways  of establishing its  dominion over the 
future. This  is  one reason reproductive heterosexuality and 
the family always  present such sensitive political issues. 
Reproduction and generationality are the main vehicles  by 
which the national future can be figured, made visible, and 
made personal to citizens  otherwise oblivious  to the claims of 
a history that does not seem to be about them individually. 
1997: 56
It is  in this  much broader sense that the true power of the ideals  of family life can be 
understood as a vital site of time’s active construction. Not simply do those dominant 
notions of clock time shape the short and long term practices of life that are deemed good and 
proper, but moreover, such practices in turn shape a population of time’s users with the 
propensity to transmit time’s  dominant practices through their familial generations, and 
outwards toward the nation state.
PHILOSOPHY
I want to end this  section on the sites’s of time’s  construction by finally turning to look at 
the construction of time in and through philosophical debate. Despite it being those 
accounts erected in the traditions of philosophical inquiry that Durkheim was  in many 
ways arguing against (1912), to my mind philosophy remains a key site at which time is 
constructed and maintained. Queries regarding the nature of time have long provided a 
basis  for temporal inquiry, even out with philosophy, and ruminations over time’s 
metaphysics have certainly proved an entry point for the more social concerns of other 
disciplines. The geographer Doreen Massey, for example, raises her worry that social 
debates into both space and time rest upon many contrasting definitions, the parity of 
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which go unquestioned due to an assumption that everyone “already assumes we know 
what these terms mean” (1992: 66), and indeed, Massey is keen to urge clarification in this 
regard. While in Time and Social Theory, a text pivotal in arresting time its more pronounced 
position in sociological thought, Adam embarks  upon a historical reading of the philosophy 
of time before embedding her discussions within more social matters (1990). And even in 
those accounts explicitly positioned against its traditions, metaphysics continues to exert a 
strong influence on their discursive framing, as  tellingly demonstrated in Fabian’s preface to 
Time and the Other:
WHEN THEY APPROACH the problem of Time, certain 
philosophers  feel the need to fortify themselves  with a ritual 
incantation. They quote Augustine: “What is  time? If no one 
asks  me about it, I know; if I want to explain it to the one 
who asks, I don’t know” (Confessions, book XI). In fact, I 
have just joined that chorus.
1983: ix, original emphasis
I too quoted Saint Augustine’s incantation in my early drafts of these chapters. I found it all 
too easy to get trapped in the depths  of Aristotle, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, 
Bergson, Heidegger and McTaggart. I engaged eagerly in their debates, over whether time 
was  a place or a relation; whether it was  a single dimension or the dimensions of past, 
present and future combined; whether it should be understood as  a process, a uni-
directional flow or an ever expanding web. At one stage, as  I searched for direction out and 
beyond the metaphysics of time towards the times of everyday life, these concerns formed 
a single, stand-alone chapter in this thesis. I eventually found, however, that it wasn’t the 
questions  I posed of time’s  nature to these philosophical tomes that proved remarkable. 
Rather, it was the fact that I, just as many others before and since, turned so freely to this 
body of literature in the first instance that made its significance felt and indeed made it 
significant. 
I’ve come to appreciate that the widespread attention garnered by philosophy’s 
commentaries  on temporal matters  is  not just indicative, but is productive of the discipline’s 
ability to speak truth to time’s  nature in a way that other domains do not. Philosophy’s 
insights  on time are maintained as somewhat more essential than those which look more 
towards  the cultural or the social, and indeed, philosophy’s transcendent analyses  similarly 
place their commentaries above those of culture and the social in everyday life. For Norbert 
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Elias, philosophy’s privileged position in this  regard sparks from a dominant assumption, 
carried forth from Descartes to Kant, that we are endowed with specific ways of 
connecting events and time is one of  those ways. Elias writes:
It was assumed [...] that the synthesis  of events  in the form of 
time-sequences  patterned humankind’s  perception prior to 
any experience and was, therefore, neither dependent on any 
any knowledge available in society nor acquired through 
learning. The assumptions  of such ‘synthesis  a priori’ implied 
that humans  possessed not only a general capacity for 
establishing connections, but also a compulsory capacity for 
making specific connections  and for forming corresponding 
concepts  such as  ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘substance’, ‘natural laws’, 
‘mechanical causation’ and others
1998: 39-40
Those “corresponding concepts” are of course the very subjects  of metaphysics  and of 
them Elias is quick to point to the extent to which they are “made to appear as unlearned 
and unchanging” by philosophy (1998: 40, my emphasis) – as things  that are not contingent, 
but natural. 
Beyond these concepts  it is  also prudent to remark on the discursive tenor of Western 
philosophical debate as  it appears to the broader academy. When viewed from outside the 
discipline, the philosophical arena is arguably marked most notably for its  complex, 
sometimes impenetrable discourse, and often self-referential styles  of argument. As such, it 
is  difficult for non-philosophers to engage meaningfully in critique where they do not speak 
the language. The same is  of course varyingly true of any academic discipline which seeks 
not only to advance its knowledge, but to maintain the premises  on which it is based. 
However, where philosophy constructs  a time which many from out with the discipline also 
turn to as  truth despite their inabilities to query why such things might not be the case, the 
potential for philosophy to speak factually of time beyond its disciplinary borders  is all the 
more pronounced.
Despite the fact that philosophy has  rendered time as  both “unlearned and unchanging”, 
philosophy does  not, of course, speak factually nor unproblematically of time’s truth, and 
one does not have to look too far to glimpse the constructed nature of philosophical 
debates and hence the construction of time contained therein. Key to this is  looking to the 
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manner in which philosophical understandings have advanced over the years. Indeed, 
examining such progressions  reveals that definitions of time have built upon one another to 
construct a maze of supposed truths, each of which conceals and is  complicit in its own 
construction. For example, the most general question of what is time? is, via Aristotle’s  Physics 
(1984), reduced to can time exist without change? in the accounts  of Gottfried Leibniz 
(1686/1992) and Isaac Newton (1687/1999) thereafter. Such a shift does not simply mark a 
re-framing of rhetoric, however, but strongly shapes the content of those temporal 
accounts offered. Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics, for example, continues  its  Aristotelean 
patronage in offering a non-linear account of time which sees substances contain the 
totality of  their past, present and future predicates at their very moment of  inception:
An individual substance includes  once and for all everything 
that can ever happen to it and that, by considering this 
notion, one can see there everything that can truly be said of 
it.
1686/1992: 7
While similarly, it is  this close affiliation of time and change which arguably led J.M.E. 
McTaggart to first establish the now widespread A-series and B-series  descriptors of time as 
devices to argue for time’s  unreality12  (1908). What is  most notable about both of these 
non-intuitive accounts  – Leibniz’s claim that substances in time are frozen postures where 
the past has disappeared and the future is  yet to come; McTaggart’s  conclusion that since 
his A-series and B-series are incompatible, “no reality is  in time” (1908: 8) – is that each 
arises out of an unwillingness to reject the law of non-contradiction, for no other reason 
than because it is  intuitive. From this  alone, the simultaneously formidable and complicated 
role intuition plays  in establishing philosophical thought emerges  for the first time, and 
when considered for its  function in each of these accounts it can be seen that truth is not 
truth at all but perhaps  just another intuition within an all too steep and wobbly hierarchy 
of intuits. In such things it can therefore be appreciated that time in philosophy is far from 
“unlearned” or “unchanging” but must be located and understood within the broader 
cultural and social context in which it exists.
Recognising that social and cultural constructions sit beneath even those philosophical 
accounts of time, allows them then to be cast amongst the excerpts at the beginning of the 
chapter. Philosophy’s  contribution to this  thesis, however, does not begin and end in helping 
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to further flesh-out time’s diversity. Rather, I’d argue that it’s  true potential lies  where its 
power not just to name, represent and specify a proper use of time, but to construct it at an 
ontological level, is  recognised. Philosophy serves not only to inform but plays a pivotal role 
in both representing and producing those realities  with which it affiliates, including within 
those non-philosophical disciplines which turn towards its counsel. In science, certainly, the 
productive capacity of philosophical ideas  is  immediately appreciable. For example, despite 
the fact that McTaggart’s account has been discredited as  inaccurate “his argument 
remains the locus classicus for scientific theories more generally” (Dyke, 2002: 137), and his 
descriptors of time – established to make sensible his argument – have been widely rolled-
out beyond scientific disciplines. And although Albert Einstein’s  Theory of Relativity is 
difficult to square with our more experientially informed understandings of time, it has 
nonetheless allowed physicists  to mathematically model the conditions  for the possibility of 
time-travel (Davies, 2002). These examples reveal that thoughts, theories and ontologies 
conceived on paper, have the capacity to take on very real and manifest forms as  they 
weave their insight throughout both the philosophical and scientific communities  of 
thought. Furthermore, buoyed by the more widely held Western belief that science 
represents  the world truly and accurately, such functions  do not remain confined to the 
work of science but arguably extend much further into other realms of life. Indeed, the 
literature recognises a very particular hangover from metaphysics in Western time. As 
Rudolf  Bernet considers:
The traditional philosophical understanding of time 
probably finds its  most pregnant expression in classical 
physics, and especially in the Newtonian image of the world. 
[...] In consequence of scientific theory ‘streaming into’ the 
praxis  of the life-world, this  traditional concept of time from 
philosophy and physics  has  come also to determine the 
everyday.
1982: 91
Bernet is certainly not alone is his assessment. The Newtonian model is also more widely 
recognised at the heart of our experiences, intuitions, understandings and organisation of 
time by Marshall McLuhan (1964), Tim Ingold (1986), Adam (1998) and John Urry (2000). 
Each have developed their own accounts  of the ways  in which Newton’s  philosophy has 
moved far beyond its  canon to impeach our experiences of everyday life. And evidenced 
via those immediately recognisable parallels  between clock time and time as  it is appears  in 
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Newton’s mechanics  – which when freed from the erroneous beliefs  of the human perceiver 
renders  time an objective, neutral, rationalised, uniform, uni-directional, all-encompassing 
and strictly linear thing – the power of their arguments can be appreciated. Therefore, not 
only is philosophy another of Western time’s influences, but in recognising the truth such 
philosophical accounts bestow on time’s  nature, the considerable reach of metaphysics to 
construct time at an ontological level is similarly appreciable.
The Social Construction of Time
My discussions throughout this past section have been in no way comprehensive, indeed, 
the maintenance and construction of time takes place at many sites unmentioned, but 
which are just as  relevant. Music, art and etiquette, for example, each carry their own 
temporal adherences to clock time, and serve to strengthen and maintain this definitive 
marker, as do a much wider range of everyday life practices, too numerable to count. While 
both the literature and my autoethnographic findings  offer some tentative connections  into 
these and other areas not discussed, it is, however, worth remembering that the task of this 
last section was not borne from any futile desire to explicate the absolute process  of time’s 
construction. Rather, its aim has  advanced directly from the first section of this chapter 
which argued that to grasp the politics  of time in an intimate sense it wasn’t enough to 
simply state that time was  socially and culturally constructed, but that our own time must 
be recognised within the assessment. Building out from the second section which 
articulated those most natural markers of Western time, I’m confident that it’s gone 
someway to achieving this. It has shown that the time which dominates the contemporary 
urban experience can be seen to be constructed in and through history, politics, everyday 
life and philosophical thought in the most personal of ways, and that its  ongoing 
maintenance similarly takes  place at those very sites. Furthermore, it has  revealed two 
additional factors which are highly pertinent, but not yet discussed. First, the construction 
of time does  not occur at these sites  in isolation, but occurs  between all of them 
simultaneously; and second, the maintained absence of that which time is  not is just as 
form-giving to the time dominant within these sites.
To elaborate on this  first point. While I have discussed them in isolation for the sake of 
thematic convenience, it must be stressed that history, politics, everyday life and philosophy 
exist in no way separate. Time is  represented and constructed, in, through and across  all of 
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these sites  in conjunction. Taking also into account those sites not discussed, this  of course 
leads not simply to one site but to a web of many intersecting ones. Illustrating one such 
connection between history, eduction and family life, for example, Adam writes:
In Western societies  we have imposed the monastic schedule 
on ourselves, our children and their educators. That is, we 
have adopted this  reified, abstracted time and its  rationalized 
control as an educational strategy.
1995: 65
And remarking on the connections  between technology and language, McLuhan notes that 
“[i]t was  not the clock, but literacy reinforced by the clock, that created abstract time and 
led men to eat, not when they were hungry, but when it was ‘time to eat’” (1964: 173). 
Similar linkages can be forged between any and all of those sites I’ve discussed. The 
metaphysical realities bestowed upon time stream into our lifeworlds through the belief 
that time’s reality is a linear one. Our common everyday practices  of time which sit across 
untold layers  mutate their own inescapable transformation from history to tradition. The 
tools and technologies  which materially maintain clock time extend its potential into realms 
not yet necessarily conceivable. Our common temporal lexis both mimics  and makes 
possible the articulation of time in politics and legislation. There is  no neat order to such 
things. In every one of these connections, and in all others that are here unspoken, time is 
re-articulated and reinforced simultaneously and multi-directionally. And arguably, it is 
through such a tangled web that the norms  of time that are contained in more isolated 
moments lend themselves to the hegemony of  clock time more generally. 
There is another crucial element to this, which is conveyed in the second point I’ve raised. 
The maintained absence of time which is  not dominant is  just as form giving as the time 
that we experience as  natural. Throughout my discussion I’ve given a number of examples 
which attest precisely to this: the French Revolutionary Calendar, for instance, or the 
difficulty of making sensible in everyday language those experiences which might remark 
on a less  objective, rational and mechanical view of time. Undoubtably there exist many 
more such moments beyond these, and though they are more difficult to unearth from the 
overwhelming presence of time’s constructed reality, it must be recognised that this is  in no 
way incidental but that their absence helps constitute and maintain the normative 
hegemony of  that overwhelming reality.
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From the discussions throughout this  chapter the politics of time can now begin to be 
imagined in a more intimate sense. Quite in line with the short overview contained at the 
beginning of this  chapter, time has been shown to be measured based on what is  of value, 
and the measurement of time in that particular way serves to uphold that value. And 
certainly, this value does not accord with the plurality of time and its  users, but with a select 
few for whom this time maintains their privileged social positions. But having looked at both 
those dominant practices of time and the sites  at where they are contained, maintained and 
extended, it is not simply the theoretical relevance of these concerns  for urban studies  that 
can begin to be grasped; they can now be positioned as  resonant amidst the more nuanced 
and everyday realities  of urban life. Moreover, the intimacy of these discussions have begun 
to make tangible the connections between time, culture, the social and the individual, 
suggesting that time’s  effect extends far beyond its own form. The emergence of these 
insights  means  that it is  now possible to embed such discussions  of time within the urban 
agenda of this thesis, which seeks to understand the way in which difference is  ordered in 
and through the city setting, and how it might connect to the manifestation and experience 
of urban ills. As such, looking to the functions, consequences and exclusions of this time 
will be the important and necessary task for Chapter Three hereafter.
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7 A write-up of  Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks can be viewed in Appendix Two.
8 I’ve purposefully omitted any reference to names, types, cultures etc. within these excerpts, the reason being 
to try and help maintain a focus not on the content but the affect of  the excerpt. A characterisation of  these 
times and their references are as follows: ONE: Nuer time (Evans-Pritchard,1940: 100); TWO: Corner time 
(Henry, 1965: 24); THREE: Queer time (Halberstam, 2005: 2); FOUR: Schizophrenic time (Melges, 1982: 
xix); FIVE: Balkan time (Hoffman, 1993: 78); SIX: description of  a thread clock (Mishnah, 1933: Berakoth 
1.2); SEVEN: Children’s time (Adam, 1995: 21); EIGHT: Protest time (Variant, 2010); NINE: Time of  the 
alarm clock (Autoethnographic reflection from Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks); TEN: 
Amondawa time (Sinha, et al. 2011: 15); ELEVEN: Women’s time (Kristeva, 1981: 354-355); TWELVE: 
Time of  bereavement (BPS, 2014); THIRTEEN: Sabbath time (Shulevitz, 2011: 3); FOURTEEN: Trobriand 
Islanders’ time (Lee, 1950: 91); FIFTEEN: Wahhabi time (Sardar in Ezzell, 2006); SIXTEEN: Time of  illness 
(Doty, 1997); SEVENTEEN: Time of  birthing (Fox, 1989: 132); EIGHTEEN: Time changing throughout life 
(Adam, 1995: 97-98); NINETEEN: Holiday Time (Autoethnographic reflection from Experiment Three: 
Experiences of  Holiday Time); TWENTY: Elderly time (Levine, 2006); and TWENTY ONE: Time 
unqualified by intellect (Appelbaum, 1995: 85).
9 A more functional description of  how this is practiced by some members of  the Muslim faith in Britain 
today is offered by the BBC (2004): “To test if  it is dark enough to break the fast, a white thread can be held 
next to a black thread outside. If  you can tell the difference between the two, then fasting continues.”
10 To be clear, while I am appealing to those dichotic models which Adam finds problematic, and does so for 
very good reason, I am not looking to reinscribe a simplified, definitive, non-contradictory and non-
problematic idea of  Western time. Rather, I am looking towards some of  those uncritical constructions of  the 
‘we’ implicit in the Other time.
11 A full write-up of  this is contained in Appendix Two.
12 McTaggart’s argument in brief: the A-series orders time by the non-relational terms of  past, present and 
future. In this view events must be acknowledged as undergoing continual transformation insofar as they 
begin as part of  the future before becoming present and then eventually fading into the past. For example, it 
only makes sense to talk of  the 2020 Olympic Games in Tokyo as events of  the future. However, in 2020 they 
will be events of  the present, and by 2021 they will remain forever past. The B-series, on the other hand, 
orders time events according to a series of  temporal positions which are relational and irreflexive. A particular 
time event either comes before or comes after another time event and unlike the A-series the event retains its 
designation. For example, the 2020 Olympic Games will always come after the 2014 Scottish Referendum on 
Independence. The relationship between these two events does not alter, regardless of  the amount of  time 
that has passed. In arguing for The Unreality of  Time, McTaggart demonstrates the individual failings of  these 
descriptions of  time. Attacking the A-series, he argues that describing an event as both past, present and 
future is contradictory, and therefore unacceptable. He goes on to consider that since the distinctions of  the 
B-series are permanent, then this may be more adequate. However, he considers that this would be a mistake 
as in line with the relational view of  time, and indeed the line of  inquiry posed by Aristotle, McTaggart 
contends that time is concerned with change. And as it isn’t possible to conceptualise change in time via the 
B-Series alone, the A-Series is necessary to constitute the reality of  time. He therefore concludes that given 
that the distinctions of  past, present and future are just as essential to the nature of  time, and considering 
their impermanence, time is unreal.
Chapter Three
TIME’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOCIAL
The Material Consequences of Abstract Time
Even in the most general sense those times  taken for granted, those times felt natural, have 
significant consequences  for life as it is  experienced in the contemporary city. The often 
told crises  of modern life – rising stress and anxiety levels; increasingly problematic drug 
and alcohol usage; progressive dependancies  on prescription medications; escalating 
tendencies for convenience products  and disposable modes of living, for example – can in 
many ways be read as  the inevitable manifestations  of dealing only in a time that is 
relentlessly advancing and running out. Such connections, then, offer a window through 
which to glimpse the processes  by which time not only shapes its own form but powerfully 
and materially shapes the mental and physical wellbeing of the broader population. One 
most obvious connection point is  through the modern propensity for a hurried and harried 
pace of life, the prolonged inhabitation of which takes a considerable toll on time’s users 
(Ulmer and Schwartzburd, 1996; Adam, 2005; Levine, 2006; Burnett et al., 2007; Birth, 
2007). Larry Dossey, for instance, goes so far to identify the effects of such patterns as a 
“hurry sickness”. Demonstrating his  claim, he outlines how the notion that time is finite 
inevitably leads to a sense of urgency, which in turn connects  to a vast range of biological 
ills  wrought on those who submit to the fast-paced demands  of urban life. Moreover, 
highlighting the mutually constitutive and hegemonic relationship between temporal modes 
and human wellbeing, he argues  that such patterns further perpetuate the perception of 
time on which they are based:
Having convinced ourselves  through the aid of clocks, 
watches, beeps, ticks, and a myriad of other cultural props 
that linear time is  escaping, we generate maladies  in our 
bodies  that assure us  of the same thing – for the ensuing 
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heart disease, ulcers, and high blood pressure reinforce the 
message of the clock: we are running down, eventually to be 
swept away in the linear current of the river of time. For us, 
our perceptions have become our reality.
1982: 50
In these afflictions alone it is  immediately appreciable that time’s  reach is not confined to 
an abstract realm but that it powerfully shapes our material existence. And where a reliance 
on the clock not only fuels  a sense of urgency within a person but forces them to overlook 
the realities of their own lived experience, these self-perpetuating, organic effects  are far 
from contained in the individual. 
For some theorists  it is precisely this disconnection from alternative, non-clock based cycles 
which is at the root of some of the twentieth century’s greatest man-made disasters. Kevin 
Birth, for example, connects early-morning decision making to the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl in 1986; the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989; and the Union Carbide gas  disaster 
at Bhopal, India in 1984 – arguing that morning is  when we are furtherest removed from 
the sensibilities  of clock time’s logic (2007). There is  also evidence to suggest that our 
submission to the apparent truth of the clock not only links  to discrete disasters  such as 
these but gives  rise to a whole host of institutional arrangements which impose a 
mandatory clock time on individuals  who are most in need of a time that better aligns with 
their distinct bodily cycles. In Patterns of Time in Hospital Life, Eviatar Zerubavel looks at such 
conflicts emergent within Western healthcare. One example he gives  is of the mismatch 
between the timing of patients’ meals and doctors’ rounds. He comments that “patients 
often ate their breakfasts  cold” due to lack of coordination in such cycles (1979: 36). While 
this  may seem a somewhat anodyne example, viewed temporally it speaks  to a most 
contradictory practice of healthcare: the abstract temporal structures adopted throughout 
Western healthcare are at odds with patients’ needs and may lead to a longer period of 
convalescence. Moreover, such clashes  are not simply inconvenient but can be extended to 
the gravest of outcomes. A recent study into UK death rates across  the National Health 
Service (NHS) revealed that of over fourteen million patients admitted to hospital between 
2009 and 2010, patients admitted during weekends were 27% more likely to die than those 
whose stay commenced during Monday to Thursday (Freemantle, et al. 2012). The 
researchers  concluded the increase to be a direct result of reduced staffing levels  of doctors, 
clinicians  and support staff between a Friday afternoon and Monday morning, 
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consequences which are again indicative of clock time’s effect on those who are most in need 
of alternative modes. Further supporting the analyses  of Dossey and Birth, these conflicts 
witnessed in the hospital environment powerfully demonstrate the material consequences 
that reified temporal patterns wreak on everyday lives lived at odds with their logic.
These are the obvious impacts. The consequences, that having recognised time not as 
natural but as a construction far abstracted from the plurality of life’s  experiences, needs 
and urges, become easiest to connect. The most powerful aspect of these connections lies, 
however, not in explaining absolutely the impact of dominant time on urban citizens. But 
rather, it is their ability to reveal that constructions  of time don’t just maintain time’s own 
form but that they also shape time’s users. Indeed, such a point is most central for Barbara 
Adam, whose work to demonstrate time’s relevance to matters  of social science has in 
many ways revolved around a central premise that the “way time is conceptualised makes a 
difference [...] it affects [...] our daily lives” (Adam, 2006: 7). From this  point alone time is 
immediately relevant to the ills of modern urban life insofar as  it can be now placed as  an 
active and critical force in shaping the material existence of those who dwell in the city, and 
hence the city itself. 
Where such matters  become wholly pertinent to this work, however, is where time’s 
material reach occurs  unevenly. As shown throughout Chapter Two, time is both 
constituted by and constitutive of the historical, political, social and metaphysical 
ontologies  of everyday life, which are themselves  unevenly and politically shaped. And so, 
where conceptions of time and their associated realities  appear to pass as natural the 
potential for normative modes  to emerge is  just as likely within the processes of time’s 
construction as  in any other moments  of cultural construction in the contemporary city. 
Indeed, just as Lefebvre argued of our understandings  of space, our understandings  of 
time are not power-neutral but are generative of effects  and inequities, and have the 
capacity to unevenly shape time’s  users and the broader social order towards exclusive 
ends. It is within these conditions, where time’s constitutive reach extends  far beyond its 
own form to materially construct and order the social, that the pursuit of urban temporal 
analyses become not only relevant, but urgent. As such, the need now is  to look beyond 
those material effects of abstract time in a general sense, and to examine those 
consequences which are uneven in their reach. This chapter will therefore proceed with this 
task by turning to address the second and third questions outlined earlier in Chapter Two: 
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‣ How does  the time that dominates  modern, Western life function to order, Other 
and exclude?
‣ What are the connections  between processes  of temporal ordering and the ills  of 
everyday city life?
Time’s Construction of the Social
Time is not merely lived in. Rather, it is constructed in the living whilst being very much 
constitutive of that life. Cultural values  shape our practices, ideas, and experiences  of time. 
These in turn give rise to specific ways of thinking, feeling, behaving and being, and extend 
forth to shape the materiality of life in the profoundest of ways. However, in a context 
where one conception of time dominates, time’s  material effects are uneven in their reach. 
Commanded by dominant groups  as a tool to reproduce their dominance, the ruling time 
not only casts a formidable weight against the sensibility of time’s plurality, in doing so it 
has the capacity to order time’s users  in exclusionary ways. In this sense, time is  far from a 
benign cultural backdrop but works  to unify, separate and to order people. In the modern 
urban context, where time’s  heterogeneity is  arguably at its most heightened, there are two 
key mechanisms through which it  can be recognised to function in this regard. First, and 
regardless  of its  character, the normative hegemony of dominant time works  to elevate 
those individuals whose ways of life accord with it, and to maintain the productive absence 
of Others whose temporalities  don’t align closely enough with the dominant mode. 
Second, the abstract character of Western time actively denies the experiences, needs and 
even the existence of those who live by different temporalities. Through each of these 
mechanisms Western time not only works to order, Other and exclude alternative ways of 
life, but musters a profound and uneven effect on the material existence of those individuals 
with whom they are connected. Looking to each of these functions in turn this section will 
now engage with the ways in which time not only constructs the individual, but the social.
NORMATIVE HEGEMONY
To look more closely to the first of these mechanisms. Dominant time functions 
normatively through the very same processes it works to maintain and extend its 
dominance. It is helpful, then, to better understand the unbounded course of its hegemonic 
march across daily existence. While my point here is  a more general one there are a 
number of characteristics  of Western time which help provide an apposite illustration, 
perhaps none better than the infamous aphorism widely attributed to Benjamin Franklin: 
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time is money. Just as I argued the broader point at the end of Chapter Two, time’s economic 
value is not simply contained within an economic setting but is maintained and 
strengthened across all other sites at which it is  directly and indirectly connected. Via its 
historical ascension it has  secured the tradition of time as  something that is  “saved, sold or 
wasted” (Adam, 1995: 33). Legislation both reacts to and maintains its  specific character, 
ensuring only that time as money is allowed an unhindered transaction. It both fuels  and 
moulds technology to continually advance its better measure. And it constitutes the very 
character of  labour, education and family life as they are institutionally organised. 
Moreover, at each of these sites  the notion that time is money is strengthened to such a degree 
that time is not simply money, but money is also more time. Those who achieve a more 
favourable proportion of money to time, for example, are also afforded the means to 
expand their existing temporal arrangements. They can secure additional time through the 
purchase of labour for home maintenance and child care; access faster, more convenient 
services  for travel, communication and the procurement of goods. And money also unveils 
the potential for a more temporally privileged social status, buying some individuals  “a 
place in front” (Levine, 2006: 114). This not only means that they are able to “make their 
subordinates  wait” whilst they themselves are “nearly immune from waiting” (Levine, 2006: 
114) but as Zerubavel explains of senior academics, they may even be deemed to require 
more “lead time” in order that their attendance or participation can be secured (1981: 
147). In addition to these features there are certain types  of time – holiday and leisure time, 
for example – that are in many ways only made legitimate within a context of time 
laboured and paid. From Zerubavel’s  commentary below it becomes clear that money is 
not simply a prerequisite to accessing the full and most privileged range of modern 
experiences, but furthermore, that an individual’s experience of time as money is  what 
upholds their broader right to access such experiences in the first instance:
Within the domain of work, the official recognition given to 
the ‘privatization’ of some parts  of individuals’ time – that is, 
to their right to periodically dissociate themselves  from their 
role and be professionally inaccessible at times  – is  most 
evident from the institutionalization of ‘paid time off ’ as one 
of the most common forms  of employees’ fringe benefits. 
Hence the introduction of paid nonwork time periods  such 
as  annual holidays, vacations, sick leaves, jury leaves, voting 
time, coffee and rest breaks, meal periods and wash-up time.
1981: 155
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In each of these things – both time as  money and money as more time – language plays a 
critical role. As discussed in Chapter Two, the idea that time is money is continually 
reproduced and strengthened through the very language that is made available for 
meaningful discourse. The sensibility of the idea, however, is  upheld and reified via 
additional means also. First, it is embedded to such an extent that it proliferates  even 
through negative engagement – that is, the idea that time is money is  not disputed, but rather, 
the source of contention is over how much time equals how much money. That arguments 
should relate not to the idea but to the appropriate correlation between the two is 
illustrative of the deep extent to which time as money is accepted. Not only is this  likely to 
be one of the reasons why an alternative critique rarely surfaces, it simultaneously 
maintains the myth of time’s objective nature in this regard, reifying it even further. 
Second, within this example it can be appreciated that these discursive regimes  effect more 
than just time, but shape the material extension of time’s users. Constituting the most 
essential backdrop to everyday life, such tropes  permeate all facets  of existence to such an 
extent that one doesn’t even need to say that time is money but only to exchange currency for 
services  rendered, consult a watch when parked on a meter, or leave the work-place prompt 
at 6:00PM. And this, arguably, is the most powerful way in which the language of dominant 
time shapes  time’s users: it leads them not only towards the ideas  of dominant time but to 
prolifically and productively enact those beliefs  and values through the embodied practices 
associated with them. 
While I’ve focused on one characteristic here – the idea that time is money – it is important to 
reiterate that my argument is  not tied to this one example. Rather, this  focus was intended 
only to be illustrative of my broader point: the hegemony of time is  maintained and 
strengthened at countless  points, and it is  in these selfsame processes that its  normativity is 
established. Indeed, in each of these moments  discussed, where time is  further 
strengthened so too are the hierarchies which support it, alongside the norms and value 
judgements of those most dominant. This  combined hegemony finds  an unmistakeable 
manifestation in the judgements  conferred on those who meet the standards of time’s  good 
and proper usage. They might be praised as sensible, organised, forward-thinking, 
responsible or well-grounded, for example. But these normative judgements  not only 
reinforce the positive character and social position of those who align with the dominant 
time, they carry weight for the time of Others too. And with the temporally construed 
assessments  of those who are not like the norm thus  established as objective facts  – lazy, 
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undisciplined and reckless, living on the edge, throwing caution to the wind, for example – 
it can here be appreciated that dominant time not only acts upon its own users but works  to 
order the temporality of  Others too. 
For Carol Greenhouse this  very feature is  “central to the business of time”. “Every 
temporal form suspends  or rearranges the temporality of the ‘other’ or others, this  is what 
formal systems  of time are”, she surmises  (1996: 85, original emphasis). Her emphasis 
suggests that such things are not simply a side-effect of time’s dominance but are 
themselves constitutive of it. And indeed, denied the discursive, practical or attitudinal 
stage to argue for their recognition, let alone afforded the dedicated technological 
advancement or the test of history to emerge as present in their own terms, those times of 
contrast are simultaneously implicated in and resigned to the exact same processes through 
which the hegemony of dominant time is  maintained and strengthened. Just as Edward 
Said argued of the mutually productive relationship between the orient and the orientalist: 
“we must not forget that the Orientalist’s  presence is  enabled by the Orient’s effective 
absence” (1978: 208). It is  therefore across both these limits, of absence and presence, that 
the normative hegemony of dominant time acts  to elevate those ways of life and values 
which accord with it, and to exclude all others  until the point that they align closely enough 
with the dominant ways. And in this  sense, the absence of those times which are 
dominantly defined as  not time is  similarly vital to the privileged position of the time that is, 
with both, together, resulting in a social order in which an individual’s  use of time relatively 
correlates to either a more or less, privileged or disadvantaged position.
THE ABSTRACT CHARACTER OF WESTERN TIME
To turn now to the second mechanism through which the seeming inevitability of Western 
time unevenly affects  those whose temporal modes mark them as  different to the norm, and 
extends to shape the broader social order. Throughout this  work I’ve commented on the 
abstract character of Western time and shared the views of those who argue that it is the 
dominant reckoning of a clock time which leads us from asking after time’s alternative 
natures. Be it the parallels Young and Schuller draw between Western society and Alice’s 
White Rabbit (1988); Birth’s argument that the clock is  a necromantic device though which the 
“dead think for the living” (2012); or the pervasive notion that the teaching of time in 
Western education is  complete when a student is  able to accurately read a clock face 
(Adam, 1995). The elaboration of each of these accounts attests to the view that in its 
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abstraction from human experience clock time helps to establish the natural character of 
Western time. Not only does this  secure the seemingness  of time’s inevitability but in such 
effects  Western time simultaneously establishes  a correct pattern for its  reckoning. Imparting 
the sense that time is told with reference to an abstract time-piece, it has  the capacity to 
order time’s users  by way of those who know time and those who do not, thus effectively 
excluding those who cannot tell clock time, and indeed those who tell time by different 
measures. Taking into account the thorough embedding of clock time across  all facets  of 
everyday life the exclusionary potential of this is far-ranging, similar to that which Marshall 
McLuhan expresses in relation to literacy and intelligence testing:
If the criminal appears  as  a nonconformist who is  unable to 
meet the demand of technology that we behave in uniform 
and continuous  patterns, literate man is  quite inclined to see 
others who cannot conform as  somewhat pathetic. Especially 
the child, the cripple, the woman, and the colored person 
appear in a world of visual and typographic technology as 
victims of injustice. [...] It is  in our I.Q. testing that we have 
produced the greatest flood of misbegotten standards. 
Unaware of our typographic cultural bias, our testers  assume 
that uniform and continuous habits are a sign of intelligence, 
thus eliminating the ear man and the tactile man. 
1964: 18
Indeed, later in the same text McLuhan moves to argue the eventual ordering capacity of 
such standards, and does  so with specific reference to the clock when he quotes  Leonard 
Doob’s comment that “[t]he turban, the sword and nowadays the alarm clock are worn or 
carried to signify high rank” (1964: 162).
In addition to maintaining its method of time reckoning as  natural the abstract character 
of Western time further orders its users  and non-users alike by working to ensure that they 
adhere to its proper use. As Darier argues, the arrival of clock time and the consequent 
commodification of time has meant that ideas about its sensible use have themselves become 
hegemonic (1998). One of the ways it achieves  this  in an everyday sense is  via the tools, 
language, philosophies, institutions and politics which simultaneously echo and make 
possible the ideals  of temporal regularity. This defining feature of Western time again relies 
on its abstraction from human use, but functions  in this instance through the more specific 
notion that times of  the same duration are interchangeable. As Zerubavel comments:
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The abstract conception of time is  also responsible for the 
fact that we so often treat time slots that are durationally 
equivalent to one another as  if they were actually 
interchangeable. Consider, for example, our ability to ‘move’ 
a one-hour class  or appointment from one day to another. 
Note also the quite common practice of switching shifts  in 
organizations that operate around the clock. It certainly 
presupposes  a notion that, if I do not work my eight hours 
today, I can still work ‘them’ on some other day, as if they 
were still the same eight hours. [...] The interchangeability of 
time periods  is  inherent to the quantitative view of time in 
the West and is  quite antithetical to the traditional qualitative 
conception of  temporality. 
1981: 64
What Zerubavel highlights  here is  how entrenched the notion of commensurability (that 
which can be made homogenous and uniform) is  to the order of Western time, and this has 
two key effects. First, in functioning by counting only that which is  the same it actively and 
productively overlooks difference. Assuming that eight hours one day is  identical to eight 
hours on another, time’s  more qualitative contexts, as  well as those more human facets  of 
being in time, are ignored. Not only does this work to homogenise expectations of what both 
time and the experience of it should be like, this abstract measure also functions to 
unevenly organise society. Those whose qualitative time aligns  relatively closer to time’s 
quantitative, abstract and commensurable reckoning – i.e. the time deemed sensible – are 
more likely able to conform to time’s  proper use. But where an individual’s qualitative 
experience makes  it difficult or even impossible to meet the standards  of temporal 
regularity, their use is deemed inefficient. And moreover, with the very idea that temporal 
modes might vary from person to person completely overlooked, those who fall into the 
latter category have no recourse to appeal such judgements.
Second, commensurability not only works  to construct proper uses of time, it also 
homogenises  the identities  of time’s users in time. Patterns, schedules  and rhythms of life, 
though they are uniquely ours, they are not lived alone. Illustrating this  by way of the most 
essential of  daily activities, Mumford comments:
Breakfast, lunch, dinner, occur at regular hours and are of 
definitely limited duration: a million people perform these 
functions  within a very narrow band of time, and only minor 
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provisions are made for those who would have food outside 
this regular schedule.
1934: 269
It is  not just in our eating habits, however, but across the day’s  routines  that we intersect 
most frequently with those who are temporally similar – getting the 7:32AM train to work 
each weekday morning; meeting a friend for coffee at 10:30AM on a Tuesday; attending the 
Job Centre every Thursday at 3:20PM to sign-on; doing the weekly shop on a Sunday 
morning, and so on. Indeed, so seemingly familiar are such processes that it is chance 
encounters or random events which become noteworthy enough to speak of. 
Certainly, as I moved through the city at different times in my second autoethnography 
experiment, Same Space, Different Time, I found myself feeling most at home in those times  I 
was  broadly familiar with. Between the non-peak hours  of 9:30AM and 3:00PM, for example, I 
recognised the spaces through which I moved – they were busy but not packed; lively but 
not hectic. By sight, sound, smell and even touch, the world outside just felt right. Out with 
these times  I saw differences that in various ways made me feel as though I did not belong – 
people snaking their way through pedestrians and vehicles, running for the train; red break-
lights stacked-up along the main route to town and exhaust stench full in the air; smart 
clothes crumpled due to exceeded capacities  on buses  and trains. For me, the psychological 
relevance of this became most pronounced when I reflected on my researcher status in these 
contrasting times. When I felt at home I initially found it somewhat more difficult to don an 
autoethnographic gaze – it took me longer to learn how to speak about those things that 
just were, those times that I was inside. In contrast, where I felt myself removed, it initially felt 
not as though I was  looking to my own culture but ethnographically towards other groups, 
as  an outsider gazing in. I came to recognise that this insider/outsider dynamic was not just 
an echo of the social times through which I moved but was  also productive of them, and I 
found Zerubavel’s work to again be particularly illuminating in this regard. Noting the 
“powerful function of sociotemporal orders in solidifying in-group sentiments and fostering 
mechanical solidarity”, his  comments extend my point from the psychological experience of 
being in time towards time’s broader role in organising social identities. He explains:
A temporal order that is  commonly shared by a social group 
and is unique to the extent that it distinguishes  and separates 
group members from “outsiders” contributes to the 
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establishment of intergroup boundaries  and constitutes  a 
powerful basis for mechanical solidarity within a group.
1981: 67
Certainly, that such regular and familiar arrangements  should be so strongly tied to group 
formation is  something that is  effortlessly appreciable within a spatial analysis. Different 
countries, different geographies, give rise to what is readily recognised as different cultures, 
ways of living and ways of being with Others. The exact same is  true of life as  it is 
experienced in time. And so powerful is this  temporal dynamic that much like the 
experience of someone who has never left their hometown or country, those who are 
regular in their temporal patterns arguably find that it is  not only the normativity of time 
that is homogenised, but the normative identities of  time’s users. 
In addition to working to homogenise the way in which life is lived and the identities of 
those who experience it in the day-to-day, commensurability also extends  this  powerful 
function across life as  it is experienced in the longer term. Different milestones, whilst 
abstractly defined, often function as  comparison points  in this  regard. Good age ranges, for 
example, are culturally and socially defined for leaving school, getting married, buying a 
first home, achieving career advancement, having children, buying a bigger house, retiring 
from work, and so on. These milestones  not only function in isolation, however, but as 
Halberstam comments, “in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the 
dangerous  and unruly period of adolescence as  a desired process  of maturation” (2005: 4). 
Moreover, the normativity of such patterns  must also be recognised, as this interview 
excerpt drawn from Adam’s research alludes to:
The decades  seem important – like watersheds  – important 
points  in one’s  life where one is  so aware in terms  of what 
one would like to be and be doing and that in turn to the social 
standards and to expectancy.
“Mary” in Adam, 1995: 3, Adam’s emphasis
As such, where such milestones are reached out side of expected parameters – the retired, 
mature-student studying for his  first undergraduate degree; the fourteen-year-old attending 
the hospital for her 36-week pre-natal check-up; or the divorcee in his late forties who has 
had to sell his  family home and move back to his parents’ house – or are not met at all, 
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broader differences which are elsewhere hidden become all the more visible and 
pronounced. Not only does this become obvious in relation to the shortcomings  of public 
provisions established in line with an expected progression throughout life but such 
normative standards also cast a powerful inward effect. This is not to say that these 
differences cannot be conceptualised or experienced in positive and empowering ways. 
Equally likely to be present, however, is the psychological burden of being the Other, the 
outsider or indeed, the outcast, which when cast against a dominant discourse that 
“pathologize[s] modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity” (Halberstam, 
2005: 5) is potentially as devastating and compelling as any material barrier.
Further to such structural and psychological pressures  to maintain appearance with both 
our short and long term apposite social identities there is  an additional feature of Western 
time’s abstraction which makes  the normativity of these parameters  all the more 
pronounced: its  uni-directional linearity. This again has two main functions. First, Ziauddin 
Sardar argues  that time’s  linearity leads not only to idea that time flows in one direction but 
leads individuals to orientate their lives  in similar ways by spreading the expectation that 
life becomes  better as  time passes (2004). If “you think of time as  an arrow, of course you 
think of the future as progress, going in one direction”, Sardar explains (in Ezzell, 2006: 
75). As such, it is not only that it it is good to marry prior to having children or to move from 
a smaller home into a larger one, but via time’s linear nature the order of these things is 
maintained as correct. Second, this  linear progression also works to exclude those who may 
live by different logics  by again hiding time’s  plurality. Sardar argues  that the deeply 
embedded notion of the past flowing towards the present amounts to Western time’s 
colonisation of the future (2004), and recognising a similar effect, Adam connects this to 
the rationalist tendencies which underpin the Western conception of  time, writing: 
The future is  considered as  a realm to be conquered and 
colonized. It is  considered to be a calculable realm of 
potential, a world amenable to prediction and control on the 
basis of  past experiences.
1995: 169
The limitations and emergent consequences  of such tendencies, however, become all too 
clear from Sardar’s  obvious  but often overlooked conclusion that “different people may 
desire different futures” (in Ezzell, 2006: 75). Greenhouse similarly comments on how 
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Western time’s  linearity leads us  to overlook this most basic fact. Writing of the “geometry” 
that “inserts official representations  of time in the West into the cultural analysis  of 
everyday life” she argues that the “orthodox canons of linear time [...] are by no means 
universal to people’s  views  on the world” (1996: 86). In Sardar’s, Adam’s  and Greenhouse’s 
comments  it can therefore be seen that normative uses  of time are not only strengthened 
through Western time’s  ability to maintain the idea of time’s  arrow as fact, but resulting in 
the colonisation of the future, its  capacity to ignore, downgrade or outright deny the 
legitimacy of  those experiences which would contradict such notions is also revealed.
This  brings  me to a final point in this section. The deeply embedded notions  of 
commensurability and linearity not only work to instruct time’s  users on the correct uses of 
time and the correct identities of time’s users, they also work to rearrange the time of 
Others whose modes  are at odds with norms outlined by Western time. Such a point is 
central to Fabian’s work. He argues  that “[t]ime [...] is  a carrier of significance, a form 
through which we define the content of relations between the Self and the Other” (1983: 
ix). For Fabian, the relevance of this idea accords firmly with his own project, aimed at 
revealing the long-hidden politics of anthropology to place its  subjects  in an earlier, less 
advanced time. Such partisan agendas are familiar to Doreen Massey also, who in 
recognising the modernist propensity for Grand Narratives in certain quarters of the academy 
writes:
Those who focus  on the terrifying simultaneity of today 
would [...] presumably long for such ‘ethnic identities’ and 
‘fundamentalisms’ to be (re)placed in the past so that one 
story of progression between differences, rather than an 
account of the production of a number of different 
differences at one moment in time, could be told.
1992: 83
I would argue that the political gains and intellectual conveniences  cited in Fabian’s and 
Massey’s  analyses are not only revealing of the temporal arrangements  of the Self and 
Others between cultures but also within, and are a most central point to how time functions  in 
contemporary urban life. As  shown throughout this  section, despite the plurality of time 
contained in the modern city we are afforded little access  to recognise time’s heterogeneity. 
Via the dominant reckoning of a time that leads us from asking after time’s alternative 
natures; in actively and productively overlooking difference by counting only that which is 
CHAPTER THREE
87
commensurable; through homogenising the identities  of time’s  users in time; and by virtue 
of its colonisation of the future, those different, alternative, Other renderings of time are 
irrepressibly hidden by Western time’s  abstract character. As such, where moments of 
difference are encountered it is  not simply that those who do not share the dominant time 
are judged as failing to meet the requirements  of normative modes, quite often they are 
placed behind. And by positioning Others so that they join the line of Western time at some 
point in its past, both they and their temporalities  are actively rearranged so as  to exclude 
the legitimacy of  that diversity, and hence those individuals, from the present.
THE TEMPORAL ORDERING OF DIFFERENCE
In Chapter One I expressed that a considerable motivation for this work was my concern 
with how difference was ordered through the contemporary city; how it appeared to hold 
steady, benefiting some whilst causing great struggle and hardship for Others whose ways of 
life were cast silently aside the city’s norms. Having spent the last two chapters looking at 
time’s dominant form in modern urban life; the places of its  construction, maintenance 
and reification; the material consequences  of modern time’s  hurried pace and abstract 
form; and the way time is not only produced by but is productive of the social, it is  now 
possible to offer some new insight into such concerns. There is undoubtably a time that 
dominates  modern urban life and the objects, ideals and norms  of this  dominant time 
merge with both users and non-users alike, marking out the sensibility of urban life at every 
site. As has been shown thus far, these standards attempt to impregnate and socialise 
individuals to such an extent that they appear willing to forego truths grounded in their 
times of representation due to an overriding consensus of what time is. And here, where the 
abstract nature of this dominant time ultimately denies  concrete qualitative time, difference 
is also denied and dominant time orders  urban individuals in an uneven manner. In this 
sense, time is  not simply a medium through which such struggles  happen but is  itself a seat 
of those struggles. As a vehicle through which a culture builds and sustains  itself – by 
attempting to promote certain usages into wider consciousness, and with them, the ways of 
life from which they were imagined – urban time is  at every moment both witness to and 
active in an ontological battle over what gets  counted as  real and what is  to be dismissed as 
fanciful or illegitimate. And just as  Lefebvre made his own arguments in relation to the 
production of space it can now be stated that time too lends  itself to the construction and 
maintenance of socially privileged identities, and to an underclass of those who either can’t 
or won’t conform. To re-appropriate his  terrible insight in this  regard, “the production of 
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[time] has  nothing incidental about it: it is a matter of life and death” (1991: 417). As such, 
with time too now appreciable as  one of the ways in which difference is  ordered in and 
through the city, this chapter now turns  to begin engagement with the third and final 
question raised in Chapter Two:
‣ What are the connections  between processes  of temporal ordering and the ills  of 
everyday city life?
The Shadowlands of Time
This  section marks only an initial and brief exploration of the question posed above. 
Indeed, in this one query alone there are incalculable dimensions  to address. In order to 
engage some of the early, tentative groundwork that might be important for such enquiries, 
however, I find it helpful to return once more to the attempts  of dominant time to establish 
not only its modes  as normative but to ensure normative identities for its proper users. 
Despite its  efforts to construct identities which complement and maintain its  hegemonic 
rule it is important to remember that dominant time is not wholly successful in this regard. 
In line with Glennie and Thrift (2005), Darier cautions against imagining that clock time has 
“totally replaced and erased other concepts and experience of time” (1998: 195); whilst 
Birth reminds that though the overwhelming presence of clock time attempts to render 
invisible those times which it is not there are many experiences, beliefs, ideas and concepts 
of time which “despite their invisibility, [...] continue to be felt.” (2007: 217). I’d argue, 
therefore, at moments  where clock time is  unable to contend with time in its  more visceral 
forms  – where times of representations are unable to match the realities  and needs posed by 
our representations of times – there exists  a heightened potential for conflict to manifest, and 
for the invisible to become visible through such clashes. And moreover, by looking to the 
identities present within such moments  it arguably becomes possible to glimpse those for 
whom dominant time casts its  most severe effects. It is  upon this logic that this  section 
therefore expands.
Two points at which such clashes  are arguably at their most heightened, and where the 
invisible becomes possible to glance, is in time as  it is experienced and time as  it is 
conceptualised. For example, there are experiences of time that though voluntarily entered, 
nonetheless provide a powerful lens into the alternative. Looking again to the collage I used 
to illustrate time’s  plurality early in Chapter Two, the description of holiday-time in 
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excerpt NINETEEN, for example, points to physical changes I myself experienced as  I let go 
of my habitual predilection for “checking in with the clock”. And certainly, the broader 
experience I captured through my third autoethnography experiment, Experiences of Holiday 
Time, confirmed not only ways  in which time was experienced differently during a period of 
disassociation from my normal routine, but perhaps more telling was  the way in which that 
disassociation continued to intensify during my period of leave to the point that my return 
to work felt as though I was returning to the life of another. Similarly, the time of 
meditation and the time of protest in excerpts FIVE and EIGHT respectively, each reveal an 
alternative cadence to that commonly expected of clock time, resulting in productions which 
range from a distinct lack of  “awkwardness” to a “different universe”.
It is  where alternative experiences of time aren’t so readily entered, however, that it 
becomes  possible to glimpse those sites  at which time’s dominant reach occurs unevenly. At 
the start of this chapter I considered the disjuncture between abstract time and other, more 
organic cycles of life. My intention was and is  not to isolate this a primary cause of urban 
ills  but this  connection nonetheless  reveals  many ways in which time holds an uneven bias 
for those whose lives manifest in ways incalculable by clock time. For Adam, “body time” is 
one key facet of  this, she notes:
As living beings we are permeated by rhythmic cycles  which 
range from the very fast chemical and neuronal oscillation, 
via the slower rhythms  of heartbeat, respiration and 
circadian rhythms, to menstrual and reproductive cycles, and 
to the very long-range recurrences  of seasonal and even 
climatical change. [...] Activity and rest alternations, cyclical 
exchanges  and transformations, seasonal and diurnal 
sensitivity, all form the silent pulse of  our being. 
1995: 45
It is, however, where an experience forces such pulses to emerge from beyond their silence, 
where one is forcibly confronted with a “body time” that no longer accords  with the 
sensibility posed by the clock, that the disjuncture is  at its most revealing. Looking again to 
the collage on pages  38–40, the poet Mark Doty’s reflection of his  partner’s  battle with 
AIDS in excerpt SIXTEEN, for example, brings to life a radically altered sense of the future 
that emerges  where illness occurs and mortality is  forcibly faced. And to this  same point 
many other experiences from the collage can be added, including bereavement (TWELVE), 
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birthing (SEVENTEEN), mental illness (FOUR) and old age (TWENTY). In each of these 
examples  attention is  forcibly shifted from time’s commensurability back onto alternative, 
variable rhythms of life. And in opening a different window, the abject disjuncture between 
the rationalised time of social construct and those modes  which present as  necessary where 
the organicity of  life insists that it is recognised, becomes unmistakeable. 
While the transformation to time in those examples so far discussed originates in 
experience, it is clear that a conceptual change is  swift to follow. Where time is 
conceptualised differently as a primary course, however, similar disjunctures are still 
discernible and also illuminating. For example, the conceptualisation of an ever present 
past in excerpt FIFTEEN gives some indication of not only why many activities common to 
modern Western life are strictly forbidden within Wahhabism, but moreover, why it 
therefore seeks to negate the very idea of evolution in human thought and morality. 
Excerpts ONE, THREE, SIX, TEN, THIRTEEN, and FOURTEEN further illustrate the way in 
which alternative conceptions connect to very different life practices both in the moment 
and going forward, including the lack of grammatical tense for the inhabitants of the 
Trobriand Island in excerpt FOURTEEN, and to the increased attentiveness  that the 
Amondawa pay the land in excerpt TEN. And perhaps what is  most crucial to recognise 
here is  that alternative experiences  of time not only shape alternative conceptions of time, 
but that alternative conceptions also dictate the experiences that are possible. 
Across these moments where experiences and conceptions are felt to clash with the pressing 
insistence of time’s objective reality, indeed within these moments, there is a presence of 
individuals and groups. In the broadest sense the identities of these individuals and groups 
are bound to particular diagnoses: those who cannot tell time or those who tell time 
differently; those who struggle to, or who choose not to maintain appearance with 
dominant temporal identities. By looking to the contradictions faced and the difficulties 
that emerge when these contradictions  are forcibly dealt with, however, a more specific 
insight can be gained. Consider the following example which brings to the fore the 
experience of  children:
Imagine yourself as a child in a classroom with adults  who 
speak your language but whose directions  you are unable to 
interpret, even though you may wish to please them. When 
you get up to see the gerbils, you are told to sit down, finish 
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your coloring and wait to see the gerbils  during free time. 
When you sit down to color, your paper is  taken away before 
you finish, because it’s  ten o’clock and time for juice. Before 
you finish juice, it’s ‘potty time’.
Norton, 1990: 1
Similarly, Till Roenneberg draws  attention to contradiction and difficulty that teenagers 
face where their time meets  the clock time of the education system. Noting that they “can stay 
up easily until the early morning hours and possess an unchallenged ability to sleep 
through the day – almost the entire day” (2012: 100), his point is  then made by his 
subsequent question: “what does that mean for all those young people who have to perform 
in school during the early hours of the day?” (2012: 105, my emphasis). Those suffering the 
effects  of drug and alcohol addiction emerge as another grouping to which the dominance 
of clock time might act upon unevenly. It is not the clock but a cycle of drug seeking and 
drug use which arguably fuels the regularity with which such individuals experience time. 
And this conflict is  heightened all the more when they are invited to rejoin the mains of 
society upon their sobriety. At such a point not only are they forced to reinterpret their 
bodily urges  in line with the clock, but they must also continually work to cast aside the 
sensibility of the temporal cues  with which they were so accustomed. Similarly, those in 
poverty emerge as a significant grouping for whom the everyday experience of time is  in 
contrast to the quantity and length of activities  deemed manageable within a standard clock 
time day. Dealing with the provision of services in the public sphere, the work of managing 
tight budgets, a greater reliance on modes  of public transport, to name a few examples, 
mean that those who are facing economic hardship not only experience an economic 
freedom that is  comparatively shrunk, but a shrinking availability to their time when the 
additional and labour intensive activities of queuing, waiting, budgeting, using public 
transport and shopping in multiple locations  are taken into account – that is the time it takes 
to be poor.
The examples  and commentaries I’ve provided throughout this section are brief. But 
nonetheless, they can be expanded to highlight a great many groups and individuals  who 
may experience and conceptualise time in a different manner than normatively considered. 
They include, but are not limited to: the single parent, the religious minority, the terminally 
ill, the unemployed, the child, the working poor, the insomniac, the addict, the rural 
migrant, the ethnic migrant, the homeless, the extremist, the traveller, the mentally ill, the 
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physically ill, the land-worker, the woman, the teenager, the protestor and the carer. And 
across  these categories, the potential difficulty and indeed inability for certain groups  and 
individuals to commit to an existence established through normative conceptions of time 
can be brought to the fore. But while these different facets  of identity provide some insight 
into those who might be unevenly and negatively affected by the time that dominates 
contemporary urban life – revealing one of the ways  in which temporal ordering connects 
to the ills of everyday city life – I want to be very clear that I’m not arguing that the 
relationship between isolated facets of an individual’s identity correlate to their 
marginalisation in any straightforward way. I certainly have no desire to suggest a simple 
typography of the temporally excluded and there are indeed a couple of points which 
reveal the shortsightedness of any such goal: the heterogeneity of individual time and the 
temporally constituted nature of  identity.
To elaborate on the first of these points. The heterogeneity of time that I’ve been arguing 
for throughout this work does  not simply relate to the existence of Others’ time in addition 
to the norm, but must also be recognised within the individual. The individual experience 
of time throughout a single day certainly proves  this  to be the case, in the contrast 
appreciable between everyday events such as sleeping, eating lunch, day-dreaming and 
waiting for a bus in the rain. Moreover, such heterogeneous experiences  of time are of 
course only magnified when appreciated across a life that is  strewn with experiences that 
force an individual not only to feel but to enter into different, unknown, and unusual 
temporal patterns, any of which might demand its  own behaviours, moral attitudes and 
senses and sensibilities which contradict the time that dominates. Many of the “body 
times” which Adam considers in her quote on page 90, for example, are most heightened 
within self-contained events such as  illness, travel, pregnancy, child-birth, bereavement, and 
so on. And though their experience is carried forth into the future, as facets  of identity they 
are often seen as temporary states that are entered into and then exited out of. As such, it 
neither seems appropriate in the short term nor the longer term to draw a simple 
correlation between time and identity. To look to the second point. In addition to the 
fluidity of the relationship between the individual and these facets, these facets  themselves 
are in no way static nor discrete. Individuals  who fall under just one of these broad 
categories  of identity are unlikely to experience the same degree of mental and/or material 
hardship than those who straddle a number of them. For example, a six-year-old child’s 
experience of a dominant time that does not quite match their own needs and experiences 
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might, depending on the child, prove challenging. Such difficulties, however, are unlikely to 
match the hardship experienced by a twenty-year-old who carries with her the childhood 
experience of being homed with a number of different foster families, has spent the last 
three years living between shelters and sleeping rough on the streets, and whose temporality 
is  strongly dictated by a continual cycle of drug seeking and drug use. Just as time shapes 
identity in the moment it also acts upon it over time. It is  therefore important to recognise 
that individuals are in no way fixed within these identities. And once again, this  means that 
the relationship between temporality and identity cannot be read in any straightforward 
manner. 
Nonetheless, whilst it is  important to stress  that the connections  between time and identity 
are in no way easily deciphered, I want to end this section by stating unequivocally two 
interrelated points. First, there are those identities who dwell in time that is  undervalued in 
the modern city. As Adam comments:
Children and the elderly, the unemployed, carers  the world 
over and subsistence farmers  of the majority of the world 
inhabit the shadowlands  of un- and under-valued time. 
Women dwell there in unequal numbers. Their time does 
not register on the radar of  commodified time.
2006: 124
Second, for those identities  who dwell in the “shadowlands” of time, the dominance and 
ordering capacity of clock time effects their further marginalisation and exclusion. Indeed, 
when it is appreciated that some identities  cannot or choose not to function within the 
confines of dominant time, and that time itself functions to actively exclude certain 
identities, work can then begin into how the problems of urban life manifest temporally. And 
though such a point marks  only the earliest of ventures into connections  between processes 
of temporal ordering and the ills  of everyday city life, across the vast range of ills 
considered throughout Chapter One the urgency with which time too must have its role(s) 
imagined should now at least be undeniable. 
An Intimate Politics of Time: reflections for research
These last two chapters have focused on point one of  my research problem:
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1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
My aim has been twofold in my address of this: to bring to life a sense that time is  not 
natural but is  in constructed in, through and across untold layers of social life; and to reveal 
that within such arrangements the reach of dominant time extends far beyond the 
maintenance and reification of its own form, to order its  users and non-users in 
exclusionary ways. As I’ve made clear from the outset, however, this is  not the exclusive 
focus  of this thesis. And while further engagement with these issues  might appear the most 
urgent and logical course, two different concerns inform the remainder of  this work:
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
Shortly, Chapters Four, Five and Six will move to detail the method by which this  work 
seeks to engage in the above. First, however, this chapter concludes  by discussing the 
rationale for this  more reflexive approach. In doing so it seeks to emphasise that points two 
and three above exist in no way separate from point one but stem from the very same 
discussions that have been advanced thus far. 
Setting out my stall early in Chapter Two, I argued that an intimate politics of time was 
necessary in order to fully grasp the ways in which time was  not only shaped by the few, but 
how it, though partial, had the capacity to extend forth and shape the temporal perceptions 
and material conditions  of the many. To achieve this  I took seriously the warnings of 
Adam, and others, who stressed the “[i]mportance of getting to know the unreflected 
backcloth of our ‘own’ time upon which ‘other’ times are constructed” (1995: 7). 
Autoethnography was crucial to the success  of that approach. It allowed me to see that 
which I took for granted, leading me to embed my discussions within the literature and the 
everyday experiences of my time. This not only allowed me to contribute to theoretical 
discussions surrounding the hegemonic and normative functions of dominant time; it 
allowed me to glimpse urban realities where norms  of time came to face alternative modes, 
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and to recognise some of the ways in which power, order and exclusion were formed within 
such encounters, continuing their interaction as they played-out over time. 
There was, however, another layer revealed in that intimate approach: the proximity of 
such arrangements to the context from which this  work has thus far been conceived and 
actioned, the academy. If I’ve managed to make anything wholly evident thus  far it  is that no 
facet of our being, nor the world in which we live, is  isolated from time. Time acts, renders, 
makes possible and ascribes  modalities across all aspects of our daily and long term 
existence, and the academy is not immune from the considerable reach and influence of 
the time that dominates  contemporary urban life. It sits  at, is  influenced by, and influences 
the exact same sites  at which clock time’s dominance is maintained and strengthened. 
Therefore, in pursuing an intimate approach this work has brought not one but two 
concerns to light, and which sit together only in an uneasy fashion: the urgency of posing 
temporal questions, and the suitability of posing them from within the existing traditions  of 
academic research.
Given the urgency for temporal urban research that has been established across  the past 
two chapters it might be expected that empirical work should begin immediately. The 
traditions  of academic research, however, reveal a number of reasons why such an 
approach would be foolhardy. First, the conception of time prevalent within the academy 
means that existing methods are unlikely to capture data suitable for this task. Second, the 
narrow-focus of existing methods coupled with the privileged academic voice, suggests  that 
any such research may in fact serve to uphold the very structures in which this  work is 
intending to critically engage. To look to the first of these issues. The doing of social science 
in many ways mirrors the dominant logic of clock time. Commenting on the analogous form 
of  the two, Adam writes:
Time theories  reflect the social sciences’ explicit concern 
with objectivity, rationality and the scientific study of 
Western, post-enlightenment society. [...] They represent a 
reality that can be taken apart and reassembled both 
physically and conceptually, a controllable reality that 
constitutes  humans  in the role of machine operator, even 
that of  maker.
2006: 120-21
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The mechanical rationality by which the traditional modes of social science inquire after its 
subjects suggests that a plurality of time is  unlikely to be grasped. Indeed, studying time 
through methodological traditions which are so closely connected to the dominant logic of 
clock time suggests  that they are also likely to be imbued with a homogenous view of time, 
and are therefore unlikely to capture the very essence of the concern which sits at the heart 
of  this work: time’s heterogeneity.
To look now to the second concern. It is not simply that such endeavours might overlook 
those times which are not dominant, but rather, in doing so they may further deny their 
legitimacy. Indeed, as Adam’s  comments  suggest, social science does not simply mirror the 
dominant metaphor which sits at the heart of normative time, but fuels  it further. As my 
discussion of philosophy in Chapter Two, pages 66–71 revealed, there is a strong 
connection between clock time and the dominant paradigms of science. And in today’s 
academic environment where science is not confined to its  own disciplines  but makes 
intelligible and legitimate much of the work that takes  place in the academy more broadly, 
this  of course crosses  into social science research also. As  such, the social scientist’s role 
helps  configure for society its higher level assumptions  of ontology. And in also prescribing 
for itself appropriate methods by which to engage within the realities is  seeks, it tells  the 
world not only its knowledge, but what knowledge is. That the basic categories  and 
assumptions  of social science should render many things about time invisible, then, is all 
the more concerning. Indeed, not all time is  commensurable; not all time can be counted; 
not all time is money. But where research is  unable to capture such realities  of time, it is  likely 
to reproduce and uphold the dominant conception through which its activities  are 
conceived, whilst maintaining the absence of those very times which are characteristic of 
Others.
Where existing methods not only run the risk of overlooking the main categories  of 
temporal research but have the potential to uphold and strengthen them further, how does 
one study time? How can it be made multiple; how can its transformative power be captured; how can 
we be taken from of  our natural attitudes? For Adam the answer is simple:
We have to let go of the illusion of an objectively observable 
reality uncontaminated by observation and unaffected by 
times, most specifically, the invisibles of  pasts and future
1995: 73
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Such adjustments  not only change the face of individual methods but calls  into question 
the corner stones  of social science research: validity, generalisation, verifiability, truth, and 
so on. It also reveals that there is a need to ask questions  of those ontologies counted as real 
and those implicitly consigned to an Othered fate. As such, it is  with this in mind that this 
work continues  to seek its subject, and in that spirit that the discussion of method in the 
next three chapters proceeds.
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II
METHOD AND APPROACH
Chapter Four
OF THINGS CRACKED AND DULLY JARRING
Introduction
As I’ve written this thesis  thus  far I’ve frequently embedded my discussions  within my own 
experiences, giving information as  to those more personal origins of this  work I find myself 
able to isolate. As I’ve done this, the following reflection from Michel Foucault has 
remained central in my mind, reminding me not only of the relevance but the importance 
of  this approach to academic writing:
Each time I have attempted to do theoretical work, it has 
been on the basis  of elements  from my experience – always 
in relation to processes that I saw taking place around me. It 
is  in fact because I thought I recognized something cracked, 
dully jarring, or dysfunctioning in things  I saw, in the 
institutions with which I dealt, in my relations  with others, 
that I undertook a particular piece of work, several 
fragments of  an autobiography.
quoted in Rajchman, 1985: 35-36
The productive sparks generated via things cracked and dully jarring, and the biographical 
nature of their reckoning to which Foucault nods, resonate with the origins and approach 
of this work. My research problem, though I have often presented it formalised across 
three, neat tiers, certainly did not make itself known in such a way. It announced itself 
slowly, iteratively – emerging through personal moments  which sat outside its direct content 
and were much more suddenly felt. As  I turn now in these next three chapters  to discuss 
and describe the methodological approach this work has adopted in order to get at the 
research problem identified, it must be said that the same is  true of its  development. While 
I am now able to discuss  it in such a way that it may appear conceptually and theoretically 
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fitting, the truer face of its production was messy, disordered and complex; marked by long, 
confusing aporias and hiatuses of intellectual confidence. All too often it seems that these 
stories of a messier, inconsistent, uncomfortable and more personal tone are written out 
from those more traditional methodological commentaries, which instead opt to formally 
bridge a thesis’ aims to its findings, extolling their own rational, objective and verifiable 
virtues as they go. In choosing to position himself at the core of his  work, however, 
Foucault’s  reflections come in stark contrast to this  more traditional presentation of 
research. And more significantly, in bringing to life his own work in this way his  quote 
serves as a powerful reminder that the researcher in no way stands  isolated from their 
subject. A simple point that nonetheless  has the potential to significantly alter both the 
orientation and scope of the research endeavour, as I will aim to show across these next 
three chapters. 
It is within the spirit of this  much more reflexive approach that I now turn to discuss  those 
things which sit internal and external to this work, informing the research agenda and the 
research approach that is  possible. As  made clear in the Preface, the positioning of these 
chapters is  in no way indicative of the point at which the research and method of this work 
commenced. Nonetheless, now remains  a suitable point at which to (a) consider, in more 
detail, those things  which have impressed constraint upon the scope and organisation of 
this  work; and (b) describe and defend how I’ve navigated such parameters in order to 
carry out my research within those frames considered. This  chapter deals with part (a) of 
these discussions. It begins by looking once more to the origins of this work but this  time 
considers  the emergence of my three-tiered research problem as  cracks emerging from a 
broader, and more personally motivated concern: social justice. This is  followed by a 
statement of the aims  of this work, formalised in relation to those factors  discussed. After 
this  I move to consider how those cracks discussed have similarly guided and constrained the 
approach of this  research in ways  that sit outside the specificities of this  project. Having 
more fully articulated both the aims of this  research and those factors which delineate its 
approach, Chapter Five then moves to discuss part (b). I start by looking at the 
methodological approach of this work in the broadest terms. I then look in detail to the 
development and practice of that methodology within those sites  at which I direct my 
attention: the self and the urban studies  canon. These discussions  take into account the 
methods I adopted to gain insight, and how I worked to ensure that these methods were 
effectively employed. Chapter Six then draws a close to part (b) of this methodological 
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discussion. Arguing that the performance of this work is  just as important as  those answers I 
seek to find, this  chapter presents the other research practices that have taken place as I’ve 
undertaken the project of  this PhD research.
Cracks: development of a research problem
As stated throughout, this work proceeds from the following three-tiered research problem:
1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
Arising from a particular context and my relations within it, and sitting across  multiple and 
intersecting sites  of experience, the encounters  from which this work proceeds, however, 
were not borne as the formalised problem set out above. Rather, each point grew iteratively, 
as  a series  of cracks first made themselves known, and then undeniable. As  the stories in this 
thesis have indicated thus far, my attention was initially grabbed when I began to see the 
hegemony, normativity, power and exclusion inherent in a time that had previously 
appeared uncomplicated, benign and, indeed, natural to me. The urgency of this concern, 
however, was  subsequently tempered by my more startling realisation that a 
problematisation of such issues  was largely absent within urban studies’ dominant readings 
of the city. And finally, where I came not only to recognise but to sense that understandings 
of the urban were in no way isolated from the time dominant to the modern, urban 
experience, my attention shifted towards the ways  in which the academy was itself 
constituted by and productive of  those temporal tensions identified. 
In Chapters Two and Three of this thesis I chose to isolate and engage within only the first 
of these points. And though that choice served my discussion well it must again be stated 
that these points  exist in no way separate. The common skein which binds  each of them 
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together and motivates their transformation is  a concern with social justice. Indeed, it is 
through this  thread that these cracks have found their way from the realm of personal 
experience to their constitutive place in the formal research agenda above. Therefore, 
before presenting the aims  of this work as  they relate to my research problem I want to take 
the opportunity to review my argument in such a way that makes prominent the 
significance of  these points to broader, and more ethically charged issues of  social justice. 
THE TEMPORAL AND ONTOLOGICAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Though perhaps not immediately apparent from the way it is  often, and seemingly 
unproblematically deployed throughout the social sciences, including those discussions of 
an urban bent, social justice is  not a neutral term. For some urban theorists its  sense cannot 
be divorced from matters of spatial justice. Such positions contend that full, un-restricted 
access to constructing, participating and being equal in society is  derived from and reliant 
on the same concessions  in space (see Soja, 2009; 2010 and Marcuse, 2009). For others, 
though the term is  less conceptually restrictive, it nonetheless remains tied to spheres of 
justice, such as  property, money, cultural and social capital, democratic participation, 
freedom of expression, for example. At each point it is  invoked it already means something 
and the same is  of course true of its presence within this thesis. I find that my 
understanding and use of the term in this work cannot be separated from prior 
connections I’d made between the ways in which cultural norms were produced in and 
through the very fabric of the city, and the manner in which such norms ordered difference 
and excluded those whose ways of life fell out with dominant urban logics. Indeed, it was 
here that I first noticed encounters  between the city and difference, and made multi-layered 
linkages between such processes  and the ills of modern, urban life. Nonetheless, as this 
work has progressed the term has undergone additional shaping and its thrust and 
significance herein is connected at two distinct but interrelated points: to the temporal and 
the ontological.
To look first to the temporal connection I make with social justice. In many ways this  is 
very much implied in my identification and formalisation of the first crack of this  work as a 
research problem. Pointing towards a normative, hegemonic process via which time is 
naturalised my very statement of point one suggests  this to be a marked concern for those 
who use, experience or conceptualise time in ways  that deviate from the normative – 
something I’ve attempted to evidence throughout Chapters  Two and Three. To briefly re-
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cap these discussions: though time’s  dominant appearance in the contemporary city 
renders  it as largely natural, examples which evidence time’s construction are readily 
gathered where we challenge the common sensibilities  of our seemingly natural temporal 
modes. Of those so far discussed in this work, perhaps most obvious are the clocks, 
calendars  and schedules  which make sensible the ideal of temporal regularity. These 
objects simultaneously serve to normalise the experience of time whilst firmly linking it to 
ideas attesting to its proper use – the impoliteness of being late, for example, or the respect 
afforded to those who complete tasks in a timely manner. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 
Three, proper notions are also abundant in relation to time as it extends  across a lifetime, 
such as  those paradigmatic markers  of birth, marriage, reproduction, retirement and 
death. Yet even these can be appreciated as constructed when alternative temporal logics 
are made visible. And where it is  recognised that diversity is to be found in all quarters of 
the city it is  no great leap to argue that those who take ease in social, economic and cultural 
modes which lie outside the norm may also perceive and experience time differently. 
Ultimately, this suggests that the difficulty and perhaps  inability for certain individuals or 
groups to commit to an existence established through normative conceptions of time must 
also be considered germane as far as matters of social justice are concerned. Following this 
realisation questions  are immediate. Does a single parent who finds  it necessary to work 
two jobs have the same ability to access  and participate in romantic time? Is an individual 
who allocates  a daily portion of time for religious  prayer at a disadvantage to meet the full 
requirements of culture proper? Will an addict’s  recovery be thwarted when their access to re-
enter the mains  of society via the labour market is  predicated on their ability to conform to 
clock time? And moreover, do the reduced capacities of these individuals  to meet normative 
time’s paradigmatic markers cast additional negative assertions  on their societal reputation? 
Though such inquiries hardly begin to capture those questions which must be posed of 
time as it relates to social justice their acute sensibility nonetheless  demonstrates that 
cultural modes which contrast with the normative expand beyond a different way of 
generating and experiencing space to also include different expressions of  time.
Though it is  admittedly less immediate, the connection this  work makes  between social 
justice and ontology is  captured in the formalisation of points two and three. However, 
where the potential consequences of points  one, two and three are examined not discretely 
but as  they combine, it becomes possible to rescue points  two and three from abstraction 
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and position their significance firmly alongside the nested concerns  of the first. Indeed, it is 
this  that reveals  that those forgotten facets  of social justice relate not simply to urban issues 
of a temporal nature but that it is  just as important to pursue such struggles  at an 
ontological level also. To demonstrate this  claim I find it prudent to begin and end with 
policy – the site through which I entered my academic work on this  topic – and to firstly 
state that formulations  of urban policy do not rest confined to the medium of their 
articulation but shape the manifest form of the city and its  citizens. The ideas  which 
influence urban policy are multiple, borne amongst political aspirations, election 
manifestos, party allegiances, public pressures, local and national pride, the guise of 
necessity, and so on. But sitting somewhat out of view, constraining the form of the arena 
in which such claims  are heard as  legitimate, the theoretical imagining of the city is  of 
great import. In writing urban policy, policy makers draw freely on understandings of how 
cities  work; how they can be improved; how their problems can be minimised – answers 
which by and large transpire through the theoretical and empirical activities  of the 
contemporary academy. Within such accounts, however, policy makers are inculcated not 
only what to measure, but how to measure it; not only what to think, but how to think it; 
not only what to see, but how to see it. Moreover, in acknowledging both desires for and 
claims to evidence-based policy, the knowledge output of the modern academy – which 
includes not simply the content of its accounts but the prevailing paradigms  which 
underpin such understandings – is  afforded a great power to extend its reach far beyond 
the seat of its productions and strongly influence the policy that comes  to fruition. Indeed, 
its noted authority and expertise in this  regard suggests  that it has the capacity to shape 
everyday urban life in the profoundest of ways. This  reveals that the academy is not simply 
a site from which social justice can be studied in a multitude of registers, but rather, that 
the academy itself must also be examined for how its explicit and implicit knowledge 
productions act upon the city. 
It is  here that it should become apparent that social justice is not simply a concern of the 
material and tangible – that which can be counted, held and conceptualised within 
prevailing understandings  – but that it must be expanded to bring into view to the politics 
which surround the dominant methodological, epistemological and ontological conditions 
of academic thought. Indeed, I very much believe that social justice relates not simply to 
everyday experiences  of life but to whose realities  are recognised as real within it and whose 
are dismissed as fanciful or illegitimate. As argued above, the academy has a powerful role 
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to play in this regard, and no less  so than as it concerns the temporal focus of this work. 
The complexity of the city necessitates that the theories  which describe it are 
incontrovertibly incomplete. However, as cracks two and three suggest, an entire analytical 
category has fallen from the urban studies’ agenda. Within this  discipline time is rarely 
made available as  contingent or constructed; its  nature is instead fixed as  natural and hence 
unproblematic. The academy’s  role can be further articulated here by recognising two key 
points. First, the absence of temporal analyses is  arguably augmented by the widespread 
presence of spatial approaches to urban topics. As Judith Jack Halberstam argues, the 
commonly held assertion that space is the primary lens through which to view the city in 
effect serves to conceal a normative and naturalised view of time which has  “become 
hegemonic in academic practices” (2005: 6). Second, as  considered at the end of Chapter 
Three, there is  evidence to suggest that the academy itself is imbued with a temporal logic 
which sits  in accordance with the dominant temporal norms  and that it in effect transmits, 
maintains and stabilises such norms through its  activities. Therefore in each of these things 
there exists a very real danger that key temporal differences which expose the complexity of 
different cultural and social groups within the contemporary city become invisible, and as 
such are delegitimised. 
As dominant imaginings  of the city filter down to the policy level, temporal questions  of 
social justice, like those posed on page 104, are routinely overlooked. It is, after all, a policy 
approach founded on a homogenous and naturalised view of time and temporality, and 
though it might be faced with realities which strongly contradict that position it has  neither 
motivation nor capacity to see them and then suitably react. Moreover, in requiring 
individuals to conform to a proper use of time in order to make best use of public services, 
policy runs  the risk of rendering those who don’t conform, whether this  is through choice 
or circumstance, as  victims  of further injustice. Where policy has  a role in not simply 
reacting to but proactively shaping the material form of the city, such omissions  are even 
further heightened. For example, conceiving of social exclusion as  a spatial issue of 
neighbourhood deprivation might lead to the design of a policy response which fails  to 
account for the temporal barriers which excluded groups and individuals  may encounter. 
The long-term, qualitative legacy claims used to support the hosting of mega-sporting 
events  might be unachievable where their temporal parity with short-term actions  – 
predicated on the meeting of quantitative spatial and economic targets – has simply been 
assumed. Again, such scenarios mark only the start of engagement but in each of these 
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things discussed what can be seen is that temporal concerns  of social justice stand in no 
way isolated from those ontological concerns discussed. And with policy, urban theory and 
the prevailing philosophical orientations of academic research all currently insufficient to 
meet the temporal lived realities  of individuals as they are conceived in their plurality, 
ultimately it is suggested that regardless of whether such cracks emerge from the theoretical 
imagining of the city in writing or the practice of it through policy and research, questions 
of social justice must be posed simultaneously of the temporal, the ontological and all areas 
in between. Indeed, it is across all facets  that time comes to colour the ways of life that are 
considered normal and proper in the city, and therefore across all facets that my concerns 
of  temporal social justice must accordingly respond.
AIMS OF THIS WORK
Having explored the first point of the research problem in Chapters Two and Three of this 
work via the available literature on time and my own autoethnographic research, my 
primary engagement with this  topic now moves  to an institutional level, at the site of the 
academy. Specifically, my interest lies  in how, where, and when has time become 
naturalised within urban theory and to consider how this  links to the naturalisation of time 
in everyday life. Beyond this, the aim is to examine the impact of such thought as it 
manifests  through the actuality of the city, and to develop an understanding of those 
conditions  necessary to include a more temporally aware agenda within urban research. 
Framed via my three-tiered research problem, the main objective of  this study is therefore:
‣ To expose the socially constructed nature of time in order to recast time and 
temporality as  critical factors  in the formation of urban culture and the 
organisation of  urban society, which warrant detailed future study.
More specifically, this work aims to:
‣ bring to life time’s  social construction, and with it, to highlight sites of its  normative 
function in the contemporary city; 
‣ open up dialogue on the meaning of  time and temporality in the city; 
‣ consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions  which have 
contributed to time’s naturalisation;
‣ help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; and
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‣ stress  the need to consider contemporary urban problems  from a temporal 
perspective.
In pursuing these aims, however, it is  not just those things which stand internal to the 
project’s  content which lend themselves  to its  development. There exist many external 
factors which are similarly motivated by my understanding of social justice and these too 
have served to guide and constrain the shape of my approach in quite signifiant ways. 
Therefore, before moving to describe and defend the approach designed in order to meet 
these aims  in Chapter Five, I first want to offer some discussion of those factors which sit 
outside the specificities  of this project but which nonetheless  have a notable bearing on 
what is possible in this work. 
Cracks: development of a research approach
Recognising the ever-present self in the motivation and development of research work – as 
Foucault does in his quotation which opened this  chapter and as I have tried to show 
throughout this thesis  thus far – also supports a need to delineate those things which frame 
research but which are not necessarily explicit within the formalisation of its  problem(s). 
Apposite here is once again my concern with social justice. This has had a bearing not 
simply on the problem with which this work engages  but it has strongly informed the 
approach called forth to answer it. In this final section, I therefore want to look at those 
things which sit just out of view but which have nonetheless had a formative presence on 
the shape of my broader research practice and hence the research and presentation of this 
work. 
Of particular relevance is  the philosophical stance which underpins  my view of academic 
research. Given that this work looks not only directly to issues of urban time and 
temporality but also turns to question the points  of their absence within the urban field 
already indicates that it is not simply the concrete and tangible which garner my interest 
but perhaps more so, it is  those conditions which give rise to what is  seen and what gets 
counted as  real which truly spark my curiosity. While this  framing of the problem of social 
justice is  in no way unique, it does again stand in contrast to the more traditional 
orientations from which academic work might commonly proceed in urban studies. I 
therefore consider it important to make explicit my orientation towards this  work as it 
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relates  to understandings of reality, knowledge, and the activities  of academic research 
more generally.
My approach to research is rooted in the belief that reality is multiple, constructed through 
the interactions between individuals, institutions, ideas, objects and texts. I view society and 
culture as emergent ontological forms which exist in a constant state of flux, each 
continually constituted and reconstituted at the various interfaces  through which actors  and 
subjects connect with their wider environment. It therefore follows that the meanings 
attached to the world are not static nor universal, but are multiple, variable and constantly 
subject to modification and change. Perhaps most importantly, I hold these beliefs  not 
simply in relation to the external world but of course consider myself within these same 
processes. The relationship between me and this  work, for example, has evolved through an 
ever-ongoing, dialogic process during which I’ve actively constructed the reality in which 
I’m engaged whilst I myself have been shaped through each encounter. And in line with 
this  it follows  that the method of this  work is  not simply intent on capturing and revealing 
those realities but that it must also be conscious of the ways in which it performs and is 
productive of them. The question that inevitably follows  – what then is the stead of 
knowledge as it relates to such processes? 
Following the ontological position set out above it might perhaps seem reasonable that I 
should locate my epistemological grounding within an interpretative tradition. As outlined, 
I do consider the social realm to be inherently complex, unpredictable, contradictory, 
multiple, diffuse and messy, and believe that as individuals contemplate, interpret and act 
within their environments notions of cause and effect no longer hold sway. And with 
human action not governed by same laws  constructed for our physical world 
understandings of the social realm cannot be conceptualised within such positivistic 
schemas. Responding as such the philosopher Peter Winch provides some scope for a 
richer, more nuanced examination of social life when noting that “our language and our 
social relations are just two different sides  of the same coin. To give an account of the 
meaning of a word is  to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is  used is  to describe 
the social intercourse into which it enters” (1958: 123). In forging a reciprocal relationship 
between language use and the resulting form of reality Winch’s  views could arguably be 
read as advocating the use of any number of interpretative social science methods, each 
one appropriate to the task of navigating this  work’s problems of the social realm via the 
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lens  of language. But Winch also recognises  that dominant techniques  for understanding 
the social world also emerge from within culture. Indeed, he cautions that the very idea of 
social science is  borne not from a desire to interpret the world accurately but a need to make 
results amenable to Western modes of understanding reality. And for me it is  this position 
that speaks  volumes for the philosophical positioning of this  study (no doubt heightened by 
the foreboding crack which manifests most dramatically against the dominance of specific 
knowledge regimes and is formalised as point three of my research problem). Thus the 
cultural baggage that accompanies  modes of knowledge production and acts of knowledge 
interpretation also, reveals that any claims made to the reasonableness of an interpretative 
epistemological tradition does in fact stand in conflict to the full force of my ontological 
position. Indeed, it is  not just an external reality or my relations within it that are 
ontologically multiple and complex, but the epistemological, methodological and 
axiological must too be drawn into that assessment.
As I’ve reflected on this tension the work of long time collaborators Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1987), has provided me an alternative conceptualisation 
of epistemology in my work. Before this alternative can be fully grasped, however, it is 
necessary to appreciate how Deleuze and Guattari see the pursuit and production of 
knowledge in a Western, academic setting. Suggesting arboreal thinking as  a metaphor for the 
traditional modes  of inquiry buoyant in this context, they explain that knowledge is 
conceptualised as a tree from which the roots grow in one direction to provide a firm and 
deep anchor. Edward Said’s now classic analysis on the emergence of Orientalism, for 
example, can in many ways be read as  an account of the framework that evolves  to 
facilitate such arboreal modes of thought. The Orient, Said argues, is a European invention, 
a discourse created from popular texts, travel narratives, scientific works, letters and diaries. 
However, through the work of recognisable and noted authorities  – in this case named by 
Said as  Silvestre de Sacy, Ernest Renan, and William Lane – such discourses  eventually 
become canonised in academic works. Describing the apparatus which aids the elevation of 
this specific type of  Oriental discourse, Said writes:
What Sacy, Renan, and Lane did was  to place Orientalism 
on a scientific and rational basis. This  entailed not only their 
own exemplary work but also the creation of a vocabulary 
and ideas  that could be used impersonally by anyone who 
wished to become an Orientalist. Their inauguration of 
Orientalism was  a considerable feat. It made possible a 
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scientific terminology; it banished obscurity and instated a 
special form of the Orientalist as  a central authority for the 
Orient; it legitimized a special kind of specifically coherent 
Orientalist work; it put into circulation a form of discursive 
currency by whose presence the Orient would henceforth be 
spoken for; above all, the work of the inaugurators  carved out 
a field of study and a family of ideas  which in turn could 
form a community of scholars  whose lineage, traditions, and 
ambitions  were at once internal to the field and external 
enough for general prestige.
1978: 122
Recognising also the eventual evolution and hold of this  intellectual apparatus  once 
established, Said points  towards the future generations of scholars  who seek to contribute 
their own knowledge to the Orient yet nonetheless  refer back to the “inaugurators” in 
order to do so. Indeed, he notes that “even when new materials came his way the 
Orientalist judged them by borrowing from predecessors (as scholars often do) their 
perspectives, ideologies, and guiding theses” (1978: 177).
With knowledge constructed by building upon or over the work of authoritative accounts 
the activity of academic inquiry, viewed under Deleuze and Guattari’s  metaphor of arboreal 
thinking, becomes a matter of locating the correct theory and exploring it in depth, 
ultimately to the exclusion and silencing of other perspectives. With the right theory 
purportedly leading to the truth – a singular and verifiable explanation that emerges 
through the correct application of a research method – writing becomes the process  of re-
writing rather than the creation of new discourses  or the reporting of difference grasped 
from observation and reflection. Deleuze and Guattari argue that with this  approach 
conditioning a researcher to seek a primary cause, a root, a canonical explanation that is 
fixed within a particular discipline, academic monism inevitably follows. As alternative they 
offer the metaphor of the rhizome as a model for academic inquiry. In biological terms  the 
word rhizome is given to resilient plant roots which generate new growth in directions that 
are both unpredictable and unexpected. Unlike rooted tree-structures rhizomes are non-
hierarchical and have no beginning or end-points. They are always  in-between; connective 
structures  that allow for propagation in all directions in response to immanent relationships 
with other elements of their environment such as soil, water, sunlight, temperature, grazing 
animals and insects, etc. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that knowledge should be 
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conceptualised in a similar fashion, as  a living entity that materialises in multiple and 
surprising incarnations. 
That the cracks from which this  research proceeds includes the marginalisation of time 
under an increasingly dominant, spatial understanding of urban issues, in many ways 
renders  the offerings of Said, and Deleuze and Guattari somewhat prophetic. Indeed, the 
cracks from which points  two and three of my research problem emerge can be read as 
exemplars  of the way in which arboreal thinking has led to a disciplinary approach that is 
unable to conceptualise reality beyond its  own terms, resulting in its own single-vision. 
Similarly, the alternative metaphor of the rhizome is also resonant to the interdisciplinary 
approach I’ve adopted in this  study thus far. My turning to the literatures of sociology, 
anthropology and philosophy in Chapters Two and Three for their content on time was 
initially dictated by the manifest absence of such material within urban studies. As my 
understanding developed, however, it also became an active attempt to breech the artificial 
barriers which are constructed within and beyond the academy; to peer beyond the 
authority of the urban “inaugurators” so to speak. Across each of these things  the rhizome 
therefore presents  as a timely encounter for the methodological framing of this  work. 
These points, however, should not be taken to suggest that its resonance automatically 
assures it an unproblematic position. Knowledge as conceptualised under Deleuze and 
Guattari’s  metaphor of the rhizome is of course very different than the term knowledge 
which fuels the workings of the contemporary academy, and when this  work is  located once 
more within the prevailing paradigm of social science, Winch’s  cautions must again be 
heeded. 
Keen to maintain a position for this  work as a piece of social science research therefore 
brings  me to a penultimate point in this chapter, revealed as I now briefly introduce how 
such orientations  lend themselves  both to what this  research is trying to capture, and also 
what it is reasonably able to show. Standing in particular tension to what might be expected 
of each of these is  a long standing hallmark of quality in academic research: validity. As it 
is  traditionally conceived validity describes  the degree to which inferences  drawn from data 
are correct and therefore representative of the truth (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Though 
the legacy of this  term stems from a more positivistic tradition of scientific research the 
trope remains a cornerstone of post-positivist, qualitative work today, to the extent that it 
leads James Scheurich to question what it is “about validity that exceeds  its paradigmatic 
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birthplace? What compels  the epistemological travellers of the post positivistic diaspora not 
to ‘leave home without it?” (1997: 81). Indeed, even though it is  often re-articulated in 
qualitative work through a language of trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, 
plausibility (Saukko, 2003), it retains  its look towards the idea of a transcendent truth. As 
John Creswell and Dana Miller define it, validity in qualitative inquiry is “how accurately 
the account represents  participants’ reality of the social phenomena and is credible to them 
[...] [and] refers not to the data but to the inferences drawn from them” (2000: 125-125). 
As they sit in relation to this research such inheritances are of course extremely 
problematic, not least from a standpoint of ontological social justice. Where a belief in 
coexisting, multiple, conflicting, messy, and fluid realities  is taken seriously the mere 
suggestion of a singular, transcendent, verifiable truth is in stark divergence to that 
philosophical position. At best it is nonsensical. More realistically, however, it calls into 
question the integrity of an approach that would claim an alternative ontological and 
epistemological orientation yet continue to hark back to such unbefitting notions of 
academic quality and value. It is therefore a principled departure I take from such traditions 
but one that nonetheless demands that the scope and meaning of this work are altered in 
quite significant ways, not least in terms of how such things stand in relation to the 
contribution to knowledge I seek to make via this  thesis. My discussion of what this altered 
approach looks like – how I’ve navigated the methodological considerations  outlined in this 
chapter – will be the substance of Chapter Five which follows. For now, however, I want to 
flag up one final point. Though their ideas  may seem at odds with the traditional pursuit of 
social science Deleuze and Guattari are far from advocating a dissolution of Western 
thought. Notably, within their argument there is no ontological dualism between rhizomes 
and the arboreal. On the contrary, they remind that where new ways of thinking are found 
these should be juxtaposed beside the old, that we are to “connect the roots or trees  back 
up with the rhizome” (1987: 14). Indeed, they argue that it  is through such comparative 
acts that it becomes  possible to discover the breaches, disruptions and inconsistencies – the 
cracks – which are themselves generative of new questions being asked of our theories, 
methods and realities. And in this  sense at least, there emerges  a glimmer for how this work 
might not simply pursue an alternative process and production of knowledge but how it 
may do so in a way that continues its important dialogue with both urban studies and the 
traditions of  social science research.
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Chapter Five
PLAYING WITH REALITY
Introduction
BROAD APPROACH
Having detailed those things which inform the methodological approach possible for and 
pertinent to this work in Chapter Four, this chapter now moves to describe and discuss the 
methodology I’ve designed to engage my research problem. The approach I employ is 
fundamentally designed to expose the socially constructed nature of time in 
order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of 
urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed 
future study; and in doing so, to also meet this work’s more specific aims in: 
‣ bringing to life time’s  social construction, and with it, highlighting sites  of its 
normative function in the contemporary city; 
‣ opening up dialogue on the meaning of  time and temporality in the city; 
‣ considering the academic, social, cultural and political conditions  which have 
contributed to time’s naturalisation;
‣ helping to imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; and
‣ stressing the need to consider contemporary urban problems  from a temporal 
perspective.
In addition, as  I’ve designed the methodological approach of this work I have not only 
taken into account those things explicit within its  problem and aims, but just as  central have 
been those things external to, yet nonetheless formative in their content. To summarise the 
key points  from Chapter Four which have had a significant bearing on the orientation and 
manifestation of  this project:
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‣ I view reality as  multiple, non-static, diffuse and continually changing, and I include 
myself, epistemic positions, methodological paradigms  and axiological frameworks, 
within that ontological view
‣ This work aims to move away from the production of hierarchical knowledge 
epitomised by more traditional approaches  to social science research. I instead 
employ Deleuze and Guattari’s  metaphor of the rhizome as  I seek to craft an 
alternative knowledge and understanding, of  urban problems and urban studies.
‣ Concerns  of social justice are what motivate my academic work, and are what drive 
this  research. These do not simply align with matters  of a tangible nature, however, 
but relate to the ontologies, epistemologies  and methodologies made available for 
the production of research within the academy, and, in this  case, within the 
discipline of  urban studies. 
‣ I recognise that this  work must therefore itself be viewed as  a performance of social 
justice, and my production of it must therefore include the crafting and 
manifestation of  an altered remit for each of  these philosophical orientations.
‣ Taking these points  into account this  work must navigate a tricky tension in not 
only ensuring that its  contribution can be recognised within social science, but that it 
remains true to its philosophical orientations.
Shortly, I will move to discuss  the development and practice of the methodological 
approach I’ve designed to respond to my research problem and aims, within the terms just 
outlined. First, however, I want to consider the positioning of my approach in a much 
broader sense. At its  heart the adoption of a rhizomatic outlook involves engaging with 
alternative ways of producing knowledge. Unlike arboreal thinking which seeks  a primary 
cause rhizomatic thinking stresses  the need to bring to the fore that which is multiple. For 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari this  is  not simply desirable, but is necessary. Neglecting 
multiplicity, they argue, merely lends itself to replication of known answers  to social 
phenomena, what they refer to as  “overcoding” (1987: 8). And crucially for them the 
pursuit of knowledge should never be about reducing “the unconscious or to interpret it or 
to make it signify according to a tree model. The issue is to produce the unconscious, and 
with it new statements, different desires” (18). Responding as  such rhizomatic thinking 
constantly reassesses  itself. It steers  itself away from the singular and canonical, from binary 
logics  and linear thought, and instead moves  continuously towards the rhizome and the 
multiple.
“To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it”, insist 
Deleuze and Guattari (22). And though it was never issued as travel guide to the 
methodologically adventurous, the ideas  central to their philosophy, as set out in A Thousand 
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Plateaus, do offer some insight into what might constitute an appropriate research design 
conceived under a rhizomatic epistemology and multiple ontology. Indeed, across a variety 
of social science disciplines their metaphor of the rhizome has been adopted, adapted and 
applied within fields  diverse as education (Alvermann, 2000; St. Pierre, 2004; Gough, 
2007; Honan, 2007, Masny and Waterhouse, 2011, and Masny, 2013), migration 
(Bottomley, 1998), urban planning (Hillier, 2008) and media studies  (Carpentier, 2008). 
What the practices  of these researchers  appear to share is  a conscious  move away from 
simplicity, linear thought and the canonisation of an unquestionable, universal truth, 
towards  an engagement in complexity, interconnectedness  and the production of the 
multiple. Within such approaches there are two equally important things  at play: the process 
of  rhizomatic thinking and its productions. 
In looking to the second of these first, in pursuing a rhizoanalytic approach rhizomatic 
research is  aimed at bringing to the fore alternative and heterogeneous  accounts  of social 
phenomena. For Deleuze and Guattari a large part of this production functions  at a 
conceptual level. It is, about revealing the “nonthought within thought” (St. Pierre, 2004: 
284). As  Todd May explains, however, such an appeal is  not confined to the abstract but is 
“built upon the not-so-controversial idea that how we conceive the world is relevant to how 
we live in it” (2005: 295). May goes on to argue that it necessarily follows that “we ought to 
conceive understandings that at least permit and perhaps encourage better – and 
alternative – ways of living in the world we conceive’ (2005: 295). This more tangible 
production is thus  not severed from its conceptual counterpart, but indeed, it is  the very 
engagement with alternative ways of thinking and the production of alternative thoughts 
that reveal a potential for making more advantageous relations in the world. Rhizomatic 
research is therefore not intent on producing truth13 but quite in contrast, it aims to produce 
that which is  silent, absent and lost within and through academia’s more traditional and 
transcendental aims and productions.
The necessity of such productions across  both a conceptual and tangible register similarly 
informs the general process required to produce them. A principle point of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s use of  the rhizome metaphor is that:
Any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and 
must be [...] A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections 
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between semiotic chains, organizations  of power, and 
circumstances  relative to the arts, social sciences, and social 
struggles
1987: 7
The challenge for a rhizomatic methodology is  therefore to facilitate the seeing of such 
linkages. As  Eileen Honan understands  it the task is  for researchers  to find new, creative 
and experimental ways of conducting academic inquiry, and amounts, in her case, to a 
textual exercise aimed at producing connections that shift attention away from the 
construction of inner meanings and particular readings “towards  a new careful attendance 
to the multiplicity of linkages that can be mapped between any text and other texts, other 
readings, other assemblages  of meaning” (2004: 296). Of course, just as crucial within this 
is  the avoidance of falling back into more traditional ways of seeing: “never send down the 
roots, or plant them, however difficult it may be to avoid reverting to old procedures”, warn 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 23). Instead, they instruct their reader to:
Make rhizomes, not roots, never plant. Don’t sow, grow 
offshoots! Don’t be one or multiple be multiplicities! Run 
lines, never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be 
quick, even when standing still!
24
In this sense, what is  ultimately required is  not simply a creative or experimental approach 
that offers the potential for seeing new linkages, but rather one that is  able to see such 
linkages ceaselessly and continuously, in new incarnations and in multiple ways.
As it relates to this work it is no doubt clear by now that the process  and production of a 
rhizomatic knowledge will not allow me to prove my thesis within the traditions  of validity. It 
will not lead me to towards a truth that is  transcendent, something original to represent, 
despite how well I design my methodology or how accurately I apply my methods. This 
means that I cannot speak of the contribution to knowledge this work makes in the same way 
that more traditional, qualitative works  would. Nor can I assume that its quality will 
automatically be judged in line with alternative conventions  I’ve followed. So to be clear, 
this  work is  not aimed at unearthing truth. Rather, its focus  is  firmly maintained on bringing 
to life the multiple realities in which it finds  itself. Its attempt is to create a way of seeing the 
world that disturbs the realities  and verities which impress  their undeniability upon us. 
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Certainly, as  I’ve pieced together alternative and multiple accounts  of time thus far I have 
been transformed in each encounter, as  has  my reading of the next account. And I would 
argue that it has been the affect of uncovering diversity and the diversity uncovered that has 
made urban time undeniably plural, not my statement of time’s  heterogeneity as fact. The 
remainder of this thesis, then, is aimed at capturing and presenting that affective, 
transformative process  – both for me and those in varying degrees of proximity to this work 
– as it sits across my research problem and as it  has  unfolded through the research process 
itself.
Questions will of course linger for how such work might be judged. And perhaps the point 
that must first be noted in this  regard is that these questions don’t simply have consequence 
for this  work but are also part of a much larger discussion of the politics  of validity, quality 
and rigour in the wider academy. Indeed, such academic badges of excellence are far from 
neutral and they too require reassessment where notions of social justice are taken 
seriously. As John Law notes, “[t]he guarantees, the gold standards, proposed for and by 
methods, will no longer suffice [...] we need to discover ways  of making methods without 
accompanying imperialisms” (2005: 15). This is  something I’ll return to in Chapter Ten of 
this  thesis. For now, however, though general, the ideas outlined in this introduction are 
nonetheless helpful in thinking through how the rhizome might sit lend itself to method, 
maintaining a contribution to social science in the process. 
To elaborate: the pursuit of rhizomatic knowledge albeit appears  a less  ordered and messier 
practice. Still, it demands a coherence and consistency as  the research unfolds, from 
identifying a problem, to designing the research, to establishing criteria for quality, to the 
rhetoric it employs  in writing-up. The quality of such research might therefore be assessed 
by examining the extent to which it plays within the rules of its game even when those rules 
are cast aside, quite deliberately, in order to pursue anew the multiple. In addition, where 
its attempt is  to move toward a place where research is  not judged in relation to truth as  an 
external notion but rather is  assessed according to its  affective powers, what really counts  is 
its capacity to craft new realities. In this regard what is crucial is the extent to which it 
allows us to think the previously impossible; brings  to light new relationships and 
alternative ways of seeing; unsettles  existing regimes; and carves out new territories  for 
those absences  which cannot be freed. And the ultimate assessment of this, then, is not 
judged against truth, but against the development and practice of a methodological 
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approach that is  capable of taking things apart and putting them back together in different 
ways – an approach that allows for experimentation and creation, for crafting and play.
Sites of Research
The self and the urban studies  canon are the sites  at which this  study takes place. It was 
within these contexts that my research problem slowly emerged, and accordingly, it is here 
that I’ve sought to uncouple the sensibility of those realities and verities which impressed 
themselves upon me and put them back together again in alternate ways. It is  important to 
note that in this work I do not consider these sites  discrete from one another. But as  I 
discuss  them throughout this  chapter I am first going to look at them and their associated 
methods individually, before I discuss how my methodology eventually evolved to view both 
sites  in combination. The reason for this is  two-fold. First, although they are inherently 
intertwined I wasn’t always conscious of this  fact. I therefore feel that isolated discussions 
have the added benefit of illustrating the development of my approach as I experienced it. 
Second, arriving at my eventual methodology was  a messy, complex and confusing 
experience – a point I raised in the previous  chapter and which I will again pick up on 
again at various points  in this chapter. Given my hope that this  thesis  might also make a 
methodological contribution I consider it important to capture the development of a 
methodology contrary to those traditions  which record the method of social research, even 
of a qualitative nature, as a much more calm, collected and sanitised affair. As  such, the 
this  section looks  first to The Self, then to The Urban Studies Canon, before I conclude this 
chapter by looking at the method of Autoethnographic Rhizoanalysis which was designed to 
access these sites in combination.
THE SELF
From the very start, the self was an essential site of this  study. It was inwards that I first 
turned as I grappled to formalise point one of  my research problem below:
1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
And it was inwards that I continued to engage with it, asking in Chapters Two and Three:
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‣ What leads to and maintains the formation of  this time?
‣ How does  the time that dominates  modern, Western life function to order, Other 
and exclude?
‣ What are the connections  between processes  of temporal ordering and the ills  of 
everyday city life?
As already indicated in the Preface to this work, and in Chapters  Two and Three, the 
method that enabled me to engage with such questions via the self  was autoethnography. 
– Autoethnography 
Often credited to the anthropologist David Hayano (Anderson, 2006), autoethnography is 
broadly considered an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and/or 
analyse the personal in order to reach the cultural. While processes of both autobiography 
and ethnography are central in its composition it moves beyond a mere combination of the 
two and proponents are quick to point to the ways in which the method differs. Contrasting 
it from autobiography Heewon Chang states that autoethnography transcends  mere 
narration of self to engage in cultural analysis and interpretation (2008); while David 
Silverman distances  autoethnography from more traditional ethnographic practices, noting 
its focus  on the mundane and everyday rather than the unusual or exotic (2007). It was in 
this  combined sense that I first recognised the potential of autoethnography as a means to 
get beneath the sensibility of  a time that up until that point had appeared natural to me. 
The scope of autoethnographic writing has, however, dramatically evolved over the past 
decade and its use in furthering cultural understanding is  no longer presented as  its  sole 
function. Increasingly, it is  recognised as  a tool for researchers to understand themselves in 
deeper ways  in turn enhancing their understanding of other issues, to such an extent that 
Michael Hemmingson stipulates “reflection and analysis of one’s  life [to be] a tenet of 
autoethnography” (2008: 16). There are today a range of autoethnographic styles which 
epitomise Hemmingson’s  claim, and while I don’t want to get bogged down in mere 
description of these it is  nonetheless important to appreciate the vastness  of the field that 
has grown-up around autoethnography since Hayano’s inaugural definition of it as  the 
cultural study of one’s  own people (1979). Indeed, it is  this that leads to a central debate 
over the practice of contemporary autoethnography, something which has helped frame 
my use of  it in this work. 
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A discernible way contemporary autoethnographic approaches differ from one another is 
in the emphasis  placed on a researcher’s  interaction with Others during the research 
process. Collaborative techniques such as  interactive interviews (Adams, 2008) and co-
constructed narratives (Ellis and Bochner, 2002), for example, focus on the interactively 
produced meanings which surface through the processes  of research. Similar to these 
collaborative processes, community autoethnographies draw on the experiences of 
researchers  in collaboration to illustrate how a community manifests particular social and 
cultural issues. Laura Ellingson and Patricia Sotirin argue that such autoethnographies are 
not only “community-building” practices  in and of themselves, but bringing to light the 
ways particular phenomena manifest and intersect with everyday life these techniques also 
make “cultural and social intervention” possible (2010: 59). It is  therefore unsurprising that 
autoethnography has  also found form as an emancipatory tool within more traditional 
ethnographies of indigenous peoples. Recognising the role of the privileged researcher in 
maintaining the structures  which underpin such relations, Norman Denzin and Yvonna 
Lincoln argue that autoethnography can be used to disrupt the traditional power 
hierarchies of Western research, particularly with regards the researcher’s  right to study 
Others (2008). Within such emancipatory practices those who were once the objects  of 
study – the colonised, economically subordinated or mentally ill, for example – instead 
work with researchers to construct their own stories via autoethnographic means. 
In contrast to these interactive and collaborative approaches  there are many techniques 
that have their focus  on and within the self. For example, narrative autoethnographies are 
often presented in the form of stories  that incorporate the researcher’s experiences into the 
ethnographic descriptions and analysis of Others; whilst reflexive autoethnographies 
document the changes a researcher undergoes  as a result of doing fieldwork. The stories 
generated in both these approaches  exist on a non-linear continuum and encompass  such 
events  as starting research; the researcher’s  biography; the researcher studying their life 
alongside cultural members’ lives; and autoethnographic memoirs (Ellis, 2009). Though 
not labeled as such, confessional tales in which an ethnographer’s backstage research 
endeavours become the focus  of investigation have of course been taking place for years 
(Van Maanen, 1988). The anthropologist Margaret Mead, for example, recognised the 
importance of her own personal reflections, observing that it was  her individual 
consciousness  and long acquaintance with her field of study that made it possible for her to 
perceive and record aspects of  lived experience that none else could (1978). 
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Finally, at the other end of the collaborative spectrum is evocative autoethnography, stories 
about authors who view themselves as  the phenomenon and write deeply personal 
narratives in response to the pertinent facets of their lives. These personal narratives 
propose to understand a self or some aspect of a life as it intersects with a cultural context, 
and invite readers to enter the author’s reality in order to reflect on, understand and cope 
with their own lives (Ellis, 2004). Accounts  of this type emerge most often in response to 
crisis  and many proponents also recognise this approach as therapeutic, considering their 
work a story that had to be written in order for them to navigate the difficulties surrounding 
a particular issue or experience (Ronai, 1995).
– The auto/ethno/graphic debate
In 2006, a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography presented a collection of 
articles, effectively illustrating that autoethnography could be analytical (Anderson, 2006), 
written in the style of a novel (Ellis, 2004), performative (Denzin, 2006) and many more 
things in between. Not only did this  juxtapose the different approaches that were both 
possible and practiced, it led a leading proponent of the method to bring to the surface 
what had up until that point been somewhat of an unarticulated debate: “apples and 
oranges – are we dealing with two different things?” remarked Denzin in his  contribution 
to the anthology (420). Indeed, while the diversity of approach I’ve just discussed is 
acknowledged in autoethnographic circles it does not necessarily exist easy between 
advocates  of specific styles. In particular, two opposing branches  of autoethnography have 
stabilised over the years in the form of analytic and evocative autoethnography, and not 
only do these advance the merits  of their own approach, at the same time each is highly 
critical of  the other.
On the surface their debate relates to whether autoethnography should be more about the 
ethno or more about the auto, a heated issue that prompts no shortage of pointed criticism 
on both sides, as  the title of Hemmingson’s 2008 article Here Come the Navel Gazers attests. 
Wolff-Michael Roth, for example, criticises  accounts  which are overly focused on the self, 
citing examples where authors  associate their practice with autoethnography but say little 
about culture (2009). Robert L. Krizek also notes  the centrality of the self in some 
contemporary autoethnographic forms  and expresses his concern for such accounts to 
devolve into narcissism (2003). He goes on to suggest that autoethnography, no matter how 
personal, should always connect to some larger element of life. Leon Anderson (2006) and 
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Martin Tolich (2010) are similarly contemptuous  of overly evocative forms  not simply 
because they focus more on the self but because they are inherently subjective and are 
arguably motivated for “selfish” reasons (Anderson, 2006: 389). For more analytic 
proponents such tendencies  demand a “rescuing” of the method (Atkinson, 2006: 400) – 
amounting to a return to realist, ethnographic roots, along with an assurance that the 
researcher is a “complete member in the social world under study” (Anderson, 2006: 379) 
and has made a stated commitment to the development of “theoretical understandings of 
broader social phenomena” (373). 
Having reviewed a number of studies that fall under the broad categorisation of evocative 
autoethnography there are indeed a number of examples that I consider problematic in 
certain aspects. My concerns, however, do not relate to a narcissistic focus  on the self but to 
a failure to account for how the self is  inextricably constituted by and has consequence for 
proximate and future Others. Indeed, Sophie Tamas has written about how her 
autoethnography of spousal abuse initially failed to take into account how the material 
production of that story would affect the children she conceived and raised with that 
spouse (2011); while April Chatham-Carpenter has  reflected on how the institutional 
compulsion she felt to publish her autoethnography on anorexia may have ultimately been 
to the detriment of her own reputation and future career in academia (2010). These 
accounts, and many like them, have helped bring about a vibrant debate as  to what counts 
as  ethical practice in autoethnography. It has led Carolyn Ellis, for example, to reflect on 
the extent to which “self-revelations always  involve revelations about others” (2007: 25); 
and Tolich to caution that “there are no future skin grafts for autoethnographic 
PhDs” (2010: 1605). Interestingly, however, the same charges over inattention to Others 
can be levelled at the analytic approach. Their dismissal of evocative methods for being too 
focused on the self in many ways overshadows the extent to which matters of the self can 
and do speak meaningfully of Others and culture more broadly. Whilst their demands  that 
a researcher be a member of the culture they wish to study completely overlooks  how that 
member’s position shifts  as they adopt the role of researcher, instead assuming a somewhat 
homogenous, static and non-consequential identity over time. 
That these shared and arguably more ethically concerning weaknesses  are overlooked in 
analytic autoethnography’s positioning of itself as the legitimate form suggests  that its 
critique of evocative styles stems not from their inability to tap into broader, cultural 
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debates, but that it is  perhaps cultivated by a much deeper divergence. Indeed, for Denzin, 
the truer face of the debate is  not simply about whether the self or culture constitutes the 
proper object of study but that each practice is borne from fundamentally different beliefs 
about the nature and limits of social inquiry (2006). Certainly, though he doesn’t frame it as 
such, Anderson’s (2006) call for a return to the basics of realist ethnography which 
accompanies his overt focus on culture must also be seen as a desire to return to a specific 
methodological paradigm. And for Denzin, such a position has considerable potential to 
negate recent poststructural, anti-foundational arguments which have been pivotal in the 
rise of autoethnographic practice, arguably leading towards the (re)marginalisation of 
phenomenological methodologies (2006). In a similar vein, DeLysa Burnier considers that 
criticisms of evocative autoethnography do not act to support a practice that is  better able 
to focus on interactions between culture and the self. Rather, she views  such criticisms as an 
attempt to undermine the validity of work that is  “overly emotional”, amounting to a 
campaign intent on re-inscribing “a series  of gendered dichotomies – heart/mind, 
emotional/rational, literary-poetic/analytical, personal/scholarly, descriptive/theoretical – 
within autoethnography” (2006: 416). Seen in this  light the practice of autoethnography 
labeled as evocative occurs not simply by chance, narcissism or an abandonment of ethical 
practice, but is in itself an active performance of deep seated differences in a researcher’s 
political and philosophical motivations. Something to which Denzin’s  characterisation of 
his own approach attests when he states: “[t]oday I want to write my way out of this 
history, and this is why I write my version of  autoethnography” (2006: 426).
There are number of things  I’ve taken from these debates as  I’ve thought about where my 
version of autoethnography lies. It was not crisis nor a desire for therapy that motivated 
this  work yet nonetheless  my focus has converged largely on the self. Similarly, my aim to 
expose the peculiarity of time in everyday life, and my belief that in doing so I could 
manage to say something about culture more generally, were not dispelled by my 
conviction that I in no way constituted a fixed point but would necessarily change as  a 
result of the research endeavour. The practice of my work, then, does  not fall within the 
evocative camp, but I find that my political and philosophical orientations  sit much better 
here. And though my vision perhaps appears more settled within the wider, cultural focus 
of the analytic tradition, I cannot agree with the position they erect against evocative 
autoethnography, nor their argument that culture is  the only legitimate target of proper 
autoethnographic work. What these tensions suggest is  that autoethnographic practices  are 
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not necessarily tied to such neatly prescribed frames. And there is an additional danger to 
note here, namely, that this  debate between the extremes  of the method, over what 
constitutes  the legitimate form, runs  the risk of making invisible other approaches which 
are not as  widely written about, including those which have unique and multi-faceted 
motivations for adopting the practices that they do. I therefore consider it not only 
necessary for this  work but also in terms  of how this  work speaks  to the broader practice of 
the method, to not simply pick a best fit but to be as  explicit as possible about my 
motivations for, and my use of  autoethnography in this study.
– Autoethnography: motivation and practical approach
Throughout this  work I have positioned myself central to the content that is  developed; 
across  all facets I have aimed to unapologetically write myself in. But while my focus is 
channeled via and speaks to the self, this work is  of course about things that exist beyond 
me and my use of autoethnography was primarily motivated by my desire to gain insight 
into problems that were elsewhere overlooked. Its  promise as a tool to see beneath the 
mundane presentations of everyday life that are so often taken for granted presented me a 
means to pick apart and play with a time I previously could only describe as  natural. But 
more than this, it allowed me to make this  time strange, problematic and entirely political. 
Furthermore, having recognised that dominant understandings of time were themselves 
partly stabilised within more traditional methods, as  an alternative way of doing research 
and representing Others I considered that the practice of autoethnography in itself served 
to challenge such canonical ways of  working. 
To this end I used autoethnography in three different ways. First, in order to develop the 
coherence and integrity of this  project as a whole I employed a reflexive style. To achieve 
this  I documented the ways  in which I approached my topic, methods, analysis  and even 
acts of reflection, and sought to think through some of the varying and at times 
contradictory reasons for why I might have arrived at these preferences. As I practiced 
autoethnography in this  way I was  keen not only to acknowledge the innumerable ways in 
which my personal experiences influenced the trajectory of my thesis  but to remain 
conscious of those things that existed beyond my autonomy. Including, for example 
institutional requirements (such as progress reviews, dealings  with the ethics  committee and 
meetings  with supervisors); resources  (considered in terms of funding, access  and 
technology); and the interface between myself and my proximate Others (including the 
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impact of my transformation throughout the PhD, and the way in which not only I but 
Others were inevitably shaped in the presence of a three year long study on time). In 
attempting to accommodate a fuller remit of these internal and external influences within 
my research rather than assume their easy fit, I aimed to reposition myself “as  an object 
of inquiry who depicts  a site of interest in terms  of personal awareness  and 
experience” (Crawford, 1996: 167). The activities  which comprised this process were of 
course autobiographical in part. But in also striving to make visible for the reader the 
manner in which I was shaped by much broader factors as I came to see the social realities 
of my study, my hope is  that the resulting commentary moves beyond the self to comment 
meaningfully on the joining of the self and culture as they constitute and are constituted 
through my research agenda. 
Second, in order to chart the lineages of my own transformation, including, importantly, 
my changing perception of time throughout the course of the work, I employed a narrative 
approach to my autoethnographic writing. This  allowed me to document the everyday 
experience of thinking, reading and writing about time alongside examples of Other time 
that I came across. The stories  I generated of alternate temporalities  also allowed me to 
take my time apart and reflect on what else it might have been. In doing this  I was able to 
see the contingency of dominant time and with it develop narrative accounts  of its grave 
consequence for those who lived at odds with its logic. 
Finally, in order to pursue such ideas further and examine how I could play with 
conventions of time in everyday life, I adopted an experimental approach. This  was not a 
technique I’d seen documented elsewhere in autoethnographic volumes. My practice of it 
was, however, similar to the narrative approach just described. Looking to the experience of 
temporality under certain, specified conditions, I conducted three autoethnography 
experiments  through which I attempted to tap into a previously unreflected aspect of time 
and think through how it functioned to uphold its sensibility. In Experiment One: Everyday Life 
without Clocks, I explored the experience of living without the use of conventional methods 
of time-reckoning. The aim was  to examine how and to what extent the subjective and 
intersubjective experience of time remained sensible without access to clocks. Moreover, I 
sought to consider what this in turn revealed about the materiality of time in the 
contemporary city. In Experiment Two: Same Space, Different Time, I tried to capture some of 
the space/time connections  of daily urban life over five weeks by staggering, at 90 minute 
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intervals, a walk taken every Tuesday by the same route through the city which culminated 
with a 45 minute stop in the Tramway café. The aim was  to get a sense of how space was 
different at different times of the day, and likewise how time was different in different 
spaces. Moreover, in this experiment I was keen to consider what effect this had on the 
urban individual who lived largely within a self-contained temporality. Finally, in Experiment 
Three: Experiences of Holiday Time, I attempted to capture and compare the sensibilities 
experienced while on holiday to those I encountered whilst at work. My aim was  to look to 
how my perception of time differed, and how this  in turn shaped my perception of time in 
that moment and going forward.
Across each of these practices I generated data similar to that produced through 
ethnographic methods. This included participant observations (of the self); field notes, 
personal notes and memos; sketches and maps; and a range of gathered and produced 
artefacts, including photographs  and videos, emails  and text messages, and newspaper and 
magazines cuttings. My techniques  for capturing this  data were varied and included 
writing, sketching and mapping, on post-it notes, scraps  of found papers, paper notebooks, 
computer documents, and various  smart phone and tablet applications; sending emails  to 
myself; and making audio, video and photographic recordings. In addition to these 
techniques which were used ad hoc I also kept two formal research diaries. The first was  a 
fortnightly journal in which I reflected on my research experience, progress  and the data I’d 
collected over the proceeding weeks. This was kept for much of the duration of my PhD, 
from December, 2010 to October, 2013. The second was a notebook I wrote in for fifteen 
minutes each morning, immediately upon waking. These stream of consciousness writings were 
kept over an eight month period from September, 2011 to May, 2012, and served the 
purpose of  helping less deliberate narratives come to the fore. 
Unsurprisingly these activities were very fruitful, producing no shortage of data between 
them. It was in the collation and analysis of that data, however, that I encountered two 
areas  of difficulty: how to deal with memory and the shaping effects  of technology. With 
regards memory, my design for collation and analysis was  initially aimed at addressing one 
of the most common criticisms levelled on autoethnography from both within and outside 
the field: an over reliance on personal memory leading to a selective interpretation of 
events  (Chang, 2008). This has led Tessa Muncey to suggest that the use of snapshots and 
artefacts are important for the legitimation of autoethnography (2005); and Margot 
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Duncan to call for the use of “hard evidence” to support “soft impressions” (2004: 1). 
Feeling an initial pressure to attend to such concerns  I made an effort to balance the 
writing of lengthier accounts (more reliant on memory) with shorter narrative, reflexive 
and analytic thoughts, and my fortnightly diaries were originally conceived in order to ease 
this  task further by facilitating an early synthesis of my data closer to its generation. The 
more aware I became of my evolving practice of autoethnography and also my broader 
methodological approach, however, I came to appreciate how my early rationale for 
minimising memory sat awkward with each. Amanda Coffey, for example, argues  that 
memories collected from within the field, and after exit, are a crucial part of 
autoethnography and that fieldwork and its resulting texts  cannot be separated from the 
memories that shape them. Stressing that “[auto]ethnography is an act of memory” (1999, 
127, my emphasis) her position suggests  that any attempt to extract memory from 
autoethnography is  not only impossible but may in fact be detrimental to the resulting 
analysis. In also recognising that those who argue against memory in autoethnography 
align themselves with realist and positivistic research paradigms, I began to recognise the 
goal of factual or “hard evidence” as  ill-conceived. As such, my eventual approach was  to 
balance longer and shorter accounts in order not give preference to either, but in the end I 
stopped short of  drawing down my data prematurely or to a fixed point of  evidence. 
With regards  technology, initially my design was motivated by a desire to make the vast 
data more manageable and easily ordered. My early solution was to tag the various data 
sources  with the code “a/e” followed by “N” for narrative, “R” for reflexive and “E” for 
experimental (and, where relevant, a combination of these suffixes). Where the data was 
electronic I assigned this code in the file name. Where it was paper based I wrote the code 
in prominent position, followed by a sequentially ascribed number, i.e. “a/e R 148”. I then 
photographed each item and saved a digital copy of the photograph, with the code also 
used for the file name. Unlike my approach to memory, as  my rationale and understanding 
shifted so too did this  strategy for maintaining order. What had prompted my turn to 
technology had been my initial experience with the data. Spread out on the floor in front of 
me, I struggled to see past the mess. I shifted pieces around like a jigsaw, trying to see the 
different and best groupings I could make. In the resulting, messy collage, however, I was 
presented not only with the content I’d actively recorded but the story of its record: 
different colours and sizes of post-it notes; dates  and destinations on train tickets; napkins 
smeared with tomato soup from memorable lunches, and so on. 
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Quite quickly, however, I came to realise that my digital strategy to maintain the order of 
my data was actually reproducing it anew by shaping it in two significant and undesirable 
ways. First, it sanitised the data. Those more nuanced, evocative, olfactory, haptic, and, of 
course, rhizomatic stories  of its  reckoning that weren’t recorded in my actual writing of 
each piece became lost from view, along with the connections they told between me, my 
research and time. Second, it ascribed a hierarchy to my data, and more concerning, that 
hierarchy was  linear. No longer could I appreciate the diverse stories  of my data and their 
infinite points of intersection, instead I had to sift  through pre-defined menus which made 
it very difficult to appreciate connections beyond the groupings I’d priorly assigned. In the 
end I continued to mark each item with the letters  ‘a/e’ but reverted to working with the 
data physically laid out in front of me. I considered this  method of analysis, and also my 
response to the issue of memory, to be much more in keeping with my epistemological and 
ontological position. Firmly believing that there was not one true reality to represent I came 
to recognise the utmost need to illustrate this through a heterogeneity of reflections, 
narratives and analyses. And ultimately this  was achieved not by minimising memory or 
seeking order, but by mitigating the urges of my own latent, rational research tendencies  on 
my analysis of  the data and making room for multiple stories to be told.
THE URBAN STUDIES CANON
To look now to the second site at which this  work takes place, the urban studies canon. My 
recognition of the canon as a site at which to position points  two and three of my research 
problem was in part dictated by my findings from the autoethnographic research described. 
As I came to argue at the end of Chapter Three, no facet of our being or the world in 
which we live is isolated from time, and the academy is included within that assessment. It 
sits  at, is  influenced by, and influences  the exact same sites at which clock time’s dominance is 
maintained and strengthened, and this  reveals  an urgent need to engage with those 
institutional factors which have the potential to uphold and strengthen time’s dominant 
form. As  Edward Said’s (1978) and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) critiques  of Western 
modes of knowledge production reveal, the canon is a potent site at which knowledge and 
truth are traditionally held. When a text is canonised it gains status through its proximate 
association with other texts  that are widely studied and respected. In this function the 
canon doesn’t simply recognise a validity that is already given but inscribes validity on the 
works  it contains. Thus, given the ability of the canon to exercise authority on those urban 
accounts and analyses  that are not simply legitimate but possible to produce, it emerges  as a 
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key site through which the absence of time within urban accounts  can be imagined and 
explored. 
The next part of this discussion might now be anticipated as a relatively straightforward 
affair: describe the canon; discuss  the possible options  for methodological engagement; 
describe the method adopted; detail its practice. This presentation of events  is  a frequent 
commentary to descriptions  of method making and procedure, and invokes not simply the 
linear development of a research approach but suggests a strictly linear progression 
between research stages (Figure One).
FIGURE ONE: THE PRESUMED LINEARITY OF RESEARCH (adapted from Bryman, 2009)
In my experience, however, the discrete points  detailed on the illustration at Figure One 
emerged in a decisively un-linear fashion. Each influenced the other, folded back upon 
itself, forced its own reorientation and that of the other parts. Trying to understand this 
complex and confusing presentation I undertook a mapping exercise in February, 2012, in 
an attempt to capture an alternative rendering that might explain the difficultly I was 
having in maintaining a neat order to my process. This  took place at a number of different 
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sittings across a number of days, with each sitting represented by a different colour for the 
content produced and a different alphabetical identifier for the connections I’d made 
between that content. Reproduced in the pull-out overleaf (Figure Two), this map illustrates 
the influence not only between the different research stages  but suggests  the extent to which 
the development of  my research approach was itself  productive of  the answers I sought. 
As such this map proved an important counterpoint to what Elizabeth St. Pierre describes 
as  the “ruthlessly linear nature of the narrative of knowledge production in research 
methodology” (1997: 179). In capturing the messy and complex evolution of my method it 
depicts an unfolding research process that is non-linear, and moreover illustrates that there 
exists multiple lines to the telling of its  story. The non-linear interplay illustrated between 
each stage of my method development testifies to the formative nature of the method 
making process in itself. Specifically, in my case this proved crucial to my ongoing 
understanding of the concept and function of the canon, meaning that it wasn’t simply the 
process  of carrying out the research but the development of its method that proved 
insightful for points two and three of my research problem. Finally, as  my understanding of 
the concept of the canon evolved I came to recognise the self as  fully central to its form 
and function. This  point was  pivotal in the eventual iteration of my methodology which 
views its sites of research not as  separate but intrinsically intertwined. Therefore, before I 
move to describe how my research of points two and three of my research problem 
eventually unfolded to pursue its concerns across the self and the urban studies canon in 
combination, it is  important that I make visible some of those shifts  that came to bear on 
the orientation of  that eventual approach. 
– The canon: from corpus to assemblage, in concept and method
The concept of the canon is perhaps  at its  easiest to grasp where it is presented as a 
dominant group of texts considered representative of their field. Across  many disciplines, 
this  notion of the canon as corpus, and its relative contents, can be readily brought to the 
minds of its  scholars. Just as  tangible is its more general form, manifest in those objects 
which adorn bookshelves, comprise library classifications, and which are spread out across 
a working desk. Between them, and together, the books which comprise the canon are 
considered to contain content central to their discipline, offering a site at which to view 
those ideas, knowledge systems and traditions  that are prevalent. In recognising the canon 
in this way social scientists have developed a vast suite of  textual methods, the majority of 
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which are intent on bringing to light a sense of a text’s  meaning in order to demonstrate its 
effect. In discerning meaning, however, researchers  are far from homogenous in their 
approach. At one end of the spectrum the structuralists  begin by delimiting the boundaries 
of the system to be analysed; identifying a text or author that is  ripe for scrutiny. Their 
analysis is then contained within the confines of that system, looking, for example, to the 
frequency and spread of its content, the binaries  it invokes  or the narrative it conveys (see 
Bryman, 2009). While such an approach tends toward a method that is relatively 
straightforward to adhere the consequential weight it affords  the notion of a text as a 
discrete, closed-off entity is, however, cited as  a profound weakness  in coming to 
understand texts and their meaning (Chandler, 2002). 
Contrary to this and infamously proclaiming The Death of the Author, the literary critic 
Roland Barthes instead suggested that “a text’s  unity lies  not in its origin but in its 
destination” (1977: 148), reasoning: 
We know now that text is  not a line of words releasing a 
single ‘theological’ meaning (the message of the author god) 
but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, 
none of them original, blend and clash. The text is  a tissue of 
quotations  drawn from the innumerable centres  of culture 
[...] the writer can only imitate a gesture that is  always 
anterior, never original.
1977: 146
Here, a text is conceived not as an unaffected, self-contained object but as  something 
shaped by many other writings, expanding far beyond its  own pages  to exact the same 
influence upon other texts. This  framing of text by other texts  not only calls into question 
the practice of authorship as it is  commonly perceived, but also holds implication for 
understanding the activity of the reader. As  Fredric Jameson notes, “texts  come before us as 
the always-already-read; we apprehend them through the sedimented layers of previous 
interpretations” (1981: 9). Indeed, the well trodden history which accompanies  the 
production of many texts  – even those texts written against dominant accounts – foretells 
the presence of a text’s common reading. Approaches toward the great novel, famous 
painting or legendary piece of music, for example, are in no small part bound to the 
context in which the object is  reproduced – a frame which is unavoidable when a reader 
turns  to interpret a text. Texts are therefore cultural in every regard – in their coming into 
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being and in the manner in which they’re read. And as Michel Foucault suggests, it is the 
activities  found in both events  which serve to construct the sense, reference and meaning of 
the emergent text: 
The frontiers  of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, 
the first lines  and the last full stop, beyond its  internal 
configuration and its  autonomous  form, it is  caught up in a 
system of references  to other books, other texts, other 
sentences: it is  a node within a network [...] The book is  not 
simply the object that one holds  in one’s hands  [...] its  unity 
is variable and relative
1972: 23
Where an understanding of the text can no longer be adequately grasped via the book that 
“one holds  within one’s  hands”, the concept of the canon is  also necessarily altered. It does 
not exist simply as  a corpus of texts, but rather, its  presence, form and importantly its 
influence, expands  far beyond the written word to intersect across  multiple sites. Also 
necessarily revised is  the method suitable for its  study. Connecting texts across two axes – 
from the author to their readers and from the text to other texts – proponents of 
intertextuality aim to expand analysis  beyond the signs which function within texts 
(Kristeva, 1980). Their method is  one that seeks to render culture itself as  a narrative 
process  in which texts and other cultural artefacts, consciously and unconsciously link to 
larger stories at play in society. In this  sense intertextuality decisively blurs  the boundaries 
not only between texts, but between texts and the conditions of daily life. Such accounts 
position texts  as instrumental in the construction of other texts and the construction of 
experience, whilst recognising that the text is in no way limited to a written form.
While the method of intertextuality now casts a considerable shadow on the structuralist 
approach to textual analysis, much less appreciated is  its  potential comment upon the 
canon-forming activities of academic critique. In a much more general sense the 
postmodern turn in social research forces acknowledgement that the researcher is  culturally 
attuned to specific discourses. What this reveals as far as  the canon is concerned, however, 
is  that the political resides not only in the text or in its  standard interpretations, but that it 
similarly structures those methodological and analytical orthodoxies  which frame academic 
engagement. Where the canonical is identified through no other means than a pre-existing 
knowledge of a discipline’s  core texts, for example, the dominance of those texts  is already 
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implied. And for Catherine Belsey, failure to acknowledge the role of the researcher in this 
way has  the potential to maintain the dominance of those texts  at the expense of those 
which might challenge their dominant ideologies (2002). Furthermore, even if such 
criticism does succeed in undermining the canon, Belsey cautions that such activities  can 
themselves serve to construct a new canon without fully engaging with the old canon or the 
influence of  its dominant discourses (2002). 
Where the very act of critical research can serve to maintain the status quo even where it 
seeks to undermine it, a further and necessary re-appreciation of the canon is once again 
required. Under this reading the canon is  formed not simply from the texts it contains  nor 
their standard interpretations, but indeed, where standard methods of interpretation have 
the potential to lead to its  further stabilisation, the researcher is brought prominently into 
the fold. Authors, readers, researchers and other actors don’t simply observe the canon 
independently but are internal to and complicit in its construction. Moreover, it is not just 
its contents  but the canon itself that is  textual in form. It too stretches out, reaching beyond 
its confines, to make connections with other texts  and other canons, including, importantly, 
non-actors, Others and those canons of the non-canonical. Therefore, locating the 
researcher and their practice within this  field requires  that a method must be adopted that 
has the capacity to examine this  much broader assemblage of things which make possible 
the positioning of  canonical texts in the first place. 
While intertextuality recognises the canon as an assemblage, its claim that the meaning of a 
text is signified through the interaction of authors, readers and their contexts does  not offer 
an immediate means  to bring the researcher into that assessment. Viewed through Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome, however, the text is neither signifier nor the 
signified (1987). That is, the meanings attributed to texts are not fixed, but are fluid and 
change over time. In this  sense both the text and the canon are better appreciated as 
rhizomatic: they embody various  connections, functioning as “a semiotic chain [...] a tuber 
agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, 
and cognitive” (1987: 7). And accepting that as  all subjects  (authors, readers and 
researchers), all texts, and all contexts  change, so do the meanings  attributed to an 
individual text, the goal of drawing analyses to a unique interpretation no longer presents 
as  an expedient one. What instead emerges as significant is how a text functions within and 
outside its confines; how it connects  with other texts, including the non-linguistic; how it 
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reaches  out to connect with other objects  including readers, authors  and researchers; and 
how it meets those literary and non-literary contexts in which it is  held and, indeed, those 
in which it is not. In this regard the prominent query is no longer what a text means, but 
rather, how a text works  – what it makes  possible to think; how it serves to limit the spheres 
of knowledge, research and action (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). And accordingly, what is 
asked of a text is  what thoughts  go unthought? What assumptions  lie within its accounts? 
And perhaps  most importantly, how is it useful? As  such, rather than advancing further 
down established lines the rhizomatic approach makes  the choice to move outward from 
the canon and the text, in a conscious attempt to uncover some semblance of those missing 
aspects of  thought and practice.
– The canon as assemblage: drawing in the self
At this point it should be understandable, at least in principle, how the self can no longer 
be maintained as a research site isolated from the canon. For me, however, it was  only as I 
turned to face the canon as my researcher self that I became fully aware of the extent to 
which I was  in effect constructing the canon as I worked to try and hold it steady. Up until 
that point I’d conceived of the self and the urban studies  canon as two separate sites of 
research. With autoethnography exercising its  limited function at point one of my research 
problem it would be the development of a rhizomatic form of textual analysis that would 
then take up the mantle as  I engaged with points two and three. It would be an approach 
that could facilitate the finding of canonical texts as an entry point for examining the 
multiplicity of junctures  at which time had become naturalised within urban studies, and 
would allow me to follow the ongoing trajectories  of dominant ideas as they moved beyond 
the field. This is  how I would play with the realities proposed through the urban studies 
canon as they circulated and became hegemonic (Figure Three). 
FIGURE THREE: DISCRETE METHODS FOR DISCRETE SITES
In beginning to collect data, however, there was a point at which that view became 
irrevocably altered. As I started to look for the dominant texts of urban studies, I realised 
CHAPTER FIVE
136
that the process of discerning this  data was in itself generative of it. I was  no longer on the 
edges but fully inside the workings and function of the canon, within an immanent and 
ongoing production of unfolding connections. And seeing myself within the data collection 
process  also brought me to the realisation that my membership of a culture that had lost 
sight of time’s heterogeneity was  not the only thing thing of value to this  work, just as 
significant was  my membership of the academic culture that sought to understand the 
urban. This  also led me to recognise these facets not as discrete, but that as  each collided 
they helped form an identity – my identity – that was  neither one, nor the other, nor simply 
both, but which was multiple. Recognising this connection had a hugely transformative 
effect on the method as I’d initially conceived it. It was no longer the case that 
autoethnography spoke only to the self which experienced Western time but it could also 
reach the self which experienced processes of Western knowledge construction. And it was 
this  which ultimately led me to expand autoethnography across  my research problem as  a 
whole. 
Furthermore, in becoming more conscious  of my multiple self, I came to appreciate the 
rhizome in other areas  of my work. Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that “every image 
acts on others and reacts to others, on all their facets  at once” (1987: 58) helped me realise 
that my understanding of the city came not from its actuality, the texts I read, nor the 
policy documents  I came across. While these told me something, even as they combined 
they did not comprise the whole story, and I gradually recognised the Other city that came 
to me in literature, dreams and art; through smells, music and conversation, and so on. 
This  city was similar but it was not the same. As such, the rhizome metaphor threw open 
further disjunctures  within the dominant image of the city – the city conceptualised in 
urban theory, translated into policy, and which then shaped the city it sought to describe – 
and problematised the very acts of definition, research, analysis  and reporting that sat at 
the heart of urban praxis. And it was this realisation that similarly led me to expand a 
rhizoanalytic outlook not simply across the urban studies  canon, but across  the project as a 
whole as  I worked to reproduce my sense of the city within the pages of this  thesis and 
beyond (Figure Four, overleaf).
Finally, the process  of method making that I’ve outlined throughout this  section, and the 
transformative revelations I’ve just described above, shaped my understanding of 
qualitative research in a much broader sense also. Arriving at a point where the self was 
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fully drawn into the research experience gave me the means  to better understand the 
difficulty I faced when I first attempted to make sense of the methodology of this  work (this 
chapter, pages 130–132). It helped me realise that it wasn’t just my experience of it, but that 
the research process was non-linear. That is, it was  complex, messy and diffuse; it was 
rhizomatic. Moreover, the collection of data in that process  was  not contained in discrete 
stages, nor could it be conceptualised in neatly described categories, but as  St. Pierre 
describes, it was “transgressive”. That is, it included data of the self: “emotional data, 
dream data, sensual data, and response data that [were] out-of-category and not usually 
accounted for in qualitative research” (1997: 175). Recognising this  also led me to realise 
the expanded potential of this data. Where I no longer looked upon it for meaning or as 
evidence representative of truth (Scheurich, 1997; St. Pierre, 2002; Dufresne, 2002; Masny, 
2011), it had the freedom to tell of the immanent connections produced through a 
rhizoanalysis which necessarily unfolded beside, within, through and in spite of  myself.
FIGURE FOUR: METHODOLOGY TRANSFORMED
Autoethnographic Rhizoanalysis
Viewing the canon as an assemblage of conceptual, manifest and sensory relations between 
authors, readers, researchers, non-actors, Others, texts, contexts and all other entities 
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encountered, makes  it  a generous site at which to consider not simply the ideas in a given 
text but to trace the multiple movements  of those ideas, knowledge systems and truths, 
throughout a discipline and far beyond it. Where research of the canon is  also recognised 
as  a canon-forming activity in its own right, the self is  also very much drawn in to that 
encounter. As such, this section now moves to describe the method of autoethnographic 
rhizoanalysis  across the self and the urban studies canon, as  it was practiced in response to 
points two and three of  my research problem, below:
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages  the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
Moreover, rather than continue to isolate the moments of this  method under the ill-fitting 
terms of data collection, analysis and reporting, this section moves  to conceive of these 
tasks  as research events in which the collection, generation and analysis  of data was, and is, 
ever ongoing. While I discuss the practice of these research events here and in Chapter Six 
in an order it should be noted that is  only due to necessity and that they unfolded in no way 
linearly nor as separate from one another.
RESEARCH EVENT: ENTERING THE CANON
I first entered the canon somewhat unwittingly. Trying to discern its  dominant texts as a 
means to plug-in to its  function, I had no idea that the method I’d designed to do so would 
itself propel me deep into the inner workings of the urban studies canon. Rather than rely 
on my pre-existing knowledge of the field, my initial intention had been only to design a 
procedure for identifying a more objective sample of canonical texts from which I’d 
commence a rhizomatic analysis. To that end I’d selected three indictors  that I felt would 
facilitate such a discovery:
INDICATOR ONE
COURSE READING LISTS 
I considered that course reading lists  from undergraduate urban studies  degree 
programmes  were a most basic way of working what texts  got read at the beginning of 
an urban scholar’s  career, and in that sense were likely to be foundational. The reading 
list is  often the first, and arguably dominant method used by undergraduate students 
when they turn to review the literature of  their discipline.
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INDICATOR TWO
EDITED COLLECTIONS 
Articles  selected for inclusion into urban studies  readers  and edited collections  sit at the 
interface between student use and academic research activity insofar as  students  are 
encouraged to utilise these resources  which are compiled and edited by experts  in their 
field of study. Frequently occurring texts  are likely to be those which are respected for 
their academic integrity and contribution to practice, and are likely to be among some 
of  those most widely read by early scholars.
INDICATOR THREE
CITATION COUNTS 
This method was an attempt to capture the political nature of the canon as  it relates  to 
academic research activity. It acknowledges  that the canon isn’t necessarily indicative 
of a quality of content but perhaps  is  better understood as  a measure of transmissions 
that are received, and the power that is inherent in this process.
In my application of each of these indictors I documented my activity along the way14, but 
to summarise: I worked to manufacture my access to the canon via these indicators  by 
looking for dominance as I went. For Indicator one: Course Reading Lists, I started by looking at 
prestige groupings  of top universities  around the world, including the Ivy League, Russell 
Group and Universitas  21. I supplemented this data with league tables and rankings from 
the likes of Times Higher Education and, more specific to urban studies programmes, the 
website Planetizen and the Town and Country Planning unit from the 2008 Research 
Assessment Exercise. Collating this data led me to a number of universities with top urban 
studies undergraduate degree programmes, from which I requested copies  of their reading 
lists in order to see what texts were most often included. In trying to get a sense of what 
authors and texts  were dominant at Indicator two: Edited Collections, I used two library search 
engines, Google Books and Worldcat. Into these I entered a combination of urban-focused 
search terms, refined by the use of Boolean operators. Of those collections that were 
returned most often I counted the entires of their contents pages  to discern the most 
frequently occurring inclusions. Finally, in gathering data pertaining to Indicator three: Citation 
counts I used two citation indexes, Google Scholar and Web of Knowledge. To maintain 
consistency with my approach for Indicator two I used the same urban-focused search strings. 
From the items returned at each search I collated those articles that had received the most 
citations. 
From the data collected and collated across each of these three indicators  I eventually 
arrived at a number of authors who appeared dominant and whose texts  might be 
described as  canonical. I further refined that list by looking qualitatively to other contextual 
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factors, including personal and academic web-pages, and testimonials written by other 
academics  in the field. This led me to discern the following four items as canonical to 
urban studies, and therefore an appropriate sample from which to enter the function of the 
urban studies canon:
‣ From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation in urban governance in late 
capitalism (Harvey, 1989)
‣ The Death and Life of  Great American Cities (Jacobs, 1961)
‣ The Rise of  The Network Society (Castells, 2000)
‣ The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Sassen, 1991)
As I noted in my opening to this discussion, however, unbeknownst to me my entry had 
begun long before I’d arrived at these points. Though I’d worked hard to maintain a 
consistency across each of the processes summarised above, I now recognise the sterile 
directions  which tell of that approach (briefed above and outlined in full in Appendix 
Three) as  somewhat disingenuous. That is  not to deny that an application of those 
instructions  is  likely approximate a very similar data set, but what goes un-captured are the 
half-steps, non-steps, dead-ends and about-turns, which actually led to the discovery of the 
steps detailed therein. I only have to think back to the long, arduous duration of those 
processes, and quite importantly, my feelings and affective responses at that time, to realise 
that those logical instructions are not indicative nor representative of my experience. And 
what I now recognise is  that my attempt to capture this  process  as objective served only to 
elide the rhizomatic paths  which thought followed in pursuit of its data. Therefore, as I 
write this here, fully cognisant of the canon not simply as a corpus of texts but as an 
assemblage that is  textual at every turn, I similarly recognise that as I was  working to find 
my entry to the canon, I was already reading it.
RESEARCH EVENT: READING THE CANON
My admission above – that an attempt to find entry to the canon resulted in my inadvertent 
reading of it – gives  some indication that those texts eventually arrived at were not the only 
points at which I plugged in to the function of the urban studies canon. In addition to 
Harvey (1989), Jacobs (1961), Castells  (2000) and Sassen (1991), the sources from which I 
ultimately recognised my reading of the canon taking place included journal descriptions; 
titles; abstracts; keywords; names; locations; dates; blurbs; course descriptions; webpages; 
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and many other textual and non-textual objects  which accompanied or sat adjacent to the 
aforementioned. Heedless  of my preemptive entry to the canon at these points, whilst 
simultaneously struggling to maintain an objectivity to my method for obtaining a more 
deliberate entry, I was also unwittingly developing my first strategies for reading its  contents. 
Primarily as a means to understand and ameliorate the struggle I was having, I had begun 
once more to draw on the autoethnographic techniques I’d previously designed. What I 
came to realise, however, was that my reflections  spoke not only to that struggle, but told of 
the multiple sense connections that were happening as I applied each of my indicators. 
Recognising the telling insight of my affective responses  in this regard I moved to make 
autoethnography a more purposive aspect of that application, and paid attention to the 
following reading prompts as I wrote autoethnographic commentaries to accompany my 
more sterile directions:
‣ How does the canon function within and between the indicators I’ve identified?
‣ How does it reach out beyond these indicators to become sensible for me? 
When it came to reading the canon, this time via the four texts  identified as dominant, the 
use of autoethnographic techniques for honing in on my affective responses again proved 
helpful. However, I also took more deliberate direction from Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 
and other rhizomatically inspired scholars  (see St. Pierre, 1997; Alvermann, 2000; Hagood, 
2002; Dufresne, 2009; Leander and Rowe, 2006; Eakle, 2007; and Honan, 2007), 
regarding what might constitute a rhizomatic reading method. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
whether captured or not, readers  come to embody interpretative connections as they move 
through texts; connections which expand far beyond the object that is  read to form links 
with other texts  pertinent to sense-making. To engage in a process of rhizomatic reading is, 
then, to facilitate a journey of continually unfolding sense connections. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, such a journey is about moving, always moving; about actively forgetting in order 
to bring forth other tendencies. They argue that much like the writing of a stream of 
consciousness, the text too must be read as such: over and over and over, again (1987). And 
summing this up in a later work, Negotiations, Deleuze returns to consider that practice:
There are, you see, two ways  of reading a book; you either 
see it as  a box with something inside and start looking for 
what it signifies, and then if you’re even more perverse or 
depraved you set off after signifiers. And you treat the next 
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book like a box contained in the first or containing it. And 
you annotate and interpret and question, and write a book 
about the book, and so on and on. Or there’s  the other way: 
you see the book as  a little non-signifying machine, and the 
only question is  ‘Does  it work, and how does it work?’ How 
does  it work for you? If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes 
through, you try another book. This second way of reading’s 
intensive: something comes through or it doesn’t. There’s 
nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to 
interpret. [...] This second way of reading’s quite different 
from the first, because it relates  a book directly to what’s 
Outside. A book is  a little cog in much more complicated 
external machinery [...] This  intensive way of reading, in 
contact with what’s  outside the book, as  a flow meeting other 
flows, one machine among others, as  a series of experiments 
for each reader in the midst of events  that have nothing to 
do with books, as  tearing the book into pieces, getting it to 
interact with other things, absolutely anything [...] is  reading 
with love.
1995: 7-9 
Where the text in question is  a novel, a record, a poem, a play, a film or indeed any text 
read solely for the purposes of pleasure, any text read “with love”, such an approach is 
recognisable. Where that text is guised as  an object of analysis  in its own right, however, 
Deleuze’s  first way of reading is  arguably the more immediate. That is  not to say that 
rhizomatic reading techniques are entirely absent in the academy. A. Jonathan Eakle’s 
practice of data walking, for example, offers some insight into the practical application and 
difference where Deleuze’s  second way is adopted for textual analysis. Arguing that the use 
of pre-codified categories when reading is  akin to experiencing a unfamiliar city by 
navigating it solely by map, Eakle instead suggests  that reading should be thought of as 
walking or “strolling” through the strangeness of that city, following those things which 
catch attention; “an exploration of data as  if you were an open and receptive traveler in a 
new and unknown territory” (2007: 483). Similarly, Donna E. Alevermann stresses  the 
importance of  what she terms an “implicated reading method”, arguing:
implicated readings  engage us  in intimate relations with texts 
and evoke a full range of readerly emotions  – including 
enchantment, devotions, envy, frustration, disappointment, 
and so on – they are, like Deleuze and Guattari’s  rhizome, 
open and connectable
2000: 119
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And explicitly connecting these “readerly emotions” back to how texts  operate outside of 
themselves, Alvermann concludes their value for research:
In sum, rhizoanalysis  is  a method of examining texts  that 
allows us  to see things  in the middle. Looking for middles, 
rather than beginnings  and endings, makes  it possible to 
decenter key linkages  and find new ones, not by combining 
old ones  in new ways, but by remaining open to the 
proliferation of ruptures  and discontinuities  that in turn 
create other linkages.
2000: 118
Looking for new linkages  as  a way to play with the realities  proposed through the urban 
studies canon, I was determined that my entry via four of its  dominant texts  took me 
beyond their beginnings and ends, towards that which was in the middle. To achieve this, I 
recognised the importance of an open, receptive and indeed adventurous attitude as I 
turned to face the texts. However, aware that this  was  not my usual method for academic 
textual engagement, I also anticipated that a loose framework through which my readings 
could unfold would be helpful. 
To this  end I developed a varied set of reading approaches, each of which allowed my 
reading to be a creative and generative activity in and of itself. I began my reading by 
attending to the texts  in isolation, starting with Harvey (1989), then Jacobs (1961), Castells 
(2000) and finally Sassen (1991). Commencing with a first and second reading of each, I 
took no notes and did not refer to any other sources (online or hard copy) to aid my 
understanding. This  allowed me to make sense of the text via my existing understanding of 
the field in which it was written and any other frames which just happened to colour its 
content. This also meant that I wasn’t hung up on producing a commentary of my 
experience but could instead focus simply on the activity and experience of reading. 
Though these readings were formally unrecorded, their journeys were not lost. To 
paraphrase Brian Massumi’s  depiction of the hope of Deleuze and Guattari – elements of 
them stayed, weaving into the melody of  my everyday life (1987: xiv). 
I then read through each text a third time, again without any supplementary material, but 
this  time highlighting and annotating them – and re-highlighting and re-annotating them – 
with those sense connections that were forthcoming. A fourth, fifth and sixth reading saw 
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me move through each text whilst following those connections, and new ones  which were 
there emergent. In these readings I turned freely to other sources that entered my thoughts 
and focused on certain sections, themes, sentences and phrases  that seemed particularly 
resonant, re-highlighting and re-annotating as I went. In my final two readings of each text 
I expanded to look across  the other sources and commentaries I’d generated in previous 
readings. Across  these assemblages  I paid attention to a number of prompts  in order that 
my increased familiarity did not lead me to close in on what the text meant. For example, 
paying attention to my affective responses as  I read, I looked to those ideas that flowed 
freely and those which got stuck; I considered the stories  it  told of the city and those it 
neglected to tell; I paid attention to where, how and when time popped up and where I’d 
expected it to; I reflected on how it made itself sensible, spoke to me and affected me 
emotionally. Finally, where I’d already been familiar with a text prior to my rhizomatic 
analysis I looked back at notes  made previously15. I read these not for their interpretations, 
but as textual materials  which told once more of the function of the urban studies  canon 
via the self.
Though my rhizoanalysis  of the canon via these texts  commenced with them as individual 
entry points, at no time did I conceive of these texts  as discrete entities. Rather I recognised 
them as functioning within, between and beyond themselves, expanding to form a broader 
assemblage with other texts, including, importantly, the non-canonical. As such, following 
the sequential readings just described, my focus then conferred on the assemblage of the 
urban studies canon more generally. I prescribed no structure for my reading of this 
broader assemblage, but instead used the following prompts as  a way to meet points two 
and three of  my research problem:
‣ What is the (non)presence of  time in this assemblage?
‣ What connections  can I make between this  assemblage and the absence/presence 
of  temporal accounts of  the city?
‣ What are the necessary conditions for temporal research?
Though I grew more accustomed with it throughout this research event, reading the canon 
rhizoanalytically was  not an easy, straightforward, nor, dare I say, natural task for me. In 
particular, and in the beginning especially, I was  often having to check myself for how I was 
reading. Initially it had been my unequivocal aim to steer well clear of those methods 
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espoused in more conventional forms  of textual analysis – “Never interpret: experience, 
experiment” was the constant reminder I borrowed for myself (Deleuze, 1995: 87). I came 
to recognise, however, that more interpretative approaches  were neither absent, nor wholly 
redundant within my readings; indeed I now realise that their presence was  somewhat 
inevitable. This, after all, was how I first learnt my research craft – I was taught to look for 
lexical clues, discursive strategies  and narrative devices in order to arrive at meaning. In 
contrast, I was never taught to follow rhizomes, to connect my affective self back up to the 
text, nor to aim only for the middles  of the assemblage. Therefore, rather than devise 
elaborate strategies for excluding such tendencies from my reading, I ultimately came to 
believe that it was better to use my interpretations  as means  to pursue alternative lines: 
where they happened to emerge I used them to ask what is this? considering that the answers 
generated provided a somewhat stable jumping-off point for then asking what is this not? 
And in that sense, used cautiously, those more conventional forms  of textual analysis 
actively helped establish the stage for new experiences and experiments  to emerge, serving, 
in turn, to facilitate the emergence of  alternative imaginings.
RESEARCH EVENT: CAPTURING THE CANON
“Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is  not a rooted or ramified matter”, write 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 15). Rather thought – like the process  of reading the canon 
I’ve just discussed – is rhizomatic. It “ceaselessly establishes connections” which unfold 
whether captured or not (7). As Honan explains, “there are always offshoots, tangents, ways 
of linking particular rhizomes  with other rhizomes. There is a ceaseless  flow of connections 
between, across, and through rhizomes” (2004: 270). And making clear that the “event of 
thought lies  beyond the autonomy of choice”, Claire Colebrook elaborates: “[t]hinking is 
not something ‘we do’; thinking happens to us, from without. There is a necessity to thinking 
[...] Thinking happens” (2002: 38, original emphasis). When it came to capturing the 
routes by which thought wandered it was obvious to me that any presentation of a fixed, 
solid or static nature would not suffice. Yet faced with something that was  always moving 
and changing, always happening, what emerged as an even greater concern was  whether it 
was  possible to capture anything at all. Describing the rhizomatic journey, Honan sums up 
this inherent tension in the quote below:
The rhizomatic journey is  not the urban trudging along a 
concrete pavement but, rather, a trail that may connect to 
other trails, diverge around blockages or disappear 
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completely. The trail is  never completely re-traceable, as, just 
like the footprints  in the sand, it is  erased almost at the same 
time it is created
2007: 535
Despite such complications I was aware from early on of two reasons why it was necessary 
to capture something of my reading of the urban studies canon in a manifest form. The 
first, and more process orientated reason, was  driven by the requirements of my method. 
While I undertook a number of readings  with no effort to document them, the majority 
required me to make some level of commentary in order that my subsequent readings 
could unfold beside, apart, on top of, or at cross  purposes with those that had come 
previous. The second reason, and which I shall look to in more specific detail in the 
following chapter, was about making visible the productions of  that process for others.
In response to both of these aims I turned once more to the pages of A Thousand Plateaus, 
and in particular the importance Deleuze and Guattari placed on making maps. Making 
maps, Deleuze and Guattari stress, is about following the rhizomatic paths  which thought 
follows, whilst at the same time acknowledging that it is  not possible to fully retrace one’s 
steps. Speaking of  the promise of  mapping in this regard, they write:
The map is  open and connectable in all of its  dimensions; it 
is  detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. 
It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, 
reworked by an individual, group, social formation. It can be 
drawn on a wall, conceived as a work of art, constructed as  a 
political action or as  a meditation. Perhaps  one of the most 
important characteristics  of the rhizome is  that it always  has 
multiple entry ways [...]. A map has multiple entryways as 
opposed to the tracing, which always  comes  back ‘to the 
same’. The map has  to do with performance, whereas  the 
tracing always involves an alleged ‘competence’.
1987: 12–13
Unlike tracings which aim to reproduce and mimetically represent reality, maps  remain 
ever-open to experimentation: “[w]hat distinguishes  the map from the tracing is that it is 
entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does  not 
reproduce [...] it constructs  [...] fosters  connections” (1987: 12). Moreover, in allowing for 
the theoretically imagined to exist alongside the seemingly concrete, the map is a supremely 
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capable medium for attending to goal of playing with reality. Making maps, therefore, does 
not stand apart from the process of following rhizomes, but is  itself a key part of doing 
rhizoanalysis.
In contrast with what received notions  may readily suggest, mapping does  not necessarily 
entail the use of diagrams (Hagood, 2002; Eakle, 2007). And though certain aspects of my 
map making in this  work did take on a diagrammatic form, my earliest strategies simply 
made use of columns on a spreadsheet. This  technique emerged largely of its own accord. 
Already inside the canon as  I struggled to discern the dominant texts by which I should 
enter it, I wrote myself notes on the difficulty of that process. Eventually recognising these 
not as  benign reflections but as  autoethnographic data generated both in response to the 
data that I was actively seeking and the data collection process itself, I began to embed 
autoethnography more fully within this  task. No longer did I simply work to refine my 
method and arrive a sample of dominant texts. As I did, I simultaneously read the canon as 
I went, recording my immanent, affective responses  in the adjoining cells of the vast tables 
of data I was generating. And returning purposefully to re-read those entries alongside my 
other data at frequent intervals, I supplemented them with the insertion of additional 
columns, comment bubbles  and hyperlinks  to other sources. In that sense the capturing of 
my reading never became routine nor linear, but was recursive and continually expanding 
in all directions.
As I then turned to capture the canon via my individual readings  of Harvey (1989), Jacobs 
(1961), Castells (2000) and Sassen (1991), I continued to make use of this  approach. In 
addition to using tables  and spreadsheets, however, I also wrote lengthier pieces. Inspired 
by the rhizomatic reading approach I’d been learning I attempted to write in similar ways: 
quickly, without convention, without polish, more rhizomatically – much like the stream of 
consciousness writings  I’d already practiced for my earlier autoethnographic research at point 
one of my research problem (discussed at page 127). Regardless of whether my writing was 
contained on the cells of spreadsheet or in the lines of my notebook, in the pages  of typed 
document or as a note on my iPhone, this  capturing always remained a part of the process; 
part of the analysis. As Laurel Richardson notes, “writing is  not just a mopping-up activity 
at the end of a research project, writing is  also a way of ‘knowing’ – a method of discovery 
and analysis” (2000: 923), and across all of my readings  I witnessed this at play. Re-reading 
my commentaries – writing new ones as I read – I’d find those I’d lost confidence in; some 
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that had joined to advocate more strongly for a particular interpretation; others which 
stood to contradict, even argue against earlier considerations. But continually, I resisted the 
urge to synthesise and interpret these further, and instead worked to facilitate a way for the 
connections and contradictions between them to remain open.
In addition to these written methods of making maps I found the use of diagrams  to be 
useful, and took my direction here from two interrelated cues. The first, from Deleuze and 
Guattari, was contained within the following short passage:
The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out [...] on a 
single page, the same sheet: lived events, historical 
determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social 
formations
1987: 9
And it was  my reading of this passage that led to the second. Forcing my imagination back 
to the process by which I attempted to make sense of my method I remembered the way in 
mapping helped to free my thoughts  (see Figure Two, page 132). Accordingly, I turned 
once more to this  technique, producing large and interconnecting diagrams at points  where 
my readings did not easily resonate in strings of words, but spoke instead in diagrams, 
pictures  and conceptual assemblages. I produced these diagrams by hand, making my 
marks with different coloured permanent markers  on lining paper. The ten metre length of 
these rolls meant that I could expand my diagrams horizontally by unfurling more paper, 
whilst it was also possible to cut more length and attach it vertically. More often than not I 
produced this  work by attaching long stretches of the paper to the the wall beside my desk, 
and keeping the diagrams ever-visible in this  way frequently prompted me to amend my 
marks and adjust their positions as and when new connections emerged. 
Dealing with rhizomes in the face of trees, making maps where there once were tracings, 
fixing free thinking whilst freeing fixed knowledge, was not an easy task. However, despite 
the difficulties  I faced, the routes  I considered and the eventual qualifications I made as  I 
entered and read the canon, mapping as I went, there remained a persistent niggle that I’m 
not sure was adequately resolved in my method. Namely, whether my trust in a technique 
that felt overtly spatial reflected a glaring naïvety when I’d stressed the importance of 
paying attention to the temporal so emphatically. Admittedly, this  concern emerges not 
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from the tenor of Deleuze and Guattari’s  work but arrives through my received notion of 
what mapping entails and those more common forms by which it speaks. Responding to 
this  perceived threat nonetheless, as  I mapped I made constant marks with time and date 
stamps, and used different colours  and codes  in my spreadsheets, notes and drawings in an 
attempt to illustrate my productions  not as static, but ever-expanding. Moreover, I made use 
not of single maps, but multiple ones, over time, of things that changed, of moments which 
emerged in the present but which were of the past. I aimed that my process and 
productions should be multi-dimensional in their division of time and space as far as 
possible. Even within these efforts, however, I always  felt that my maps  retained an 
unsatisfying flatness to them, and I long craved the potential to build out from the page, 
screen and wall in pursuit of a more pleasing semblance to my thoughts. Looking to the 
rhizomatic techniques of other researchers I recognised similar concerns  motivating their 
decisions to use software programmes (Bowles, 2001) and mind-map style diagrams  (Masny 
and Waterhouse, 2011) to capture their journeys. But with no intention to dismiss  the 
alternative insights and potential benefits of these approaches, even they lacked the 
dimensionality that excited me when I first read Deleuze and Guattari’s  ideal vision for a 
book, as quoted above. 
As I reflect back on this, having reached an end of my entering, reading and capturing the 
urban studies  canon, my niggle doesn’t hold quite the same weight it once did, and my 
resolve is much more pragmatic as I recognise the work-arounds and limitations that occur in 
the application of any method. Instead, I now choose to hold on to what this approach has 
managed to facilitate in terms  of process, and to produce as a result. Moreover, in 
recognising this important link between process and production, what perhaps  emerges  as 
even more important is the comment this makes for the development of a rhizoanalytic 
method more generally. Like the subjects  it has the potential to reach after, rhizoanalysis 
must not be assessed for its  complete coherence but rather the scope it allows for its  own 
change and expansion as it seeks to produce the multiple realities which sit congruously to 
that which motivates it use. Indeed, where the goal is not to arrive at truth but to produce an 
alternative, it is against these such productions that the process  of its  method must be 
assessed. And with this  in mind, now is  an appropriate point to move to my final discussion 
of method in Chapter Six, which looks not simply to the efforts of this work to play with 
reality, producing it through the process; but outlines the ways  in which those efforts have 
made it possible to (re)craft those realities in multiple and alternative ways.
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13 To be clear, the truth I refer to here is the version outlined on page 112–113, which sees truth as a singular 
and verifiable explanation that emerges through the correct application of  a research method. That version of 
truth is the one that motivates and organises the practice of  traditional academic research, and which I am 
seeking to distance myself  from in this work. As such, where I refer to this type of  traditional truth without 
qualifying it as such, it will herein be italicised in this document. Where I am referring to truth beyond these 
notions, it will be left unitalicised.
14 See Appendix Three for a fuller description of  entering the canon via these indicators.
15 I looked to notes made previously on Harvey (1989) and Jacobs (1961).
Chapter Six
(RE)CRAFTING REALITIES
Performing Performative Method
“The picture of method starts to shift. The argument is no longer that methods discover 
and depict realities. Instead, it is  that they participate in the enactment of those realities”, 
writes John Law (2004: 45). My conscious  effort to detail not simply the practice of my 
method but also its development throughout Chapter Five, was inspired by Law’s remarks 
in a couple of ways. First, this decision was motivated by my desire to make explicit the first 
part of Law’s  statement. That is by juxtaposing the development of my method alongside 
its practice, my belief was that it would be more difficult to cling to the idea of method-
making and research as  straightforward, linear and objective activities, thereby forcing the 
“shift” to which Law refers. This making visible a different process  than that commonly 
assumed of method is an important point in itself. Second, and more significant, however, 
is  what takes place where that alternative is confronted head-on. In bringing to light the 
non-linear development of research events, the new temporality that emerges in its  place 
makes it much easier to appreciate the productive capacity of method in the way that the 
second half of Law’s quote remarks upon. No longer is  causality linear and forward bound; 
no longer does the researcher stand in isolation from their data; no longer does reality hold 
steady in its  wait for observation. Rather, each part of the research process flows in every 
direction, shaping and being shaped by that with which it comes  into contact. As Law 
summarises: [m]ethod is not [...] a more or less  successful set of procedures  for reporting 
on a given reality. Rather it is performative. It helps to produce realities” (2004: 143). 
It is this point which draws my discussion to the final but crucial part of this work’s 
methodological practice: its  necessary and active engagement with the politics  of ontology. 
Where the depiction of a true reality is  no longer viewed as an expedient, sensible or indeed 
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possible research goal, and method no longer reacts to reality but forms reality through its 
practice, there is both danger and potential for research to be caught up in the making of 
ontologies. The danger – which is a danger for any method – is that the activity of 
conducting research further perpetuates the ontologies  which it might rather argue against, 
and in doing so becomes complicit in the ongoing maintenance of those problems it seeks to 
address. I’ve already touched on this  point briefly in Chapter Three, pages  96–97, when I 
spoke of how the mechanical rationality of social science bore a striking resemblance to the 
temporality of clock time, and was therefore an inappropriate means by which to orientate 
this  work; and in Chapter Four, when I reported how the cracks of this  work manifested in 
relation to social justice across  an ontological register. My subsequent discussion in Chapter 
Five of the broad research approach I deemed necessary in light of such considerations 
then spoke, albeit implicitly, of the potential that the researcher is afforded where they 
become cognisant of the performative nature of their work. No longer forced to report on 
reality they might instead craft new ones through the research process. Indeed, considering 
this  “promise of qualitative research as a form of radical democratic practice”, Norman 
Denzin notes: “[t]oday we understand that we write culture, and that writing is not an 
innocent practice. We know the world only through our representations of it” (2001: 23). 
And certainly, it was in such a sense that I was able to take as central to my work the cry of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari that “[t]he multiple must be made” (1987: 6, original 
emphasis); allowing me to play with reality in pursuit of that goal whilst actively (re)crafting 
it through the very process. 
Beyond this  general approach, however, I’ve also maintained a careful attendance to my 
performance in more specific terms. At points  where I’ve recognised my activities as 
enacting realities that were ill-fitting with my broader research and ethical positions, I’ve 
been quick to respond. Either by adapting my approach (in the case of my decision to stop 
coding my autoethnographic data so precisely) or by qualifying and making visible its 
limitations (such as accepting that the flatness of my maps did not necessarily render them 
overtly spatial). Similarly, I’ve also taken the opportunity to challenge arrangements I’ve 
recognised as perpetuating notions  of time and ontology as  singular and homogenous, and 
have made active attempts to (re)craft the multiple in their wake. 
This  has  been particularly the case as I’ve performed this  work through method and in 
writing. For example, Carolyn Ellis’ view that “autoethnography, as  method, attempts to 
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disrupt the binary of science and art” (2010: 11), revealed its scope to undo some of the 
artificial, disciplinary barriers erected between legitimate and illegitimate ways  of doing 
academic work. Similarly, my decision to write my “multiple contradictory selves into the 
text, and to make visible the embodied experiences and their effects on the writer and the 
text” (Honan, 2007: 536) allowed me to challenge the practice of “silent authorship” which 
accompanies and upholds the idea of the objective researcher (Ellis, 2004). The 
heterogeneity of narratives  that were then able to emerge allowed me not only to produce 
the multiple, but in the process helped dispel any notion that knowledge was  equal only to 
truth of a singular or transcendent nature. Finally, both autoethnography and rhizoanalysis 
have allowed me to generate data through non-linear and non-mechanical means, and the 
processes involved in these efforts  speak powerfully against the temporality presumed where 
the clock maintains its domination. 
Arguably, however, my most definite attempt to (re)craft the realities  in which this  work has 
found itself has  occurred not in method and writing, but in my reporting of the canon. The 
remainder of this  section therefore looks to this as  the final research event involved in the 
production of  this thesis document.
RESEARCH EVENT: REPORTING THE CANON
In addition to the process  requirements  discussed at the end of Chapter Five, my efforts to 
capture the canon were motivated by my desire to make visible the productions  of that 
process  for others. Such a desire is central to the production of any thesis, with the 
reporting of findings often considered to be the fundamental goal of research. Lacking any 
ambition for producing findings representative of truth, however, two alternative ends  have 
driven the practice of this seemingly pervasive research event. In addition to the first goal 
of finding a way to play with reality, the second and equally important aim has been to put 
it back together again so as to disturb those realities  and their verities  which so readily 
present. As May considers
Ontology itself has  strange adventures  in store for us, if only 
we can think differently about how it might be conceived. If 
we stop searching for the true, stop asking for the world to 
allow us to recognize it, stop knowing what everyone knows, 
then we can set off  on a new thought
2005: 81
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Where the goals  of research are motivated more by the production of thinking than 
knowledge, this task requires a conscious move on the part of the researcher from 
presenting their  findings, towards  encouraging a freedom of thought within the mind of the 
reader. That is, the task of reporting findings seeks  a much more performative role. At this 
point, however, the tension of how to capture the inherently un-capturable character of the 
rhizomatic journey (discussed on page 146 in the previous chapter) rears its  head once 
more. And moreover, is  compounded by the need to reproduce the experience of that 
journey for the reader, whilst simultaneously heightened by the fact that the production of 
a thesis necessitates a certain amount of  fixing. 
In navigating this tension it is helpful once more to remember the function of the rhizome. 
As Deleuze and Guattari argue, there is no dualism between rhizomes and trees, and 
regardless  of individual predilection neither concept negates  the ontological status of the 
other – “[t]here are knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in 
roots” (1987: 20), they write. As  such, the pursuit of the rhizome – the goal of producing 
thinking – is  not to negate the existence of arboreal thought, nor are its ends  directed 
towards  a state of pure rhizomatic thinking. Rather, the rhizome necessarily exists  in relation 
to the tree and is invoked not to dialectically dissolve but to dialogically challenge:
The important point is  that the [...] tree and [...] rhizome are 
not two opposed models: the first operates  as  a transcendent 
model and tracing, even if it engenders  its  own escapes; the 
second operates as an immanent process  that overturns  the 
model and outlines  a map, even if it constitutes  its  own 
hierarchies, even if it gives  rise to a despotic channel. [...] We 
invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another.
1987: 20
This  makes clear that the immanence of thinking always interjects to disrupt knowledge 
just as  representational knowledge always intervenes to structure thinking. And what this 
allows for is reporting by representational means whilst at the same time being informed by 
a different aim. 
In this work I have therefore chosen not to present findings, but to report my research of the 
urban studies canon by producing stories  from and of my process. Though I recognise that 
my stories may take on a representational form, I remain firm to my insistence that they do 
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not seek to represent truth. Rather, I present them as  snapshots of the rhizoanalytic process 
that unfolded throughout this  research and continues to do so; as a way to display 
fragments  of data that seem “to be engaged or interjected in such a way as  to make new 
relations  possible” (Leander and Rowe, 2006: 440). In working to realise this premise my 
intention has been to encourage my readers to move between a multiplicity of 
representations I’ve made, whilst also beyond them to make their own connections. As a 
result I’ve used data from three different origins in my telling of these stories: 
autoethnographic recordings, presentations to my supervisors, and new narratives crafted 
specifically for inclusion in this document. Each of these sources arose from a moment 
wherein sense emerged; an immanent event which suggested not what the correct 
interpretation of the data was, but rather, what potential it had to connect with other facets 
of data. And in that sense each is not the final but only the next iteration of the process of 
capture that took place. 
Recognising that I could not tell each and every part of this work I crafted my stories  on 
the basis of their affective powers – their potential to disrupt and to deterritorialize 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). As such, they emerged not from an effort to code the vast 
data I’d gathered as  I entered and read the canon, but rather through my allowance for 
certain groupings, including those which contradicted one another, to come to the fore. 
(Re)writing my data in this  way involved a certain amount of editing. For example, I altered 
the tense of many autoethnographic passages in order to ensure that my narratives flowed 
more smoothly. I corrected spelling and grammatical errors, and altered sentences for 
clarity where there was potential for confusion. In addition, moments of editing occurred 
as  I transcribed my hand-written notes to the uniform text of this document, erasing, in the 
process, the more nuanced facets  of their origin that I considered so important for my own 
analysis (see Chapter Five, page 128). And perhaps most significantly, editing occurred as I 
decided which data was most salient and warranted inclusion in my stories. 
Prior to editing my data in these ways I considered alternatives that might lessen my 
interference. For example, I pondered using photographs and screen captures  of my 
original data, allowing the reader to unpack my spelling mistakes  (potentially finding in 
these my moments  of haste, distraction or learned inaccuracies). While such strategies had 
their appeal I also recognised that a desire to report a raw and unedited version of my 
research might be taken to the extreme: I might simply leave the remainder of this 
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document blank, save for an instruction to the reader to rummage at will through the 
artefacts collected and constructed for this work. And even this, I considered, involved a 
certain amount of editing, for I could never hope to include the entire range of sensory 
and environmental conditions which gave rise to those artefacts, privileging, in many ways, 
the visual over the aural, haptic and olfactory, and, more concerning for this project, the 
present over memories  of the past. Moreover, I realised that while I felt a pull to maintain 
the original form of my data, the more pressing aim was to keep a multiplicity of elements 
at play. As a result I considered that though editing my data for tense, spelling and clarity 
further drew things  down, there overall remained a heterogeneity buoyant in the resulting 
stories, and this  allowed me to strike a balance between something that was fixed but also 
moving, making the simple but important argument that “[t]here is always more to 
think” (May, 2005: 132).
The stories  which I report in this  thesis include key pieces of the rhizoanalysis; moments  of 
sense that relate to my research problems. There are ten in total, presented across the next 
three chapters as follows:
CHAPTER SEVEN
TELLING STORIES 
What is the City? (What is it Not?)
Power, Dominance and Sensibility
Material Encounters
Writing Solo, With Others
The Value of  Knowledge
From Language to Presentation, Method and Pedagogy
Abridgement
CHAPTER EIGHT
STORIES OF THOSE STORIES 
Entering the Canon
Reading the Canon
Reporting the Canon
This  event of reporting is  then concluded in Chapter Nine, where I tell one final story – 
The Scope of the Debate – in which I consider the connections between these stories, and the 
issues which sit at the heart of  this thesis.
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Beyond the Thesis
So far in this chapter I have written of the potential to perform method within and through 
the production of a thesis. The active crafting of ontology, however, is  not exclusive to the 
production of the thesis  document. Rather, the sites  at which research takes place – as Law 
informs “in a combination of people, techniques, texts, architectural arrangements, and 
natural phenomena (which are themselves  being enacted and re-enacted)” (2004: 56) – 
suggests that the performative capacity of method extends  across all that it touches, no 
matter how loosely. This potential for enactment across a much broader realm means  that 
the danger for types  of knowledge to be reified, objects to be stabilised and representations 
to become verities, are of course heightened. Also considerable, however, is the potential to 
extend the practice of research beyond commonly designated research events, into those 
spheres which tacitly, though nonetheless powerfully work to uphold normative and/or 
problematic ontologies. 
Such activities  are not easily subsumed into the process outlined by a traditional research 
model (such as the one depicted at Figure One, Chapter Five), often sitting outside the 
anticipated limits of start and end dates, and research sites. In this work, however, I 
consider such efforts  just as important as those research events detailed throughout Chapter 
Five, and Chapter Six thus far. There have been many points  throughout this work where I 
have found myself enacting my thesis beyond these pages. For example, as I’ve attended 
conferences; designed and taught, lessons  and workshops; facilitated discussions; spoke with 
colleagues; written for other sources, and so on. In addition to these activities  which were 
previously unanticipated, however, I’ve actively tried to create spaces  in which to (re)craft 
the realities this work found itself within and without, in ways that are more fitting. The 
remainder of this section now moves to discuss two such research events: an engagement 
with the university’s ethics  committee, and the production of an alternative form to sit 
alongside the thesis document. 
RESEARCH EVENT: ENGAGING ETHICS WITH ETHICS
My engagement with the University of Glasgow’s Ethics Committee was motivated by two 
separate but interrelated concerns. The first stemmed from my realisation that aspects  of 
my work that were increasingly demanding my own ethical consideration appeared absent 
from the purview of the university’s  Ethics Committee. The second, from my growing 
belief that many of the procedures considered to promote good ethical practice by the 
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university’s Ethics Committee might in many ways be consider unethical. To look at this 
first point. Early on I realised that my research might be exempt from formal review by the 
university’s Ethics Committee16, given that its  subjects  were textual objects and myself. 
Despite this, I recognised the potential for my work to have consequences  which I felt 
should be considered for their ethical character. For example, my evolving understanding of 
texts  were not as a passive objects, but as  living, fluid entities which held strong relations 
with ways  of seeing, and hence the world. Be it through the act of reading and re-reading; 
offering interpretations; or prompting others to question the ways  in which texts  related to 
their own work and practices, dialogue ensued, along with the potential for transformation. 
Moreover, while I was the only active human participant of the work I viewed myself as 
constituted through Others (see Ricœur, 1991; Derrida, 1998; Nancy, 2000), and hence felt 
a need to expand ethical considerations from a direct to a relational register. For example, 
there was potential for my work to impact upon other human subjects, either because they 
were in close physical and mental proximity to me and may witness my change; because 
they were closely related to my work and might experience a direct change in themselves; 
or because in choosing to write about myself I necessarily wrote about the Others who co-
constituted me, potentially implicating and identifying them in the process.
Considering the range of ethical issues  outlined whilst noting that there appeared no 
institutional requirement to engage with them, prompted me to question the institutional 
framing of ethics, and its relationship to ethics in a broader sense. And as  I looked to the 
university’s application form I grew to realise a number of other issues, leading to the 
second concern noted – my feeling that many of its  procedures promoted not ethical but 
unethical behaviour within researchers. I had many concerns, such as the limits  of 
informed consent, the notion of discrete research sites and times, and the nature of 
participation, for example17. But my gravest concern was  that the relation of ethics to 
academic research was  largely limited to the process of gaining institutional approval, and 
with its meaning reduced to the act of filling in a form, ethical research equaled research 
that had been ethically approved. Together these concerns portrayed a bleak reality, that 
the institutionalisation of ethics was in itself unethical due to both its  production of 
normative values to assess  research ethics, and in its promotion of research behaviour 
which served to maintain and extend those values in the guise of ethics. And where I grew 
to recognise the role of the Ethics  Committee not just in stamping their approval upon 
ethical research but in deciding what research could and could not be conducted, I realised 
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that the knowledge, objects  and representations of the Ethics  Committee weren’t limited to 
this  arena but extended far throughout the practices  of research in the contemporary 
academy, limiting the possibilities of  knowledge, research and action.
In addressing these concerns  my decision was  to prompt a dialogue between myself and 
the Ethics  Committee. This  was done over a series of steps. First, after thinking through my 
issues  with the form, I wrote to Ethics Committee to relay my concern that whilst my 
research did not seem to fall within their remit, I nonetheless considered it to be ethically 
concerning18. They took this very seriously, stressing where I understood there to be ethical 
concerns with my project I should make an application to the Ethics Committee, raising 
them to their attention. Upon this  reply I completed and submitted a form, mitigating the 
lack of and ill-fitting categories by detailing my ethical concerns  in lengthy appendices. 
Over the course of four months  my correspondence with the committee continued back 
and forth as we worked to come up with a solution that was both ethical and met their 
institutionally framed notions of ethics. The eventual stumbling block related to the nature 
of Others  in my project. My feeling was that it was important to recognise Others  in my 
work for how they might be relationally affected by the project without subjecting them to 
the consent process. The Ethics Committee were clear in their stance: I must consider these 
Others as  participants, and carry out the appropriate measures  to assure their informed 
consent. By no means was my engagement and dialogue with the Ethics  Committee 
complete, yet other facets of  my project demanded that I concluded it and moved on.
Though I did not feel satisfied with their decision regarding my project, my engagement 
was  an important one for a number of reasons. During our correspondence I reflected 
deeply on what ethics meant in relation to social research. This prompted many discussions 
with my supervisors, other colleagues and peers. It also led to my co-designing and teaching 
a workshop on ethics for postgraduate research students  at the University of Glasgow19. 
Moreover, the correspondence appeared to lead to some fruitful discussion within the 
members  of the Ethics Committee. Indeed, at no point did I find the committee dismissive 
of my application and our ongoing engagement. On the contrary, I felt they took my 
concerns seriously, suggesting that whilst they operated within the fixed parameters of the 
existing framework such things  were always subject to ongoing review. Perhaps  most 
significantly, however, it helped introduce the method of autoethnography to the 
committee – a method capable of imagining things  differently. As Denzin notes, by 
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bringing into question many of the things which traditionally sit at the heart of research, 
such as verifiability, objectivity and truth, the practice of autoethnography can be conceived 
as  an ethical practice in and of itself (2006). And in securing a certain amount of 
legitimacy for autoethnography by subjecting it to the scrutiny of the Ethics Committee, it 
was  possible to enact a different politics  of ethics both alongside and within the ill-fitting 
procedures stabilised and transmitted through the institutionalisation of  ethics.
RESEARCH EVENT: QUILTING KNOWLEDGE
Within this  thesis  document there are points at which I’ve worked to (re)craft the problem 
realities  addressed by this work not only through content but in presentation. Oftentimes 
the motivation for such efforts  emerged where I was unable to express  my thesis  within the 
traditional limits of the written form. The collage of time in Chapter Two, for example, 
was  presented not as  a logically reasoned argument of time’s  multiplicity as fact, but in 
such a way that it invited the reader to focus on the experience of reading about different 
times in order that they might reach that realisation on their own terms; whilst the non-
linear research map which unfolded from this  document in Chapter Five was  a means to 
allow that alternative reality of method-making to break free from what remained a 
necessarily linear discussion of methods. Despite such efforts, however, as my production of 
this  work progressed in content, I also grew to recognise a need to challenge those 
limitations of  the traditional thesis medium more explicitly. 
When I looked more closely at the form of the traditional thesis document I was unsettled 
by what stared back. Black and white text; composed in rationally reasoned sentences, 
paragraphs, chapters; comprised of a start, middle and end; all sheets bound together at 
their spine. There was a strong linearity to the document, and bound from cover to cover it 
suggested that knowledge lives here; that within it, truth was  fixed. Moreover, with its two 
dominant colours  and uniform text, its somewhat masculine aesthetic conveyed a troubling 
rationality – black and white; on or off; true or false. Far from passive, as  a medium it 
enacted strong statements of knowledge’s  proper modes  and time’s linearity, and moreover, 
suggested who might rightly make claims to speak of such subjects. In this  I came to realise 
that I could be as  plural with the content of my written thesis as  I wanted, but there was 
also a need to challenge, not uphold, the dominant realities posed through my thesis as  it 
was traditionally presented. 
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To this end I looked first to literature for inspiration, considering it closest to the medium in 
which I was  working. I was initially quite taken by the achievements  of Georges Perec in A 
Void (1994), B.S. Johnson in The Unfortunates (1990) and Jonathan Safran Foer in Tree of Codes 
(2010) – postmodern texts in which the authors  challenged the limitations of their craft, 
crafting it anew in the process 20. Despite their creativity, however, my feeling was that there 
was  only so much I could alter within the limits of the traditional thesis medium whilst 
maintaining its ability to present as a social science thesis. Moreover, perhaps more 
concerning, the words  of Deleuze and Guattari shouted loudly from within: “[n]o 
typographical, lexical, or even syntactical cleverness  is enough to make it heard. The 
multiple must be made” (1987: 6). As  a result my decision was to produce a second object in 
order to challenge the realities and verities proposed through the traditional thesis  form – 
something that could sit alongside it, telling its stories, but through an entirely different 
medium and in an entirely different way. 
What I eventually arrived at was a quilt. My recognition of this  idea came not from other 
sources, but from an autoethnographic reflection I captured on writing: 
Writing.
How do i actually write?
Blank page – filling in or stripping away – or both?
Writing starts for me in the shower, when I’m cooking, walking, crocheting.
Mundane tasks that i am so familiar with.
They free my mind and it starts writing.
(Sitting staring at the computer screen makes this a more difficult process)
I capture it often when i come out the shower – the watermarks  on the pages  of 
my notebooks testifying to the urgency with which I scribble down my thoughts.
That for me is after writing.
Writing was what came before.
This thought, here, is a shower thought. 
It is  a Sunday morning, I’m still dripping wet, one towel on my head and 
another wrapped around body. I type this  one. And actually I’m finding that 
rather easier. I’m not looking at the screen. I’m not even looking at the 
keyboard. I’m just thinking. 
Although, I’m still aware of the translation from head to page – my ‘error 
correcting’ kicks  in as I start to write. This  thought isn’t that which occurs  in the 
shower, its  combined with the thoughts  that facilitate the task of writing. Much 
of these are non-verbal, in fact. I just feel myself stutter, stop in my tracks. I 
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press  backspace a number of times, correct, move on. Sometimes I can’t help 
but search my head, the air around for words. I look up. Pursed lips, I glance to 
the side. This  is  a more verbal part of thinking, but I’m also amazed by the 
speed at which the thought changes from broad to focused.
So this is  how I write and will write. A combination of notebooks, voice memos 
and typed text will provide the outlet. But what i fill them with will always  come 
from another place, another activity. A kind of ‘process’ activity that compels 
the attention of the focused part of my mind, keeping in its  shadow the acts of 
writing. An activity that I am familiar enough with that it leaves  my mind 
freedom to reign over its  contents. So much of this  thesis  has been borne not 
from the activities  that are so readily associated with it, but rather, from those 
which it is not.
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From this I came to recognise more fully the spaces  in which I wrote, and hence, how I 
wrote. There was  a physicality to writing – a tactility, urgency and energy in my efforts that 
were wiped out on the page; a vulnerable openness that all too often became tempered 
when it was translated and fixed in written text. I therefore wanted to find a way to bring 
that part of the knowledge production into focus; to bring to the fore the embodied practice 
of thesis  creation. It was very quickly after this that I arrived at the idea of a quilt. I’d 
always  been a keen seamstress and had amassed a lot of fabric over the years. Whenever I 
caught site of my pieces, bundles  and bolts of pattern, texture and colour, it  was fragments 
from my life which spoke back. Memories  of where it came for, what it was  meant for, what 
it had been previously, what it had become. And just like showering, walking or crocheting, 
I also remembered that cutting and stitching were tasks  that I found busy enough to free 
my mind to write.
The composition I decided upon was  a patchwork quilt, constructed from thirty-six 
individual squares, each of a different fabric, embroidered with a different quote. The 
quotes were to be from non-academic sources – snippets from outside the academy that 
nonetheless spoke to the same concerns of my written thesis. In joining the squares the 
edge would be left unbound; non-squares of absence would be interspersed at points 
between; and it would be quilted in two continuous  lines – one tracing the order in which I 
embroidered each square, the other tracking the temporal origin of each quote. The rest of 
it was to be quilted in person, and in the mind, as I performed the quilt by telling its stories 
with Others  who might look upon it. Indeed, there was  to be no proper line through the 
quilt, only lines. Lines starting from the threads  that made up the warp and woof, to the 
lines I marked on top. Only lines, and only stories21. 
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As an alternative form to sit alongside the thesis  document the quilt would act not to negate 
but to challenge the problematic realities  that were enacted through the traditional 
medium. It was  to be a counterpoint to the masculine, rationalised aesthetic of that 
electronically produced, sanitised form. It was to be produced from and to produce 
knowledge that was  less fixed, more open, more rhizomatic. And perhaps most importantly, it 
was  to permit time to flow in many directions; to be made in the present; and for what was 
past to be remade in the future. In spite of it fittingness, however, I felt compelled to justify 
my quilt to others  – perhaps also to justify it to my earlier and less confident academic self 
– beyond the logic of my own rationale. It turned out that I didn’t have to look too far to 
do so. 
The fourteenth chapter of A Thousand Plateaus, “1440: The Smooth and the Striated”, 
opens with an image of a quilt. Here, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the conceptual pair 
of smoothness  and striation as a way to rethink space. Striated space, they explain, is  a 
partitioned field of movement which prohibits free motion. Smooth space, on the other 
hand, allows a subject to operate more freely and unhindered. They write:
Smooth space is  filled by events  or haecceities, far more than 
by formed and perceived things. It is  a space of affects, more 
than one of properties. It is  haptic rather than optical 
perception.
1987: 479, original emphasis
Provoking a more sensual, tactical response, rather than navigated by a rationalised, 
perhaps planned trajectory, smooth space is more conducive to rhizomatic growth. And for 
Deleuze and Guattari the patchwork quilt, “[a]n amorphous collection of juxtaposed 
pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways” (1987: 476), is  a prime 
example of that concept. It wasn’t simply the conceptual fittingness of the quilt I was to 
find in Deleuze and Guattari, however, but a more cultural and political rationale. Indeed, 
within that chapter they also make note of “the importance of the quilting bee in America, 
and its role from the standpoint of  a women’s collectivity” (1987: 476–477). 
In this  assessment I recognised even more fully the way in which the practice of making my 
quilt enacted a more fitting reality; how it produced a different space and a different time, 
in which knowledge could be made differently. And thinking through the different 
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knowledges that might be produced I remembered a passage I’d read previously in bell 
hooks’ Belonging: a culture of place (1991). Describing the quilts Baba (hooks’ Grandmother) 
used to make, she writes: 
Baba would show her quilts  and tell their stories, giving the 
history [...] and the relation of chosen fabrics  to individual 
lives. [...] To her mind these quilts  were maps  charting the 
course of our lives. They were history as life lived. To share 
the story of a given quilt was  central to Baba’s  creative self-
expression, as family historian, storyteller, exhibiting the 
work of  her hands.
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Indeed, reflecting on that same passage, Susana Vega-González makes clear the 
importance of quilting to the black community in particular, noting that “[q]uiltmaking 
gave black women the opportunity to tell their particular histories and stories, apart from 
the history imposed from outside by the white man.” (2001: 242). And in this sense, and for 
me also, not only did the quilt have the potential to craft through its  presence a different 
knowledge and different time, but in many ways it was, itself, the Other.
Beyond the Thesis, in Space and Time
Shortly I will move to the final two parts  of this thesis  in which I report on the returns and 
my experiences of conducting the research events  described in Chapters Five and Six, and 
discuss  the significance of these for my research problem, my aims, and for this  project as a 
whole. However, even after I punctuate the final line of this  thesis’ concluding sentence, the 
work is far from over. This chapter in particular has aimed to make clear that the 
performative productions of method extend well beyond the limits assumed of the research 
process, and while I have largely focused on those events  that exist beyond the manifest 
production of the thesis  in space, the same is of course true for its  extension in time. There 
are some future moments at which I am already anticipating my performance of this  work 
must continue. In terms  of the quilt, for example, the point at which I fold its lengths 
together, place it in my bottom drawer and stop talking about it, the claim by which it 
attempts to speak is denied. In this  case, I therefore foresee an important need to continue 
to find and create ways of performing the quilt with Others, until such a point emerges 
where it no longer feels appropriate, or where it seems  sensible to stop and try another tack. 
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Similarly, my development of autoethnographic rhizoanalysis in and for this work will 
undoubtably make its presence felt in any future projects  I tackle or with which I am 
involved. What I anticipate here, however, is  not that I retain a strict adherence to its form 
as  it unfolded for this work, but that I allow for its  ever ongoing change and expansion. In 
addition to these performances at which I anticipate my active engagement, there will be 
countless others  that will reveal themselves in due course. The point, however, is made not 
by my knowledge of these at this  moment, but rather, my knowledge that a careful 
attendance to the realities  that are enacted through this work must remain, not simply for 
the way in which this thesis is spatially bound, but to how it may linger far beyond its  ill-
presumed temporal limits.
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16 The University of  Glasgow stipulates only that all research involving data or material relating to human 
subjects which is not lawfully in the public domain is subject to formal ethical review.
17 See Appendix Four, pages 256–258 for a more thorough overview.
18 See Appendix Four, pages 258–281 for the communication between myself  and the Ethics Committee.
19 This workshop, Research Ethics in Practice, was designed with Dr Gesa Helms, and was designed to explore 
the wider implications of  research ethics and how they manifested in the practice of  postgraduate research. It 
covers a number of  areas, including the politics and ethical implication of  social science research, moving 
from the administrative management of  ethics towards the practice of  research ethics, and ownership and 
power within the research cycle.
20 A Void is written without using the letter ‘e’. As Warren Motte suggests, “The absence of  a sign is always the 
sign of  an absence, and the absence of  the E in A Void announces a broader, cannily coded discourse of  loss, 
catastrophe and mourning” (2004). The Unfortunates is a book-in-a-box which consists of  separate pamphlets of 
a first and last section, plus 25 other chapters that can be read in any order. As such it allows the readers’ 
experience to echo that of  the story’s protagonist as he reminisces his way, non-linearly, through Johnson’s 
narrative. Tree of  Codes is literally a story cut from another story, with each page a die-cut of  Foer’s favourite 
book, The Street of  Crocodiles. 
21 For obvious and also important reasons, the quilt is not contained in this text. Obvious, because it is made 
of  fabric, and unlike this document, it remains as a single and original form. Important, because it exists to 
challenge this document, not to be subsumed within it. Though the quilt and this document are separate, 
however, they are interconnected at infinite points, and accordingly, Appendix Five provides a photographic 
sample of  just some of  the squares of  the quilt in a possible juxtaposition.
III
REPORTING THE CANON
Chapter Seven
STORIES OF THE CANON
Telling Stories
Throughout this thesis I’ve been telling stories, stories  bound by a common thread: changes 
to my imagination through time. It was in the Preface that I wrote of how my difficulties in 
finding a way to write of time in time led me to recognise this  frame as a means  by which I 
could capture and present my work in this thesis. It was  this  first story that granted its form 
to the other stories, whilst being a story of that type itself. It led me in Chapter One to 
explain how the question what about time? journeyed with me, prompting me to open my 
mind and pose that question to the urban field. Chapter Two started with a similar story of 
transformation. Collecting around my reading about time I discussed that not only did I 
learn to appreciate the social construction of time in theory, but through reading of other 
and Others’ times I felt it. As  I continued to explore the significance of that intimacy 
throughout Chapter Two, and in its companion, Chapter Three, the culmination of that 
story for this thesis was that an intimate politics  of time moved me not to deal with urban 
temporality as a matter of first course, but to find means of better appreciating the 
presence and function of such gaps within dominant conceptualisations  of the urban. And 
as  I moved in Chapters  Four, Five and Six to talk generally about method and more 
specifically about my approach, the stories  that were central related to the development of 
my research imagination and the multi-directional linkages I grew to appreciate between 
each and every stage of research work, both internal and external to the endeavour. 
Indeed, it was this  transformation that fuelled my desire not simply to play with the realities 
I’d found myself  within but to (re)craft them through this work. 
As I now turn to report my efforts  of playing within the realities which sit beneath canonical 
presentations of the city, difference and time, the option of telling stories of the imaginative 
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shifts which have accompanied these efforts continues  to hold promise for a couple of 
reasons. Reflecting upon those stories already told, I am reminded of the way in which this 
activity has allowed me to decipher various  moments  of this work without fixing them; has 
generated knowledge that is insightful in multiple though not necessarily concordant ways. 
What I find even more penetrating, however, is the productive capacity brought by a more 
fluid and changeable insight. Where perceptions  are continually altered, so too are the 
realities  of their perception. And in that sense, not only do these stories  tell of the ways in 
which I’ve played with reality, they offer a means  to (re)craft it in the process. It is for these 
reasons  that my report of the urban studies canon in these next two chapters continues to 
appeal to my changing imagination as  a means  by which to loosely hold and present my 
accounts. 
These stories not only share this in common, however, but are equally framed by my 
interests for entering this  site in the first instance. What prompted my turn to the urban 
studies canon was  a desire to explore the ways  in which the discipline exercised authority 
on those accounts and analyses that were not simply legitimate but possible to produce. 
The prominent query was never what a text meant but how it worked – what it made 
possible to think; how it served to expand, maintain or limit the spheres  of knowledge, 
research and action. What was significant to me in this  regard was how a text functioned 
within and out with its confines: how it connected to other texts, including the non-
linguistic; how it reached out to connect with readers, authors, researchers and non-actors 
alike; how it met those literary and non-literary contexts  in which it was  held, and those in 
which it was not. Accordingly, what I asked of the canon and the texts  through which I 
read it was what thoughts go unthought? What assumptions lie within their accounts? And perhaps, 
most importantly, how and in what ways are they useful? Rather than advance down previously 
established lines  this research approach was designed to be rhizomatic. It was intent on 
moving outward from the canon and the text in a conscious effort to uncover some 
semblance of those missing aspects  of thought and practice, and their effects  and 
consequences for the urban realm. 
In order to report the productions of this research I have split my stories  into two main 
groups. This  chapter deals  with Stories of the Canon, before I turn to consider some Stories of 
Those Stories in Chapter Eight. The former of these groups takes  the urban studies  canon as 
its object of rhizoanalysis, while the latter looks rhizoanalytically to the ways  in which my 
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experience of researching the urban studies  canon has  itself informed the points  of my 
inquiry described in the previous paragraph. There are of course many points  of 
intersection between the stories gathered in each of these groups, and also between them; 
points of intersection that no doubt continue to transform the stories  I tell. I address this to 
some degree by telling one final story in Chapter Nine of this work, as I prepare to move 
from reporting my research to rhizodiscussing it. This final story makes it possible to bring to 
the fore some of the connections  between the stories. But as I’ve noted frequently, I cannot 
tell every story nor each version of it. And motivating my decision to tell the stories  that I 
have included in this thesis  – the next but not eventual iteration of this work – has  been my 
long standing preoccupation: connections which tell of a naturalisation of time within 
urban theory, and their links  to the naturalisation of time in everyday life. In this  regard, as 
I’ve allowed myself to imagine how the canon connects to expand, maintain and limit the 
possibilities of research, thought, knowledge and action, my specific orientation toward 
such functions is in their relation to time. 
In an effort to reflect the way in which both time and my imagination necessarily 
interjected such moments I use three different fonts in my telling of these stories. Their 
accompanying references pertain to the timeline of research events in Appendix Six. Not 
only does this  presentation bring the temporality of these stories to the fore but it makes 
obvious the extent to which each of my stories are comprised of other stories, whilst 
themselves being smaller parts of  larger tellings. The fonts I use are as follows:
‣ The first font speaks  of those connections  I made as  I entered, read and captured 
the canon during the research events discussed in Chapter Five. These are lifted 
from my autoethnographic reflections, with added context given where necessary. 
My reference relates  to the stimulus  which prompted its collection, the research 
event during which it was  collected, the medium of its  recording, and the date on 
which it was recorded. To illustrate:
This font looks  like this, is  full justified, and positioned 3cm in from the main 
body of  the text.
[STIMULUS; RESEARCH EVENT; MEDIUM OF RECORDING; DATE]
‣ The second font I use represents  my efforts  to report aspects  of this data to my 
supervisors. Just like the research events  discussed in Chapter Five, my submissions 
to my supervisors  were also iterative and recursive, with the development of my 
thinking spanning not just weeks but many months. I reference these entries to 
show the month of  their submission to my supervisors. To illustrate:
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This font looks like this, is full justified, and positioned 1.5cm in from the main body of  the text.
[MONTH OF SUBMISSION TO SUPERVISORS]
‣ Finally, the third font – which is  the font I’ve used throughout the body of the thesis 
so far – relates to my writing of these stories  for this  work. It makes  no reference as 
it is the original source. To illustrate:
This font looks like this and is presented in line with the body.
Finally, just as I cannot tell every story it is  equally impossible to enter the canon via all of 
its data, not least given the prominent role I myself played in generating that data as I 
made my efforts  to discern it (see Chapter Five, pages 139–141). In this  sense, my entry to 
canon was  forged at many nodes beyond the texts identified as  dominant, including via the 
strategies I developed to gain entry. Thus as  I discuss  the Stories of the Canon in this chapter 
and some Stories of Those Stories in Chapter Eight, it is  therefore this  much broader field 
which constitutes the object of  research and of  my reflections. 
Stories of the Canon
WHAT IS THE CITY? (WHAT IS IT NOT?)
As I read Harvey, Jacobs, Castells  and Sassen, their accounts  of the urban realm resounded 
from the page and propagated within my mind. My imagination expanded into proximate 
realms  of interest and significance; relevant sites at which the city unfolded. With intention 
or not, through explicit statements or more tacit characterisations, each spoke to me their 
answer(s) to that most central of  urban questions: what is the city?
There is a section early in ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The transformation in 
urban governance in late capitalism’ [herein ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism’] where 
Harvey explicitly engages with conceptual issues. Early in this section he moves to define the 
character  of urbanisation, noting that it should be “regarded as a spatially grounded social process 
in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact 
through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices” (5). Harvey talks about 
urbanisation in the first three pages of the paper also, but this is the first time he suggests a 
definition of what urbanisation is, how it occurs, how it manifests. With no ambiguity whatsoever 
he describes it as a spatial process, tacitly naming the city as spatial by virtue of  that fact. 
[JULY 2012]
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Yet I was  to quickly realise that the authors did not simply speak positively of their claims, 
but the non-proximate, non-interesting, non-significant and non-relevant were implicated 
within their accounts. That is, where the nature of the city was named so too implied was  the 
nature of  what was not.
Reading and re-reading Harvey’s account of the city, I appreciate so much more 
than that which he chooses  to make expressly evident. From more purposeful 
readings, I certainly feel a spatial focus  discernible [within the text], most 
evident from the frequent use of the word space and its associated terms. At no 
point does  Harvey move to or even appear to move to positively deny, 
undermine or delegitimise the pertinence of time and temporality for analyses 
of the urban. Yet that is not to say that this does  not happen anyway, indeed, I 
think it does. There are more subtle ways  in which time loses its  standing, and 
particular to this text is  Harvey’s  distinct focus on the “spatial nature” of 
hegemonic capitalism. Where Harvey choses to stake a claim to his  subject, in 
that claim can be read an additional point: he does  not allow that it could be 
anything other than spatial practices which account for urbanisation. And where 
he elaborates (“in a class-bound society such as  capitalism, these spatial practices 
acquire a definite class content” (5)), where he broadens his  argument further 
(noting that gender and race, amongst others, can also act as  lenses  for certain 
spatial practices), space is  made ever more connected, significant, pivotal, 
contingent and vital. And time? Well, that’s nowhere to be seen nor counted.
 [HARVEY (1989); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 24 MAY 2012]
At numerous points throughout the text ‘space’ is singled out. Describing major sociological 
changes that might elsewhere be understood out with processes of urbanisation, Harvey includes: 
“technology, space relations, social relations, consumer habits, lifestyles and the like” in his list of 
“successive revolutions” (3). This is clearly not intended as an exhaustive list nor a particularly 
comprehensive one. But nonetheless, while it alone cannot account for the wider absence of the 
temporal, it is certainly of note. Consider that it is not the absence of ‘time relations’ on the list, 
but the absence of time relations coupled with the presence of “space relations” that is significant. 
There are many such examples throughout this text, each serving to introduce and strengthen the 
presence of  the spatial in our imagination.
[JULY 2012]
It was in such ways that I first recognised the presence of space working to fix time as 
irrelevant within my mind. I read of space but not time; I thought of space but not time; 
and so I continued to see space and its sensibility, while the lack of my temporal imagination 
had the potential to render any moments of  its presence a blip on my mental landscape.
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Where space is  made so explicit there appears  to me no room for time. It grows, 
expands and pushes  time and concerns  of temporality from my mind. Indeed, 
despite my own claims for time’s  importance even I can feel it slipping as  I 
gravitate back towards  space. I see the word space, I think of space. I rarely see 
the word time. And not only is  absent on the page, it remains absent in my mind 
whilst space’s presence only grows. 
[HARVEY (1989); READING 2; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 9 MAY 2012]
But with readings of Jacobs  and Castells unfolding in the interim, as  I turned to Sassen my 
feeling was that there was even more to consider as to how the positive presence of space 
fixed time’s absence as it went.
With reference to the relationship between time and space, I’ve certainly found it tempting to 
construe the spatial discourses of Sassen, Harvey and Castells, in binary opposition to time – to 
conclude that the presence of space was in itself a statement of the non-temporality of the thing in 
question. Indeed, that is how I experienced it in my mind: ideas of time and space certainly exist 
in relation to one another there, pitted against each another by virtue of the urban studies canon, 
and elsewhere. However, to say that ‘if space not time. Space, so not time’ is all that can be 
concluded from the relationship is perhaps overstating the extent to which this binary functions 
exhaustively in my mind. And more fundamentally, it does very little to flesh out the ways in 
which space and time function as interrelated concepts. Indeed, the extent to which space is 
foregrounded throughout these texts narrows the scope for temporal interpretations in many ways 
beyond its presence on the page and in the mind. 
[JANUARY 2013]
Time, I came to realise, was  absent not only on the page but ever-outward in the urban 
field. It was  not only absented from my mind but more generally from a collective urban 
consciousness.
I need to find a way to see the presence (absence) contained in statements of what 
the city is (what it is not) out with my own urban imagination and those texts  which 
prompt it. And this, then, isn’t really about me simply asking after the presence 
of space, but about considering how it’s  presented; how it functions; how is it 
analysed.
[AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; READING THE CANON; JOURNAL 2; 13 MAY 2012]
This dominance of space relates to the (non)presence of time in two key ways. A positive 
statement of ‘what something is’ not only implicitly suggests ‘what it is not’, but further cements 
the ‘truth’ of what it is by (a) funnelling critical activity toward the explicit statement of what it 
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is; and (b) making it difficult to pose questions of the implicit features, as these have only been 
implied. Taking space and time as an example, spatial conceptualisations lead to spatial critiques, 
spatial problematisations and ultimately to spatial solutions, all of which are performed and 
enacted within texts, and materially within the academy and the city. On the other hand, as time’s 
absence is only implied, it has no activity in any of these three processes until the point where it is 
either named as relevant, or its absence is recognised and challenged. What is secured, however, is 
the performance and enactment of that absence, within the text, and materially within the 
academy and the city. And the most pressing question that now emerges is how the parameters for 
urban engagement are further narrowed through the performances and practices which are not these 
texts, but are nonetheless connected?
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
Space, it seemed, functioned via positive descriptions of the city; its presence was secured by 
the practices that gave rise to and maintained such descriptions. We questioned space but 
not time. We researched space but not time. We spoke of space but not time. The spatial 
construction of the city by and through the urban studies canon was happening not simply 
within the text, but in academic activities  of the everyday. But it was  not only beyond the 
text, but at many points beyond the relation of space to time that I came to appreciate how 
such collective practices of  presence functioned to construct the city.
Edited collections work to tell dominant stories  and portray overarching 
narratives  of the urban. Editors  have considerable ability to control the story 
through their positive selection of items, the sequencing of those items, and the 
editing of the text. In many ways  it seems  like the actual content of those items 
that are included can be read as  secondary to their positioning on the contents 
page, the way in which they proceed throughout the text and the categories  used 
to group them into broader urban themes. Though much more implicit, these 
are the overriding positive statements within these texts, the ones that make 
clear the nature of  the urban, and crucially the order of  that nature.	
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 14 FEBRUARY, 2012]
The procedures by which citations are counted remain unknown to me. The counting takes place 
inside a black box. I input my search terms; it outputs a list deemed canonical to my inquiries. 
But where the canonical is counted in darkness, the non-canonical also remains behind the veil. 
This is very much in contrast to reading lists and edited collections. It is possible to see what is 
missing from these grouping. In bibliographies and contents pages, these texts explicitly set out their 
stall and what’s missing can, to an extent, be assumed as that which goes unexpressed. And 
though I’m not privy to the conversations, meetings and negotiations which led to the production of 
their contents, I can at least imagine the spaces and times in which they took place. But citations, 
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they do not tell me who they are, what they’re about, let alone how they work. Like course lists 
and edited collection they count only that which is legitimate. Yet there is no framing, no sense of 
what ‘legitimate’ means in their case. And where I cannot see their function – how they function, 
how they understand their task of ‘counting’ – I find it impossible to read the non-canon within 
their process. Where the rationale by which they ‘count’ cannot even be glimpsed, that which goes 
un-counted disappears from view. Indeed, it is only when a list of frequently cited texts are 
generated, after these algorithms have functioned to produce the canon, that the absent stands a 
half-chance of  coming to the fore. 
[MAY, 2012]
Within this case, within this  image of the urban studies canon, where I pose the question 
what is the city (what is it not)? I can assure a claim for the answer: space (time). But where the 
canonical is counted via citations, represented in edited collections  and presented in course 
reading lists, different answers emerge. It is  that which is counted (that which cannot be seen); the 
table of contents (the white gaps in between its lines); the reference list (those texts absent and/or dismissed 
from the course coordinator’s mind). Each and any answer that might occur is, then, but a single 
line within a much more important story of how the canon constructs the city through 
presence. And rather than name the city as space and not time, the presence (absence) of spatial 
(temporal) urban conceptualisations are perhaps better recognised as symptoms of the 
function of the canonical (non-canonical) within the text, within the mind, within research, 
within debate and within the counting of legitimate accounts. Indeed, it is across each of 
these realms  that the presence (absence) of the city is  maintained, and across each that a way 
must be paved for imagining the city not only temporally but via other absent facets of 
urban life which have no course to argue for their relevance; facets  which are neither now, 
nor perhaps even in the future, counted let alone countable.
POWER, DOMINANCE AND SENSIBILITY
I came across no shortage of powerful, dominant, sensible, voices as I read the urban studies 
canon. But I was also quick recognise that the canon was  not simply as a grouping of those 
voices  or the texts in which they were heard. Rather, it appeared that the very act of 
grouping certain authors together rendered them canonical; their dominance was 
manufactured; the sensibility of their accounts  was produced. As  I myself grouped David 
Harvey, Jane Jacobs, Manuel Castells and Saskia Sassen as  entry nodes  for this  research, 
finding and then naming them as  relevant, I felt myself inadvertently issue cause for my 
reader to recognise them as dominant, dare I say vital as far as urban matters were 
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concerned. But even before that point, I sensed a similar process take place within the 
ranking of  top universities.
The Time Higher Eduction (THE) don’t just measure top universities, they 
construct them. Indeed, it is  their lists  of the top 100 universities  which serve to 
construct and maintain the dominance of  those institutions.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 13 DECEMBER 2011]
Public acts of recognition, it seemed, bestowed a dominance and sensibility upon those 
things named as  dominant and sensible, gifting an heightened power to those things  in the 
process. This  certainly appeared the case as I read Ida Susser’s  introduction to her subject, 
Manuel Castells, in her editorial of  the The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory (2002).
Susser writes  that Castells has  produced three “encyclopaedic volumes”, 
comprising a comprehensive theoretical framework which outlines  “the 
development of an informational mode of production, which follows  the 
industrial mode of production” (my emphasis). In this statement it occurs  to me 
that Castells’ ability to adopt a position from which to be recognised, and then 
for that recognition to take place by the independent third party, Susser, in some 
ways  facilitates  the dominance and sensibility of his  ideas. Just like Harvey 
before him, Castells  emphasises space as  it relates  to the urban. But far from it 
solely being the content of his  account which extends the sensibility of his 
argument, it is  his  ability to adopt a speech position and for that position to be 
maintained at other visible points  within that context that makes  its  sensibility all 
the more pronounced. Indeed, the comprehensive nature of his framework 
doesn’t just describe the city but arguably works  to construct it where his 
authority to speak and the fact that he has  already spoken sensibly (at least as  far 
as  Susser has  it) is taken into account. So what does  he speak about and what is 
its  effect? He makes  his  position clear: “[w]hat urban sociologists  of the twenty-
first century really need are new tool boxes (including conceptual tools) to take 
on the hard work necessary to research and understand the new relationships 
between space and society [...] systematic theorization [...] to be specifically 
focused on the study of cities  and spatial processes” (Castells  in Susser: 404, my 
emphasis). This  at no point denounces  the importance of time, it cannot be 
charged for that outright. And yet it equally does  nothing to provoke a temporal 
imagination, let alone give permission for a researcher to look upon the city out 
with a spatial gaze. And so where the tradition of urban sociology is  explicitly 
stated as  a spatial one can Castells’ power and position can be linked back to the 
absence of time? And to what extent is it the fact that Castells is  who he is  – that 
his  position and dominance allows  him not only write such a statement but for 
that statement to be heard – that makes  his statement, and all that is contained 
and implied within it, all the more compelling?
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; SPREADSHEET; 17 AUGUST 2012]
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Initially my urge was to chase those lines; to grasp the threads of the dominant accounts of 
urban life in order to track down the seeds  of space’s  sensibility and time’s silence. Indeed, 
within my own self I’d witnessed the power of the author’s  voice as I felt compelled to fall 
in line and recognise the sensible.
The very fact that Harvey does  not speak of the social construction and social 
production of time, the very fact that he is  David Harvey, makes  me worried 
that time is  of no importance to urban matters. For he is, after all, Harvey the 
great urbanist, and surely if it was important he would be speaking of its  absence? 
He would be making it present.
[HARVEY (1989); READING 2; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 10 MAY 2012]
And yet dominance continued to be manufactured, sensibility continued to be produced, at 
points indirectly linked with an author’s own vocalisation of  their ideas and accounts. 
Those “independent third parties” who recognise the dominant and sensible aren’t really 
independent at all. Rather, they are just as connected to the discursive lifeworlds of which they 
speak, and to the power, dominance and sensibility contained within them. As such, many more 
questions must now be posed of the ways in which dominance and sensibility manifest in the 
urban studies canon. For example, [with regards the relationship between Castells and Susser] 
which effect is more heightened? Is it simply that Susser confirms Castells’ position? Or in electing 
to advocate for a figure who is already recognised as important, in using her voice to speak in 
sensibly apposite ways, in associating herself with those accounts already marked as canonical, 
might the effect be better recorded as Susser establishing her own authority to speak?
[AUGUST, 2012]
In other areas of the canon too, I came to see dominance manufactured by association to 
that which was already dominant, and strategically so.
Prestige markers both indicate and maintain dominance, but their application is not 
straightforward in this regard. The Ivy league, for example, is connected to sport and the traditions 
of its members. It views such things as important and was established in order to group such 
things and make them recognisably so. The Ivy League is dominant because it’s prestigious. The 
Russell Group, on the other hand, openly trades on research excellence, income generation and its 
links to business and public sectors. And arguably, recognising the added value and power 
bestowed by ‘badges’ such as The Ivy League, their strategy is one that manufactures prestige in 
order to become dominant. Both [The Ivy League and The Russell Group] can be accused of 
elitism; both manage to weave their way back to the market. But whilst The Ivy League might be 
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recognised first and foremost as a ‘badge of excellence’ bestowed upon something considered 
excellent, the function of ‘The Russell Group’ is perhaps better stated as a self-fulfilling 
promotional tool, designed to tap-in to a dominance that was elsewhere established.
[MAY 2012]
As I’m looking at the home pages  on the websites  of top universities  from 
around the world I’m struck to the extent to which they resemble a trophy 
cabinet. Each displays  their affiliations, prestige memberships  and academic 
awards proudly. But is  this  excellence? Or does  it just contribute to circular 
notions  which strengthen and maintain the idea of excellence and the limited 
form it should take?
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 16 JANUARY 2012]
It appears  that in 2009 The Times  Higher Education (THE) altered the way 
they score and rank top universities. “Our world rankings  are hugely influential 
but also come under criticism every year, so we have decided to improve 
them” (Mroz, 2009), they reason. But what are they improving? They don’t cite 
any failure of their old system; they haven’t retracted any of their past results  or 
listings. And all I’m left to see is  influence: they are motivated to improve their 
enormous influence in the academic sector.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 13 DECEMBER 2012]
Power, I came to realise, was not contained and exercised through the texts of the urban 
studies canon; it did not reside within dominant and sensible accounts of the city. It was not 
neatly contained, linearly traceable nor individually associated, and its effects  did not start 
and end with an individual text, author or institution. Rather, its presence, influence and 
effects  were diffuse throughout the canonical assemblage. And even beyond the more 
obvious moments of grouping, recognising, speaking, measuring and associating, power, 
dominance and sensibility appeared to circulate ever more pervasively to decisively shape 
both the outward appearance of the urban studies  canon, and its  inward effects  upon 
academic practice.
What is  the effect of the mimicry? What effect does  the manufacture of prestige 
have on the activities of those institutions  who assume it for themselves? Perhaps 
I need look no further to the establishment of the 1994 Group as  a direct 
response to The Russell Group, as  in this  alone I can appreciate the manifest 
reality of the project for other institutions. It shapes their research and teaching 
[practices], setting new limits  on the knowledge and realities  they deem valuable 
to produce.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 16 JANUARY 2012]
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What of items [in the canon] where there appears  a distinct difference to the 
dominant found elsewhere; where dominance isn’t so much maintained, but in 
someways appears  challenged? Because I’m seeing some things  that just don’t 
fit. They’re present within the canon but they don’t match up to the dominant 
ideas which fuel canonical activity. Feminism, gender, black and race studies 
appear quite often on the reading lists  and edited collections. I’d add bell hooks, 
maybe even Jane Jacobs(!) to this  list too. And what is  the nature of their 
inclusion into the canon? Do they represent an alternative canon, an expanded 
canon, and anti-canon? Is  this  seeds  of challenge I am witnessing? Or maybe 
this  presence of the seemingly non-canonical within the canon speaks more of 
an affirmative action by inclusion. Rather than re-imagining the canonical limits 
of the city they are included strategically for their ability to ameliorate tension 
and critique.
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 22 MARCH 2012]
In this regard, my eventual question was not how space maintained its power, dominance 
and sensibility, but how power, dominance and sensibility collided to confer truth on certain 
logics  of the city, allowing those logics to hide the Other by virtue of the collision. And far 
from tracking and mapping the effects flowing outward from dominant texts  and notions, 
as  I considered power, dominance and sensibility I came to recognise a much more pressing 
task.
It’s not the authors but their connections  that confer dominance and sensibility 
upon certain ideas – connections  which enable power to flow not only forward, 
but back and forth, and all around. The need, then, is  to connect their texts  to 
those points  at which sensibility and dominance are produced and maintained 
within the urban studies canon, as many as possible, and continuously so.
[AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; READING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 22 AUGUST 2012] 
MATERIAL ENCOUNTERS
The canon as  corpus is  solid. I see it in the books  that line the shelves  beside my 
desk. I find something concrete, comforting even in that notion. The canon as 
assemblage, on the other hand. I get it. I know why it’s important. But it seems 
somewhat otherworldly. It is more of an abstract, theoretical construct and 
leaves  me nothing to hold, turn over in my hands  – nothing to see, feel or smell. 
Is there anything solid I can take from it at all?
[AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; ENTERING THE CANON; JOURNAL 1; 11 JANUARY 2012]
Despite early difficulties in finding a tangibility in the canon as assemblage I was  to find 
plenty of concrete, and important links to make. It was a conceptual device, yes, but one 
that nonetheless  told of very real, manifest relationships. There were networks of power 
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and privileged identities  existing within past and present iterations of the urban studies 
canon. A colonial Britishness, for example, resounded in my lists of  top universities.
[As  I’m working to find what top universities  to approach for reading lists  of 
their urban studies’ degree programmes] I’ve come across  something much 
more interesting. There is  a Cambridge, London and (New)York, to name a few, 
on both sides  of the pond. It seems that many high ranking universities  can be 
traced back to British settler states. Anglo-American/post-colonial. There is  a 
privileged gaze that constructs  the modern academic field, and that gaze 
emerged from a very specific material context, from very specific points  in 
history and geography. In this  sense, these shared names suggest much more 
than just a shared language, but hint at shared practices, traditions, cultures, and 
so on. And in these much broader affects  the ‘privileged gaze’ is  arguably no 
longer simply a remnant of the past, but actively constructs present and future 
ways of  academic working in very particular and material ways.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 DECEMBER 2011]
The dominance that circulated within the canon as assemblage was no longer confined to the 
abstract, but could be named and counted. I’d found cause to recognise the broad, 
historical sharing of culture in solid, geographical terms. And not only was this  something 
that I might trace back through time, but noting its  effects  in the present, I also imagined it 
marching forth into the future. Beyond the historical linages of the modern university I also 
recognised the sharing of culture in more individual terms, in the relationships  that authors 
held with one another.
There are some relationships that go beyond author, reader and contemporary 
within these texts. Harvey, for example, references  Erik Swyngedouw, who I 
seem to recall was himself a doctoral student of Harvey’s. Swyngedouw’s 
studentship does  not dictate that his  arguments  be identical to Harvey’s, nor 
even that they follow a similar form. Harvey and Swyngedouw of course retain 
their academic freedoms  to perform different analyses of urban issues, to come 
up with different solutions  to urban problems. But it nonetheless seems 
important to recognise that these things  are happening within the same 
universe. And where Harvey and Swyngedouw navigate their work by way of a 
similar language, a similar code, and similar points  (all mediated of course 
through a relationship imbued with hierarchical power) perhaps  this  freedom is 
not really freedom at all, but a limited sphere of consent in which permissible 
readings of  the city unfold along paradigmatic lines.
[HARVEY (1989); READING 3; SPREADSHEET; 16 MAY 2012]
Beyond the texts [of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells and Sassen’s], there are other ways in which their 
relationships with one another, and other dominant authors, maintain specific lines of enquiry. In 
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a very real sense they not only share ideas through text but in coming together in person. Castells, 
for example, informs his reader that Saskia Sassen reported some of her research findings to him 
“over a glass of Argentinean wine”. Susser writes about an interdisciplinary session that was 
attended by Castells, Sassen, Mollenkopf, Soja, The Fainsteins... 
[OCTOBER, 2012]
How many of the top urban academics  are married? Sassen and Sennett come 
prominently to mind – they’ve in many ways  sewn up a large part of ‘the city’ in 
their seminal texts. To what extent does the trajectory and temporality of an 
academic career promote proximate working with one’s  spouse and other close 
companions? To what extent does  proximate working engender closeness, 
allowing more personal relationships  to flourish? And to what extent is  it this 
which writes the city?
[SASSEN (1991); READING 3; NOTEBOOK; 16 OCTOBER 2012]
... and in this sense the production of knowledge does not remain solely within the ‘professional’ 
relationships sanctioned for academic activities, but like business deals concluded on the golf 
course, practices of knowledge making are perhaps most prolific out with academic office hours 
and university buildings. They take place in social gatherings and closed events; around the dinner 
table, over weekends, and even perhaps late at night when drifting off to sleep. And where ‘ways of 
seeing’ are established not only within texts and ‘working’ practices, but within the mundane 
activities of the everyday, no longer does the idea that an ability to speak sensibly of the city is 
based on an objectively defined authority. Where knowledge of the city is performed and 
constructed by academics out with the institutional setting, where academic ideas become canonised 
in ways that are not immediately visible, the sites at which we engage with the dominance of some 
ideas whilst others are confined to silence, must accordingly be adjusted.
[OCTOBER, 2012]
In such relationships  I could not help but come back to the cultures, histories and traditions 
transmitted through proximate things. York became New York, Cambridge was  a city in 
Massachusetts. And where names were shared, so too, I considered, were cultures. But 
what was shared and to what extent? 
What does  the close proximity (professionally and/or personally) with Others 
like ourselves  imply? Do such relationships  reinforce views; do they help reify 
certain things; do they prevent us  seeing beyond the diversity of our most 
immediate Others? 
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; ANNOTATION ON TEXT; 20 AUGUST 2012]
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It seems somewhat obvious to state, yet I will do so anyway, that these individuals [Harvey, 
Castells and Lefebvre] between them hold many of the components of the contemporary urban 
studies canon, fluid and changeable though it may be. But they are only three voices, theirs are only 
three accounts of the city. Much could be laboured about the non-representativeness of their 
identity, with assertions being cast as to their gender, education, class, race, ideological and 
political positions, etc. But so obvious is this that it seems more important to simply state that not 
only do they get to describe the city by their own accounts, they define and narrow the available 
parameters in which others can speak meaningfully of urban problems; others who fall into both 
similar and different categories of  being, often moving also between.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
With ways of seeing performed and enacted not only within the texts  of the canon but far 
beyond their pages, I felt the canon as  assemblage at its  most tangible and understandable. 
Culture(s) played an unparalleled role in the accounts that were produced.
Accepting the group culture that could potentially develop within such proximate relationships, it 
may also be the case that a particular way of conceptualising the urban is shared amongst these 
authors. In Castells’ case, there are a number of things that can be gleaned. It seems that his 
experiences in exile shaped his analysis of urban movements. ‘The Urban Question’, for example, 
emerged from his development of a methodological training program. His ethnographic tradition 
emerges because he feels the need of ‘going beyond class’: “in each case he is more concerned to 
document urban struggles in their full historical context than to find underlying class explanations 
as the roots of a diverse group of effective and social movements” (Susser, 2002: 8). Much of 
Castells’ work on the city, be it a conceptual framework or methodological approach, derive from 
what he’s seen and what he’s looking to see. Similarly, this appears a decisive element of Jacobs’ 
and Sassen’s careers too. Jacobs’ detailed account of the city derives from her day-to-day 
experience of ‘her’ city, the presentation of which is at odds with the prevailing logic. Sassen, who 
is fluent in five languages and travelled the world as a child, perhaps ‘sees’ the importance of 
being able to understand the processes and impacts of  urbanisation at a global level.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
And at its most relevant, this  point led me not only to consider the conditions under which 
an author’s  take on the city continually evolved via ways of life and ways of seeing, but how 
such proclivities, forged through shared experiences with proximate and similar Others, 
tended towards  a culture of time that made matters of urban temporality a more or less 
present concern.
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There is a temporal logic that comes through strongly in each of these texts. Harvey, for example, 
positions himself linearly, in relation to the past. Jacobs lives in the here and now. Castells lives 
somewhat in the future. Not content with historical critique he feels an urge to imagine the ways in 
which such things prescribe the urban environs for decades to come. And in titling her text ‘The 
Global City: London, New York and Tokyo’, urban time for Sassen is something already overcome 
in our ability to maintain twenty-four hour trading practices across a spatial scale. Moreover, the 
language developed and coded between Harvey, Castells and Sassen in particular, is largely one in 
which time is conquered. Time is not up for grabs, nor does it need to be. These discourses, whilst 
never explicitly undermining time, nonetheless serve to stifle any recognition of its social 
construction. And what is perhaps more concerning is that it is within these temporal frames that 
each of these authors conceptualise their own practices, frames which in turn establish the 
parameters for sensibility and with it the limits of their own and their readers’ urban 
imaginations.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
As I recognised this contiguity between everyday experience and the categories made 
available for analysis, I turned away from the canon and looked to myself as  an urban 
scholar. I asked: what ideas does my embodied, day-to-day existence made possible to think? And to what 
extent do these experiences allow me to materialise alternative spaces and spatialities, alternative times and 
temporalities, within my work? And in posing such questions of myself, I of course could not 
separate my thoughts from my relations with Others.
There is  a section [in ‘The Network Society’] when Castells  describes  business 
men who commonly stay in the same beige hotel rooms, regardless  of where 
they are in the world. This, he remarks, is  part of the codified culture of 
business  and is  understood by business  people as  such. I wonder the extent to 
which academics  share a similar code and a similar language; one that in turn 
suggests  their sharing of a similar temporal logic? And so what type are the 
academics  and how are they (and their temporalities) shaped by the work of 
producing knowledge in the contemporary academy? Where in-depth, highly 
nuanced and longitudinal modes  of research, for example, are not seen as 
strategically viable in terms  of career progression and notions  of academic 
excellence (may not produce materially implementable solutions; would not 
speak to international agendas, could take too long to produce results), a 
broader turn away from methods  that have the capacity to record temporal 
heterogeneity might also be taking place. And how does  this  further fuel the 
temporality of those who do the understanding, researching and writing of the 
city through institutions  so closely aligned with the time of the clock? And 
perhaps more crucially, how do their temporalities compare with those who are 
the subjects  of their accounts: the urban Others? I know from my own 
experience, and from my familiarity with those around me (at various  scales  of 
an academic career), time functions  differently here [in the academy] than in 
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other quarters  of the city. I can call to mind many examples  around working 
weekends; working to (oftentimes competing) project and teaching deadlines; 
difficulties  in getting diaries  to ‘line-up’; stress  levels  which are weekly, monthly 
and seasonally variable; mixing of holiday time with working time at academic 
conferences; traveling across time zones  for research and networking, and so on. 
And of course some of these experiences share aspects  with other modes  of 
urban living: the accountant, the lawyer, the business  person, for example. But 
nonetheless, the academic appears  a particular breed who, like any individual, 
inhabits  a temporal logic, partly peculiar to their own lived experience of work. 
And in this  sense, the canon must be conceived in terms  of the relationships  it 
crafts  and holds  between proximate Others. We must ask: what cultures of time 
are buoyant within such associations, and therefore maintained not only within 
texts, but as  we circulate with Others who are not unlike ourselves? Indeed, if 
everyday material experience does  have a role in shaping the ways  in which we 
further experience, conceptualise and write about our subjects, then the 
temporal logics  found in dominant spheres  of academic activity are by no 
means  secondary to questions  over the (non)presence of time within these texts. 
Rather, these are, perhaps, the most essential.
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 20 AUGUST 2012]
WRITING SOLO, WITH OTHERS
For quite some time I’ve had this  feeling that my writing in this  work is  not my 
own, but is  framed, and significantly so, by those around me. There are of 
course things which make me take pen to paper, things  that I choose to speak of. 
But when it comes  to tying those impulses  together in writing I write not 
necessarily for myself but for my supervisors; I write not in monologue but in 
dialogue with those things  I agree and disagree; I write not by myself but embed 
my words  in the language and themes  of debates  elsewhere established. I 
wonder the extent to which the context in which I write holds just as  much 
claim to the authorship of  my work as I do.
[AUTOETHNOGRAPHY; DESIGNING METHODS; JOURNAL 1; 10 OCTOBER 2011]
I’ve been aware of the Other in the production of my work from early on in this PhD 
project, one reason, perhaps, why it came as  no surprise that the Other should similarly 
populate the texts of the urban studies canon. At points  both visible and invisible, I came to 
discern the presence of  Others in many texts and in many forms. 
In her acknowledgements [in ‘The Global City’] Sassen expresses gratitude for the assistance she 
received during the research and writing of the text, pointing to some individuals by name; others, 
by the many research roles necessary for the achievement her project. And there is further evidence of 
these individuals throughout the text, sometimes explicitly so when she writes ‘we’, for example, 
instead of ‘I’. But beyond these obvious recognitions there are other voices to be found within this 
text. When she characterises Part Three of her inquiry as “admittedly provocative”, there seems a 
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hesitance in her articulation. Could this perhaps be in relation to the audience she anticipates? And 
though their voices may remain manifestly silent within the closed quarters of the text, I’ve no 
doubt that Sassen’s anticipated audience is of much greater influence to the broader production of 
her work. In contrast, Castells writes not ‘with’ or ‘for’ others, but ‘against’ others he views of a 
particular tradition. And this is just as pivotal to his telling of the city. Indeed, it seems that his 
rejection of what has gone before – of Marxist concerns with class and Lefebvre’s account of the 
production of space – leads strongly to his own re-imagined spatial analysis, ‘The Space of 
Flows’, in his treatise ‘The Rise of  the Network Society’. 
[JANUARY, 2013]
Writing, therefore, appeared not as the self-contained process one might have imagined it 
to be, but occurred always in conversation to what came before, what was present, what 
might come after. And as  such, I came to consider that the potential to produce the city 
through one conversational line and not another, revealed framing tendencies  that were as 
canonical as those produced concretely upon the page. However, what I hadn’t anticipated 
was  the extent to which Writing Solo, With Others, crafted not only present and future 
accounts, but strongly reshaped the past.
While Harvey doesn’t explicitly name Lefebvre in the text [From Managerialism to 
Entrepreneurialism], the context by which Harvey comes to the city reveals Lefebvre a strong 
influence in his work. Indeed, Harvey cites Lefebvre in other seminal texts, such as ‘The Right to 
the City’ (2008) and ‘Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference’ (1996). And with the 
ideas contained within these easy to link back to this text, and this time, the connection between 
Harvey and Lefebvre is available for all to see. But as I look more closely to the sparks of 
influence between Harvey and Lefebvre, I not only appreciate the ways in which Lefebvre shapes 
Harvey’s accounts of the city, and Harvey’s accounts shape the work of future scholars as they 
posit their own accounts and critiques in response. But Harvey also performs a significant re-
imagining upon that which came before; that which was already written. The story is of course 
more commonly presented as Harvey uncovering the ‘lost’ work of Lefebvre; re-positioning it to a 
rightful prominence in urban studies. However, the correspondence between the contemporary 
rediscovery of Lefebvre’s thoughts to Lefebvre’s original work is not quite as straightforward. As 
Luke Butcher implies, perhaps too many words have been placed in Lefebvre’s mouth (2011). And 
what this brings more fully to the fore is not the influence of Lefebvre on Harvey’s work, but 
Harvey’s influence on Lefebvre’s accounts in a way that linear understandings of temporality 
cannot and must not be left to account for. 
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
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Writing, I realised, not only occurred in a forward trajectory, forged within the 
conversations  an author found themselves in the present, but it also involved a re-
articulation and re-construction of past Others, whoever they may be. There was nothing 
linear to such processes. Indeed, the past is not contained there, but was  made to emerge 
continuously as an order of the present. And in this, what I ultimately came to realise was 
that the urban studies  canon I’d been able to name as the texts  of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells 
and Sassen, was better appreciated as the conversational streams that tied and re-tied those 
authors to the past, present and future. For it was these streams that made visible not only 
the ways  in which an author’s productions are informed by the context from which they 
write, but how their productions, in turn, hold just as much influence upon that context.
THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
Knowledge is valued in the modern academy. Good and therefore valuable knowledge is  often 
recognised where the labels truth, valid, justifiable, and so on, can readily be applied. And 
when placed, such judgements might be considered paramount to deciding what texts, 
what knowledge, is  allowed to freely circulate and populate the canon. Yet as I worked to 
discern the canonical texts  of urban studies  I came to see that a text’s  correspondence with 
truth was not the only value judgment which gave form to the canon. Rather more pivotal 
was  an external, non-intellectual view of value that was elsewhere determined. I’d had a 
number of early clues to this, including a conversation with the University of Glasgow’s 
subject librarian about difficulties I’d been having in obtaining reading lists from top urban 
studies degree programmes.
I suppose I hadn’t really thought about any potential difficulties  in accessing 
course reading lists, I think because my own recollection of them was  as 
temporary documents: necessary for the duration of a course, but to be filed 
away upon completion, perhaps for future use, perhaps  in the bottom of a 
drawer. But the librarian has made me realise that the reading list has  a greater 
value than I’ve attributed. Her suggestion that my difficulty in obtaining them 
[from the course coordinators  of top urban studies  degree programmes] might 
be down to the fact that they are perceived as  intellectual property, is  certainly 
telling. In fact, I’ve obviously had an implicit sense of this  for sometime or I’d 
have never even have considered looking at reading lists  in order to discern the 
canon.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 17 FEBRUARY 2012]
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As I grew more familiar with the descriptions  of edited collections citation indexes, I again 
recognised a language and sensibility that appeared to chime much more freely with 
property, business, markets and economics, than it did my anticipated notions  of academic 
value.
What does it suggest when [the publisher] Blackwell describes  its  Companion to the 
City collections  as  a “blue chip” item? Does  this  speak of the knowledge that is 
contained within it? Or is  this  about a value that doesn’t align with knowledge at 
all, but something else? Am I in fact better to recognise this  not as  a description 
of the product but as  a marketing strategy designed to stamp an alternative, 
more appealing notion of  value on these texts?
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 FEBRUARY 2012]
There is  competition visible as far as  the counting of citations  go. SCOPUS and 
Web of Knowledge (WoK) each compete to prove they do it better. They trade 
on their self-proclaimed strengths, whilst hinting at their competitors’ 
weaknesses. And the fact that they can even make these comparisons  suggests 
that they work differently. This  is, perhaps, the strongest indication that their job 
isn’t just the counting of knowledge. And what their job might be I don’t quite 
know, but there appears to be a lot more going on than simple counting. 
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 25 JANUARY 2012]
[The citation indexes  recognise that] things  external to the content of knowledge 
shapes  its value. Social media buzz, for example, appears  to be a prominent 
measure. How far removed this  seems from notions  of good research and true 
knowledge. And yet, having now spent sometime sifting through these indexes, 
trying to get to grips with how they function to produce the canon, I really 
cannot say that I’m surprised that influence is  credited as  a gold standard as  far as 
knowledge goes, because it’s  really not about knowledge at all, but rather, how 
far it has the capacity to travel.
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 12 JANUARY 2012]
As I looked to the structures  which formed and maintained the urban studies canon, any 
sense I held that knowledge for knowledge’s sake might at least fuel the forward production of 
academic knowledge was also abruptly halted. 
Citation indexes  may not measure absolute citation counts but they certainly 
correspond with something, something that is  of great value in the modern 
academy. Bibliometric methods and citation analyses, for example, are to be 
rolled-out more widely in the REF. I read recently that some panels will make 
use of citation counts  in place of peer-review in their assessment of excellence 
(REF, 2011). And yet the REF’s  idea of what citations measure appears  just as 
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vague as  mine: “Where sub-panels  make use of citation data, it will be made 
available to them as  follows: (a) The REF team will procure a single source of 
citation data that provides  a good level of coverage” (REF, 2011, my emphasis). 
What “single source”? What “good level of coverage”? Sources  and coverage of 
what?! When it’s  gotten to this stage I more convinced than ever that citations 
don’t simply indicate the dominant literature, they manufacture it. 
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 6 MARCH 2012]
Business logics not only determine what is canonical at a given moment but appear to fuel the 
production of knowledge within the modern academy. From those practices which surround the 
canonisation of certain ideas, texts and authors, however, it becomes easier to see the movement of 
knowledge within this sphere, and with this, to then ask some questions of its momentum. There 
is indeed a business to the production of knowledge, but what effect does this have? And where the 
value of knowledge is not held in its content but in adjacent factors, how are we to understand 
knowledge and our role in producing it? For one thing it seems that the ‘knowledge-business’ not 
only shapes the types of  knowledge that are produced, but also that which is possible. 
[MAY, 2012]
Knowledge, it seemed, was  far from prime currency in the academy. Rather, both the 
canon and the activities of judging the canonical were shaped elsewhere, and by, I came to 
realise, a logic which bore a striking resemblance to that which fuelled another definitive 
marker of the contemporary urban experience: clock time. Recognising this, two questions 
were quick to form within my mind: where knowledge is  valued in line with clock time (a) 
what types of knowledge are (im)possible to produce?; and (b) how does this  connect to the 
absence of time’s  heterogeneity within the academy and in everyday life? And though it 
was  not answers  that followed, a fertile ground in which my questions bred ever more 
questions  proved telling of the less  visible roles that the canon played in establishing and 
reifying its dominant views.
Both SCOPUS and WoK seem to deal more with journal articles  than books. 
Why is it that social science knowledge is packaged and sold in this way in the 
academy? Does  it link it to a necessary sphere of economic activity? Is it easier 
to regulate? Or perhaps  it’s  a hold over from the science disciplines, where the 
journal article holds  more sway. And what does  this  do to the accounts  on offer? 
When I think about the book, its  knowledge unfolds in a different manner than 
the article. The article stands  as  the more digestible account. Time is  present in 
the familiar guise of tell me quick. The book, on the other hand, arguably 
encourages  a deeper and more prolonged engagement. It remains  more visible 
across  our lifespan; left to sit upon the shelf as  witness  to our daily activities, as 
we continue to witness  its  presence. The article, on the other hand, has  its 
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presence in a more temporary form, more often than not via the computer 
screen, or perhaps  printed, marked-up and then filed away. And within these 
differences I feel myself making a case for attributing the absence of time’s 
plurality to the power that citation indexes  have in valuing knowledge. Indeed, 
their tendencies for counting journal articles  more prevalently than books  is  not 
benign at all, but arguably fuels  a trend towards this  mode of academic 
communication. And with different mediums  of knowledge valued differently, 
and higher valued mediums  becoming dominant, I recognise not simply what 
they count but the activity of counting citations  as  itself canonical. And what 
becomes of knowledge where it changes  its  material form of choice? What is  at 
stake where WoK, SCOPUS and Google provide data of the canon to me, pre-
analysed, leading me to read that data in a particular way? They control not 
only the transmission but the interpretation. Ideology does not simply populate 
the text but lurks ominously in the assemblage. And that’s truly what’s  at stake in 
all of this: the limits  and delimitations  that are placed upon knowledge and 
thought by vehicles  that do not even allow their functions  to be glimpsed let 
alone challenged. 
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 14 MARCH 2012]
The REF values knowledge at its highest when it speaks internationally. And the cycle of the 
REF determines a finite window, during which that knowledge is at its most valuable. Each of 
these things detract from time. The international element arguably positions research at a macro-
spatial level. There is not a great deal of scope for difference, let alone temporal difference to come 
through here. And where the research cycles of universities, and the academics within them, are 
dictated by the REF to quite a large extent, it is of course a ‘clock time’ that dominates. I cannot 
imagine that many allowances exist within this for an alternative temporality to emerge within 
academic life, let alone within the texts that are produced through the embedded, day-to-day 
temporality of  the modern academic.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
[When I asked the subject librarian how I might get a hold of past editions  of 
edited collections] she mentioned that standard practice was  now to dispose of 
old, and middle editions  of texts, and to only keep stock of first and newest 
editions. This  was, she explained, in order to save valuable shelf space within the 
library. This  is  but a small example, and I’m not about to draw the conclusion of 
space’s dominance to time’s  marginalisation from this  alone. Nonetheless, that 
call to save space at the expense of maintaining the temporality of the text is 
based on something, and that something shapes the form of knowledge allowed 
as  meaningful. And this  suggests  something about how institutional practice 
links  to knowledge in the city; how the marginalisation of time may stem from a 
a seemingly unrelated need to save space; and how that may in turn serve to hide 
alternative theorisations. What would a world be like with only first and current 
editions, I wonder? What does  that say about the interim? Where our witness  to 
the temporal evolution of a text is  annihilated by spatial privilege, does  this 
implicitly yet powerfully suggest that only the start and end products are of 
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importance; that process and the development of thought are no longer relevant 
objects for examination? 
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 17 FEBRUARY 2012]
FROM LANGUAGE TO PRESENTATION, METHOD AND PEDAGOGY
Neither the canonical nor the making of it are contained solely within a text. Across 
multiple spheres of academic activity, the canonical is performed, practiced and 
strengthened. As  I recognised the extent to which language maintained the canonical 
presentations of space and time, however, I initially found it difficult to refocus  my 
attention away from the page, and onto other proximate streams of  canon formation.
I find Castells’ chapter on Timeless Time a much easier read than Space of Flows, 
and I can’t help thinking this  is  down to the fact that the language of time is  not 
as  technical as  the language of space. And this  makes  sense I suppose – space, as 
an urban concept, has  been explored in greater depth so there exists  more 
words to talk about it with. 
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 2; NOTEBOOK; 13 AUGUST 2012]
Looking to the frequency with which words  occur [in the contents, descriptions 
and blurbs of edited collections], many instances  of space, spatial, spatiality, 
spatialisation are revealed. In contrast, there exist very few inclusions  of time, let 
alone the corresponding variants, temporal, temporality and temporalization. 
Moreover, the language of space goes  beyond its  directly associated terms  – it is 
a place, a process, a description, a type. A more nuanced language of time, however, 
doesn’t appear to exist within collections  of canonical texts. Time is  just time, and 
I feel that this  adds  strongly to the sense that time is  natural – you can’t do 
anything with it. The contingency of space, on the other hand, is  right there on 
the page, manifest in the range of  language that is available for its engagement.
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 6 FEBRUARY 2012]
Something which illustrates the way in which time is limited is the narrowness of the language 
available for engagement. But again, this language doesn’t just reflect the research and engagement 
that has taken place to date, but also conditions future engagement in a number of ways. For 
example, in Sassen’s text [‘The Global City’] space once again commands a privileged presence. 
And while it may be borrowed from elsewhere it certainly appears reaffirmed within her text. 
Moreover, the relative spread between the prominence of this spatial language and those very few 
points at which time is explicitly manifest suggests that the availability of a temporal urban 
discourse is lacking not only in this text, but arguably from those it drew its impetus and in those 
which it has itself impelled. Indeed, the heightened presence of a spatial discourse juxtaposed 
beside a more marginal temporal one further cements space as a concern in the imagination of the 
reader, whilst the range of its vocabulary makes it clear that it can take many forms, crafting it as 
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contingent in the process. In contrast, the relative lack of language available to discuss time makes 
it all the more naturalised. In this sense, the development of the language of space is also the 
development of the mythology of it, and inevitably the mythology of time if we are to accept that 
there is a relationship between the two.
[FEBRUARY 2013]
Language, as  anticipated, was highly significant. Gradually, however, I began to recognise 
ways in which space maintained its presence not just in vocabulary, but via the descriptive 
approaches  adopted to write the city. Of particular note was a tacit presentation of space in 
accounts which told the city, compared to a tacit presence of time where an author instead 
showed the city through their work. 
Harvey, Castells and Sassen ‘tell’ their readers of the urban. They privilege facts and conceptual 
schemas, to the extent that sometimes I require another book to read their accounts; I need a ‘key’ 
to code myself into their descriptions. But even when I have this, their urban environments do not 
propagate freely in my mind. Rather, laden with direction, even when my thoughts are given half a 
chance to gestate away from the narratives championed the fast and purposeful movement from one 
point to the next carries me along, attempting to fix their ‘truths’ for me. In contrast, Jacobs’ 
descriptions populate the city with people, and the resulting effect could not be more different. Far 
from being cast within a conceptual realm, the city is revealed a living, breathing, fluid entity. It is 
a performance and at no place in ‘Death and Life’ is this more obvious than in the section most 
anthologised, ‘Sidewalk Ballet’. This piece unfolds through the minutiae of everyday, city life, but 
displays an evocative sincerity that somehow transforms the mundane into something vital in the 
process. It doesn’t leave me cold, perplexed or alienated. I am not reaching for another book in my 
collection to ‘make sense’ of the framework within which it speaks. I am not simply to accept it 
and move on. But rather, in reading ‘Death and Life’ I’ve no option but to experience Jacobs’ city 
for myself, and my mind is left to freely wander as I fill-in and contrast her account with elements 
from my own urban experience. Across each of the authors, neither space nor time have a necessary 
presence in their descriptions. Nonetheless, they are infused into their descriptive endeavours. The 
macro-spatial theories, concepts, statistics and historical critiques which fill the texts of Harvey, 
Castells and Sassen, for example, describe fixed snapshots in time and by doing so they spatialise 
time in the city. Whilst in Jacobs, describing instead the organically unfolding pace of everyday 
life, a more heterogeneous time is made visible for all to see.
[FEBRUARY 2013]
Beyond this, I also came to realise that these contrasting acts  of description did not simply 
relate to space and time, but to the traditions of  wider academic practice.
CHAPTER SEVEN
192
I don’t think that the [descriptive] difference in Jacobs’ work speaks  only to her 
writing preference, but the fact that it stands  out as  remarkable probably says  a 
lot more about our common ways  of communicating in the academy. Be it the 
text, paper, conference panel or seminar, each of these mediums  asks  us to argue 
for something; to pick a position and erect it in a finite space and time. There 
isn’t a lot of room left for just showing and letting the audience interpret in such 
encounters. And even when there is, a meta-narrative frequently runs  alongside 
to explain which parts are significant and why that is the case. 
[JACOBS (1961); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 28 JUNE 2012]
And as  I considered these contrasts  further, leaving the texts more fully to consider what 
other practices I might link back to the canonisation of the urban, I began to see not only a 
preference for one style over another, but methods of research that appeared to lead 
authors inevitably toward specific descriptive tendencies. 
The specialisation of a spatial vocabulary can be also be seen in the 
advancement of ways  to measure and produce the city spatially. In the articles 
which dominate the lists  I’ve generated from edited collections  and citations 
counts, I find frequent reference to new and advanced  methodological techniques 
– GIS [Geographic Information System] methods, for example, and other 
mapping techniques. And the descriptions  of space which accompany these 
advancements are similarly advanced, more commonly defined as  scale, segregation 
and locality. Spatial engagement with the city is  now so complete that it is 
specialised to the point where it is  no longer necessary to describe an approach 
as a spatial one. How very far we have advanced down the arboreal line.
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 8 FEBRUARY 2012]
Perhaps the most crucial question here is how description links back and forth to method. How 
and in what ways do the large scale methodological practices of Harvey, Castells and Sassen 
connect to their macro-spatial descriptions which emerge alongside an argumentative use of 
statistics and historical critique? But such links between description and method don’t simply pit 
spatial research against temporal research, for time can of course be measured. Hours worked and 
wages earned in one part of the city can be contrasted with another part; the time it takes to do the 
school run can be compared to the average commuting time to work. These measurements, and 
specifically the very fact that time is ‘measured’, are already indicative of a very particular type of 
time: one that is fixed and spatialised. Look again to the time that ‘is’ present in Castells and 
Harvey: it’s measurable time. And so what is of concern here is whether their projects would have 
been able to capture any other types of time through their method; whether it was even possible for 
them to ‘see’ within their data a time and temporality contingent and more nuanced in nature. 
[FEBRUARY 2013]
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Jacobs’ fight is for a way of life. It is her culture that is at stake, not her academic reputation. She 
writes differently because she is coming from a different place, and accordingly, her choice of 
method also differs [from Harvey, Castells and Sassen’s]. Her autoethnographic methodological 
approach (though it is not named as such) is laid out in the introduction: “So in this book we 
shall start, if only in a small way, adventuring in the real world ourselves. The way to get at 
what goes on in the seemingly mysterious and pervasive behaviour of cities is, I think, to look 
closely, and with as little previous expectation as is possible, at the most ordinary scenes and 
events, and attempt to see what they mean and whether any thread of principles do emerge among 
them” (23). And this autoethnographic approach is also carried forth in her descriptions. She 
makes the city sensible to her reader by writing of the ways in which she makes sense of the city 
for herself. Revealing that it is the act of “Mr. Goldstein arranging the coils of wire which 
proclaim the hardware store is open” speaks strongest not of the hardware store nor Mr. Goldstein, 
but of the subjective, experiential manner by which her accounts unfold. Likewise, it is not the fact 
that she puts her bin out and exchanges glances with her neighbours, but the fact that she is 
conscious of this fact, notices it, and then considers it important enough to make manifest within 
her text, that is significant. It is not the language of the text which populates Jacobs’ city with 
people instead of concepts; it is not its language that favours a heterogenous time over one that is 
fixed and spatialised. Rather, in her text’s descriptive form and in the methods she chooses to record 
it, such things echo prominently to resonate through its pages and populate the mind of  her reader.
[AUGUST 2012]
Language, description and method: tendencies  for each of these things  were secured by the 
canon, maintaining it through their ongoing practice. Their form and influence, however, 
were not immediately apparent to me, but emerged only when I was  able to contrast the 
more typical approaches of Harvey, Castells and Sassen to Jacobs’ alternative way of 
writing, describing and recording the city. And in Death and Life, I was also to find one final 
entry point into processes by which the canonical was performed and strengthened: 
through pedagogic practice.
[In introducing Death and Life] Jacobs’ describes  the common use of Boston’s 
“North End” as  a case study exercise: “The North End is thus  a recurring 
assignment for Massachusetts  Institute of Technology and Harvard planning 
and architectural students, who now and again pursue, under the guidance of 
their teachers, the paper exercise of converting it into super-blocks  and park 
promenades, wiping away its non-conforming uses, transforming it to an ideal 
order and gentility so simple it could be engraved on the end of the pin” (10). 
Such exercises  I certainly remember from my Masters  degrees  – thought 
experiments  with existing sites, the purpose being to make them better (under 
an assumption that they are broken to begin with). As  students  we are taught to 
play, but in a way that leads  to being educated. We are socialised, institutionalised 
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and indoctrinated into good practice with nary the credit given for what 
intuition, creativity and alternative ways  of seeing might bring to the process. 
Indeed, how the city can be seen is  largely inconsequential given that such 
courses  [as  Jacobs describes] teach students  how to see. It is here, then, that both 
the relative absence of time within teaching materials and the methods  by which 
students  are taught to train their inquiries, serve to sever the temporal further. 
And by methods, I am not simply thinking about the tools  of interviews, surveys, 
mapping exercises  (though these are of course important), rather, what I’m 
trying to get at is  the broader methodological approach to the urban that is 
taught; the philosophical traditions  and degrees  of reflexivity encouraged. 
Where the canon is presented largely as  fact, and it is  accompanied by a 
methodological tradition that seeks  to train rather that provoke intrigue, then it 
is  left all the more dominant for it. Indeed, the manner in which the classroom 
has  the potential to accompany a student into practice is also captured by Jacobs 
when she recalls  a conversation shared with a friend: “Here was a curious  thing. 
My friend’s  instincts  told him the North End was  a good place, and his  social 
statistics  confirmed it. But everything he had learned as  a physical planner 
about what is  good for people and good for city neighbourhoods, everything 
that made him an expert, told him the North End had to be a bad place” (20). 
And from this  I can only conclude that processes  of learning and teaching, 
informing others  and re-informing ourselves, matter greatly in the search for 
time. These behavioural activities  that sit at the heart of imagining the city are 
also the making of cities  as  they are carried forth. And in this  sense, the expert is 
a site to examine not simply for their external power to make the city, but in the 
internal powers  which shape their tendencies  as  they do so. Indeed, often the 
expert is paid not for their capacity to re-imagine but for an application of 
knowledge, already learnt. It must be asked, then, the extent to which this  role 
causes  the expert to revert to their training and official learning practices  as  they 
share their knowledge? Do acts of knowledge delivery lead to cautious 
behaviours on the part of experts, censoring out what other eyes  may see? Is 
there too much personally at stake for them (reputation, getting paid, getting 
repeat jobs, etc.) to question their apparently tried and tested analyses? And 
indeed, perhaps  there is  no real incentive for them to imagine things  differently 
– nowhere up from expert, only down if you show yourself to be fallible. As 
Jacobs  herself notes: “they are all in the same stage of elaborately learned 
superstition [...] just so in the pseudo science of city rebuilding and planning, 
years  of learning and a plethora of subtle and complicated dogma have arisen 
on a foundation of nonsense. The tools  of technique have steadily been 
perfected. Naturally, in time, forceful and able men, admired administrators, 
having swallowed the initial fallacies  and having been provisioned with tools  and 
with public confidence, go on logically to the greatest destructive excesses, which 
prudence or mercy might previously have forbade” (21).
[JACOBS (1961); READING 4; SPREADSHEET; 22 JUNE 2012]
It is not only the explicit, but in that which is implied and tacit it is necessary to ask after the 
processes of canonisation. In relation to language, description, method and pedagogy: what do they 
allow us to see?; who is present?; who is active?; who has the potential to be active?; what 
questions are possible to pose? With regards to language, there is more available to describe and 
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debate space in, making space all the more contingent and flexible, leaving time to appear 
comparatively fixed and naturalised. Language moreover allows us to bring that which is static on 
the page to life in the minds of the reader. This again may convey an open, fluid, rhythmic and 
temporally contingent encounter of urban life, or it may construct the city with reference to fixed, 
spatial point that renders the city as a process, a concept or as something connected to the global 
economy. And each evokes a response of not only how one ‘should’ engage, but limits the sense of 
how they ‘can’ engage. Indeed, in language and description, the methods used to arrive at the 
presentations of the city are also visible, and in this sense, the evolution of a particular paradigm 
not only makes space visible to the researcher, but it spatialises that which is not space, making 
invisible that which cannot be held within its conceptual framework in the process. And when 
attention returns to the classroom and the dissemination of knowledge to future urban scholars, it 
is not simply content but the instructions and exercises by a student learns their craft that shape 
the possibility for thought. Such activities can lead us not only to truth but to ways of seeing and 
recognising both truth and apparent falsehood. In each of these academic activities the canonical is 
made, constructing the non-canonical as it goes. And in this case, in urban studies, as dominant 
linguistic, descriptive, methodological and pedagogical practices are disseminated into the field, the 
(non)canonical presentations of  space and time are perpetuated ever further.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
ABRIDGEMENT
Throughout my reading of the canon something curious appeared to linger: the presence 
of  the non-canonical.
Jacobs’ method [in Death and Life] allows her to see time. This  method seems 
very similar to that which I’ve termed autoethnography in my own work. And 
this  text is, for all intents  and purposes, dominant and canonical. She suggests 
that people draw on their own realities  when reflecting on their city, that they 
“listen, linger and think” about what they see. In her introduction, she actively 
instructs  people to use their own illustrations. At no point does  she demand of 
her reader that their city should be as  hers  is. And while she makes  no explicit 
statement of the salience of time’s  contingency to matters  of the urban, a 
heterogeneous  temporal rhythm fills  her work nonetheless, oozing forth from her 
descriptions  of everyday urban life. Hers  is  a reality of the urban that is  notably 
lacking in many of the disciplines less  dominant texts, so how is  it that Jacobs’ 
accounts  have come to inhabit a canonical stage when so many of its  central 
traits remain silent?
[JACOBS (1961); READING 2; NOTEBOOK; 11 JUNE 2012]
It is  important for me to state as clearly as  possible that time is not absent in 
Harvey’s  account of the city. It appears  both conceptually and categorically 
relevant throughout many of his  texts. For example, his  discussions of time in 
CHAPTER SEVEN
196
The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (1990) 
and Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographical Imagination (1990) 
recognise the productive capacity of time to construct normative modes of 
culture. And in the latter of those, Harvey actually points  to a shift in acceptable 
modes  of temporality in the academy. Reminiscing that in the past the 
publication of two books  would have been considered something of a great 
achievement he notes  that today’s  academic career demands  a more numerous 
textual output for success. Surely this  hints at the way in which a shifting 
conception of temporality leads  to a shift in institutional practice, and vice 
versa, and doesn’t this  get at least somewhere close to the relevance of time for 
matters of  urban culture?
[HARVEY (1989); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 9 MAY 2012]
Time has had a varying level of presence in Harvey and Jacobs, but the manner in which it has 
manifested has been very different to space. I never had to go looking for space, it grabbed my 
attention. But time, for the most part, was something I had to excavate via the connections these 
texts held with other texts and contexts. In this sense, given the extent to which I actively sought 
moments of time’s presence, my finding of it is not surprising. And yet my reading of Castells has 
been rather different. [In ‘The Rise of the Network Society’] time largely ‘found me’. ‘Time’ was 
so central to this text that it demanded for itself a dedicated chapter [‘Timeless Time’], whilst it 
also flitted in and out of  Castells’ spatial account of  the city in [the chapter] ‘Space of  Flows’.
[FEBRUARY 2013]
How was it that the non-canonical was present within the canon yet never elevated to the 
canonical? What might account for time and temporality to be lost within processes  of 
canonisation? As I turned once more to attend to the presence of time in Castells’ account 
of  the city, I developed a greater sense of  why such things might be the case.
[In The Rise of the Network Society] Castells’ chapter Space of Flows unsurprisingly 
reinforces  the spatial dimensions  of urban life. Through my broader familiarity 
with his  work, however, I know that he is not arguing that modern society only 
holds  relations  with space. Nonetheless, even though I realise that Timeless Time 
is  required to fully appreciate the strength of his  argument I wonder if the fact 
that Space of Flows is  the widest read chapter privileges  space and society over time 
and society? And I’ve certainly some cause to suspect this. When I think back to 
my lists  of edited collections, Space of Flows made a frequent appearance – 
physically removed and abridged for inclusion. And in Susser’s  The Castells Reader 
on Cities and Social Theory (2001), she directs  her reader toward Castells’ seminal 
message “the Space of Flows” at every turn: “Castells  (1996) outlines  the 
structures  of global networks  and characterises the new communication 
processes  as the ‘Space of Flows’” (10). Moreover, in her more general 
introduction to Castells’ work, she condenses  his  three volume urban treatise The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture [of which The Rise of the Network Society 
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is  volume one] into less  than 300 words. Perhaps  Castells  intended time to be 
central to his  argument, but where a reader is  strongly directed to the Space of 
Flows at every turn, that becomes the marker with which his work is associated. 
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 24 AUGUST 2012]
The level of canonisation across an author’s work is not homogenous. The texts which surround a 
text work direct readers to their canonical parts. And this is significant for a number of reasons. 
Knowledge is often made in the academy by ‘following the breadcrumbs’ rather than reading each 
and every text in depth. And where does one go when faced with lengthy texts: do they start 
dutifully at page one or seek instruction on where to begin? Castells’ text [‘The Rise of Network 
Society’] provides a good example here. This is a text with over 22,000 citations (Google Scholar, 
2013), that is 597 pages long, and is only the first volume in a three volume series. And yet a 
single concept endures which both the text and its author have become somewhat synonymous with: 
the space of flows. Therefore, in this particular separation of concept from text a strong message 
for understanding the city spatially rather than temporally is borne. It does not matter that 
Castells writes so much about time if it is largely overlooked in favour of his more dominant 
work. It does not matter that time is present if it is to become absent in the more narrow portion of 
the work that is circulated and transmitted. An author may in fact write about about time, but if 
it’s not in the dominant, canonical aspects of their work, it can easily go unacknowledged. And the 
question that really gets to the heart of this is whether it really matters if you’ve written about 
time if  no one is going to read it?
[OCTOBER, 2012]
I’m realising that you never get a full picture of an author’s  work. The dominant 
aspects  are lifted from everything else, and it is  only these dominant features 
which become canonical. I’ve even come to recognise this  from the marks upon 
the page. We customarily indicate the removal of sections  of a text with an 
ellipsis. No harm done, I originally thought, they were only circular  references that would 
be redundant in an abridged version. But I’m now seeing some other features  that have 
been altered, including the removal of references  and footnotes, and I’m really 
starting to wonder about the impact of these common practices  of abridgement. 
Indeed, even if the references  are only circular, they are nonetheless  descriptive 
and instructive. For example “described in chapter 5” directs  a reader towards 
other information, indicating that a full account is  not provided but the blocks 
necessary to build the argument are also to be found elsewhere. 
[CASTELLS (2000); READING 5; SPREADSHEET; 25 AUGUST 2012]
Abridgement, it seemed, was not simply condensing an author’s  work for a particular 
audience or creating it as  a more digestible form. But the means of reproduction it pursued 
appeared to involve a reframing, and therefore the reconstruction and rewriting of an 
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account through the process. And as  I looked to the direction upon which such processes 
might draw I came to see that time never left the texts, but rather, it left the agenda. 
Time has become marginalised as the agenda has shifted more and more to a spatial one – the 
spatial turn. Throughout Harvey’s, Jacobs’ and Castells’ work there is an attentiveness to time. 
Perhaps this does not always appear in the most useful of ways (with the exception of Jacobs, it 
is often fixed and spatialised) but it is present nonetheless. What seems crucial then are the 
‘soundbites’. The slogans that sum up a concept, a paradigm, an academic discipline. It is these 
which become removed from the context in which they are held, reinterpreted as they go. And it is 
also these which frame any future (and previous) works who seek entry to the canon.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
In terms of space, it was not its presence within a text but its removal and circulation as  an 
element in its own right that ensured its  heightened role in the framing of other works. 
Moreover, I also came to recognise the considerable power of such processes. While each 
author’s  accounts were of course much broader than a single issue, they themselves 
appeared consensual with such arrangements  as  they continually (re)produced their work 
within the canon.
Despite his conceptualisation of ‘Timeless Time’ Castells’ own characterisation of his urban 
inquiry often appears to return back to the spatial. In the conclusion he authors for Susser’s edited 
collection [‘The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory’ (2001)], for example, Castells 
defines his work in spatial terms. In this sense, despite his broader account which prompts a 
necessary engagement beyond space, a focus on space is retained when he is asked to define his 
endeavour and does so spatially. And in doing so he arguably implies time’s non-relevance once 
again. In this example it seems that it is not simply the canon that works to unearth the canonical 
from the text, but that an author, aware of the wider salience of some of their ideas, can 
themselves act to further reify the canonical aspects of their work as they continue their practice of 
knowledge production amidst the workings of  the contemporary academy.
[AUGUST, 2012]
The mechanisms  by which part of an author’s  work became substituted as the whole 
emerged evermore relevant as  I read the urban studies canon. But far beyond space, I also 
came to recognise that such processes had a significant role to play in the canonisation of 
much broader ideas.
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It does not simply relate to space and time but part of this ‘abridgement’ means that other key 
aspects of an author’s work are reified in their removal. When an idea emerges above the context 
of its construction; when it is removed from its context and becomes ripe for extrapolation; when it 
is backed not only by an author but by the canon: what becomes its power to construct the city? 
Take Sassen’s concept ‘the global city’ as an example. It is widely acknowledged as being coined 
within her text [‘The Global City’] yet it of course does not rest within its pages. In the twenty-
plus years since its inception it has become a mechanism for debate within many quarters of urban 
studies and, out with the academy, it frequently appears as an aspirational blueprint for urban life 
via its prominence within urban marketing strategies and competitiveness agendas. Not only, then, 
does ‘the global city’ shape how research is done and how we think about our city, but it helps 
construct the ways in which cities and its institutions attract investors. It is important to also note 
the ‘the global city’ has become part of a popular urban lexicon in ways that Harvey’s 
‘entrepreneurial city’, Jacobs’ ‘sidewalk ballet, and Castells’ ‘space of flows’ cannot even begin to 
match. And while these popular understandings and uses of the term may not be akin to what 
Sassen had in mind, connected back to points of its original inception the question is: does the 
widespread salience of the term work to reinforce ‘spatial’ understandings, problematisations and 
solutions in urban studies and beyond? And moreover, in its popular usage has ‘the global city’ 
become naturalised as a ‘thing’ and thereby extracted from the sphere in which critical engagement 
was once at least possible? Indeed, who’d dare to question the relevance of ‘the global city’ in 
today’s academic and everyday spheres of  urban activity?
[JANUARY, 2013]
And similarly, beyond the loss of time, I came to see that processes  of abridgement had a 
significant role to play in absences which were much more profound and devastating to the 
production of  urban knowledge.
Abridgement not only ‘makes’ the dominant, but does so by silencing those aspects which don’t 
align with the canon. Such acts remove not only the content that the canon deems non-pertinent, 
but also our ability to see that content and reproduce it in other work. Indeed, from Jacobs’ work it 
appears that not only has time been lost, but a method that allows us to see time. In her 
introduction; her argument; her style of writing; her method of research – explicitly and tacitly 
Jacobs’ makes her point: it is not the results but the method of inquiry that must change. But this, 
it appears, is not enough in itself. Across many measures this work is recorded as the number one 
planning text, but again, that’s apparently not enough to maintain its critical methodological 
message. Had it have been we might have seen a field of inquiry more inventive with its 
presentation. To come back to autoethnography, we might recognise this as a more prevalent 
medium in coming to the city. Yet this method, this mode of writing, while present it certainly does 
not dominate the field of urban studies. Much more prevalent are GIS mapping techniques, and 
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quantitive, indicator driven accounts. It is not the case that a contingent time and a method by 
which to see are absent in Jacobs’ work, but that they are made to appear absent despite their 
presence. And what ‘Death and Life’ serves to illustrate is the functional power of the canon to 
‘extract’ sense from texts, and to sever from accepted practice the methods which could enable us to 
see something different. Indeed, it is the fact that Jacobs’ book is both dominant whilst its more 
radical readings remain silent that is telling of the broader processes at play in the canonisation of 
urban ideas. And in this, perhaps the message that comes through strongest is a need not simply to 
take for granted that the dominance of an author’s work will ensure the wide dispersal of their 
texts’ contents, methods and stylistic tendencies. Rather it is the canon that speaks, and it does so 
via its texts.
[FEBRUARY, 2013]
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Chapter Eight
STORIES OF THOSE STORIES
Stories of Those Stories
2008, the year in which I commenced my postgraduate study of urban studies at the 
University of Glasgow, was also the year in which my urban imagination was newly fired by 
academic accounts of the urban realm. Ever since, my understanding of the city has been 
forged not simply within experiences of city-life, be they of my own or Others’ making, but 
through the contents, relationships  and functions of the urban studies canon. So too are my 
productions. When I write, my accounts are accompanied by the ghosts  of all that they 
don’t contain. As  I work to craft sense for my reader I position myself and my writings 
alongside the dominant. I circulate amongst Others  who are not unlike myself. Like 
Harvey, Jacobs, Castells  and Sassen, I write for, within and against the canon. My efforts 
are in part decided by a value that is  elsewhere established. I perform my theses far beyond 
the confines of my texts. And these very pages will potentially be sliced and diced to 
paragraphs, sentences  and strings of words, moulded for other contexts  and other 
arguments.
All along the canon has been present as I’ve read, thought, discussed, performed and 
written the city, and my experience of conducting research upon it has  been no exception. 
It too has  proved insightful into the functions of the urban studies canon, revealing itself 
something of an autoethnographic case study into how the canon works  to expand, 
maintain and limit the possibilities of knowledge, research and action. As such, following 
from Chapter Seven which focused on the canon as  the object of rhizoanalysis, this  chapter 
looks to the research events of entering, reading and reporting the canon (as described in 
Chapters Five and Six). And in doing so offers a more nuanced and personally informed 
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account of the ways  in which the canon constructs  its  objects and itself via those who look 
and remark upon it. 
ENTERING THE CANON
I had no intention of entering the canon in this first research event, only to tap gently to 
have it reveal to me its  canonical texts. Yet as I sifted through edited collections, making 
decisions as  to those which sat within my remit; designed search strings that might generate 
canonical texts; narrowed down universities  from which to request reading lists, enter it I 
did. In blurbs, contents pages, reviews  and course descriptions – texts which spoke of the 
texts  I sought – I found the canon. My appreciation of this was  gradual, initially roused 
only by the familiarity of  the results that were appearing.
Top institutions  – the ones  I expected to see, I’ve seen. Harvard, Yale, Oxford, 
Cambridge – every one of them there. The institutions  at the centre of my 
personal experience – Glasgow, Edinburgh, St. Andrews – they don’t rank at the 
very top, but still appear. Other institutions  that hold for me an embodied 
connection to Urban Studies  in Glasgow – Amsterdam through Dvora Yanow; 
Richard Sennett through NYU – good schools, top academics, expected.
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 2 FEBRUARY 2012]
But with each bit of  data, each fragment that I read, my familiarity grew.
Castells. Again. There’s  a surprise! It’s  funny, if I base my understanding of him 
on the courses  I’ve taken throughout my Masters’ years  in Urban Studies, I 
wouldn’t think him that important. I came across  the name but never really 
engaged with any of his  writing beyond that. And I guess that’s  now seeming 
like a bit of an oversight on my part: he’s  everywhere! In all the edited 
collections, and now making a frequent appearance on the reading lists  of other 
institutions. 
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 5 MARCH 2012]
The neat idea I’d had that I would collect my data and then analyse it has been rudely halted. 
Working this month to uncover something that can be said to present itself as the urban studies 
canon has made me realise of analysis in the research process: ‘it’s happening all the time’. My 
urgent pleas for the analysis to stop have given ground as I’ve come to accept that as I engage with 
the data, it proliferates within me. And so my rhizomatic analysis of the canon won’t only happen 
in relation to the chosen data at the end of the data-collection process, but also within the process 
of  data-collection itself. 
[JANUARY 2012]
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In this  I began to realise that the canon was  not to be revealed in a sterile list – the Top 10 of 
Urban Studies so to speak – but in a much more intimately formed knowledge of dominant 
categories, themes, and institutions, that evolved as  I searched for those very texts. Far from 
being contained within a corpus of texts, the canon appeared to me as a complex network 
of  relations between authors, spaces, texts and ideas.
I found that this knowledge was also forged at points of dissonance, points where the canon 
manifested in ways that were strange, messy and unexpected. This  was particularly the case 
with the citations  search. When conducting this I was frequently met with connections that 
I didn’t understand; experiences  that did not match existing or newly developed 
expectations.
Citation index search engines  have a “keyword optimizer”, suggesting what 
words should be used in the retrieval of data. Another layer of complexity. Both 
categories  and content are co-produced between me and the search engine, but 
I have no idea how they work out their part. So much is shaped by the search 
engine that in the end it’s  difficult to know the nature of the data produced, but 
it is  certainly more than just a count of top cited articles. At no point 
throughout this process have I become accustomed to how the algorithms  work. 
I get different results  from different search engines  so what are the variables  used 
in the searches? 
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 24 JANUARY 2012]
I am quite a neat a methodological worker and I was very aware of how ‘messy’ my computer 
desktop was becoming when using the citation search engines...
[FEBRUARY 2012]
I have 11 web windows  now open. 11! And I have no idea what they are, where 
they came from, other than they also bare the Thomson Reuter’s  logo. Out of 
all my searches  for dominant urban studies texts, this  one is by far the most 
challenging. I know what I’m looking for, and it’s  not even that I cannot find it. 
It’s that I can’t even find a way to find it. I lack any clear way to translate what 
I’m looking for into information that will populate their search boxes, and where 
I cannot provide this, I’m pushed out by the search engines. 
[CITATIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 24 JANUARY 2012]
...I resorted to leaving myself breadcrumb trails that I could follow – webpages, connecting to 
webpages, connecting to other webpages – believing that with enough data, sense would appear 
amongst the tangles, showing me the ways in which the search engines counted their objects. 
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Instead, I found myself going deeper and deeper into websites, losing myself and my data in the 
twists and turns.
[FEBRUARY 2012]
With no other means to make sense of what I was coming across I found myself turning to 
fictional accounts in order to place the different search engines and relations between them.
SCOPUS by SciVerse is  meaningful only to me through sci-fi and dystopian 
fiction. I have no real understanding of this  company; what they are or what 
they do. Left to rely solely on other sources  I find myself turning to fiction, and I 
cannot dispel the immediate connections  I make to the Ministry of Information, 
Replicants, The Umbrella Corporation, and so on. Digging deeper I find that 
SciVerse is owned by Elsevier who describes  itself as  a publishing company. But 
they do more than publishing, surely? Like Thomson Reuters, there is something 
that just doesn’t seem right; something that just doesn’t feel right. Thomson 
Reuters  describes  itself as  a business data provider. I don’t know what that means! 
These companies  come across as  so strange that even when I dig deeper, all I 
have to draw on to make sense of  them are fictional accounts.
[CITATIONS, ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 25 JANUARY 2012]
This  need to look elsewhere made me realise just how much I was relying on existing 
knowledge to make sense of the citations  search. Indeed, as  I thought back to my previous 
searches, I recognised similar strategies at moments of  confusion.
The way in which edited collection are described reveals  the discourses  they sit 
within. For example, Blackwell describes  its  Companion to the City collections  as 
“blue chip” items. This  isn’t the language of the social sciences, is it? I certainly 
can’t makes  sense of it within that context. Only when my thoughts turn to 
stock markets and reports of  share prices does such language resonate.
[EDITED COLLECTIONS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 14 FEBRUARY 2012]
At every turn I was reading the texts  through text in order to make them sensible. Whether 
familiar or strange, there was always  something there in the background, enticing sense to 
come to the fore – a sense that in this case fabricated my knowledge of the canon. But as 
this  knowledge continued to develop I realised that the canon was not simply a network of 
relations  that I looked upon. Rather, it was much more tacit. A feel for the canon was  growing 
within me; I no longer felt “pushed out” by the citation search engines, for example.
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Any interface is about more than just ease of use as  a universal attribute. I have 
become accustomed to Google – it makes  sense to me now. After moving from 
Windows to Mac OSX, I can’t use Windows. It just doesn’t feel right. These tools 
become an extension of us, and for them to work well we need not to notice 
them. But what we also don’t notice is  their subtle changes  to our working 
practice and patterns. And I’m thinking this  is where I’m now at with WoK and 
SCOPUS. It wasn’t so long ago that they didn’t make any sense to me 
whatsoever. I couldn’t actually use them to search for what I was looking for. 
They were maps  without a key. But now I turn to them and... they just work... 
I’ve learned to use them. I don’t even think about it.
[CITATIONS, ENTERING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 23 FEBRUARY 2012]
I realised that the something there in the background, the thing that enticed sense to come to the fore, 
the text through which I read the canon, was  now the canon itself. The canon had become 
the barometer against which I measured the sensibility of the data that was emerging. My 
growing familiarity had ultimately returned a canonical sensibility within me. I had become 
a node in its network. And the considerable scope that this arrangement afforded the canon 
to maintain its dominance through my reading of  it, could no longer be ignored. 
In using the results  from my previously collated groups  of Reading Lists  and 
Edited Collections, I realise that I’ve been drawing upon my growing familiarity 
with the look of the canon to check the accuracy of my methods. That is, I’ve 
been using my expectations, no doubt trading on their accuracy thus  far, to check 
my methods. If a list looked wrong, the filter combination must be wrong: MIT 
doesn’t appear in this one, must be something wrong here, for example. And across  each of 
these things, I realise that never have I been on the periphery of the canon, but 
in seeking the canon I’ve been drawing on my existing, my evolving 
understanding of  the canon to check my results. 
[READING LISTS; ENTERING THE CANON; SPREADSHEET; 8 JANUARY 2012] 
This work of examining the canon can serve, in part, to uphold the canon. The majority of places 
I’ve come across seem right. I am at ease as they emerge from the data. It is the unfamiliar that 
causes concern. The unfamiliar has led me to question the efficacy of the methods I’ve chosen to 
get at the most dominant texts, and the results are far from inconsequential. When sorting through 
the various rankings of top universities, for example, my initial response was to delete non-
Western, non-English speaking institutions, considering them pointless to retain as ‘they don’t exist 
within the canon’. Little did I appreciate that the very fact they were appearing showed them to be 
on the radar. Anticipation and assumptions can be dangerous things! In this case, it was ‘me’ that 
made the canon Western by removing non-Western items from the analysis. I done that. And in 
doing so my efforts led to my reproduction of the canon in its canonical form. As such, even in my 
deconstruction of it, I am working to uphold a similar canon by virtue of my own assumptions. 
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Even in the most gentle of encounters it proliferates fervently. It draws in all that it comes into 
contact, and maintains its dominance in the process.
[JANUARY 2012]
READING THE CANON
There was a certain amount of relief I felt when the time finally came for me to read the 
texts  of this research. I turned first to Harvey, and did so with an eager anticipation of 
knowing what to expect. Having performed textual analysis  on policy documents and news 
articles  in the past, I was confident that with the texts now selected I could finally search for 
time, space, and all else that I was  meant to be doing. Initially this  appeared to be the case. I 
read Harvey’s text as I’ve read many texts  before it: looking for clues, attending to the 
language, trying to work out what it was  trying to tell me, and searching each of these 
things for what it meant in order to get at how it worked. Time, it appeared, was absent. When 
I turned to read Harvey for the fifth and the sixth time, however, it, like everything else in 
this  work, failed to hold steady. These encounters  called my previous  interpretations  firmly 
into question. 
So sure was I that time was  absent in this  text. But then chasing the lines, as 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest; allowing my reading to reign freely beyond these 
particular pages, I find time in Harvey’s  work, and so must assume that if it’s  a 
feature of  his writing elsewhere, it somehow informs this analysis too...
[HARVEY (1989); READING 5; NOTEBOOK; 9 MAY 2012]
But then these readings  of Harvey’s text weren’t in fact my first readings at all. I’d been 
familiar with this text prior to the research.
My first encounter with both David Harvey, and this particular text, came simultaneously. It was 
one of the first items I’d read after choosing to study for a MSc in Public Policy, in 2008. I’ve 
still got my original, annotated copy from that first reading. Looking to my notes, they read more as 
a conversation with myself about how I access the text. I pose questions about the article, yet make 
no assessment nor interpretation of its contents. I ask only tentatively, is this what he means? Is 
this what he’s talking about? The battle lay with me and my ability to read the text, not with 
being able to get to Harvey, let alone engage critically with him. It made no sense for me against 
the contextual background which prompted me to undertake the MSc in the first place. I think this 
in itself tells me something about a texts’ and my own temporality when reading a given text – 
time changes both meaning and significance – readers from a different temporal context to that 
when the text was written (and without a developed knowledge of that context) may struggle to 
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engage with the text on its terms. And when they then engage with the text on their terms, the text 
is changed because of it. Reading ‘From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism’ for the first time 
in over two years, and with quite a different motivation for doing so, the first thing that struck me 
was the familiarity of its content in terms of the concepts it drew on and of the contemporaries 
Harvey identifies. Things that wouldn’t have meant much to me in October 2008 now held a 
connection for me; connections to Harvey and to each other that I could now make sense of.
[JULY 2012]
What had changed?...
...I had. 
And the same was of course true as  I started to engage with the texts of Castells  and 
Sassen. But it was  when I turned to engage with Jacobs that I recognised the extent to 
which there was  a great deal of me not only in such changes over time, but also in my 
present readings of the texts. This was  particularly visible when two very distinct versions of 
Death and Life emerged. In the initial readings I found Death and Life to be a heartening, 
affirming read. But when read with and in the shadow of other sources, more negative 
connotations were to follow.
It is very easy to get swept up in the imagery of Death and Life, and certainly, for my first 
readings, that’s just what happened. But in my more recent readings I have witnessed myself have 
a more negative response. She writes, for example, that “[d]eep and complicated social-ills must 
lie behind delinquency and crime, in suburbs and towns as well as in great cities. This book will 
not go into speculation on the deeper reasons. It is sufficient, at this point, to say that if we are to 
maintain a city society that can diagnose and keep abreast of of deeper social problems, the 
starting point must be, in any case, to strengthen whatever workable forces for maintaining safety 
and civilisation do exist” (31). And I find myself wonder whether Jacobs rejection of theory in 
favour of reality is possible, let alone sensible. Moving more cautiously through the text in 
subsequent readings I feel myself taking further issue with this separation of theory from 
experience. I read now about her famous solution, ‘eyes on the street’, but this time wondering 
whether an informal, self-surveilling, neighbourhood watch scheme would be satisfactory. For 
example, would it really attend to ‘deep and complicated social ills’ or might it just drive them 
further away from the eyes? And where would this be to? In this I can’t help but question whether 
Jacobs’ concerns over safety are in fact serving to mask a civilising discourse. Indeed, within this 
text lie many assumptions of what cities are and what they are for, and it also willingly seems to 
set people apart from criminals and delinquents, when in reality, this isn’t perhaps so easy to do. 
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‘Eyes on the street’ suggests a certain type of attitude towards Others. There have been a number 
of comments of late about Jacobs’ being read as fore-bearer to the Tea Party movement in the US 
and of advocating a very early form of gentrification, and I wonder if this in fact is what I’m 
seeing. A glorified NIMBYism?
[NOVEMBER 2012]
Writing my analyses  of Jacobs’, drawing in my interpretations  sixty years on 
from this  text, with hindsight my companion, I realise the extent to which these 
texts are read and imagined with context. And with my readings  emerging quite 
distinct from one another, I realise that there is  a subjectivity to that context. I 
am there within the interpretation. 
[JACOBS (1961); READING 4; NOTEBOOK; 22 JUNE 2012]
Following my readings of Jacobs’ text, I attempted to be more attentive to my framing and 
in doing so witnessed the ways in which my affective anticipations and reactions had the 
potential to either pull me in, or push me out.
Far too often now when I think of the urban I think of ideas  relating to 
infrastructure, planning, mobility, flexible accumulation, knowledge exchange, 
competitiveness, and so on. Much less  frequently does the idea of people living 
there come to the fore. In all honesty, however, I’m not engaged by this 
language, and I’ve maybe not realised the extent to which it repels  me until I 
realise just how drawn I am to Jacobs’ text. I live in a city, in a neighbourhood 
not too dissimilar from that which that Jacobs  describes. When I read Sidewalk 
Ballet I populate it with fragments  of my daily life. The characters  in Jacobs’ text 
are brought to life with faces of  my own daily experience.
[JACOBS (1961); READING 2; SPREADSHEET; 17 JUNE 2012]
And within this  I could start to see why such things might be the case. I, like anyone, had 
preferences, for certain styles, certain topics, even, dare I say, the motivations which 
compelled certain authors.
Reading through Castells’ chapter on Timeless Time, I must say I find it much more engaging – 
it piques my interest a lot more. But I also have to be aware that it was written by the same 
author. This helps me realise that my preferences for a certain language, a certain type of 
argument, help frame the text.
[SEPTEMBER 2012] 
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My imagination was another factor which had the potential to help me read between the 
lines, so to speak. It might either bring a text to life, in the case of Death and Life, or fill the 
cold analyses of  Harvey’s Baltimore with a Baltimore from another encounter.
Harvey discusses Baltimore more and more as the text progresses, culminating in a description of 
the city borrowed from the findings of a local enquiry which suggests there is much “rot beneath 
the glitter”. So much of this speaks to me not through Harvey’s account, but through the television 
show The Wire. This has come to be recognised by academics and non-academics alike as an 
important portrait of North American, urban life. And it is indeed a very powerful one. But when 
I think as to why The Wire conjures more of an image for me than this text, it is perhaps the 
manner in which different aspects of the city are juxtaposed side-by-side throughout the series. At 
times almost fly-on-the-wall documentary, it shows rather than tells. 
[JULY 2012]
And as my readings progressed beyond individual authors, I realised that I couldn’t escape 
my previous  encounters  – these too now helped construct my preferences  and imagination. 
I read Jacobs with Harvey; I read Castells  with them both. And as far as  my enquiries  went 
the meanings of the texts were cumulatively made. After my analyses of Castells, for 
example, I imagined a map of the processes  at play, and drew them accordingly (Figure 
Five). But upon that act I also realised that those processes were also occurring within 
Harvey and Jacobs, its  just that it took the process  of reading all three to get me to that 
point.
It was when I eventually turned to engage with Sassen, however, that I realised that my 
framing of these texts was  not only something that made my readings in a personal way, but 
it also made the texts. My interpretations constructed the texts. I recognised this at points 
where I could no longer reach out for alternative analyses.
Looking back to my first engagement with [‘The Global City’], and its associated concepts, I 
didn’t see time. Rather, the text functioned by leading me to familiar debates on space, 
gentrification and agglomeration in order to anticipate its meaning. While this is what I was 
largely expecting, such expectations were also leaving me concerned that my reading of ‘Sassen’ 
was being too heavily influenced by the analyses already conducted on Harvey, Jacobs and 
Castells. As such, I returned to ‘The Global City’ a number of times, trying to ‘see’ something 
different. Forcing myself to move beyond my own framing I began to interpret the text temporally. 
The casualisation of  working practices, for example, seemed particularly relevant, whereby the
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Figure Five: Castells and the Canon 
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different ‘types’ of work are named not for their spatial location, their economic potential, nor their 
political influence, but for their temporal appearance: part-time, seasonal, daily labour and 
temporary. Beyond the stated interpretation of the text, this data stands for itself. From recognising 
this temporal facet I can also engage differently with other aspects of the text. For example, when 
Sassen tells of the “pressure to reduce labour costs” I can read this as a need for business 
operators to get more time, and more flexible time for the same money. Appreciated temporally, 
aspects of this text are freshly rendered with a utility applicable to my own concerns, and derived 
from Sassen’s own examples, and therefore based on the same data, a focus on the temporality 
inherent in these apparently spatial patterns in the global city reveals that time, too, serves as a 
powerful lens through which to consider the relationship between the world economy and the life of 
cities. This is not to say that my original reading of the text was wrong, nor that this one is better. 
Nor is it to say that Sassen was in fact telling a temporal story all along. The point here is that 
different readings have within them a different productive capacity. Part of space’s dominance is 
the spatial imagination with which we read, revealing that readers too hold clues as to a stated 
(non)presence of time within this text. Such considerations remind and reinforce that any meaning 
of a text is is connected not only to its writer, but also its reader. But more importantly, it is in 
recognising this we can begin to appreciate that part of the problem isn’t just the absence of 
temporal accounts of the city; it is also the absence of the city reader’s temporal imagination. 
Reading, therefore, is an active sphere of activity in which the scope of the debate is narrowed 
powerfully in the reader’s mind.
[OCTOBER 2012]
It was  not an understanding of the content of the canon that was fleshed out in my reading 
of Sassen, but rather, an understanding of how the canon functions  in relation to its reader. 
Expectations, imagination and judgement; each of these were crucial. I expected certain 
things to appear and read the text with such an imagination, making judgments  based on 
that framing. But realising the extent to which my readings were a product of other 
readings, this  time I again recognised the role of the canon in all of this. It had an 
enormous hold over what got read; what order they got read in. It directed me towards 
certain texts, sections, even sentences. And even beyond its structural direction, I 
recognised the role the canon played in getting me to read right. I noticed points, for 
example, where I censored my readings, in favour of what I felt to be more or less 
appropriate interpretations. And with increased reading, increased time with the canon, the 
greater ability it had to fix each of these things  for me. Indeed, even my very search for the 
absence of time within these texts spoke not of an actual absence, but rather, its absence 
within the canon. And subsequently, that is how I read these texts; believing time to be 
absent, and without a temporal imagination as a result. And crucially, what I recognised in 
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this  was  that the imagination with which I read texts, the imagination that might expand 
beyond what was deemed possible, was not entirely my imagination at all, but once again 
(co)constructed between myself  and the canon. 
REPORTING THE CANON
As I’ve reported the canon to date I’ve been careful not to overwork my writing. This is partly to 
keep my ‘working’, so to speak, visible on the page. But primarily it’s in order to ensure that the 
potential lines of analysis remain open as long as possible. As I’ve captured my data, I’ve allowed 
myself to write quickly, more rhizomatically, and without many of the conventions which merit 
the polished academic text. And as I read through my notes of the canon, to check only for basic 
clarity, I’ve lost confidence in some of the thoughts, while some have joined with others to advocate 
more strongly for a particular interpretation. In addition, there are those which stand to contradict, 
even argue against earlier considerations. You [my supervisors] will see that there are fragments of 
my data scattered throughout. Orphan lines. Font, colour and justification changes. In many ways 
the ‘activity’ that is visible on these pages is akin to the experience of doing the research. There 
was a lot of energy inside that process too – a lot of thoughts that were jumping around. As my 
aim in this research has not been to ‘interpret’ the texts but rather to analyse them in such a way 
that my own assumptions and those of the text are allowed to surface, I’ve opted to retain all 
aspects of the analysis as they’ve emerged. But currently standing at over 55,000 words, when it 
comes to drafting this work into my findings I’ll need to find as way to manage the tough decisions 
over how and where to edit it.
[JULY 2012]
Where to cut, how to edit, what to lose? 
There’s still quite a bit of cutting to do with this  section but I just can’t find the 
right places. I’m tempted to lose some of the stuff around Castells  and Susser, 
given that Susser’s  text isn’t in the corpus. But then it speaks  so powerfully about 
how the canon functions... I’m struggling.
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 2 SEPTEMBER 2011]
As anticipated, I’ve spent the time available this month re-reading and attempting to re-craft my 
analyses thus far. The chapter(s) remain lengthy, somewhere around 40,000 words. Editing has 
proven to be an uneasy task. So many decisions. I’ve tried to keep track of my thinking by working 
with tracked changes, but that’s just created an even bigger mess. My commentaries of my 
commentaries of  the texts are now joined with a commentary of  reporting them!
[FEBRUARY 2013]
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Maybe I just need to use what data I’ve got, and not worry too much about 
rewriting. Just allow myself to be comfortable with what came out. Keep the 
mistakes I made. All the grammatical and spelling errors  that occurred along the 
way. Oh dear, I don’t even want to think about what that would look like, let 
alone read like. I still want this  to be readable. I want the narratives  [of my 
stories] to flow. But then is  that really the reason that I’m so uncomfortable with 
the idea of  submitting my thesis as a jumble of  mess and mistakes?
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 9 DECEMBER 2012]
How to order, how to introduce, what context to give?
I am unsure as  to which of these spheres  to discuss  first when ordering the 
findings  chapter(s) – the texts  of the canon, the look of the canon, or the 
processes underpinning the canon.
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 15 APRIL 2012]
With regard to the texts of the canon, I am wondering whether to present these in order of 
publication, or order them as I’ve conducted the analysis. Currently they are in the order of 
analysis. Ordering them autobiographically like this seems more apt, given that neither readers nor 
authors come to texts in the order of their publication. As such, what would I be demonstrating by 
presenting them in this way? All that comes to my mind is a linear temporality; a narrative that is 
neither mine nor the texts, but a construct of rationalised time. On the contrary, presenting them in 
the order of  my coming to them tells a story which does indeed find truth in my experience.
[JUNE 2012]
How much contextual information do I provide as I introduce each author? 
Specifically, do I present their official biography or focus  more on how it is  that I 
came across their work? Similarly, do I bring the statistical information which 
suggests  their dominance into these sections? Or maybe such discussions  would 
be better held in the methodology chapter(s)... Maybe I should merge all three 
of  these things. I just don’t know where to put all this – where does it all go?
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 10 JUNE 2012]
For so long my writing of the canon has been contained with each author. It has reached the point, 
however, where I’m realising that these authors don’t stand alone, nor does my analysis of them. 
In fact, the perhaps the most important thing I’ve came across is the extent to which the canon is 
(co)produced. So, from this month I’ve been writing my findings more as themes around how the 
canon functions in that way, rather than about the individual texts. And in many ways that deals 
with my questions about how to order the authors – I don’t. They’ll appear as and when the data 
reveals their sections as apposite.
[SEPTEMBER 2012]
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How to present, how to signpost, what commentary to provide?
I think part of the problem I’ve been having is  that describing this  work as 
findings seems  so positive, so definite – like one day I just arrived at an answer. 
And I haven’t. But I do have something to say of my encounters  with the canon. 
This is, after all, what I’ve been working towards. But where it comes  in this 
thesis, what it’s called, how it’s written – I’m just not sure of  that at all.
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 23 SEPTEMBER 2013]
For the past while I’ve been working with two themes: contents and function, but this bundling of 
analyses doesn’t seem very rhizomatic. It’s far too neat and I wonder if I need to reconsider the use 
of text boxes, columns, more diagrams, or something else to make the page less simplistic? I just 
feel that I’m not yet capturing this in a way that is as rhizomatic as I’m arguing. I need to better 
capture the function of the canon rhizomatically in the text itself, or to find a way to defend why 
my write-up of the rhizoanalysis is itself not very rhizomatic. One way or another this must be a 
conscious decision on my part. It’s far too important to leave to chance.
[OCTOBER 2012]
Given my growing feeling of the extent to which the canon is  produced not just 
by the texts  of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells  and Sassen, but by the framing of the 
debate, by the agendas of urban studies, and so on, I need to find a way to make 
the (co)production of the canon visible. Maybe I should be writing some of the 
material literally alongside other segments, making sure that it’s  not just 
straightforwardly down the page. Would that better reveal the non linearity of the 
connections I’ve been making? Or maybe that would just be irritating!
[REPORTING THE CANON; NOTEBOOK; 4 MARCH 2013]
Each of these questions finds resolution within this text. But as  I’ve (re)produced my version 
of the canon within these pages, that resolve has  been met through acts  of erasure 
fashioned with the canon in view. As  I found, read and wrote of Harvey, Jacobs, Castells 
and Sassen, I wrote with Harvey, Jacobs, Castells  and Sassen; all that they contained; and all 
that contained them. And as  I report upon those encounters – abridging the work of 
Others, abridging myself from myself – the canon has  been freshly fixed within my mind, 
within this thesis, and placed within the mind of  anyone who may glance upon it... 
...along with the impossible denial of  all else that it might have been.
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Chapter Nine
ONE FINAL STORY
The Scope of the Debate
The stories told in Chapters Seven and Eight report upon the process  and productions of 
this  research as  I have explored the ways  in which the urban studies canon connects  to a 
naturalisation of time within the academy, and more generally within everyday life. Viewed 
individually, each story reports on how the canon works to expand, maintain and limit the 
possibilities of knowledge, research and action. Viewed together, they gravitate toward a 
common theme: the scope of the debate. And viewed in combination, cumulatively, exponentially, 
the powerful function of the canon to limit that debate can be glimpsed in the connections 
these stories make with one another. As I reach the end of reporting the canon, my urge is 
to comment on such connections; to tie up some of the ends  that have unraveled as  I’ve 
moved beyond the fixity of the reports I’ve offered and provide some answers. Yet 
simultaneously I recognise that I too exist within those connections; I too am caught up in 
the making of that scope and that debate. And I acknowledge that if there is  any thought I 
truly wish to make present here it is  that the scope of the debate is  not broadened through the 
offer of alternative answers alone, diverse though they may be, but by making visible the 
conditions and questions which gave rise to them. 
As such this  One Final Story unfolds  differently to those already told in a couple of distinct 
ways. First, it is written not as  a narrative, but much like the collage of time in Chapter 
Two it offers itself as fragments  drawn from Chapters  Seven and Eight. These are provided 
separate from one another, in the envelope overleaf, the intention being that they may be 
freely juxtaposed and repositioned as connections  are seen, and new ones  emerge. Second, 
the questions which have in part prompted the answers I find myself urged to tell are also 
contained within the envelope. Where these are made visible there is potential for different 
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answers  to those questions to come forth or for the questions themselves  to be challenged 
and/or replaced by others  more pressing. Therefore, before moving toward the final 
discussions of this work in Chapters Ten and Eleven, I conclude my stories of the canon in 
such a way that they may be made anew. 
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IV
RHIZODISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION TO THE WORK
Chapter Ten
THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE/
THE POLITICS OF TIME 
Introduction
As I now approach the final pages of this thesis the point has  arrived at which to reflect and 
remark upon the ways in which this work has met its  foci. My stated motivation throughout 
this  work has been a desire to expose the socially constructed nature of time in 
order to recast time and temporality as critical factors in the formation of 
urban culture and the organisation of urban society, which warrant detailed 
future study. Significant to this has been this work’s more specific aims to: 
‣ bring to life time’s  social construction, and with it, highlight sites  of its  normative 
function in the contemporary city; 
‣ open up dialogue on the meaning of  time and temporality in the city; 
‣ consider the academic, social, cultural and political conditions  which have 
contributed to time’s naturalisation;
‣ help imagine the necessary conditions for temporal research; and
‣ stress  the need to consider contemporary urban problems  from a temporal 
perspective.
The course of this  project has been realised, however, not in strict relation to stated 
objectives  but rhizomatically, across processes  and productions that were intended and 
aimed for, and experiences that have developed quite serendipitously nearby the 
undertaking of this  PhD. Indeed, long before my interests in the difference, the city and 
time were stabilised in the aims above, my inquires  began with a simple question: what about 
time? As  I posed that question towards everyday life, the literature of urban studies, and the 
workings  of the contemporary academy, many more questions surged forth. They took me 
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from considering the social construction of time and time’s  construction of the social; to 
thinking through the possible ways in which to craft this thesis  through method; to seeking 
the sites and mechanisms  by which time was  naturalised within urban studies. In each 
encounter I witnessed limits placed upon time, knowledge and the city. Limits not only in 
terms of what was  possible, but what was imaginable. And it was  as I sought to examine 
the forms, functions  and impacts of such limits that I recognised the importance of chasing 
the lines that thought followed and felt the need to re-imagine the impossible as  I went. 
Indeed, it was in these things that I was pulled into this project and this work was made. 
Far beyond the fixed points of interest that are implied by the aims  on page 218, then, this 
work’s focus has been to privilege a freedom of thought. In recognition of this considerably 
expanded remit these next two chapters  take their cue from an earlier and much broader 
frame: the problem realities  this work was founded within. Until this point these problems 
have been more readily articulated as follows:
1. While time and temporality appear natural in the contemporary city,
a. time is socially constructed, and
b. dominant modes of  temporality have a normative function.
2. The presence of time and temporality as  categories  for analysis  seem to have fallen 
off  the agenda in urban studies.
3. Knowledge of the urban is  constructed in such a way that it encourages the 
naturalisation of  time and the marginalisation of  temporal accounts.
In these points  the cracks from which they emerged can once again be seen. But before they 
were cracks, long before they were problems, they were simply facets  of the realities that 
impressed themselves upon me; verities  which demanded the right of recognition. It was an 
underlying sense that time was  natural and hence removed from the social and cultural 
construction of urban life and urban ills, that was to eventually crack and emerge as strand 
one. For strand two, it was my unquestioned assumption that the productions  of urban 
studies were objective, complete and determinable. And in many ways the third strand was 
preceded by the seemingly simple fact that the production of academic knowledge was 
about the discovery of  truth.
Taking such things  into account this  rhizodiscussion does not speak directly to the aims of 
this  work22, but rather, its effort is to follow just some of the lines  that my thoughts  have 
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followed as I re-confront those verities  that all too recently sat comfortably within my 
perception. It is not written as the final say on these points  of interest, nor on this  work. It 
is  simply a space in which I make visible a temporary gathering of connections and 
passages of thought that occur as  I reflect, first, on how the performances and productions 
of this work has served to unsettle the ideas that time is natural, urban studies  is objective, 
and knowledge is  truth. And second, as I imagine what is produced when we dare to choose 
to make such realities anew. That is, when those verities are challenged, what becomes 
possible on the back of that. In an attempt to capture the rhizomatic character of that 
process  my writing is  faster, more fluid, and more questioning than previous passages  in this 
document. The text is  more scattered on the page as  I attempt to convey the movement of 
these thoughts. Despite these efforts, however, the limitations of this document form are 
not fully escapable, and I am all too aware that only finite points  of connection are possible 
as  I pass between each, refer back to some, all the while keeping the clarity of the 
discussion in my sights. Certainly, the quilt that accompanies  this text is far more rhizomatic 
in this regard and it offers a means  to tell those connections  which go unrecorded and 
unimagined. Nonetheless, the connections  that are made in this  chapter have the means to 
make visible some of the ways in which this  work has  (re)imagined the (im)possible limits  of 
time, knowledge and the city. And the performance of that begins now, where in starting 
with the last of the verities  in order to arrive back at the first I argue for a close and 
important connection between the ideas that time is natural, and knowledge is truth.
From Verities which Present...
KNOWLEDGE IS TRUTH
I began this  thesis by telling stories and so it has continued. Stories  of my own and my 
stories of Others’ stories. The stories have been told from a common location: the 
comfortable armchair of the academy. A place where the production of knowledge is 
conceived by some as the quest for a truth that is  transcendent, singular and universal. 
Where it is conceived by many as a truth that is unearthed by the studious application of an 
appropriate research method; a truth that has the right to make the world a better place 
through its truthfullness; a truth that reasonable people will agree upon.
Or so the story goes. 
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For this has not been the case in this work. Far from neutral, knowledge, in this  thesis, has 
been revealed as  political and personal in every process and in every production. In stories 
told of policy making in Chapter One, philosophising about time in Chapter Two; and 
cracks in Chapter Four, disincentive, intuition and motivation have been positioned as 
potent in the knowledge-making activities  of the academy. When Jacobs’ grounded her 
urban knowledge in her life-world; when Castells’ turned against his experiences of class to 
write the city; and when Burniers’ autoethnographies proudly carried their feminine traits, 
experience, culture and gender were brought to the fore. Far from neutral, the production 
of knowledge has  been rendered a far more complex mingling than the simple quest for 
truth might suggest. 
But these stories only tell of  the political and personal in the production of  knowledge. The 
showing of  that comes elsewhere: in the practice of  telling stories. 
In the stories  that I’ve told of my practice, the political and the personal have been made 
visible. Embedded equally in moments  of comfort and difficulty, in spaces  of clarity and 
points of dissonance, my stories has  questioned my motivations, my character and my 
abilities  for seeking and claiming knowledge. They have revealed the ways  in which the 
decisions I’ve made have been bound up with one another, over time, derived from both 
my academic and non-academic lifeworlds. In looking for the means  to undertake the 
research of my thesis, my stories  reveal that far from method uncovering truth, it already 
supposes its  existence. The personal is  already entangled in those processes that lay claim to 
truth’s discovery. In telling my stories  multiple motivations for telling, speaking and writing 
knowledge have been written into this work; multiple motivations for looking and looking 
in the ways  that we do. In each of these things  there is much at play, and much that is 
implicated. And again, the production of knowledge finds itself caught up in far more 
processes of  fabrication than the simple quest for truth implies.
But again, this story only tells of  the political and personal in the production of  knowledge. 
I repeat, the showing of  that comes elsewhere: in the practice of  telling stories.
It is  the way in which the production of knowledge has been performed in this  thesis that 
uncouples knowledge from truth. The practice of telling stories  doesn’t just provide content 
for a thesis, but is the process  by which a thesis  is made. And making this visible is a way of 
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making knowledge. Choosing to characterise the activities  of this  work as telling stories is a 
choice not to search for truth but to reveal the personal and the political, so that they are 
present on the page. A choice not to search for the truth but to bring the immanent, multiple 
and contingent into focus. A choice to argue that method, and our choice of it, are 
productive of the apparent truths that we seek. A choice to question the very notion of truth, 
rights, and better worlds that legitimate the production of academic knowledge. A choice 
not to contribute to the stability of reasonableness, but to question the nature of that 
reason. In such choices, in such practices, the quest for knowledge isn’t the quest for the 
academy’s truth but a quest for something entirely different. Social justice, ethics, making 
better relations? Perhaps. But regardless, in performing a practice of knowledge production 
that is  unlike that which might be expected, the easy equivalence between knowledge and 
truth is throughly unsettled.
Or so the story goes.
Because it cannot be denied that truth still circulates beside knowledge in the academy. It 
cannot be denied that telling stories is better recognised as the crafting of fiction – a 
worthwhile pursuit but not the purview of the academic. So what is it that maintains the 
pursuit of truth as legitimate and casts other forms of knowledge production aside? What 
are the means by which some stories lose their status as fiction and are elevated to the level 
of truth? What mechanisms hide the story telling nature of knowledge making? What 
configures some methods, motivations and interests appropriate to the quest for truth but 
not others?...
...To what extent is it significant that the academy acts to legitimate its own brand of  truth? 
My engagement with the ethics  committee. It revealed the academy’s ability not only to 
facilitate the pursuit of truth within its pre-designated categories, but in deciding which acts 
of knowledge production could and could not advance, the ethical arm of the academy also 
decided which stories  might be rendered truth, and which stories were to remain as  fictions. 
And then there is  the viva voce and publication by peer-review, what statuses might these 
staples  of entering and continuing in academic life confer on thought? How does the 
political and personal circulate in these processes? How will my knowledge speak to truth 
and how does that truth speak to Other knowledge? And where social realities are formed 
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within the academy, whilst the academy itself acts  to make its own brand of truth legitimate, 
dare I even wonder whether all along the more pressing question has been not about the 
equivalence of  knowledge to truth, but of  truth to truth?...
...another story, for another day.
URBAN STUDIES IS OBJECTIVE
Urban studies. A discipline that seeks to understand the urban. A discipline whose 
knowledge is  applied by urban practitioners to undo the ills of urban life. The discipline in 
which this work was  conceived. But that at the end of this  work urban studies should have 
less meaning as the container of this  thesis, than as  a case-study which attests to thoughts 
just shared on knowledge and truth, is telling. Much that was  written in that section holds 
here also. As  I entered, read, captured and reported the urban studies  canon, I saw 
methods selected, stories told, knowledge made and realities silenced. I saw that urban 
studies participates not in objectively recording the truth of the city, but recording a 
knowledge of  the city that is necessarily partial. 
All too easy I recognise a parallel between Said’s analysis  of the Orient, discussed in Chapter 
Four, and my understanding of the urban. And all too easy I find myself replacing Said’s  -ism 
of  interest with that of  an urban bent, and with characters from my encounters...
...What Harvey, Castells  and Sassen did was to place urbanism on a 
scientific and rational basis. This entailed not only their own exemplary 
work but also the creation of a vocabulary and ideas  that could be used 
impersonally by anyone who wished to become an urbanist. Their 
inauguration of urbansism was a considerable feat. It made possible a 
scientific terminology; it  banished obscurity and instated a special form of 
the urbanist as a central authority for the urban; it legitimized a special 
kind of specifically coherent urbanist work; it put into circulation a form 
of discursive currency by whose presence the urban would henceforth be 
spoken for; above all, the work of the inaugurators carved out a field of 
study and a family of ideas which in turn could form a community of 
scholars whose lineage, traditions, and ambitions  were at once internal to 
the field and external enough for general prestige.
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It is uncomfortable to read this back. This hybrid account feels wrong to produce. Where I 
recognise the characters from my encounter within Said’s analysis, it reads not as a story, 
not even as fiction, but a lie. 
But simultaneously, I cannot deny that the urban is  not the city; it’s not even the urban. It is 
an apparatus  crafted from vocabularies, ideas, terminologies, clarities, authorities, 
coherences, currencies, lineages, traditions and ambitions. Something which functions 
powerfully to produce the methods, activities and limits of urban studies. And far from 
objective, this apparatus is the product of micro-decisions, reasoned from the subjective 
faculties  of its scholars, imbued with their preferences, motivations  and politics. And I 
cannot deny that Harvey, Castells, Sassen and Jacobs, whether they are cast as the 
inaugurators or not, remain a part of  that.
Indeed, Said’s analysis also speaks of the eventual evolution and hold of these intellectual 
apparatuses  once established, where the activity of making knowledge becomes  performed 
not just by the “inaugurators” but “future generations  of scholars”. This too was  visible in 
my reporting of the canon. The language of urban studies was revealed a conduit through 
which authors, future authors, and so on, found the means to speak meaningfully with one 
another. Everyone entered the field in the shadow of this  language. But it was those who 
performed it best that were deemed sensible enough to speak for the field. The same was 
true of method. Scholars  reproduced their knowledge of the city through method in such 
ways that it would resonate as meaningful to the field. In language and in method, urban 
studies defined its trajectory of knowledge not through the objectivity of its  content but 
through the establishment of a coded framework that allowed qualified individuals  to speak 
meaningfully of  the city as the urban. 
And indeed, it did so in such a way that it staked claim to all that the city was, all that it 
could be, banishing anything that could not be held in its conceptual faculties. Ultimately, I 
see that the urban exists not as the city, but as a concept of  it. 
And so perhaps the search for time within the urban is no longer a mystery...
a story rushes forth
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...Spatial accounts  of the city breed other spatial accounts of it, not only through the 
development of a language in which to speak of it, but a methodological tradition which 
makes certain discourses impossible.  
In turn, this wider discursive field helps to reify such spatial accounts  through the 
continual development of its  lexis  and descriptive preferences, and the adoption of an 
associated methodological paradigm that helps it see its subject. 
Add to this  the self-censorship of authors in their anticipation of their audience, and 
as they work to produce value. 
Add to this that inquiries  of the urban take place in officially sanctioned 
environments.
And here, we see not the city, but a powerful construction of the city – a 
powerful means to construct the city, by a discipline that is not objective, but 
cultural, political, personal, and ideological in every which way.
Here we see that not all facets of  the city can be spoken about in the urban.
And even if time has always been there in city, its silence is  all too easily 
performed where the city shrinks and the urban grows.
TIME IS NATURAL
Parallels  between urban studies and the production of knowledge now draw to another, this 
time between the academy and between everyday life. It is at the intersection of these sites 
that any notion of  time as natural is thoroughly unsettled.
But first, back in time, there are many other points where that idea was challenged. 
Everyday life. Placing our time within the Other and using the Other to illuminate our 
time. Revealed the ways in which time was  made through time, via history and 
tradition; the ways in which language made certain times more possible than others; 
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the ways that technology upheld, strengthened and extended existing dimensions of 
time into new arenas. 
A similar case was  found in politics. Not only did it legislate for time but did so 
to actively maintain the dominance of temporal modes that were beneficial to 
those who had the power to act. Its  very practice, like the academy, and like 
urban studies before it, was imbued with a distinct temporality – one that relied 
on the linearity, rationality, objectivity, spatialisation, uni-directional causality, 
and so on, of  clock time
The institutions  of the family and of education. The self-same ideals  of 
clock time were taken on board at a personal level: learned as a way of 
being in time that was  passed on through generations  and worked to 
uphold the temporality suited to the preservation of  the nation state. 
Can’t forget philosophy. Here was revealed the capacity it had for 
bestowing its  ontology of time, its  ontologies, upon everyday life 
practices. 
And finally in method, where I recognised its  role in enacting 
reality, and saw this not as problem but potential. 
Autoethnographic rhizoanalysis presupposed that time was 
not natural, but that it was  multiple. It set out to capture this 
time, and time’s  multiplicity was  subsequently brought to the 
fore through the practice of that method and through the 
presentation of it in stories. In both performances a very 
different knowledge of  time was produced.
And so we arrive at the last verity: knowledge is  truth. And so we see the role of it in making 
time. The ability of philosophical accounts  to construct time at an ontological level; the 
relationship between social science, and science and metaphysics. The ability of the 
academy to stabilise its time through it activities of knowledge production, and to do so in a 
way that secures  it as truth. It performs and produces its  temporality as  it makes  knowledge; 
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and the easy equivalence between knowledge and truth extends back to pull in the 
conditions of  its production. The academy’s time is truth.
But perhaps it is through the academy’s ability to order difference that time’s reification is 
all the more secured, for it is  here, where time’s heterogeneity is hidden, that surely its 
homogeneity is secured? So many points at which this might occur, too many to mention, 
but I can at least look back within this  chapter and see single truths in place of multiple 
stories. The translation of the city to the urban; the translation of time to clock time. In each of 
these the multiple is configured as  singular, and made singular in the process. The city as the 
urban is  the city. Time as  clock time is time. And in many ways, isn’t this the traditional way of 
making knowledge in the academy where notions of  validity and truth hold court?
Validity is the determination of  whether the Other has been 
acceptably converted into the Same, according to a particular 
epistemology. The world is the raw, untamed Other, as in raw data 
and as in rejected, invalid research. It must be cooked into a valid 
research-based theory so as to be visible and knowable; the coarse, 
untheorized, polyvocal Other is considered to be insufficient unto 
itself. It must be given meaning and appropriate form
Scheurich, 1997: 85
The academy’s  ability to order difference, however, is  perhaps most visible where there is 
an active attempt to produce it within its  walls. We can see its  reach in the rationalisations 
we make; the things we tell ourselves  to keep us  ticking along. We can see its reach in the 
struggles  we have as we fall in line with the traditional ways of doing academic work, 
submitting to the truth of the academy. Indeed, within the visceral, within the self, within 
the personal, these are the locations whereby difference is dealt with and ordered. 
...to Imagining the Impossible
WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS NOT TRUTH 
When knowledge is  not truth the potential in not knowing might more fully be recognised. 
Crises of aporia; hiatuses  of intellectual confidence. Such experiences have been difficult in 
this  work. They have been uncomfortable. But when viewed not as failure, inadequacy, or 
inability to get to the truth, the (non)knowledge in such moments can instead be chased. In 
autoethnography I glimpsed just some of  the generative potential of  this:
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Working with the data, I was realising that I was  always  with it. It was  in my 
dreams; with me when I awoke again. It was there, proliferating. Making 
connections  that I cannot follow. And it’s  moving, from being data in the 
empirical sense, to something a lot more abstract. I have no hope of  keeping up. 
11 JANUARY, 2012
Aporia. Not knowing. Making my not-knowing public. I’ve been experiencing it 
for sometime. What is  this feeling? What can I do with this? Does  it tell me that 
I’m doing something right? Where does it lead to? 
24 SEPTEMBER, 2011
Not knowing led to a space in which I could actualise another reality. It led me to 
experience contingency in the face of the absolute. And in realising this, not only did I 
witness it unfolding beside my research practice, I began to seek it out. I’d ask myself, am I 
comfortable? Then challenge that comfort. For it became all too obvious  what happened when 
not knowing was dismissed as  ignorance – the questions asked and answered (and those that 
sat silently beside). Such is the substance that works  to maintain the silence of the silent; 
that uses absence only to enable presence. But when knowledge takes seriously (non)
knowledge it finds productive sparks that would elsewhere be hidden. It makes  a new 
knowledge unhindered by truth, and produces that difference in the process.
When knowledge is  something other than truth, it is  able to present as  multiple. Just like not 
knowing, however, making the multiple through story-telling, juxtaposing and collaging can 
feel difficult. Too many tangents; not enough focus; failure to reason contribution. It can feel 
uncomfortable. More than once I wondered: was I falling into that trap? But bringing to 
the fore heterogenous  accounts of points of interest, finding ways  to hold them together 
whilst apart, knowledge was accumulating.
So what of this difference in knowledge and different ways  of making it? What about 
chasing the uncomfortable? For so much of this work, so much of my defence of my 
approach, has been was  written in response to the traditions  of social science; in response 
to the comfortable armchair of the academy. And might it have simply been enough to 
state this work was different and then for it to be different? Perhaps.
But so much of this work’s evolution occurred within a context which though malleable, 
was  nonetheless telling me how I ought to work. So many of its cracks emerged in direct 
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relation to verities I perceived within that context. And in this  there is another point. 
Having written so much of this  thesis in response to social science, as  a defence of what it 
does  and why it does it, not only does it perform another way of producing knowledge, but 
in doing so, it calls into question those traditional practices. What becomes  possible when 
knowledge is  not truth? It becomes  possible to question the means and rationales by which 
knowledge is  made as  truth. Where traditional ideas have not space for aporia, or not 
knowing, or story telling, we can move beyond it, and in doing so actively challenge those 
taken for granted assumptions of  knowledge.
Still, what is  to occur where this  transpires amidst the expectation for knowledge in the 
form that it is  known? If research reporting is about sharing what has been learned, if the 
defining feature of a doctoral dissertation is that it makes an original contribution to 
knowledge, what does  it mean if that knowledge speaks more to thought? Because this 
thesis has not simply been about expanding the existing network. It has not aimed to add 
another node that will join existing readings of the urban and construct a more complete 
urban environment on the basis  of a more complete understanding of it. Rather, it is about 
ensuring that I recognised the network and its functions; that I was not content with 
interpreting the city as the urban. 
How might this be assessed?
the truth effects of  telling stories, the empathy they generate, the 
exchange of  experience they enable, and the social bonds they 
mediate.
Jackson, 1998: 180
I seek an existential, interpretive social science that offers a 
blueprint for cultural criticism. This criticism is grounded in the 
specific worlds made visible in the writing process. [...] The work 
should articulate a politics of  hope. It should criticize how things 
are and imagine how they could be different.
Denzin, 2003: 261–262
If  truth by itself  is not a gold standard, then perhaps there may be 
additional political reasons for preferring and enacting one kind of  
reality rather than another. Such, at any rate, is a possibility.
Law, 2004: 13
Options, at least.
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WHEN TIME IS NOT NATURAL
Where knowledge is  not truth, the way is  cleared not only for it to become multiple, but for 
time to become multiple too. And where time is  multiple, where it is  no longer natural, the 
politics of  time are made visible... 
...and things that were previously impossible become possible, including the 
potential to see and pose questions of  the difference, the city and time. 
Indeed, in the methods  I’ve employed – in the politics  of knowledge I’ve enacted through 
them – time has been multiple within. And so where time is no longer natural, not only 
might we begin to imagine the methods  by which we might see another time but we might 
begin to make another time through our methods. 
A way of  making time through knowledge... 
...a new way of  making knowledge in time? 
I come back to this excerpt from the collage of  time:
When the stop arrests the intellectualising tendencies of  the mind, 
the concept of  time is also affected. Time is ordinarily understood 
through succession (one event follows another), direction 
(movement from past to future), insufficiency (never enough time), 
and extraneousness (Being outside of  and containing events.) When 
time comes to a stop, one experiences not timelessness, but time 
unqualified by intellect. [...] A reversal of  ordinary assumptions 
takes place. Events are linked by nonlinear relations rather than by 
succession. Time ceases to be past, present and future, and instead 
either moves or is frozen. Time becomes ample enough to allow an 
event to occur without crimping it. Time ceases to exist apart from 
what takes place; instead it becomes a quality specific to the event.
Appelbaum, 1995: 85
For it is within this  that we see the politics  of time connect to the politics of knowledge 
production, and the politics of knowledge production connect back to the politics  of time. 
That it becomes recognisable: should we experience time differently, we might make 
different knowledge; and if  we make different knowledge, we might make a different time. 
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Where time was natural, existing methods were not able to see time as  multiple, nor could 
they avoid upholding time as  natural through the performance of their practice. In this  it 
was seen that:
Complexity could not be held within classic dualisms.
How time was conceptualised made a difference, it had implication for 
what could and could not be seen.
Clock time was unsuitable for the multiple times of its  subject 
matter. It had no hope of reaching, capturing the time of 
Others, let alone invisible pasts, future extensions, and aspects 
of  everyday lives lived at odds with its logic.
And so methods, they need to:
Draw on multiplicity in order to see it, and ensure that our time is placed within it.
Find ways to capture hard to grasp times – of the body, of the mind, of 
moments of the past emerging in the present, of hope and fear 
configuring the potential of the day. These cannot be excluded from 
social science.
Be wary of a research understanding that enforces  a 
separation of past, present and future; relies on a linear 
causality; stems  from a positivistic methodology; and seeks to 
make generalisations across time.
What might this look like in urban studies? There is  much of that which may not sit easy in 
the canon. And much, that in its  entry to the canon, might be altered. But as it  is practiced 
in person, perhaps there is some scope. Talking about time in urban studies, with 
colleagues, with peers, has made time matter. Do the necessary conditions for temporal 
research begin by simply talking about time again; by bringing to the fore temporal 
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connections that are already known and making connections that emerge for the first time 
in conversational exchange?
And in reading too, is this another way?
Time was  already present in the texts. When I read and 
looked for it, it was  there. When I read with a temporal 
imagination, I found time. Time never left the texts, but 
rather, it left the agenda. And in this  sense, can reading be 
reclaimed as an strategic and critical activity in and of  itself ?
28 NOVEMBER 2012
It cannot just be about injecting time and temporal concerns back into the canon, because 
depending on how we look, both are already there. Moreover, viewing the canon only as  a 
material entity, formed from the texts which fill it, grossly undermines and underestimates 
the nature of the efforts necessary to maintain it. It cannot be just about placing within it 
new texts – affirmative action from those with the power to act. 
But it can be about encouraging a temporal imagination to gestate. 
Developing a methodological suite with the ability to capture time and a language 
nuanced enough to speak meaningfully of  the findings. 
Increasing instances of  temporal research...
...and that marks only the beginning. For the academy is itself embroiled 
in this politics  of time, and if efforts are to be truly successful they must 
reach beyond their category to touch those devices which serve to limit 
the horizons for thought and knowledge. 
And so, might we practice a different production of knowledge, in a different time, and ask 
after the time that would be required to make life differently? Can we consider what scope 
there is for the possibility of Other times? Will we attempt to reach out and feel for those 
times that are irrational, non-dominant – that are not clock time? Do we dare to think about 
how time could help us transform? 
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Perhaps the urban cannot hold such multiplicity within its framework. 
Yet. 
But at least now there should be no doubt that the city can and does; and it is  from here, 
and from now, that we must take our cue as  we work to imagine the possibilities of time, 
knowledge, and the city itself.
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22 Though they are not addressed directly, each of  these aims are nonetheless attended to within the content 
of  these chapters.
Chapter Eleven
(IN)CONCLUSION
The aims of this  thesis  have not been to answer a set of questions. Rather, in response to 
those verities I’ve identified as problematic, in response to those realities in which they sit, I 
have worked to produce the possibility of the alternative. This work originated from cracks 
within my own imagination and practice, ending up as  research problems which have 
guided this work. As  I now reach the physical end of the thesis, and hence that part of my 
journey with them, there are no threads  to tie together. Rather, what I hope I’ve achieved is 
a diversification, an expansion, dare I say a tangled mess  that prompts further questions of 
those problematic realities, and also the ones I’ve (re)crafted in their wake. Therefore this 
conclusion isn’t actually about concluding anything at all. It closes simply, remarking upon 
a potential for openings that this work has made.
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Postscript
A PREGNANT PAUSE
“Look at it well. You will never see it again”, says the book-seller to Jean Louis Borges’ self-
styled narrator in the Book of Sand, “neither sand nor this book has a beginning or an end 
[...] No page is  the first page; no page is the last”. Feeling “threat in the [seller’s] words”, as 
Borge’s narrator grasps  the book within his hands, at the point where he might say 
something of one page and turn to another, it is gone: the Book of Sand has  changed. Time, 
in this  thesis, throughout this  PhD journey, has borne the selfsame quality. Personally, 
institutionally and within this work, the only thing that has remained constant is that it has 
never been the same. On a personal level, time, my time, has not been static, simple nor 
solely of the clock, but fluid, multiple, of myself and of Others. From the first to the last of 
this  work, my days, their routines, have been punctuated by deadlines, pauses, progressions, 
aporias  and back-steps – each bringing their unique and multiple temporalities  along with. 
I could write here of so many encounters which attest to this, but perhaps none have been 
more arresting than my journey into motherhood. In pregnancy, I did not locate and judge 
myself in time solely with reference to my PhD schedule, but in counting down, with 
dutiful attention paid, a finite, scientifically rationalised measure of 40 weeks. I did not feel 
time’s continual march only in the passage of night into day but in the tightening of my 
clothes, the stretching of my skin, the increased movement I felt within, and the growing 
attentions I garnered from strangers. As  I approached 36 weeks one such stranger shouted 
to me from across the supermarket aisle, “either that’s  twins in there or you’re about to 
pop”. As I moved past 41 weeks I was preparing myself for the ensuing fight not to have 
my labour medically induced. When labour eventually arrived at 42 weeks, time emptied. 
Numbers were stripped away all together. There were no cycles, no passages, no counting, 
only a constant rhythm oscillating between surges  and not surges  – always present, never 
past and never future. Yet all the while a clock time remained prominent for nearby others: 
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heart-rates  were measured, hours were counted between stages, all culminating in the 
announcement of a baby girl born at 12 noon before I’d even glanced upon her face. And in 
motherhood my time(s) has been cut through with that of a smaller being’s. On-demand 
feeding, changing, playing and sleeping mark out the quality of days; the perceptible 
changes of cheeks  getting fuller, a body getting longer, a mind becoming more aware are 
the furnishings for the weeks and months. Our time(s) combined, time as multiple, together 
encountering multiple times of  progress, respectability and nature elsewhere determined.
At an institutional level too, time has also undergone something of a transformation. Whilst 
I find it difficult to judge whether time is now less  absent to academic concerns, I’ve 
certainly recognised it entering and exiting in different ways. The current promise of big 
data, for example, brings with it the potential to make time multiple. Past records and future 
projections  of the city might be pulled into the present, commenting upon the multi-
directional influences upon urban policy and planning. Space and time might be pursued 
side by side, creating powerful pictures that show competing temporalities alongside areas 
of spatial deprivation – not only spatialising time but temporalising space. Far reaching and 
long ranging political and institutional barriers to temporal social justice might now be 
studied more comprehensively, raising awareness of points at which they are most 
compounded. Possibilities, yes, but all too readily I am reminded that time and knowledge 
go hand in hand. And where academic departments up and down the country recently 
scurried and hurried towards the end of the REF 2014 cycle, where time was practiced in 
pressed, constricted and finite conditions, perhaps the trajectory of time studies through big 
data may be more readily realised in projections of the future based upon the past. That is, 
time may simply have its complexity tamed by the power of big data, and its  linearity, 
causality and measurable nature once again reinscribed through the process.
The making of time through academic research, however, is  not something that occurs 
solely at an institutional level and smaller, more personal interventions, interruptions, can and 
must be made. As  I reach the final sentences of this  thesis, for example, I am all too aware 
that time as an object of and for analysis  in this  work has of course taken on a new, 
changed, developed sensibility. All too obvious feel those absent accounts of time that 
might have appeared, in this case the work of Deleuze. My journey with time commenced 
largely ignorant to the work of Deleuze and Guattari. They came later to the party, after 
the point at which I’d explored the sociological, anthropological and philosophical 
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literatures  on time; after the point at which I felt my research problem set. Had I have 
known then what I know now, Deleuze’s work on time would have undoubtably helped 
shape the calling and method of this work. I can imagine myself getting swept away in his 
language of time. Of past-past-futures, repetition, temporal multiplicities and becomings. I 
can imagine myself crafting this work anew under his tutelage. Pursuing not only 
knowledge but time in a rhizomatic manner, from the very outset. Into such reflections  can 
certainly be read the admission of this work’s  shortcomings; of what it doesn’t do. And yet 
this  work was always of time, in time. I allowed myself no privileged or better position from 
which to write it. Look at it well. You’ll never see it again – yes, that may be. But there is no 
threat in those words as long as  the possibility to see time differently, to reimagine it anew, is 
not simply punctuated by this work, but remains facilitated by it.
A PREGNANT PAUSE
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QUESTIONS ABOUT TIME
The questions below arrived as  a result of a mapping exercise I undertook in March, 2010. 
My aim then was to try to discern those themes which were both central to my own 
concerns (which were continually evolving as I read about time) and, crucially, were 
researchable. While this  thesis in no way addresses the range of these questions, the questions 
nonetheless had a constructive effect on its  eventual direction. And in that sense I’ve 
continued to think of them as threads of this work, which though not yet fully tugged upon 
remain significant elements of  the tapestry. 
TIME IN THE CITY
• What is the reality of  time in the contemporary city?
• Are dominant modes of  temporality in the contemporary city normative or naturalised?
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF TIME AND TEMPORALITIES
• How and what does time mean in the contemporary city?
• How does the process of  temporal construction occur?
• What are it’s instruments and procedures?
• What are it’s enabling technologies?
• In what way does the construction of a particular temporality build upon, modify, expand and 
limit culturally available shapes of  time? 
• What is the relationship between intuitive understandings and ideological constructions of  time?
• What is the relationship between the perception of  time and the experience of  reality?
• To what extent does technology govern the human experience of time and construct reality in 
the contemporary city?
THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCE OF PARTICULAR TEMPORALITIES
• How do particular temporalities contribute to the formation of social, cultural and individual 
identities?
• How do particular temporalities organise behaviour?
• In what way do particular temporalities constrict or expand the field of  experience?
• What is the relationship between the process of  temporal construction and empowerment?
• Are particular temporalities involved in processes of  domination?
• Does clock time exclude those who are unwilling or unable to conform?
• Who does clock time serve?
THE FORM OF NORMATIVE AND OTHER TIME
• What is the form of  normative time in the contemporary city?
• How are dominant temporalities related to ‘whole-life’ temporalities?
• What is time for those individuals who operate outside dominant modes of  temporality?
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE RESEARCHER'S MODE OF TEMPORALITY
• What is the impact of  ‘knowing’ a particular temporality while conducting this work?
• What idealisations  and reflections  (conscious or otherwise) take place in the analysis  of 
particular temporalities?
• How does  the researcher’s  own position in time impinge on the process  of analysis  and 
description?
• To what extent is  the apparent dominance of certain temporalities  due to proximity with a 
particular group of  individuals, and the patterns they inhabit?
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Appendix Two
AUTOETHNOGRAPHY WRITE-UP
This  write-up of Experiment One: Everyday Life Without Clocks was prepared in April, 2011, as 
part of  my First Year Review.
Everyday life without clocks
My pursuits to date have served to suggest that time is socially constructed, with the 
constructs of clock-time and mechanical time pieces playing a particularly prominent role 
in organising and making sensible the experience of everyday life in a Western context. 
However, while such constructs  appear particularly manifest in the urban context, the 
extent to which an individual’s  perception of time is  governed by these externalities 
remains unclear. Also uncertain is what and how clock-time means in the contemporary city. 
In order to engage with these concerns  an experiment was  conducted which explored the 
experience of everyday life without the use of conventional methods  of time-reckoning. 
The aim was  to examine how and to what extent the subjective and intersubjective 
experience of time remains sensible without access  to clocks, and to consider what this  in 
turn reveals about the materiality of time in the contemporary city. This report presents the 
reflections and preliminary analyses which emerged as a result of  this work.
OVERVIEW OF METHODS AND DESIGN
The experiment was conducted over a period of twelve days from Saturday the 5th to 
Wednesday the 16th of February, 2011, and was split into three distinct stages. Stages  one and 
three lasted for three and seven days  respectively, during which every effort was made to 
minimise the presence of clocks and other such conventional time pieces. In between these 
stages was a two day break in which I reverted back to my usual method of time-keeping. 
While some individuals were aware of my intention to conduct the experiment, no one was 
informed of  the exact timing of  the experimental period or of  the individual stages. 
While all stages  broadly adhered to an autoethnographic approach, the precise manner in 
which this was conducted varied slightly between the three. Stage one ran from Saturday the 
5th to Monday the 7th of February, during which all clocks that I knowingly came into regular 
contact with were either hidden or covered. These included the digital displays on my 
computer, laptop, mobile phone, television and in my car, and the clocks  in my kitchen and 
by my bedside. Reflections  were documented by using the Notes application on my mobile 
phone and were officially recorded by writing entries  and posting these to an online blog. 
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For the most part these entries comprised the culmination of the day’s  thoughts, however, 
where I had access to a computer throughout the day, shorter reflections  were embedded 
directly into the blog. This electronic method had the benefit of attributing a fixed 
timestamp for each entry, potentially allowing for the future analysis of the extent to which 
my perception of  time aligned with clock-time over the course of  the experiment.
Stage two ran from Tuesday the 8th to Wednesday the 9th of February. During these two days my 
everyday life resumed with my usual methods of time-reckoning reinstated. Journal entries 
were minimal during this period as  the purpose was  not to compare an everyday life with 
clocks  to one without, but rather it was intended to stimulate reflection on how the 
experience to date could shape the form of the third and final stage of the experiment. 
Allowing for this break not only provided insight into the operational techniques which did 
and didn’t work, but it also refocused both the objectives of the experiment and my 
personal approach to it.
The third and final stage lasted a total of seven days and ran from Thursday the 10th to 
Wednesday the 16th of February. Like stage one, this  too minimised the presence of clocks 
whilst documenting the experience, however, drawing on stages one and two, changes were 
implemented to improve the manner by which this was achieved. Despite the 
precautionary efforts taken to cover and hide time pieces in stage one, as  the initial three 
days progressed I grew familiar with the location of other clocks. The main intrusion came 
from timestamps on text-messages and emails  received and accessed on my mobile phone. I 
did consider that I could refrain from retrieving these communications via my phone for 
the duration of stage three, however, acknowledging the extent to which this  activity forms 
an integral aspect of my everyday life I decided that this  would likely conflict with the 
overall aim to isolate and experience the absence of conventional methods of time-
reckoning. I therefore continued to use my mobile phone in the manner which I was 
accustomed, but randomly altered the clock-time at various  intervals throughout the day in 
order that the time displayed was both inaccurate and meaningless.
As stated previously, stages one and two recorded reflections solely on an online blog. This 
decision was the result of many hours of considering how best to keep order and 
systematise the experiment. However, during stage two I realised that the rigidity of this 
method was not only hindering the fluidity of my perception but it was  also heavily reliant 
on my memory. To address  this, stage three adopted multiple methods for documenting 
reflections, including taking photographs, making voice recordings  and writing on post-it 
notes, whilst also using the blog as and when it seemed appropriate. The variety of 
methods available to me at any given time made for more spontaneous reflections which 
were more in keeping with the nature of the experiment. While the loss  of systematic order 
nullified the prospect of analysing the timestamps for each post, given that I was mostly 
updating the blog with lengthy posts based on memory, it is  likely that the time stamps 
would have revealed very little about the immediacy of  my perception in any regard.
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The final aspect that altered during stage three was my personal approach to the 
experiment. As  indicated previously I was conscious that I had not successfully minimised 
the presence of clocks, nor had I designed the best way to document my reflections. 
Together these culminated in preoccupying thoughts of how to undertake the experiment; 
raising questions  of where I should go to best utilise my chosen methods. The break of stage 
two highlighted the extent to which these considerations were at odds with the overall aim 
of the experiment, and as such served to refocus  my approach. Adopting a more fluid 
approach to both my encounter with clocks  and the manner by which this was recorded, 
and not questioning where I should go, helped shift my focus  away from the technicalities  of 
the experiment back to reflecting on the experience of  everyday life without clocks.
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
Over the twelve day period of the experiment I experienced a variety of thoughts and 
emotions. Central to stage one, however, was an ever present anxiety stemming from my 
need to organise and control. Indeed, even prior to the start of the experiment my thoughts 
were occupied with questions  of how to do it: when should I start; how should I keep track; 
how should I deal with the plans that I’ve already made. I acknowledged this  in the first 
journal entry, writing;
I could easily get caught up in the practicalities of it all and get bogged down in 
establishing the correct way to do it.
5 FEBRUARY 2011, 10:38 AM: BLOG ENTRY
Similar anxieties  were also manifest in a dream I had that evening. Reflecting on it the 
following morning, I wrote;
I had some rather unexpected dreams last night...for the most part transient and fluid, 
but where my thoughts did coalesce there emerged an office scene which saw me 
attempting to negotiate a way to navigate without time. And it wasn’t just me, Jennifer 
Aniston and Lisa Kudrow were there too. Together  we sorted, filled, scheduled, met and 
discussed, in order to find a way to restore balance. The overriding feeling of the 
situation was akin to what I imagine the immediate aftermath of a disaster; complete 
with acknowledgment of a reduced capacity to operate and compliance with protocol 
which dictates an emergency meeting be called to take control of  the situation.
6 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:47 AM: BLOG ENTRY
My preoccupation with how to keep control of time in spite of having to abandon clocks 
continued throughout stage one of the experiment and it wasn’t until I entered stage two 
that I realised the extent to which it had been the experience of the experiment itself which 
formed the experience of  my everyday life without clocks thus far;
So my three days are up, and this morning I awoke to my alarm once more. I got up, 
had my breakfast, showered, and dressed; all the time thinking that it didn’t really feel 
any different to any other day; that I didn’t really feel any different. And then it struck 
me – today feels like a Monday. This of course could be largely due to the fact that I 
worked from home yesterday, however, when I consider why I worked from home it is 
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clear  to me that my feelings are just as linked to this experiment (just as connected to my 
perception of  time) as any others I’ve had over the last three days.
Yesterday, other  than my mid-sleep post (which I now know was around 6:00am), I 
did not reflect on my experiences; I did not update this journal. I was intending to, but 
something kept getting in my way. At the time, I put this down to a combination of 
busyness/having nothing new to say. But in retrospect, yesterday, I was just a bit flat. I 
could have got up in the morning, had my breakfast,  showered and dressed, and got on 
with the day. Instead I stayed in my pyjamas until it was dark; feeling like I was 
waiting for something but that I couldn’t quite remember what that something was. I 
think that perhaps I was waiting for the time to return...I think I was bored already...
Looking back over the last three days, there was something very unreal about the 
experience of living without clocks. And it wasn’t the absence of time, but rather that 
my time was filled only with the reflections of time’s potential absence. I wasn’t reading 
for  the PhD, I wasn’t stressed about completing work, there were no deadlines crowding 
my thoughts. There was simply existence and waiting.
The hardest thing about living without clocks was trying to live without clocks; keeping 
the intrusions to a minimum. Now this of course reveals something very significant 
about how far  it is possible for  an individual to be removed from the mechanics of time 
in the contemporary city. But other than the acknowledgement that my perception of this 
experiment has shaped my perception of living without clocks as non-threatening and 
non-disruptive, I feel I’ve yet to uncover anything as interesting about my own 
perception of  time.
So in a few days I’ll begin again, this time armed with the knowledge that this 
experiment must force me to adopt as close to my normal routine as possible. I will 
spend today and tomorrow considering how best to do that, before on Thursday I start 
living without clocks once more. May it be threatening; may it be disruptive.
8 FEBRUARY 2011, 8:26 AM: BLOG ENTRY
Following the reflective break of stage two, stage three began with me feeling reinvigorated 
and refocused on the task at hand (10 February 2011, time not recorded: notebook). Some 
anxiety remained, yet its  object was  not the organisational concerns  of stage one, rather, it 
appeared borne from my realisation that I no longer had access to my ability to control 
time;
I’m beginning to feel a little bit nervous about this. And it’s not about things going 
wrong or not being able to effectively hide the clocks in my life. I think it’s the feeling 
that I now can’t look at the time. Even though I don’t want to right now and shouldn’t 
need to over  the next seven days, I feel nervous that I can’t. In fact maybe it’s better 
characterised as vulnerability? Or maybe it’s ‘feeling exposed’. Regardless, I think I’m 
slowly being stripped of my ability to control that which perhaps, was never  meant to 
be tamed. 
9 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK
With the reality of an everyday life without clocks slowly dawning, my anxiety manifested in 
irritability and uneasiness  the following day (10 February, time not recorded: Notebook). 
However, as the day continued and I grew less  conscious  of my lack of access to clock-time, 
these feelings gradually dissipated and were replaced with a sense of ease and contentment 
that for the most part continued to the end of stage three. I reflected that this was 
grounded in my experience of a new everyday reality in which there was no such thing as 
being late, and which saw me eat when hungry, go to bed when tired and get up when I woke 
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(14 February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note). I also noted how this reality shaped a 
different emotional response to familiar events;
Unlike most Sundays, there’s been no ‘I can’t believe tomorrow’s Monday’ weighing 
heavy on my head. In it’s place is a calm acceptance that when I’m tired, I go to bed, 
and yes the weekend is over, but tomorrow’s just another day.
13 FEBRUARY 2011, 9.23 PM: BLOG ENTRY
This  is  not to say that other thoughts  and feelings didn’t enter during stage three, indeed, 
there were panics over being late (10 February 2011, time not recorded: notebook; 11 
February 2011, time not recorded: voice memo), rogue desires to check the time (10 
February 2011, 9:49 AM: blog entry; 11 February 2011, 2:12 PM: Notes application; 16 
February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note) and at times a heightened awareness of the 
unreality of the experimental state in which I’d placed myself (13 February 2011, 1.24 PM: 
voice memo), however, in comparison to the pleasure derived from not having to keep time, 
these other sensations were minimal.
THE SEMIOTICS OF CLOCK-TIME
In addition to the immediate and subjective experience outlined above, the experiment also 
led me to reflect on my own and indeed other individual’s  relationship to clocks; in 
particular what and how clock-time means. My feelings of ease and contentment which 
arose for the duration of  stage three highlighted my own tendency to clock-watch; 
On a personal level, any feelings of anxiety over my lack of access to clock-time remain 
absent. I do at times go to look at the clock or ask the time, but always manage to catch 
myself before I actually do. I’m beginning to realise that this ‘checking in’ with the clock 
is purely habit. I don’t really need, or even want, to know what the time is.
14 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK
Even more revealing was  the qualitative value that I would normally assign to what I find. 
Waking during sleep one night, I noted;
It’s still very dark outside. Normally this would present a prime opportunity for me to 
clock-watch. Depending on what I’d find, I’d either feel better about my predicament or 
worse; either  comforted by knowing that there was still time to get a good ‘x’ hours sleep 
or distressed that it was already ‘x:xx’ AM and it was almost time to get up; either 
thinking that tomorrow could still be salvaged or  it would be an awful day...no such 
access to joy or misery-making tonight.
13 FEBRUARY 2011, 6:02 AM: NOTES APPLICATION
As stage three of the experiment progressed my desire to clock-watch certainly declined and I 
even recorded an instance in which I accidentally saw the time but didn’t immediately 
recognise, or bestow upon it, any meaning;
I’ve just accidentally glanced towards the clock and it took me a moment to register what 
18:48 meant.
14 FEBRUARY 2011, 6:48 PM: POST-IT NOTE
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Whilst contemplating my tendency to frequently check the time throughout the day, I also 
reflected on the extent to which I utilise the clock as a tool for procrastination;
I’ve noticed that procrastination has been a lot less of an issue during the active stages 
of the experiment and it makes me realise the extent to which the clock is the chief 
enabler  of this rather  obstructive activity: “Just five more minutes”; “I’ll move in ten”; 
“It’s 4:32pm, I’ll move at quarter  to”. I say this, I do this, I lose more time than I 
save.
14 FEBRUARY 2011, 11:21 AM: BLOG ENTRY: 
As I began to write up the findings in the very final days of the experiment I did notice that 
my desire to clock-watch returned to an extent. I documented this, reflecting that while it 
seemed in opposition to my newly established freedom from temporal constraints, the 
organisational ability of  clocks still held sway in my mind;
I’m back to the writing; preparing the next paper for  my PhD supervision. I am also 
still undergoing the final stages of the experiment. The combination of the two result in 
my desire to check the time to gauge how many working seconds/minutes/hours remain 
in this increasingly darkened day...and yet this is also tempered by my desire to negate 
this primary desire.
16 FEBRUARY 2011, 4:27 PM: BLOG ENTRY
These subjective traits  were also echoed in my reflections  relating to other individual’s 
ineffectual relationship to clock-time. I noted the extent which notions  of good and bad 
time could impact an individual’s mood and go on to shape their behaviour and use of 
clock-time;
I’ve noticed that indicators of time play a huge role in the organisation of the 
everyday...even in the scheduling of that which does not need scheduled. Take JK for 
example, out of the people that I know, he probably has the life that is least dictated by 
temporal constraints; no need to be at the office for  9am, doesn’t need to go home at 
lunch to feed the dog, doesn’t need to pick up the kids from school at 3.30pm. Yet he too 
makes use of temporal markers to assess his progress throughout the day, saying that 
“It’s only 1 o’clock, that’s good” or “I can’t believe it’s already four, and I’ve not even 
started what I wanted to do today”. Comments like these come often, and on schedule.
15 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK
Also witnessed was  how notions of good and bad time are checked and established between 
individuals. During stage three I had a friend come to visit me. Her first words when I 
opened the door came were; ‘I’ve been told I’ve to apologies for being late and holding you 
back’ (14 February 2011, time not recorded: post-it note). Indeed, while this  individual 
didn’t feel the immediate pressure of time etiquette, she nonetheless  willingly attributed 
negativity to her lateness  based on her partner’s  understanding of what time means. I also 
located this  interpersonal construction of time’s meaning in my own understanding of 
time, most visibly in instances when I was concerned about being late;
Yesterday; before, during and even after the tutorials; I felt anxious, sweaty and ill at 
ease with the prospect of being late. And today, I’ve experienced the reality of it. I was 
planning to attend a seminar this afternoon which started at 4:00 PM. At what I 
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thought was roughly the right time I headed to the venue, only to unintentionally glance 
the time from the clock on the university tower. It was already 4.25 PM. I didn’t go in 
and instead headed back to the office. I do wonder if maybe I should have went in 
regardless, to experience the feeling of being ‘that person who came in late’. Yet I’ll 
nonetheless feel the shame of being ‘that person who didn’t show’, so perhaps it’s not a 
total loss for locating the threatening and disruptive consequences of  living clocklessly.
11 FEBRUARY 2011, 5:26 PM: BLOG ENTRY
THE NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC EMBEDDEDNESS OF CLOCK-TIME
During the course of the experiment there were very few occurrences where I actually lost 
clock-time. While I found this  highly problematic during stage one of the experiment, I 
came to realise that it was  in fact highly significant. In particular it suggested the extent to 
which clock-time is time in the contemporary city. This sentiment was echoed when I 
reflected on the extent to which the conventions  of clock-time are embedded in everyday 
life. 
Especially noteworthy was the presence and profusion of temporal lexis in everyday 
language. Despite the fact that I’d isolated many of the physical indicators of clock-time, 
throughout the course of the experiment I remained largely aware of the time due to the 
frequency at which individuals  made reference to it. Averaging at around five occurrences a 
day, I documented over sixty instances where different individuals  stated the time, quite 
often unprompted. I also repeatedly came across the need for individuals  to translate vague 
plans into time. During stages one and three I was actively resisting the use of clock-time to 
organise my day which accordingly resulted in my making approximate or casual plans. Yet 
this  was often met with a desire for formality from other individuals. For example, one day 
during stage three I sent a text to a friend to tell her I would meet her in about half an 
hour. She replied;
Ok, yip, in about half  an hour, so about 10.40 then if  that’s ok?
12 FEBRUARY 2011, 10:07 AM: TEXT MESSAGE
Moreover, there were a couple of instances where some people became irritated when I 
displayed reluctance to agree to a specific time. For example, one family member got quite 
impatient when I failed to engage in discussions  relating to what time lunch time would be 
the following day, despite my insistence that I would be at home all day (6 February 2011, 
5:21 PM: voice memo).
In addition to this naturalised presence of clock-time, also apparent was  the extent to 
which it was  integral to the function of technology. In particular I noticed its  pervasive 
presence on my mobile phone;
It is becoming increasingly apparent how difficult it is to block temporal indicators from 
my mobile phone. Whether  a call comes in, I receive a text, or  get an email, it is all too 
easy to see the time. I have of course covered the clock on the home screen, but every 
action taken by my phone is logged and communicated back to me in real time
5 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:54 PM: BLOG ENTRY
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The time according to clock-time was also highly visible from the television;
Sitting down to have my tea and toast as per  my normal routine shows the television to 
be a prominent keeper  of time. I’ve covered the position of the screen clock on BBC 
News, but even though there are no clocks on the other channels, they all mark the 
procession of time at regular  intervals. Whether  it’s to run through the headlines; break 
for  some adverts; transition to the next show; or to report on the weather, the television 
tells its story in neat little packages, seemingly scheduled for optimum efficiency. I am in 
two minds whether to avoid it completely or to embrace it as I would normally. But it’s 
really got to be the latter. If I am able to tell the time by the content and running order 
of the programming, then this is significant. Not least considering the extent to which 
the TV has replaced the fireplace as the focal point in the modern family home.
7 FEBRUARY 2011, 8:46 AM: BLOG ENTRY
Finally, clock-time was also recorded in the rhythm of the city. In stage three of the 
experiment I spent one day in the city centre, walking and experiencing different spaces 
and different times in the city. It was clear the extent to which the apparent fluidity of the 
city aligned to the rigidity of  the clock;
From the early morning rush, to the lunchtime break, to the evening sprint towards 
home, clock-time is very much alive in the city centre. While people come and go all day 
long, the human flow increases, purposes alter, external avatars change and internal 
characters shift. And all the time the clock ticks onwards.
15 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK
CONVENTIONAL TIME RECKONING BY PROXY
The extent to which I experienced clock-time as embedded is  further highlighted by 
considering that not only did I never really lose track of time during the experiment, but 
that I was able to more or less  function in accordance with clock-time without using a 
clock. This came not only through my familiarity with the rhythms of the city, but also 
from my familiarity with the routine of  those people around me. 
From early on in the experiment I was  aware that I could take a cue for ‘bedtime’ from my 
partner (5 February 2011, 10:19 PM, blog entry) but it was only as the experiment 
progressed that I begun to grasp the interpersonal nature of  my time-reckoning;
The temporal infiltrations have been at a minimum today, yet I don’t feel I have lost my 
sense of time at all. I have however noticed the extent to which this feeds off of others 
around me. While they may of course opt to validate their urges with reference to 
watches and mobile phones, nonetheless, for me at least,  making sense of time has today 
seemed a very interpersonal activity.
7 FEBRUARY 2011, 9:29 PM: BLOG ENTRY
As I grew more aware of this, I realised that I was  able use this understanding to allow me 
to navigate my everyday life more or less on time;
Thursdays are teaching days for me and while I considered this should dictate that the 
experiment should start after  my commitments, I instead relied on my familiarity with 
my colleagues’ schedules and awoke unaware of the time. I was repeatedly tempted to 
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check the ‘time’ before I left the house; feeling increasingly conscious of my desire not to 
be late to class. But I held true to my decision and when I got into the office and saw 
that SR and KD had yet to leave for  their appointments I realised I wasn’t going to be 
late.
10 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTEBOOK
I also reflected that my newly established method of time-reckoning must still be 
recognised as making use of  conventional clock-time;
Of course this method of keeping time of is not without issue and again raises my 
previous concern over  time-reckoning by proxy: while I myself may not be relying on 
clocks to tell the time, I am depending on my familiarity with the schedules of those 
around me who are relying on clocks. It also again draws attention to the difficulty of 
keeping time in the city by modes external to conventional logics. Such findings will no 
doubt continue to surface over this next week, but I have come to accept that in some 
way my life without clocks will remain governed by a temporal rhythm which is 
underpinned by a rationalised system of  conceptualising and keeping time.
13 FEBRUARY 2011, TIME NOT RECORDED: NOTES APPLICATION
ESCAPE FROM THE CITY?
Over the course of the experiment I did try to develop other methods of time-reckoning 
and to uncover experiences free from clock-time. Prior to the experiment I held the 
somewhat naïve notion that where clocks would depart from my everyday life I would grow 
accustomed to the changes in light. Certain of this I set out to document this  over the first 
five days of stages  one and two by taking a photograph each morning so that I could later 
compare the view from the window to the clock-time. Comparing these now reveals that 
there was very little difference (see Figure A).
FIGURE A: PHOTOGRAPHS OF MORNING
DAY 1: 8:42 AM        DAY 2: 9:05 AM        DAY 3: 9:15 AM        DAY 4: 10:01 AM      DAY 5: 9.16 AM
Despite my inability to convene with a more natural indicator of time, there was  one 
standout example in which clock-time was largely absent in the city. During the weekend of 
stage three, a friend and I went shopping to a purpose built centre on the edge of the city. 
Writing about this  after the experience I reflected on the extent to which conventional 
methods of  time-reckoning were more difficult to detect in this artificial location;
Not immediately, but as our  trip progressed, it struck me that there was a distinct lack of 
access to conventional methods of time-reckoning. Firstly, there were no clocks. 
Admittedly I was initially trying to avoid exchanging glances with any sort of 
timepiece, but becoming increasingly aware of their absence I began to seek them out. 
The result: there are no public clocks in this shopping centre; at least none that revealed 
themselves to me. Secondly, the enclosed and indoor nature of the space made it difficult 
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to sense the day’s progression by natural light. The sky was particularly overcast, but 
when we finally emerged from the car  park it was dark outside. An interesting 
counterpoint to the artificial light inside the centre which remained static throughout the 
day.
Where these modes were lacking, some others took their  place. We went for  a lunch not 
dictated by lunchtime, but by when we were hungry. I was careful not to alert AF to my 
experiment; it sufficed to agree that we were both ready to eat. When we arrived at our 
chosen eating location I was surprised by the lack of patrons. No need to queue; no need 
to watch for  a seat. It certainly wasn’t lunchtime, but it was time for lunch. The 
various restaurants and cafes in the centre also provided further cues; as the day got older 
their busyness increased. This was particularly noticeable by the increase in sound; the 
pervasive hum of conversation and the clinking of crockery and cutlery. The temporal 
nature of these activities was further evident from the content of plates; soups, 
sandwiches and salads for lunch; and afternoon tea for, well, afternoon tea. Yet despite 
this, and unlike any other  space I’ve experienced while conducting this experiment, it 
was incredibly easy to lose time here. Indeed, AF arrived home late for  her evening 
plans.
12 FEBRUARY 2011, 7:36 PM: BLOG ENTRY
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Appendix Three
ENTERING THE CANON: APPLICATION OF METHOD
READING LISTS
To ascertain which reading lists would be suitable for examination it was considered 
appropriate to look to the universities which presented as dominant. Markers of top 
academic institutions, such as  the Times Higher Education Annual University Rankings (THE), 
and prestigious  groupings, such as The Ivy League, seemed like the obvious place to locate 
this  search. Starting with these two sources, data was gathered of universities included in 
such lists. Looking first at The Ivy League, a list was created of the universities  who had 
membership of this grouping. In searching to confirm the members of The Ivy League, a 
number of other prestige groupings  emerged as potentially pertinent, namely, Ivy League 
Plus, The Russell Group, Universitas 21, Group of Eight and U15. Universities who were 
affiliated with one or more of these groupings were compiled in a table under the headings 
UNIVERSITY NAME, LOCATION, and MEMBERSHIP OF. In total fifty-seven institutions were 
recorded in this search.
The search then moved to examine institutions who frequented the THE rankings. Data 
was  included from 2004 (when the results  were first recorded) to 2011/12 (the most recent 
results). In compiling this data the top 100 entires from 2004-2011/12 were copied from 
THE website and pasted into table retaining the THE headings of WORLD  RANK, 
INSTITUTION, LOCATION  and OVERALL SCORE. This produced a total of 800 entries. The 
table was checked through manually to ensure that each institution was identified by its 
correct given name and that locations were of the same format. The table was then sorted 
alphabetically by institution name, and only those with four or more appearances on the 
table between 2004-2011/12 were kept. The table was  again sorted alphabetically by 
institution and rankings for each institution over the eight year period were combined to 
give an average. For institutions that did not rank in the top 100 consecutively over eight 
years, absent years were marked as ‘not ranked’ under WORLD RANK and a score of ‘101’ 
was  entered at OVERALL SCORE. A further column was  added (AVERAGE SCORE), and a 
formula entered to calculate the average score for each institution, rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
Its  existence being detected whilst conducting the above, attention then moved to consider 
the ranking of the Top 50 Social Science Universities 2011/12, also published by THE. A new 
table was created, combining headings from the previous two and adding a column titled 
SOCIAL SCIENCE SCORE. Into this  the 2011/12 rankings were entered. A further three 
columns were added, titled NO OF PRESTIGE INDICATORS, PRESTIGE INDICATORS and 
WEBSITE. Entered into these fields  was the number of prestige groupings each university 
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held affiliation to, the name of these groupings, and a direct hyperlink for each university’s 
home webpage. To help identify not only the top institutions but those who ranked highly 
in relation to urban studies, a further three measures of excellence in urban research and 
theory were considered: The 10 Best Graduate Programmes in Urban and Regional Planning from 
The Best Colleges; Planetizen’s 2012 Top 10 Planning Programmes; and Town and Country Planning 
Unit from the 2008 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). Where present, data was entered for 
each university under the appropriate headings of  BEST COLLEGES, PLANETIZEN and RAE.
The universities  selected for potential examination were based on a geographic spread 
dictated by the relative percentage of locations  in THE World University Rankings 
2011/12. This resulted in twenty institutions  spread across  six areas: USA(9), UK(4), EU
(2), Canada(2), Australia(2) and Other(1). Based on this spread, universities were selected 
from each area that ranked strongly across  each of measures. A strong result in the WORLD 
RANK column and at least one entry at PRESTIGE INDICATORS was necessary, after which 
each institution was considered on its  relative merits. The group of twenty was  then 
reduced to ten by identifying those which had the strongest urban studies  programmes. 
This  was achieved by individually entering each university’s  name followed by “urban 
studies” into Google. Course descriptions were read, and those with a broader theoretical 
focus, rather than a planning or practice focus, were given preference. 
The process then moved to identify relevant courses and request reading lists  from ten 
institutions: University of Melbourne; Cornell University; University College London; 
University of Pennsylvania; University of California; Los Angeles, University of Toronto; 
University of Amsterdam; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; University of 
Manchester; University of Glasgow. This process was conducted from the home page on 
each university’s  own website. For each institution, “Urban Studies” was entered into the 
search box on the home page and the most pertinent departments were examined in order 
to identify available urban studies  degree programmes (undergraduate and postgraduate) 
and courses  within them. A new table was created with relevant information entered under 
the headings  of UNIVERSITY NAME, LOCATION, WEBSITE, and SUMMARY OF RANKINGS 
ACROSS INDICATORS. Columns titled DEPARTMENT, DEGREE DESCRIPTION, CORE 
COURSES, and NOTES were also added, into which details  pertinent to the above search 
were recorded. From the data gathered the most foundational course from each degree 
programme was selected and the ten universities were contacted via email (with letter 
attached) requesting access to their reading lists for their respective courses.
EDITED COLLECTIONS
Two search engines were used to find key edited collections  in the field of urban studies: 
Google Books and Worldcat. Starting with Google Books, keywords  stemming from the research 
problem defined throughout the thesis  were identified and applied in various combinations, 
further refined through the use of boolean operators. Searches were conducted via the 
home page with all variants of “Urban (Boolean OR) City (Boolean AND) studies; theory; 
culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems” entered, yielding a total of 
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sixteen search strings. For each search string returned, details  of the first twenty entries 
were copied and pasted into a table under the headings TITLE, EDITORS and RELEVANCE. 
The table was manually formatted and sorted alphabetically by TITLE in order to delete 
any duplicates. Each item was  then individually examined to consider its relevance to the 
intended search parameters and those deemed non-related were deleted.
Following completion of the Google Books search, attention moved to Worldcat. Searches were 
conducted from the ‘advanced search’ window. Using the same keywords  and Boolean 
operators, the following options were additionally selected from drop-down menus: 
“Audience = non-juvenile; Content = non-fiction; Format = Book; Language = English”. 
The results  from each search string were sorted by “relevance” and the first fifty entries 
were saved to a private Worldcat list named after the variable search term (i.e studies; theory; 
culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems). Following the completion of the 
searches, the eight lists  were downloaded as comma-separated Value file (.csv) and the 
content of each pasted into a single table under the following headings  OLCL NUMBER, 
TITLE, EDITOR(S) PUBLICATION INFORMATION and NOTES. The data was  sorted by 
arranging OLCL NUMBER in ascending order, and duplicates were combined to create one 
entry for each title, recording the number of searches the item had been returned in an 
additional column VARIABLE(S). The data was then sorted alphabetically by TITLE and 
duplicates were again combined. Working from the data in the table and each items’ 
information page on Worldcat, each item was  considered for relevance and its applicability 
to the intended search parameters. Out of 245 items, only thirty-four were retained as 
specific to the search.
At this  point both the Google Books and Worldcat tables were combined in a single document, 
with duplicates combined. For each entry, further columns were added, indicating the NO 
OF EDITIONS, and the YEARS PUBLISHED and PUBLICATION INFORMATION for each 
edition. The number of editions recorded for each item did not include the number of 
print runs  or different formats, but was strictly limited to the number of edited revisions. To 
ascertain this  information, details  held by Worldcat and Google Books was considered, 
alongside other sources such as Amazon and the University of Glasgow online library 
catalogue where necessary. This produced a total of thirty-eight items. Of these items, only 
those items published after 1990 were retained, reducing the list of  titles to twenty-one.
To compile more specific information about each title two new tables were created. The 
first table, TITLES, had eight headings: PUBLICATION TITLE, EDITOR(S), EDITION, 
PUBLICATION DETAILS, NO OF EDITIONS, WEB LINK, SECTIONS, and PRODUCT 
DESCRIPTION. The second table, CONTENTS, duplicated the first seven of these 
headings, replacing PRODUCT DESCRIPTION with CHAPTER TITLE and AUTHOR. To 
populate these tables, information from the Worldcat entry for each title (and each edition) 
was  examined, and where the PRODUCT DESCRIPTION and contents were available online, 
they were copied and pasted into the relevant fields, and formatted to maintain consistency. 
Where the information wasn’t available electronically, hard copies of the titles  were 
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obtained from The University of Glasgow library (in some cases  via interlibrary lending), 
and the data was inputed manually. In all cases, the data entered was checked against a 
hard-copy for any errors or inaccuracies.
CITATIONS
So as  not to get bogged down in analytic debates, it was decided that citation counts alone 
would suffice to establish the those urban studies  articles  which were the most cited and 
arguably therefore, the most dominant. To access  this information two indexes were 
selected from a wide range of paid for and free services: Social Science Citation Index accessed 
via Web of  Knowledge (WoK) and Google Scholar. 
The search proceeded first by way of Google Scholar. Using the same keywords  used in the 
edited collection search, all variations  of “Urban (Boolean OR) City (Boolean AND) 
studies; theory; culture; anthropology; society; sociology; issues; problems” were entered, 
yielding a total of sixteen search strings. For each search string returned, the first twenty 
entries  were copied and pasted into a table, and manually formatted to retain information 
of AUTHOR, ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS. The table was  sorted alphabetically by 
ARTICLE TITLE in order to find and delete any duplicates, and then ranked in descending 
order of NO OF CITATIONS. Attention then moved to consider the relevance of each entry 
in closer detail, seeing the further addition of two columns  headed RELEVANCE and NOTES. 
Fields were completed to indicate whether the texts returned were applicable to the 
intended search parameters, and if  not, why not. 
At this stage the search moved to WoK. This method necessarily relied heavily on the level 
of specification that could be altered in the engine itself. At the home page “urban” was 
entered into the first search box and “topic” selected from the drop-down menu beside it. 
The search was limited initially by expanding the menu under “citation databases” and 
selecting only “Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) - 1898-present” . For the 83,506 
entires  that were returned, the parameters were further refined by eliminating non-relevant 
subject areas from the results. Of 100 subject areas  offered under “Web of Science 
Categories”, only nine were retained: Urban Studies; Geography; Planning Development; 
Sociology; Social Issues; Political Science; Social Sciences  Interdisciplinary; Anthropology. 
The results  were sorted by “Times  Cited -- highest to lowest” and the first one hundred 
records were exported as a rich text format (.rtf) document. After manually formatting each 
entry, the contents were copied and pasted into a table under the headings  AUTHOR, 
ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS, RELEVANCE and NOTES. As  with the Google Scholar 
search, each entry was  examined independently to assess its  applicability to the intended 
search parameters. 
Following the completion of these two searches, the results from each were combined into a 
single table under the headings  AUTHOR, ARTICLE TITLE, NO OF CITATIONS (WOK), NO OF 
CITATIONS (WOK), COMBINED SCORES (AVERAGE), RELEVANCE and NOTES. Entries were 
manually checked to ensure that they were formatted to the same standard, and results 
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were sorted alphabetically by ARTICLE TITLE. Entries  that were returned under both 
searches  were then combined as  a single entry and the average of the two citation scores 
was  calculated and entered into COMBINED SCORES (AVERAGE) and ranked in descending 
order. A further two columns were added to the table headed KEYWORDS and ABSTRACT. 
The abstracts  and keyword for the top thirty highest ranking entires were entered into the 
table where applicable and, where available, a copy of  the text was obtained.
DOMINANT TEXTS
In order to ascertain the texts, categories  and authors  most dominant, a content analysis 
was  performed on various items of text which were gathered throughout the stages 
described above. From Reading lists, this  data included: COURSE DESCRIPTION, 
PUBLICATION  TITLE and AUTHOR From Edited Collections, this included data entered at 
PUBLICATION  TITLE, PRODUCT DESCRIPTION, SECTIONS, CHAPTER TITLE and AUTHOR. 
From Citations: ARTICLE TITLE, ABSTRACT, KEYWORDS, and AUTHOR. From each table the 
pertinent column was selected, formatted to remove any punctuation and to ensure a 
uniformity of data, then pasted into Textmechanic, an online word frequency counter. To 
avoid an over saturation of non-relevant terms, the programme was instructed to ignore 
136 common words in the search23. It was  also selected that it should highlight the terms 
“time, times, temporal, temporality, temporalities, temporalization, space, spaces, spatial, 
spatiality, spatialities  and spatialization” in the results. In addition to these quantitive 
outputs, word clouds which visually illustrated the relative dominance of these texts were 
made by entering the same text into Worditout, an online word cloud generator. The 
option was again taken to remove 136 of  the most common words. 
Reader, urban and city unsurprisingly ranked highest in word count for titles  amongst the 
edited collections, but out with these broad descriptions, terms diverged into more focused 
areas. There were a number of titles that specialised in sociological, geographical and cultural 
perspectives  of the city. There were also single instances of urban readers framed from 
communication, globalisation, political and cybercities issues. In the product descriptions, culture, 
social and geography were again prominent, but were accompanied closely by politics, theory, 
planning and history. Across these descriptions there was also sufficient reference made to the 
inclusion of specific prominent authors, including: Manuel Castells, Jane Jacobs, Lewis 
Mumford and Saskia Sassen. Within the descriptions, there were ten references  to spatial 
modes of analysis in comparison to three references  to time. On closer inspection two of 
these instances were idiomatic, with the third suggesting a need to understand democracy 
and citizenship in spite of the fact that “urban politics may change over time” (Strom and 
Mollenkopf, 2006).
Like the product descriptions, the section headings of these texts revealed a more detailed 
account of historical and contemporary conceptualisations of the city. After culture, politics 
and planning ranked amongst the most regularly occurring frames of inquiry across  the 
readers. Also common were sections  focusing specifically on space, design, gender and economy. 
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Within these section headings  there were eleven spatial references, and only one reference 
to time in a section in The Cultural Studies Reader entitled “Space and Time” (During, 1993). 
The chapter headings in the vast majority of instances  (over 97%) remained as the title of 
the original text. Unlike the section headings, which were editorially titled, arguably these 
would be expected to appeal to a more diverse range of common terms; less dominated by 
synthesised issues. However, after city and urban, space, planning and global remained highly 
dominant. Within the chapter headings, spatial terms  appeared in seventy-eight separate 
titles, compared to two references to time. A number of authors  were frequently included 
across  the readers. In addition to Manuel Castells, Jane Jacobs, Lewis Mumford and Saskia 
Sassen, who were already highlighted as  prominent in the product descriptions, David 
Harvey, Susan Fainstein, Sharon Zukin and Edward Soja appeared most prominently.
In the citations  search, the titles of journal articles appeared much more varied than those 
included in edited collections. While urban again dominated, there was a reduced inclusion 
of alternative terms such as  city and cities. Out with the urban, terms including poverty, social, 
black, crime, neighborhood and space ranked as  the most common. There were eight articles that 
included spatial terms in comparison to one that mentioned time, and it should be noted 
that this was in reference to a longitudinal study. The abstracts  portrayed a much more 
diverse range of topics and conceptualisations, with scale, economic, geographical, neoliberalism 
and industrial each appearing in approximately 10% of the articles. Political, space, disorder 
and growth were similarly common. There were ten references to spatial conceptualisations 
in comparison to only one reference to “change over time” (Morenoff and Sampson, 1997: 
31). From Managerialism To Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation In Urban Governance In Late 
Capitalism (Harvey, 1989) was the article most cited, followed by Neoliberalizing Space (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002) and Systematic Social Observation Of Public Spaces: A New Look At Disorder In 
Urban Neighborhoods (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999). However, amongst the top one 
hundred, Robert J. Sampson, Jamie Peck and James  McCarthy were the most cited authors 
overall, each with 3 texts (co-authored and single authored) in the list.
notes
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23 Words and terms ignored in the search: a; also; am; an; and; are; aren't; as; at; be; been; but; by; can; can't; 
cannot; could; couldn't; did; didn't; do; does; doesn't; don't; down; e.g.; for; from; get; gets; got; had; hadn't; 
has; hasn't; have; haven't; he; he'd; he'll; he's; her; him; his; how; however; I; i.e.; I'd; I'll; I'm; I've; if; in; into; 
is; isn't; it; it's; its; may; me; might; mine; must; mustn't; must've; my; no; not; of; off; on; or; our; ours; out; 
shall; she; she'd; she'll; she's; should; shouldn't; so; such; than; that; that's; the; their; theirs; them; then; there; 
there's; these; they; they'd; they'll; they're; they've; this; those; thus; to; too; up; us; very; was; wasn't; we; we'd; 
we'll; we're; we've; were; what; when; where; which; who; why; will; with; won't; would; wouldn't; you; you'd; 
you'll; you're; you've; your; yours.
Appendix Four
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ETHICS COMMITTEE
Detailed in this appendix is my engagement with the University of Glasgow’s  Ethics 
Committee. The first section outlines the issues I had with the standard application form. 
The activity of compiling these concerns was  what prompted my engagement with the 
committee over how I should apply. The numerical headings  used in this section refer to 
those used on the form (which can be viewed at pages  264–271 of this  appendix). The 
second section of this  appendix reproduces  my initial correspondence with the committee. 
The remaining sections  provide copies  of my applications  to the committee and their 
responses.
CONCERNS WITH FORM
I believed that the following items required problematisation:
• Title of  the form 
“College Ethics  Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects: EAP1 - 
Application for Ethical Approval”. The fact that it is  applicable to research which involves 
human subjects means that it should be applicable to my work.
• 2.3A Research Methodology and Data Collection
Data isn’t gathered solely through pre-specified methods, even if one claims  this  to be the case. 
Also, “Other (please provide details  - maximum 50 words)” - this  isn’t sufficient space in which 
to describe the methods of  this project.
• 2.3B Research Methods
The ethical considerations  of this  project aren’t discussable via the form. Key areas, in my 
project, which should be given ethical consideration are: self; Others; truth; culture.
• 2.4 Confidentiality and Data Handling
I again cannot discuss  my concerns  via the form. The data ‘exists’ largely in my head. 
Furthermore, I cannot anonymise the data to the point that it becomes  meaningless. It also 
seems  too simplistic to assume, and dangerous  to suggest to students  and staff, that it is  possible 
to assure “confidentiality of data” for any participant. In making research findings  meaningful 
the researcher contextualises  and connects  their account, thereby making visible some of the 
relationships  which their subject(s) inhabit. Making visible these relationships  also has  the 
potential to reveal the identity of those who inhabit them. Raising the issue of confidentiality in 
such an absolute way could give a false sense of security to researchers, making them remiss  of 
the range of  ways that they may inadvertently reveal the identities of  their participants.
• 2.6A Dissemination of  Results
Cannot foresee the lifecycle of our work. Again, too simplistic and encourages  researchers to 
view research as a series of  discrete projects. 
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• 2.7 Participants
The participant is  me, but there is  no space to record this  on the form. Furthermore, the self is 
constituted through Others, therefore, even though I am the sole participant, there are ethical 
considerations applicable to the Others which are implicated in my work.
• 2.7E Dependant Relationship
It is likely to be those Others  with whom I share my closest relationships  with that are the key 
characters  in my work, arising from their relational proximity to me. I’m not sure what steps 
could be taken to ensure that their participation is  purely voluntary. Seems  like any subject’s 
participation would be always  be influenced by the research relationship in one way or another. 
And of course it is  ethical to try and address  the inherent power imbalance in this  relationship, 
but to suggest that it can be eradicated again seems overly simplistic, and ultimately runs  the risk 
of making researchers blind to the presence of power (and their power) within research 
practices.
• 2.7F Location of  Research
Research is not an on/off  process and as such it cannot be linked to a finite series of  locations.
• 2.9 Informed Consent
How can I be considered to be in a position to fully inform my research subjects  when I myself 
am not fully aware (in some sense, informed) of  the full reach of  my work? 
• 2.9A Plain Language Statement
Doesn’t recognise the potential ethical issues arising from changing the ‘language’ of something. 
This is  a reductive process, and so how can this be presented as  unproblematic and necessary 
part of  gaining ‘informed consent’?
• 2.5C Retention and Disposal of Personal Data; 4 Health and Safety; 5 UK and Scottish 
Government Legislation.
Topics  such as these above demonstrate the conflation of ethical considerations with those which 
would be better described as  health and safety, and legal concerns. These things  shouldn’t be 
presented on the from, which is  titled as  the “Application From for Ethical Approval”. Doing so 
suggests  that ethical concerns  are similar, if not the same as, ensuring compliance with best 
practice and applicable legislation of  the day.
• 6 Declarations by Researcher(s) and Supervisor(s)
This following suggests that research is a neat, contained process:
“I understand that no research work involving human participants  or data collection can 
commence until full ethical approval has been given by the either the School Ethics  Forum (UG 
& PGT students  only) or the College of Social Sciences  Ethics  Committee (for PGR students 
and Staff)”
Furthermore:
“I have read the University’s  current human ethics  guidelines, and accept responsibility for the 
conduct of the procedures set out in the attached application in accordance with the guidelines, 
the University’s  Code of Conduct for Research and any other condition laid down by the 
University of Glasgow Ethics  Committee and the College of Social Sciences  Ethics  Committee 
[…] I and my co-researcher(s) or supporting staff have the appropriate qualifications, experience 
and facilities  to conduct the research set out in the attached application and to deal effectively 
with any emergencies and contingencies related to the research that may arise”. 
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These seem to be about entering into a contract with the researcher in which they are liable for 
their own ethical conduct. This  is, in a sense, fully appropriate. However, when the only ethical 
guidance is  delivered via a form that is unethical, the reality of the process  of applying for 
ethical research becomes  clearer: this  is  not a process  designed to ensure the ethical conduct of 
researchers, it is  a way for the university to safeguard themselves  against potential legal 
ramifications.
Overall I had a number of concerns  beyond the individual items on the form. I understood 
that the form may be suitable for some projects. If, for example, a researcher was  doing a 
survey in a fixed location and were to analyse those results  at another fixed location, they 
would likely be able to discuss their work in the manner dictated by the form. However, 
three problems lingered: 
• It is  the most simple types of work that this  form is  geared towards, likely to be those projects 
that perhaps  pose little ethical concern when viewed within the narrow parameters  of the 
project.
• The language and categories  of the form leads  the researcher to only view their work in this 
narrow sense, and doesn’t encourage a broader ethical engagement with their topic and research 
project.
• The naturalisation of forms  like these within the academy and within individual’s  research 
careers  means that when a research project is  being conducted that may have very pressing, 
broader ethical concerns, the researcher isn’t aware of these, nor would they be in a position to 
deal with them.
INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE ETHICS COMMITTEE
• 18 November 2011
Dear Dr Valentina Bold,
I am contacting you in relation to your role as the College Ethics Officer and it is from that 
position that I hope you can assist.  My name is  Lisa Bradley and I am an Urban Studies PhD 
student in the School of Social and Political Science, under the supervision of Ms Annette 
Hastings  and Dr Libby Porter.  It is  my intention to commence the research stages  of my PhD in 
the coming months  and accordingly I have been preparing a submission for ethical review.  As 
per the Committee's  guidance, I have attempted to engage with the five stages  for making an 
application.  Whilst I have successfully completed step one, I am having difficulty proceeding 
past step two as  I am unable to discuss  pertinent ethical concerns  relevant to my study using the 
proforma provided.   
To give some background, the topic of my PhD relates  to processes  of cultural construction in 
the contemporary city and their relation to the framing and concrete manifestation of social 
malaises  prevalent throughout this  context.  My approach to this  issue is  meta-theoretical: I am 
seeking to comment on the dominant ways  in which urban theorists  and researchers  understand, 
analyse and approach urban problems.  Specifically, I posit that time and temporality are crucial 
yet contingent factors  in the formation of urban culture, but consider that these features  have 
been largely naturalised in the contemporary era.  My aim is to uncover some of the ways  in 
which the socially constructed nature of time has  become invisible in academic discourse and in 
everyday life, in order to recast time and temporality as  critical factors  in the formation of urban 
culture and the organisation of  urban society which warrant detailed future study.  
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In pursuit of this  thesis  I intend to use three methods: autoethnography, textual analysis  and a 
spatio/temporal comparative case study.  While there are ethical considerations  relevant to each 
of these methods, it is  with the first method - autoethnography - that I am experiencing 
particular difficulty.   Autoethnography is a method aimed at opening up and exploring the 
peculiarity of one's  own culture, therefore I am the primary human subject and sole 
"participant" of this  research.  However, recognising that I am constituted through other people 
with whom I come into contact (both regularly and uniquely), non-participating individuals  are 
also necessarily implicated in my work.  For example, while I write about my perception of time, 
my perception is  not mine alone but is  constituted intersubjectively; when I write about my day, 
the activity of those around me not only shapes  my reflections, but these individuals  are key 
characters  in my experience of culture and are recorded as such.   This  means that ethical 
considerations should extend to these other, non-participating subjects, however, I am unable to 
address  such points  via the suggested method for review.   This is  just one area of difficulty - 
there are quite a few others  for which the criteria on the proforma are similarly insufficient for 
the nature of  my research.
To enable me to proceed in an appropriate and ethical manner, I wonder if I could seek 
clarification and guidance on a couple of  points:
1) Am I correct in thinking that as  my work involves  human subjects  (participating and non-
participating) and data that is  not publicly available, that my research falls  within the remit of 
the College Ethics  Committee and that my submission for review should seek to engage with the 
full range of  ethical concerns relevant?
2a) If so, could you outline a way in which I can submit my project for ethical review and fully 
engage with the ethical concerns, that will also satisfy the College Ethics  Committee's  Terms of 
Reference?  
2b) If not, would you be able to point me to the appropriate mechanisms  to ensure that my 
research is  given adequate ethical consideration by me, the researcher, and also the institution 
from which I conduct my research?
As outlined above, I have discussed these concerns  in full with my supervisors  and we are in 
agreement that I should seek guidance from the College Ethics  Committee before proceeding.  
Should you require any further information, please don't hesitate to get in touch.
Yours sincerely,
Lisa Bradley
• 18 Nov 20111
Dear Lisa Bradley,
Thank you for your e-mail and for outlining the issues  therein: it is  an interesting set of 
questions.  I see the dilemma of drawing on personal experience, but on the formative impact of 
other people.   The main question to ask is: will you be quoting/describing from observation the 
speech/action of others?   If so, then I think you should submit an ethical application; you 
mention ‘recording’ the experiences  of others—does  this  imply covert observation, or will you 
be asking consent to do so?   I would certainly advise the latter and that, again, means  an ethical 
approval is necessary.
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I think the safest way  is  to submit a formal application, in consultation with your supervisors 
which, at the least, will assist you in clarifying your own ethical understanding of your 
methodology and, at the best, will protect the interests  of the individuals  whose opinions  you are 
drawing on.
I am copying in Terri Hume so that the correspondence will be noted and, if you need further 
information, please give me a call: my direct line is  01387 702021, although next week I am 
away from the office a great deal, as  we have a conference on site—I will still, however, be 
checking e-mail regularly.
With all best wishes, and good luck with what sounds like a very fruitful approach,
Valentina Bold
• 18 November 2011 
Dear Dr Bold,
Many thanks for the promptness  of your reply.   I very much agree that the appropriate step 
is for me to submit an application for ethical review, as do my supervisors.  The main issue I'm 
having is  that the standard method of submission - the application form made available at 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/colleges/socialsciences/info/students/ethics/forms/ - does  not allow me 
to discuss  the range of ethical considerations relevant to my PhD, nor to outline my intended 
approach to mitigate these issues.  There is  indeed the potential for me to quote/describe from 
observation, the behaviour of Others.  However, the exploratory nature and non-limited range 
of an autoethnographic approach means  that these Others  are unknown to me until they 
present, thus  they would not be classified as  “participants” under the criteria set out on the 
proforma.  I have given my response to the ethical dilemma just outlined (and others  relevant to 
my PhD) considerable attention over the past few weeks, however, there is  no way for me to 
communicate my intended approach through the current application form.  Might you be able 
to suggest an alternative method which will allow me to submit a formal application that fully 
articulates  the ethical dimensions  of my project, and that will also satisfy the requirements  of the 
Ethics Committee?
All best and many thanks,
Lisa
• 19 Nov 2011
Dear Lisa why don't you complete the form as  best you can and add a coda in the form of an 
explanatory note similar to your explanation here? You do not need to name participants  if you 
cannot but an indication of  number and types would be useful.  Best wishes Valentina
CONTINUED OVER /
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INITIAL APPLICATION TO ETHICS COMMITTEE
Application No. (Office use only)  __________
COLLEGE ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR NON-CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
EAP1: APPLICATION FORM FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL 
This application form should be typed, and submitted electronically. All questions must be answered. “not 
applicable” is a satisfactory answer where appropriate. (NB: In Word format, click on shaded area within box to 
enter text, the boxes will expand accordingly). Applications should be submitted at least one month in advance 
of the intended start date for the data collection to allow time for review and any amendments that may be 
required.
1. Applicant Details
1.1 Project Title:
The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban malaise in the 
contemporary city.
1.2 Name of Applicant:
Lisa Bradley
1.3 Matriculation or Staff Number:
0108279
1.4 School/Subject/Cluster/RKT Group:
School of Social and Political Science/Urban 
Studies
1.5 This Project Is:
Staff Research Project Postgraduate Research x Programme Conveners Only: 
Project within a PGT or UG programmePostgraduate Taught Undergraduate 
1.6 Programme Title:
PhD Urban Studies
1.7 Comments from Supervisors:
Comment on the research ethics risks involved in the project:
Lisa’s research poses very  little ‘risk’ to herself  as the primary  research participant ,  and very  little other kind of  risk to the 
various ‘non-participating Others’ she outlines here. Her application represents an extremely  thoughtful and deeply  ethically 
informed approach to research. Her approach stretches, and indeed challenges,  the assumptions built into procedural 
approaches to ethics, and this is intended as a genuine attempt to work through the issues arising from and thorugh her 
research as she sees them. This is why  we as supervisors fully  support her unusual approach in this application, as a means 
of more insightfully engaging with the ethical dilemmas she sees present in her work. 
Supervisor’s Name: Dr Libby Porter                                                Date: 20 December 2011
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1.8 Researcher(s) (and Supervisor(s) where appropriate):
Researcher(s)
TITLE & SURNAME FIRST NAME PHONE EMAIL (This MUST be a University of Glasgow e-mail address)
Miss Bradley Lisa 0141 422 124607791 757891 L.Bradley.1@research.gla.ac.uk
Supervisor(s) (where applicable)
TITLE & SURNAME FIRST NAME PHONE EMAIL
Dr Porter Libby 0141 330 3664 Libby.Porter@glasgow.ac.uk
Ms Hastings Annette 0141 330 6275 Annette.Hastings@glasgow.ac.uk
Dr Franks Benjamin 01387 702055 Benjamin.Franks@glasgow.ac.uk
1.9 External funding details:
Note. If this project is externally funded, please provide the name of the sponsor or funding body.
Urban Studies Journal
2. Project/Participant Details
2.1 Start date for your data collection and end date of your research project:
(dd/mm/yy) (dd/mm/yy)
From: 31/ January/2012 To: 31/June/2014
2.2 Justification for the Research (use no more than 100 words):
Why is this research significant to the wider community? Outline the reasons which lead you to be satisfied that 
the possible benefits to be gained from the project justify any risks or discomfort involved.
The prominence afforded to spatial analyses of urban issues can be seen to overlook and marginalise the extent to which 
time too is a significant medium in constructing the city culture.  With spatial analyses thus unable to capture the complexity  
of urban life, policy which emerges from such accounts could be ill-informed, perhaps ineffective, and almost certainly 
incomplete.  A need therefore exists within urban studies, and arguably in the broader academy, to move beyond an 
overwhelmingly spatial understanding of urban issues and to explore the processes of social and cultural construction via a 
temporal lens.
2.3 Research Methodology and Data Collection
2.3A Method of data collection (Tick as many as apply):
Questionnaire (attach a copy)
Online Questionnaire (provide the address: http://_____)
Interviews (attach a copy of discussion guide/proposed questions)
Participant observation (attach an observation proforma)
Audio or video-taping interviewees or events (with consent)
Focus Group (attach proposed questions and recording format)
Other (please provide details - maximum 50 words):
Documents that are not publicly available: 
Course reading lists will be requested from prominent academic institutions in order to examine the texts which 
present as the urban studies canon.
Autoethnography:
Audio recording; Video recording; Journaling; Blogging; Note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; 
mobile phone applications; post-it notes); Morning pages (stream-of-consciousness writing upon waking); 
Photographs; Voice memos; Personal communications (such as emails and text messages); Drawing/sketching.
Please refer to appendix A for further detail on how these methods differ from the categories offered above.
x
2
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2.3B Research Methods:
Please explain the reason for the particular chosen method, the estimated time commitment required of 
participants and how the data will be analysed (use no more than 250 words).
AUTOETHNOGRAPHY: Autoethnography will be used throughout the study in three main ways.  First, to achieve integrity 
of methods and approach, and to more fully inform the findings and analysis of the other research methods, I will use a 
reflexive approach.  This will document the position from which I approach this PhD and reflect on the reasons I arrived at 
the topic in the first place.  It will be autobiographical in part, but will also recognise the manner in which I am shaped by 
Others.  Embracing personal thoughts, feelings, stories and observations will lead to a more nuanced understanding of the 
social context in which I and the topic are situated, and it will shed light on my interactions with the research, making them 
visible for the reader.  Second, in order to chart my own transformation, I will conduct a narrative autoethnography.  The 
everyday experience of thinking, reading, writing about time has been and will continue to be reflected on throughout the 
PhD, with a particular focus on how I have changed with regards to how I interpret reality and everyday life in respect of my 
understanding of what time is.  Finally, in order to see how I can ‘play’ with conventions of time and still make sense of 
everyday life, experimental autoethnography will be used.  This will be similar to the narrative method, but conducted under 
experimental conditions in which the experience of specific temporalities are investigated, for example, time after 
meditation; while on holiday; urban and rural time; and the same space at different times.  
RHIZOMATIC TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: To trace and establish the presence and subordination of time within this canon, 
textual analysis will be conducted on dominant texts.  To examine those texts which present as dominant, course reading 
lists (which may not be publicly available) will be requested from prominent academic institutions.  Under the metaphor of 
the rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), texts are not isolated units of meaning, but rather, are assemblages that function 
within a context or contexts; connecting with other texts, institutions, contexts, and audiences, and constantly changing 
through these connections.  This approach will develop an understanding of where, when and how time has been 
naturalised in the academy, and beyond and is complementary to the autoethnographic method which views the researcher 
and the research as rhizomatic (with multiple and contradictory reasons for approaching a particular topic and multiple and 
contradictory interpretations arising from the data).  
DATA ANALYSIS: Data will be analysed discretely as described above and also rhizomatically across the three methods in 
order to consider the impact of time’s naturalisation on understandings and approaches to contemporary urban problems 
and to comment on the necessary conditions for future temporal research.
TIME COMMITMENT: This work is largely theoretical and whilst there is an empirical aspect to the autoethnography, I am 
the sole participant in this method.  I am a full-time PhD student and I am fully committed to this project in that capacity.  
Other than my supervisors, there will be no time-commitment required from any other individuals.  
2.4 Confidentiality & Data Handling
2.4A Will the research involve (Tick all that apply):
Participants consent to being named? x
Please note, as outlined above this research 
employs only one participant: me.  However, whilst I 
am the sole participant, other non-participating 
individuals will be implicated by this work.  For 
details of how I intend to make reference to these 
Others in an ethical way, please see appendix A.
De-identified samples or data (i.e. a reversible process whereby  
identifiers are replaced by a code, to which the researcher 
retains the key, in a secure location)?
Participants being referred to by pseudonym in any publication 
arising from the research?
Anonymised samples or data (i.e. an irreversible process 
whereby identifiers are removed from data and replaced by a 
code, with no record retained of how the code relates to the 
identifiers.  It is then impossible to identify the individual to 
whom the sample of information relates)?
Complete anonymity of participants (i.e. researchers will not 
meet, or know the identity of participants, as participants are 
part of a random sample and are required to return responses 
with no form of personal identification)?
Any other method of protecting the privacy of participants? (eg. 
use of direct quotes with specific, written permission only; use 
of real name with specific, written permission only)  
If “any other method of protecting the privacy of participants”, 
please provide more details:
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2.4B Which of the following methods of assuring confidentiality of data will be implemented? (Tick all that apply): 
Data to be kept in locked filing cabinets x
Data and identifiers to be kept in separate, locked filing cabinets 
Access to computer files to be available by password only x
Storage at University of Glasgow x
Stored at another site (please provide details, including address):
Private residence: 
2/1 6 Leven Street, Pollokshields, Glasgow, G41 
2JQ.
Also, please see appendix A.
2.5 Access to Data/Dissemination
2.5A Access by named researcher(s) and, where applicable, supervisor(s) and examiner(s):
Yes
2.5B Access by people other than named researcher(s)/supervisor(s)/examiner(s):
Please explain by whom and for what purpose
N/A
2.5C Retention and Disposal of Personal Data:
The 5th Principle of the Data Protection Act (1998) states that personal data must not be kept for longer than is 
necessary based on the purpose for which it was initially collected. Please state when and how you intend to 
destroy the data you have collected.
Non-publicly available documents:
The course reading lists that are requested from other prominent academic institutions will be destroyed within a year of 
completing the PhD research.  Paper documents will be destroyed by a mechanical shredder and digital files will be deleted 
and irreversibly corrupted using digital document shredding software.
Autoethnographic data:
This data will not be destroyed.  The fifth principle states that “If personal data have been recorded because of a 
relationship between the data controller and the data subject, the need to keep the information should be considered when 
the relationship ceases to exist”.  As I am both the data controller and the data subject there will be no point at when the 
relationship no longer exists.  Furthermore, as I believe that I may make use of this autoethnographic data in future 
research, in compliance with the conditions set at Section 33: “personal data may be kept indefinitely despite the Fifth Data 
Protection Principle”.
2.6 Dissemination of Results. (NB: Take account of age appropriateness of participants)
2.6A Results will be made available to participants as:
Written summary of results to all Copy of final manuscript presented if requested
Verbal presentation to all (information session, 
debriefing etc.)
Presentation to representative participants (eg. CEO, 
school principal)  
Dissertation Other or None of the AbovePlease explain: N/A, but please see appendix A x
2.6B Results will be made available to peers and/or colleagues as (tick all that apply):
Dissertation x Journal article(s) x
Thesis (e.g. PhD) x Book x
Submission x Conference papers x
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Other or None of the Above.  Please explain:
It would not be consistent with the philosophical positioning of this work to produce a single objective textual document.  I 
believe that there is an ethical imperative for this thesis to move beyond a conventional form in order to better capture the 
confusion, contradiction, and inconsistencies inherent in its production, and to also challenge the norms implied and 
stabilised through a conventional linear narrative, a textual means of representation, and the truth status that is awarded 
and transmitted via this form.  To accompany the written thesis, I intend to present this work in at least one other form.  The 
exact parameters are unknown at present and will be allowed to emerge during the research process, however, this 
alternative representation will make use of the same data and methods used in the production of the written thesis and 
therefore should not pose any additional ethical concerns.
2.7 Participants
2.7A Target Participant Group:
Please indicate the targeted participant group by ticking all boxes that apply.  
Students or staff of this University x Adults (over 18 years old and competent to give consent) x
Children/legal minors (under 18 years old) Adults (over 18 years old who may not be competent to give consent)
Young people aged 16 – 17 years
2.7B Will the research specifically target participants with mental health difficulties or a disability?:
YES NO x
If YES, please explain the necessity of involving these individuals as research participants (no more than 50 
words:
N/A
2.7C Number of Participants:
if relevant give details of different age groups/activities involved
One participant: age 29, PhD Student and sole researcher of this work.  Also, please see appendix 
A.
2.7D Please explain in detail how you intend to recruit participants:
If payment or any other incentive (such as a gift or free services) will be made to any research participant please 
specify and state the level of payment to be made and/or the source of funds/gift/free service to be used. Please 
explain the justification for offering payment or other incentive.
N/A
2.7E Dependent Relationship:
Are any of the participants in a dependent relationship with any of the investigators, particularly those involved 
in recruiting for or conducting the project? For example, a school pupil is in a dependent relationship with their 
teacher. Other examples of a dependent relationship include student/lecturer; patient/doctor; employee/
employer.
YES NO xHowever, please see appendix A
If YES, please explain the relationship and the steps to be taken by the investigators to ensure that the 
participant’s participation is purely voluntary and not influenced by the relationship in any way.
Please see appendix A
2.7F Location of Research:
University of Glasgow x
Outside Location x
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Please provide details of outside locations, including as much information where possible.
The rhizomatic textual analysis and spatio/temporal comparative case study elements of this research will be desk based 
and will be conducted from two main locations: on campus in my office and from my home.  
The autoethnographic elements cannot be linked to a finite series of locations.  The nature of this method means that all 
locations I inhabit during the research of the PhD are also active sites of research.  This extends to non-material spaces, 
such as the internet, fictional and non-fictional spaces portrayed in books, television and film; and those I enter during 
dreams.  In order to suitably consider the potential ethical concerns that may arise in non-familiar material sites, an evolving 
location map will be kept that will anticipate the likely new locations.  This will be discussed at regular intervals during 
monthly supervision meetings and more frequently as and when the need arises.  Please see appendix B for an example of  
this.
2.8 Permission to Access Participants
2.8A Will participants be identified from information held by another party?:
(eg. a Local Authority, or a Head Teacher, or a doctor or hospital, or Glasgow University class lists)
YES NO x
If YES please describe the arrangements you intend to make to gain access to this information including, where 
appropriate, any other ethics committee that will be applied to. (No more than 150 words)
N/A
2.8B Written Permission:
Please note that written permission is usually required to gain access to research participants within an 
organisation (e.g. school, Local Authority, University of Glasgow class).
Are copies provided with this application?
YES NO x
OR are they to follow?
YES NO x
OR if not required, give details explaining why.
N/A
2.8C Is this application being submitted to another Ethics Committee, or has it been previously submitted to 
another Ethics Committee?:
YES NO x
If YES, please provide name and location of the ethics committee and the result of the application.
N/A
2.9 Informed Consent
If you require information on the age of legal capacity please refer to the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 
1991 available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/50/contents  
2.9A Have you attached your Plain Language Statement(s) (PLS) for participants?:
A Plain Language Statement is written information in plain language that you will provide to participants to 
explain the project and invite their participation.  Contact details for Supervisor and College Ethics Officer 
MUST be included.  Please note that a copy of this information must be given to the participant to keep.
YES NO x
(If NO, please explain.) 
N/A
2.9B How will informed consent be recorded by individual participants or representatives?:
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Signed consent form
(A copy of the proposed consent form, written in simple non-technical language, MUST 
ACCOMPANY THIS APPLICATION. The final consent form MUST contain the University of Glasgow 
logo.)
Implied by return of survey
Recorded verbal consent
Other 
(Please specify): N/A, but please see appendix A x
3 Monitoring
Please describe how the project will be monitored to ensure that the research is being carried out as approved 
(e.g. give details of regular meetings/email contact) (Maximum 50 words).
The project will be monitored as part of monthly supervision meetings.  These meetings are integral events for ensuring that 
the ‘staged’ approach outlined for dealing with the locational concerns (see 2.7F) and the ethical treatment of non-
participating Others (see appendix A) proceeds in the manner detailed herein this application.
4 Health and Safety
Does the project have any health & safety implications?
YES x NO
If YES, please outline the arrangements which are in place to minimise these risks. Please give details
I believe that this research poses an extremely low risk to my health and safety but it would be remiss not to highlight the 
extent to which the theoretical nature of this work may impact upon my mental faculties.  By exposing myself to a different 
way of seeing and understanding time it is likely that cognitive, and therefore manifest, change will occur on some level.  
This of course does not entail a negative impact upon my mental or physical health, however, the position of this work in 
relation to a number of existential orthodoxies make it sensible to maintain awareness of such activities throughout.  This 
will be monitored during monthly supervision meetings or more frequently as and when required.
5 UK and Scottish Government Legislation
Have you made yourself familiar with the requirements of the Data Protection Act (1998) and the Freedom of 
Information (Scotland) Act 2002? (See Application Guidance Notes for further information. In addition visit http://
www.gla.ac.uk/services/dpfoioffice/ for guidance and advice on the Act). Please ensure you have read the eight 
basic Principles underlying the Data Protection Act 1998 [“DPA”] that protect the rights and freedoms of 
individuals with respect to the processing of their personal data. The Freedom of Information Act 2002 [“FOI”] 
provides a general right of access to most of the recorded information that is held by the University. The Act sets 
out a number of exemptions/exceptions to this right of access.
YES x NO
If NO, please explain
N/A
6 Declarations by Researcher(s) and Supervisor(s)
- The information contained herein is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, accurate. 
- I have read the University’s current human ethics guidelines, and accept responsibility for the conduct of the 
procedures set out in the attached application in accordance with the guidelines, the University’s Code of 
Conduct for Research and any other condition laid down by the University of Glasgow Ethics Committee and 
the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee. Full details of the University’s ethics guidelines 
are available at: http://www.gla.ac.uk/research/aimsassessmentandpolicies/ourpolicies/ethicshomepage/ 
- I and my co-researcher(s) or supporting staff have the appropriate qualifications, experience and facilities to 
conduct the research set out in the attached application and to deal effectively with any emergencies and 
contingencies related to the research that may arise.
- I understand that no research work involving human participants or data collection can commence until full 
ethical approval has been given by the either the School Ethics Forum (UG & PGT students only) or the 
College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee (for PGR students and Staff). 
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In the case of student applications, the Ethics Committee will give no final  decision UNLESS the electronic 
submission has been authorised by the supervisor. If there is no digital signature then please type the names in 
to the boxes below.
Signature Date
Researcher Lisa Bradley 20 December 2011
Principal Supervisor Libby Porter 20 December 2011
For student applications, there are two options for submitting Supervisor approval:
(a)The student e-mails the application to their supervisor, who checks it and submits it to their local SEF contact 
(UG and PGT only) or to the College Research Ethics Secretary, Terri Hume (for PGR only). 
(b)The student e-mails the application to the SEF contact (UG and PGT only) or the College Research Ethics 
Secretary (PGR only) and the supervisor sends a separate e-mail to the appropriate UG/PGT/PGR admin 
point of contact giving the details of the application and confirming approval for the submission. 
Where to send your application
Applications should be submitted electronically as follows:
- Undergraduate and Postgraduate Taught Student applications should be sent to their School Ethics Forum. 
Please see contact details on the respective School’s website.
- Postgraduate Research (PGR) and Staff applications should be submitted to: Terri  Hume in the College Office 
Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk, Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow, G12 8QF
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Appendix A: Additional ethical concerns
Autoethnography is a method aimed at opening up and exploring the peculiarity of one’s own culture, meaning 
that I am the primary human subject and sole “participant” of this research.  However, recognising that I and my 
culture are constituted through other people with whom I come into contact (both regularly and uniquely), non-
participating individuals are also necessarily implicated in my work.  For example, while I write about my 
perception of time, my perception is not mine alone but is constituted intersubjectively; when I write about my 
day, the activity of those around me not only shapes my reflections, but these individuals are key characters in 
my experience of culture and are recorded as such.  This dictates that ethical  considerations should extend to 
these other, non-participating individuals.  As I am unable to address such concerns within this pro-forma this 
appendix serves to outline the range of ethical considerations relevant to this research, and to detail my 
intended approach to mitigate issues that may arise.  The inclusion of this addendum was suggested and 
discussed via email with the College Ethics Officer, Dr Valentina Bold.
In many ways the autoethnographic narrative that will emerge from this research presents as a low ethical 
concern to both me and Others; for example, the topic  does not address an area that is socially sensitive, such 
as the lived experience of eating disorders, homelessness, incestuous relations.  However, even the most 
benign of topics can still pose difficulties.  Specific to this research, my attempt to reveal  the constructed nature 
of something so everyday, so taken-for-granted as time, has the potential to be unsettling not only to me, but to 
Others also.  There is also a danger I present Others in a negative manner, perhaps by detailing their temporal 
logics in a way that would be considered a ‘bad’ use of time, or by documenting their unsettled  responses to my 
work.  There is an ethical imperative to engage with these concerns and to minimise the negative impact this 
research has on Others.  However, it would not suffice to simply render them unrecognisable in this work.  On 
the contrary, I believe it would be ethically unjust to position myself centrally in this research without explicitly 
acknowledging the extent to which my position is constituted by Others.  While the autoethnographic data that 
will  emerge during this research will  not be written in collaboration with these Others, their rights in relation to 
the narrative must be given adequate consideration.
The headings below relate to the sections of this form that I feel  should be extended beyond participants to non-
participating Others that may be implicated in the research process.
2.3A: Method of Data Collection:
Autoethnography employs similar data collection techniques as ethnography, and this study will include: Audio 
recording; Video recording; Journaling; Blogging; Note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; mobile 
phone applications; post-it notes); Morning pages (stream-of-consciousness writing upon waking); Photographs; 
Voice memos; Personal communications (such as emails and text messages); Drawing/sketching.  The range of 
Others which may appear in this data cannot be finitely stated, however, their position will  be neither that of 
subject nor object.  Rather, where and when they appear, they will  stand as markers to give meaning to the 
manner in which time functions in the context from which I study and the manner in which I experience and 
perceive time.  For this stage of data collection I don’t believe it necessary, possible or even ethical to obtain 
written consent from every individual.  However, to ensure that research is not misconstrued as covert, those 
individuals who appear in the data will be verbally informed of the ongoing autoethnographic process (see 2.9 
below) and updated where ethically appropriate.
2.4B: Data Handling:
Autoethnography is a very immediate method with data potentially being recorded and gathered at any time and 
any where.  To maintain adequate privacy of this data, all sources will be collated weekly intervals using the 
techniques previously indicated on this pro forma.  However, as the data I gather will  not simply allude to my 
behaviour, but also Others around, when making notes about others who are known to me I will  use only their 
initials and those who are unknown will be described in a manner that is meaningful  to the context from which 
the data being collected rather than a general identifier.
2.4A: Confidentiality:
I will  be named as author and participant of this work.  To ensure a wider degree of confidentiality to the Others 
that are implicated, if they consent they will  be referred to only by their initials.  Should they wish to retain a 
higher degree of privacy they will  have the option to be known by assumed initials.  No steps will be taken to de-
identify Others who can be identified by their relation to me, as it is these relations which I hold and am held in 
which are essential categories for the analysis in this work that must be maintained in order that it remains 
meaningful.  Should individual Others find this level of anonymity unsatisfactory their wishes will be respected. 
If the pertinent section is crucial to the thesis it will be reworked into a fictional vignette, if not, it will  be discarded 
from the final documents.
2.6A: Dissemination of Results:
9
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While the Others implicated in this work are not the topic of this PhD, fragments of them nonetheless help 
constitute the culture that is.  As such, this work may be of interest to them and they will be given access to the 
written thesis and the alternative output.
2.7C: Number of Participants:
Similar to my response at question 2.7F “Location of Research”, this research cannot be linked to a finite and 
known group of Others.  It is impossible to know with certainty those who may be implicated, directly and 
indirectly, until the autoethnography is in process.  A mapping technique will again be used to maintain 
appropriate ethical consideration of Others in this research.  This map of non-participating Others will  be 
reviewed and updated on a monthly basis, and will  be amended in respect of data already gathered or in 
anticipation of Others who may feature more prominently due to my expected increase in proximity to them (see 
appendix C for an example of this).
2.7E: Dependent Relationship:
The topic of this research and my desire to explore the way in which time is intersubjectively constructed means 
that the prominent Others in this work are likely to be those whom I am in an intimate or dependent relationship 
with.  The fact that this is not intended as a therapeutic  process or a narrative that I feel  compelled to write 
reduces the likelihood of emotional coercion.  However, while my emotional  investment is relatively uncomplex, I 
do have a professional investment in the project which these others will be aware of.  The manner in which 
these individuals will be informed is crucial to ensure that their potential inclusion is voluntary and with their 
informed consent (see 2.9 below).
2.9: Informed Consent:
Taking these considerations outlined above into account, the process of gaining informed consent from Others 
will be a staged process.  
STAGE ONE: With reference to the map of non-participating Others, individuals whom I reference in my 
autoethnographic data by name or by relational identifier will be verbally informed of the topic  of my PhD and 
the manner in which I am researching it.  These individuals will be updated where appropriate throughout the 
data-gathering stage.
STAGE TWO: On completion of data gathering, individuals who were verbally informed in stage 1 will  be 
recontacted and asked whether they would anticipate an objection to the inclusion of their words or a written 
observation of their behaviour, for example, being used in the thesis documents.
STAGE THREE: On completion of the written thesis draft, appropriate Others will  be given a document 
comprised of copies of the sections in which they are present (contributions that are not mine or theirs will be 
redacted from these documents).  They will be asked to review and to indicate whether they consent to being 
identified by the applicable option (as set out at 2.4A).  Their consent will be implied and recorded by the signed 
return of the document.
Gaining consent using a staged approach will ensure a greater level  of informedness; I am currently blind to the 
eventual  trajectory this research and it would be unethical  to suggest to non-participating Others that I am 
conscious of the extent to which their presence will  in fact constitute my object of study.  It will also minimise the 
provocation posed by intimate and dependant relationships that would be undoubtably heightened if consent 
was sought retrospectively accompanied with the material realisation of three years work.
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Appendix B: Location Map
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GLASGOW
Mum and dad’s home
SOUTH SIDE:
Home; Friends’ homes; 
restaurants; cafes; shops; 
public houses; train 
station; parks; theatre
CITY CENTRE:
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restaurants; cafes; 
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UNIVERSITY OF 
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Appendix C: Non-participating Others Map
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COMMITTEE'S RESPONSE TO INITIAL APPLICATION
 
Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects
NOTIFICATION OF ETHICS APPLICATION OUTCOME PGR Applications
Application Type:       Application Number:   CSS/2011/0105
(select as appropriate)
Applicant’s Name: Lisa Bradley    
Project Title:  The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban malaise in the 
contemporary city.
Date Application Reviewed: 25/01/12
APPLICATION OUTCOME:  (see sections A, B, C below as applicable)
 (A)            
 (select from drop down as appropriate)
 Start Date of Approval: !!!!!  End Date of Approval: !!!!!
 
If the applicant has been given approval subject to amendments this means they can proceed with their data 
collection with effect from the date of approval, however they should note the following applies to their application:
Approved Subject to Amendments without the need to submit amendments to the Supervisor  
Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the applicant’s Supervisor        
Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the College Ethics & Research Committee (CREC)   
             See APPLICATION COMMENTS on page 2
The College Research Ethics Committee expects the applicant to act responsibly in addressing the recommended 
amendments.  
A covering note (letter or email) must be provided highlighting how the major and minor recommendations 
have been addressed. Some amendments only need to be submitted to an applicant’s supervisor. This will 
apply to essential  items that an applicant must address prior to ethical approval being granted, however as the 
associated research ethics risks are considered to be low, consequently the applicant’s response need only be 
reviewed and cleared by the applicant’s supervisor before the research can properly begin. If any application is 
processed under this outcome the Supervisor will need to inform the College Ethics Secretary that the 
application has been re-submitted (and include the final outcome). 
 (B) Application is Not Approved at this Time  
See Application Comments and provide further information where requested. 
If you have been asked to resubmit your application then please send this to the College Ethics Secretary.   You 
should include a covering letter to explain the changes you have made to the application.
This section only applies to applicants whose original application was approved but required amendments. 
(C)             
 (select from drop down as appropriate)
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APPLICATION COMMENTS
Major Recommendations:
This has been a very difficult application to respond to. The concept and methodology outlined by the 
applicant are new to the reviewers and raise, in our minds, significant issues to be resolved before research 
can begin. We believe that, with further information, we may have a clearer idea of what the researcher 
hopes to achieve. 
Although the applicant indicates that she is the only participant, she describes the research as involving 
non-participating "Others" as is described in Appendix A and B. The committee is not persuaded that the 
boundaries for the involvement of Others is clearly enough described and would like further detail of what 
behaviours might be part of the research - for example, are there areas which will be excluded such as 
bereavement or intimate relations with a partner or others. Are there any limits to the research where Others 
are involved?
The very act (as described at 2.9) of informing Others of the work could be said to make them participants, 
particularly with a partner or another with whom a significant amount of time was spent. To understand this 
better, the committee would like to see examples of the verbal explanation which the applicant will provide 
to those notified at Stage One. And will the content and emphasis of the verbal explanation vary from one 
person to another depending upon their knowledge of research or their age or ability to understand? Given 
the complexity of the research idea, the words used to describe what is involved will be crucial to informed 
consent and must be in plain language.
The opportunity to opt out of the research is described in the Appendix but is unclear to the committee. At 
Stage One, there does not appear to be the opportunity to opt out. Could family members or work colleagues 
feel obliged to be involved in order to support a relative undertaking research important to her career? How 
long is data collection likely to last and could a lengthy period of research place a strain on those with whom 
the applicant interacts? And at Stage 3, when non-participating Others sign their section of the thesis to 
confirm consent to use their words or described behaviours, what will be the outcome if they decline? Will 
the data, even if crucial to the thesis, be withdrawn?
Among methods of data collection described are video recording and photographs. Will the act of using 
photographic equipment create discomfort among the non-participating Others described in Appendix B and 
how can this be addressed? Will they have the option to to view film containing their images and request 
that they not be used?
The urban malaise referenced in the title is not mentioned again in the application. Can the applicant clarify 
how this will form part of the research?
The applicant notes that the work will be presented in another form which will emerge during the research 
process. It will be necessary to update the committee when that form is defined in order to ensure that no 
further ethical issues arise.
Minor Recommendations:
There are no recommendations in this section.
If amendments have been recommended, please ensure that copies of amended documents are provided to 
the College Office for completion of your ethics file.
Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact 
Terri Hume, Ethics Secretary, in Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow G12 8QF.
End of notification.
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Tel: 0141-330-3007
E-mail: Terri.Hume@glasgow.ac.uk
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AMENDED APPLICATION TO ETHICS COMMITTEE
Tuesday 14 February 2012
Dear Ethics Committee, 
Re: Application number CSS/2011/0105
Thank you for your response.  I have considered your recommendations and discussed them in depth with 
my supervisors.  Your view that “The very act (as described at 2.9) of informing Others of the work 
could be said to make them participants, particularly with a partner or another with whom a 
significant amount of time was spent” is a concern I share.  The definition of research participation and 
how it relates to the Others who populate and who are implicated in my PhD research has long been a 
preoccupation of my ethical deliberations.  I find that a dilemma lies in managing to find a way to 
recognise the central presence of Others in this work without requiring them to be subject to the guidance 
offered under procedural notions of research participation.  My decision to describe these Others as ‘non-
participating Others’ (where ‘Others’ is the dominant adjective) was an attempt to account for their role 
without elevating their presence to such a point where their participation, and the ethical response 
dictated by standard procedures to ensure their ethical treatment, becomes far more intrusive  than the 
research process itself and misinforms these Others as to the nature of their involvement.  
Following your response, I now consider that while the term ‘non-participating Others’ captures these 
Others as distinct from standard research participants, it doesn’t fully acknowledge their participative 
presence within the work.  Still, the problem remains that the characterisation of these Others as 
participants doesn’t leave space for participation beyond the types discussed and made available through 
the standard ethics proforma.  I have continued to seek a better description and have found guidance 
published by the University of Sheffield to be particularly helpful.  Their Research Ethics Policy conceives 
of participation in a manner that moves beyond ESRC guidelines, outlining a broad spectrum of 
participation ranging from “actual research subjects”, to Others who facilitate and/or are proximate to 
research activities.  They characterise this latter group as indirect participants, of whom they note to be 
“particularly an issue in auto-ethnographic research, in which the researcher uses her/his own life 
experience as a primary source of data” (available: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ris/other/gov-ethics/
ethicspolicy/policy-notes/participants-data-tissue).  Sheffield’s policy contends that in any research the 
safety and well-being of participants in this broadest sense should be taken into account.  And while they 
identify that research which involves only indirect participants is exempt from formal ethics review, they 
nonetheless stipulate that “informed consent should always be sought from anyone who may be 
recognisable in an auto-ethnographic account” (available: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/ris/other/gov-ethics/
ethicspolicy/policy-notes/consent/autoethnographic-research).
There seems, then, some precedence to characterise the Others in my research as ‘indirect participants’, 
however, I don’t suggest that this suffices to render my work exempt from the University of Glasgow’s 
ethics review process.  Indeed, my own difficulties precipitated by the lack of formal guidance, and the 
fact that the concept and methodology appear new to the reviewers, suggest that it is important to engage 
with these issues and their ethical implications within the broader research community at Glasgow.  As 
such, I herein provide a full response to this committee for consideration.  
Under the advisement of your recommendations I have made the following changes to my application:
• The term ‘non-participating Others’ has been replaced with ‘indirect participants’ in the main form and 
the accompanying appendices.
• A further appendix has been added (Appendix D).  This takes  as its headings  the main issues raised as 
the Major Recommendations  of the committee and seeks  to clarify: the aims of this research project; 
the role of indirect participants within it; and the method by which full and informed consent will be 
gained should any indirect participant be rendered recognisable in the resulting autoethnography.
A copy of Appendix D is also attached to this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Lisa Bradley
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Appendix D: Further clarification on the role and ethical treatment of Others
1. The committee is not persuaded that the boundaries for the involvement of Others is clearly 
enough described and would like further detail of what behaviours might be part of the research - 
for example, are there areas which will be excluded such as bereavement or intimate relations with 
a partner or others. Are there any limits to the research where Others are involved?
The nature of participation in this research means that indirect participants are not mined for data or 
placed in deliberate research conditions; rather, the indirect participants in this work are regarded in their 
own conditions with reference only to the manner in which their everyday lives reveal something about the 
meaning of time and temporality in the contemporary urban context.  Furthermore, it is not the words or 
behaviours of indirect participants that will be captured directly, but rather, it is the manner in which their 
various activities make me consider myself and the research topic, time and temporality.  As such, there is 
a level of analysis that happens before the autoethnographic reflection is even captured meaning that the 
data will not explicitly pertain to the indirect participant directly.  
There will be no areas which will be limited or excluded in this research.  To comment on the committee’s 
example of bereavement: I see no ethical issues that arise from my reflecting on such events and features 
of everyday life in and of themselves.  On the contrary, I think it would be unethical to exclude such areas 
from this research and to limit its scope to the seemingly benign facets of our lived experiences.  My very 
engagement with the topic emerges from what I consider to be an ethical need to better understand how it 
is that urban scholars theorise and subsequently shape our cities.  Imposing limitations or exclusions 
would lead only to a partial engagement with the research topic, potentially resulting in an incomplete 
analysis which may in turn further silence the different temporal realities which exist in the city.  The ethical 
response to circumstances of heightened sensitivity should not be one that limits or excludes certain 
autoethnographic reflections, but rather, it should ensure that the process of capturing these reflections is 
done so in an ethically sensitive manner.  For example, if I was attending a funeral and a pertinent thought 
occurred during the service, I would consider it unacceptable to capture this reflection at that point. 
However, that is not to say that I may recall and note this reflection at a less sensitive and a less public 
future point, or that I might later return to reflect on the manner in which time and temporality functioned in 
this environment.  
2. The opportunity to opt out of the research is described in the Appendix but is unclear to the 
committee. At Stage One, there does not appear to be the opportunity to opt out. 
I am not asking for consent to reflect on the social meaning of time in the presence of the indirect 
participants, I am asking their permission to add their presence to the thesis in a way that may render 
them recognisable.  This is to what the ‘consent’ is in relation to.  As such, there is no opportunity for 
indirect participants to opt-out prior to stage three as there is nothing for them to opt-in or out of.  To be 
clear, the rationale for employing a staged approach for gaining the informed consent of indirect 
participants is not to obtain consent from each individual at each stage, but it is to ensure that when an 
indirect participant is approached to give their consent, they have been informed as fully as possible in 
order that they can make their decision with sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to be 
recognisable in this work, and to minimise the possibility of coercion or undue influence that may be 
introduced should permissions be sought retrospectively. 
3. [T]he committee would like to see examples of the verbal explanation which the applicant will 
provide to those notified at Stage One. And will the content and emphasis of the verbal explanation 
vary from one person to another depending upon their knowledge of research or their age or ability 
to understand? Given the complexity of the research idea, the words used to describe what is 
involved will be crucial to informed consent and must be in plain language.
This research will involve no procedures for which written consent is normally required out with a research 
context and the intended methods do not unnecessarily expose the indirect participants to risk.  I do not 
foresee the potential for it to adversely affect the rights and welfare of the indirect participants in any way. 
As outlined in the point above, the staged approach is to ensure that if an indirect participant is 
approached at Stage Three to give their consent for their recognisable inclusion in this work, that have 
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been informed as fully as possible in order that they can make their decision with sufficient opportunity to 
consider the implications of the request, free from undue influence or coercion.
The explanation of this research will not occur as a verbal statement but will be established through a 
conversational exchange between myself and each indirect participant.  The nature of the research means 
that the Others who may feature in this work are likely to be individuals with whom rapport has already 
been established, making such an approach possible.  I also consider this to be a more ethical approach 
to ‘informing’ the indirect participants who populate and are implicated in this research.  While I fully 
accept the need to minimise a technical or academic vernacular, I do not necessarily agree that the 
simplification of complex ideas into plain language leads to better informed participants.  Indeed, I think 
that such a practice runs the risk of being reductive to the point that it misinforms the indirect participants 
as to the framing and positioning of this work.  This research idea is  complex and ensuring that the 
participants are informed as to their presence in this research and their rights in relation to their indirect 
participation requires a more nuanced approach and a space for dialogue to emerge.  As such, each 
exchange will begin with an introduction of the fundamental aspects of this work in as straightforward a 
way as possible in order that the more esoteric ideas are received with some foundational understanding 
of their contextual significance to this research. 
The conversational style of this approach does of course entail that the process and therefore the 
emphasis may vary from one person to another, however, in order to maintain clarity in the necessary 
content, certain key elements will be included in each discussion in order to ensure that the indirect 
participants will have sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to consent to their recognisable 
inclusion if and when requested.  
The key elements that will be covered in each conversation are:
• An outline of the research topic covering the following key points:
- Urban policy is not confined to a piece of paper but it shapes  the form of the city and its citizens, 
impacting on everyday life as  it is  experienced in the urban environment.  While the ideas that 
shape urban policy may be borne from political ideology, election pledges, manifestos, public 
pressure, perceived necessity etc; theory is also significant.  
- A great deal of ‘urban’ theory is the product of empirical and theoretical research activities that 
occur within universities.  In writing urban policy, policy makers  draw upon understandings of how 
cities  work; how they can be improved; and how their problems can be minimised.  As such, the 
way in which the city is causally understood shapes the policy which comes to fruition.
- Therefore, academics and university researchers  don’t just describe what they see, but, 
acknowledging that policy is  based to some extent on the evidence produced through various 
research activities, the manner in which they understand the city also has  a direct consequence 
on the form of the city and its  citizens, and everyday life as it is  experienced in the urban 
environment.
- The complexity of the city necessitates that the theories  which describe it are necessarily 
incomplete, however, it is  my view that there is  an entire category of city life that has  notably fallen 
off the urban studies agenda: the socially constructed nature of time and temporality.
- Evidence of the socially constructed nature of time is all around, in the watches, clocks  and 
calendars  we use to make sense of our daily routines.  At the same time, these objects  help serve 
to naturalise our experience of time and can be linked to ideas  which attest to the proper and 
normal use of time such as the impoliteness  of ‘being late’ or the respect afforded to those who 
manage to get tasks completed quickly. 
- The city is a diverse place and individuals who come from different social, economic and cultural 
backgrounds may perceive and experience time differently.  Nonetheless, urban policy seems 
largely constructed on the basis that we all share a similar understanding of time.
- The university also has a role to play in this.  Time and temporality are not considered as key 
categories  within contemporary urban theory and a great deal of urban problems are considered 
from a spatial perspective.  As such, policy that draws  on dominant urban theory will be 
insufficient to address the temporal lived realities  of individuals in the city and may require 
individuals to conform to a proper use of time in order to make the best use of available public 
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services.  Moreover, those who don’t conform, either through choice are circumstance, may be 
stigmatised within society.  This  suggests  that urban theory also has some bearing on the way of 
life that is considered normal and proper in the city. 
- My engagement with this topic sits  at the university level.! I’m interested in examining how, where, 
and when has time been naturalised within urban theory and to consider how this  links to the 
naturalisation of time in everyday life.!!One of the ways  that I aim to consider the naturalisation of 
time is by reflecting upon my own experience and perception of time in order to examine how 
time means and functions within the city. ! I also aim to consider how to reorientate the field of 
urban studies in order capture a more holistic understanding of the city and its problems, in turn 
facilitating the production of a temporally aware and more complete urban policy. !
• A full overview of the autoethnographic data collection techniques  used in this  work that 
indirect participants’ presence my be recorded within, including: audio recording; video 
recording; journaling; blogging; note-taking (in a variety of mediums, e.g. note-books; mobile 
phone applications; post-it notes); morning pages (stream-of-consciousness  writing upon 
waking); photographs; voice memos; personal communications  (such as  emails  and text 
messages); drawing/sketching.
• Assurance that if I do record indirect participants  within  my autoethnographic reflections, to 
minimise the risk of them being recognised from the raw data I will refer to them only by their 
initials and/or their relation to me.
• A clarification of what it is  that I may seek consent for from indirect participants  at a future 
point: their recognisable inclusion in the thesis.  It will also be made clear to indirect 
participants  that their consent will be entirely voluntary and that they will have full access  to 
view the pertinent sections prior to giving their consent.
• Assurance that my autoethnographic reflections  will be viewed only by me and my 
supervisors  up until the point that the thesis  is  completed and they sign-off their section  if 
relevant.
• I will also provide each indirect participant with a card containing my contact details, and the 
names  and email addresses  of my supervisors  and the ethics  committee, and make it clear 
that should they have any further questions  about the research and/or problems  relating to it 
they are free to get in touch.
4. And at Stage 3, when [indirect participants] sign their section of the thesis to confirm consent to 
use their words or described behaviours, what will be the outcome if they decline?  Will the data, 
even if crucial to the thesis, be withdrawn?
As previously outlined in Appendix A of my application, should the indirect participants prohibit their 
recognisable inclusion within the thesis, their wishes will be fully respected.  If the section in question is 
crucial to the thesis, the data will be withdrawn and the argument reworked into a fictional vignette.
5. Among methods of data collection described are video recording and photographs. Will the act of 
using photographic equipment create discomfort among the [indirect participants] described in 
Appendix B and how can this be addressed? Will they have the option to view film containing their 
images and request that they not be used?
Data that is produced in an audio, video or photographic medium will result either from my attempt to 
capture something that reveals something about time and temporality, or to document my attempt at 
doing so.  My feeling is that I would be unlikely to find such data in a portrait of an individual, and I imagine 
that cityscapes, crowd scenes and non-personal spaces are more likely to comprise the foci of such 
material.  In order that my presence impacts minimally on the existing flows of everyday life in these 
settings and the indirect participants who occupy them, my use of this equipment will be discrete.  As 
such, I do not expect that it will create discomfort amongst the indirect participants.  However, in order 
that my activities are not misconstrued as covert, indirect participants will be altered to the full range of 
autoethnographic data collection techniques that my research may employ during the verbal conversation 
outlined above at point 3 above.  If I do happen to record data that I later wish to use in a way that could 
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render an indirect participant recognisable in the thesis, that individual will be asked to give their 
permission for the inclusion of the item.  If they decline, the data will be withdrawn from the thesis.  
6. Could family members or work colleagues feel obliged to be involved in order to support a 
relative undertaking research important to her career? 
Yes, however, I think that this ‘obligation’ is akin to that which is already imposed upon Others by any 
lengthy period of research and is not unique to, or heightened by, my chosen methodology.  The decision 
to undertake a period of research such as a PhD has the potential to be all-consuming and requires if not 
support, at least an understanding on the part of those who surround the researcher.  Looking at the 
acknowledgements which preface many academic dissertations and monographs, it is clear that the 
experience does not occur for the researcher in isolation but that it has had some bearing on those Others 
who are proximate to the process.  ‘Obligated’ could be one way to characterise the behaviour of those 
Others who endure the difficulties of this process not through any direct reward for their own selves, but 
for those with whom they are intimately related.  Viewed through the methodology of this research, this 
intimate relation undergoes no additional measures of obligation, the difference is that this 
autoethnography recognises these voices as central to the research and as such it ethically and explicitly 
names them as indirect participants.  
7. How long is data collection likely to last and could a lengthy period of research place a strain on 
those with whom the applicant interacts?
The autoethnographic method does not conceive of data-collection as a discrete act within the research 
process but recognises that data-collection and data-analysis have the potential to be constant 
throughout the research.  There is the chance that these activities place a strain on those Others who live 
and work in close proximity to me, but again, this is not heightened by the specific manner in which 
autoethnographic research functions but is a feature of academic inquiry in general.  I think, therefore, that 
the ethical question of this strain is not of consequence for the matters dealt with in this application but 
relates to the decision to undertake a period of intensive research in the first instance.  My decision to 
commence the PhD was made with the support and awareness of those closest to me, and as the reality 
of that decision continues to reveal itself, its impact for me and for my significant Others is negotiated 
within the confines of those existing relationships.
8. The urban malaise referenced in the title is not mentioned again in the application. Can the 
applicant clarify how this will form part of the research?
This phrase relates to the theoretical orientation of this work only and has no direct influence on the 
collection or analysis of data.  To clarify, I am not looking for ‘urban malaise’ in the data but seeking to 
comment on the extent to which dominant urban theories have the capacity to recognise time and 
temporality in the contemporary urban problems (considered collectively as the ‘urban malaise’) which 
occupy academic inquiry in this field, and to consider the extent to which the production and 
dissemination these dominant theories can be linked to the marginalisation of time and temporality as 
analytical categories within the academy, and the silencing of their contingency in everyday life.
9. The applicant notes that the work will be presented in another form which will emerge during the 
research process. It will be necessary to update the committee when that form is defined in order 
to ensure that no further ethical issues arise.
Yes, I will ensure to update the committee as and when this is defined in order to engage with their 
considerations and requirements.
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FINAL DECISION OF ETHICS COMMITTEE
 
Ethics Committee for Non Clinical Research Involving Human Subjects
NOTIFICATION OF ETHICS APPLICATION OUTCOME PGR Applications
Application Type:     Application Number:   CSS/2011 0105-2            
(select as appropriate)
Applicant’s Name: Lisa Bradley   
Project Title:  The Social Construction of Time: recognising the temporal strands of cultural construction and urban 
malaise in the contemporary city.
Date Application Reviewed: 8/3/12
APPLICATION OUTCOME:  (see sections A, B, C below as applicable)
 (A)            
 (select from drop down as appropriate)
 Start Date of Approval: 19 March 2012 End Date of Approval: 30 June 2014
 
If the applicant has been given approval subject to amendments this means they can proceed with their data 
collection with effect from the date of approval, however they should note the following applies to their application:
Approved Subject to Amendments without the need to submit amendments to the Supervisor  
Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the applicant’s Supervisor        
Approved Subject to Amendments made to the satisfaction of the College Ethics & Research Committee (CREC)   
             See APPLICATION COMMENTS on page 2
The College Research Ethics Committee expects the applicant to act responsibly in addressing the recommended 
amendments.  
A covering note (letter or email) must be provided highlighting how the major and minor recommendations 
have been addressed. Some amendments only need to be submitted to an applicant’s supervisor. This will 
apply to essential  items that an applicant must address prior to ethical approval being granted, however as the 
associated research ethics risks are considered to be low, consequently the applicant’s response need only be 
reviewed and cleared by the applicant’s supervisor before the research can properly begin. If any application is 
processed under this outcome the Supervisor will need to inform the College Ethics Secretary that the 
application has been re-submitted (and include the final outcome). 
 (B) Application is Not Approved at this Time  
See Application Comments and provide further information where requested. 
If you have been asked to resubmit your application then please send this to the College Ethics Secretary.   You 
should include a covering letter to explain the changes you have made to the application.
This section only applies to applicants whose original application was approved but required amendments. 
(C)             
 (select from drop down as appropriate)
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APPLICATION COMMENTS
Major Recommendations:
Thank you for the care taken in setting out responses to issues previously raised. However we still have 
difficulties with the proposal / application and require amendments to enable the research to begin. We 
have carefully reviewed your arguments in favour of no PLS or consent form but cannot agree that these 
are not required. 
The application is approved but the committee requests that you respond to their concerns as noted 
below before commencing your research.
We recommend that you recognise that the other people involved/implicated in this research will be 
participants and that they should not be made participants without their prior adequately informed 
consent. Normally such consent should be evidenced in writing and supported by a full plain language 
statement, and it is not clear that there is good reason to make an exception in this case. We recommend 
that such consent and plain language statement procedures be planned for. You might like to consider 
whether there is a two-part process to informed consent, given the stages in your design. 
We note that at Appendix D point 1, it is confirmed that “there will be no areas which will be limited or 
excluded in this research”. Even with informed consent, such wide ranging freedom to make the lives and 
activities of others an object of research seems potentially intrusive in ways that participants might not 
fully foresee at the time when an initial consent was given.  Careful consideration needs to be given to the 
question of consent, and the particular difficulties associated with such open consent as is proposed.
The recommendations above are predicated on our view that the others involved are participants: On the 
basis of the information given we do not see good reason for thinking otherwise. You may have other 
explanations to give on this point. If so please note that in our view  the fact that the others involved in 
the research really are participants seems to be clearly indicated by the explanations already supplied. For 
example, the claim at Appendix D point 1, that “the indirect participants in this work are regarded in their 
own conditions with reference only to the manner in which their everyday lives reveal something about 
the meaning of time and temporality in the contemporary urban context”, seems to indicate that the lives 
of the others involved will be subject of research. 
The argument that the others involved are not participants, because their participation is mediated 
through your reflection on how “their various activities” (Appendix D point 1) make you think about 
yourself, is not convincing. The fact that you will use the activities of other people as material for your 
reflection seems quite clearly to make them subjects of / participants in the proposed research. We 
therefore reject the claim, at Appendix D point 2, that the consent to participation is not required from 
other people implicated in the research because “there is nothing for them to opt-in or out of” .
Minor Recommendations:
There are no recommendations in this section.
If amendments have been recommended, please ensure that copies of amended documents are provided to 
the College Office for completion of your ethics file.
Please retain this notification for future reference. If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact Terri 
Hume, Ethics Secretary, in Room 104, Florentine House, 53 Hillhead Street, Glasgow G12 8QF.
End of notification.
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Appendix Five
QUILT
Appendix Six
TIMELINE OF RESEARCH EVENTS
RESEARCH EVENT MONTHS OF ACTIVITY (Between October, 2010 – February, 2013)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
General Autoethnography (A/E)
Engaging with various literatures
A/E Fortnightly Journal
A/E Experiment One (clocks)
A/E Experiment Two (space/time)
A/E Stream of  Consciousness Journal
A/E Experiment Three (Holiday)
Engaging Ethics with “Ethics”
Entering the Canon (EC): Reading lists
EC: Edited collections
EC: Citations
Reading the Canon (RC): Harvey
Reporting the Canon
Capturing the Canon (CC): Harvey
RC: Jacobs
Making Quilts
CC: Jacobs
RC: Castells
CC: Castells
RC: Sassen
CC: Sassen
• General Autoethnography (A/E)  October, 2010 – Present
• Engaging with various literatures   October, 2010 – Present
• A/E Fortnightly Journal   December 2010 – October, 2013
• A/E Experiment One (clocks)	 	 February, 2011
• A/E Experiment Two (space/time)  August – September, 2011
• A/E Stream of  Consciousness Journal September, 2011 – May, 2012
• A/E Experiment Three (Holiday)	 	 October, 2011
• Engaging Ethics with “Ethics”  October, 2011 – present
• Entering the Canon (EC): Reading lists  December, 2011 – April, 2012
• EC: Edited collections    December, 2011 – March, 2012
• EC: Citations     December, 2011 – March, 2012
• Reading the Canon (RC): Harvey	 	 May, 2012
• Reporting the Canon   May, 2012 – February, 2013
• Capturing the Canon (CC): Harvey	 	 June, 2012
• RC: Jacobs 	 	 	 	 	 June, 2012
• Quilting Knowledge   June, 2012 – Present
• CC: Jacobs 	 	 	 	 	 July, 2012
• RC: Castells 		 	 	 	 August, 2012
• CC: Castells 		 	 	 	 August, 2012
• RC: Sassen	 	 	 	 	 September, 2012
• CC: Sassen	 	 	 	 	 October, 2012
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